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Abstract 
The crux of this thesis was the investigation of how safety was managed in 
small businesses. The research considered how management differed from 
the approaches championed by large employers. The concern was that, that 
which was good practice for some businesses may not necessarily have 
transposed to others, which differ in terms of number of employees, 
managerial complexity and access to information and advice. 
The research was strongly based on recently propounded and popular models 
and theories of business management. The McKinsey 7 -S framework® was 
used as a skeleton to facilitate the ordering and collection of data. 
The case studies were not intended merely to provide an accounting of how 
many small firms were under-performing, or performing well. The aim was to 
identify how control and management of change for safety improvements 
were effected in small businesses. Where there was good practice to highlight 
those parts of the approach may be transferable to others. This work used 
systems, paradigms and metaphors to convey the complex mechanisms of 
managerial decision making. 
This was a multi-method research design utilising postal survey, focus groups 
and case studies. 
The case was put forward that good safety management was not divorced 
• 
from the general principles of so·und. hianagemei:lt practice. It was also 
• .' I t .w: ... ~t .~ .: 1., /' ". . 
hypothesised that small businesse~do, manage safety, but in a mode suitable 
to themselves. 
Two performance rating systems were used to facilitate comparison of the 
.' 
businesses, based on their success in managing safety and controlling risks. 
One method of performance rating may be suitable for further development to 
assist future safety benchmarking. 
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CHAPTER ONE - OVERVIEW: The Background and Rationale 
CHAPTER ONE 
Overview: The Background and Rationale 
With ever-increasing numbers of people working in firms having 
fewer than 50 people, where our current evidence suggests that 
they are at greater risk of fatal or serious accident than those 
working in large firms, it is a priority ... over the next few years to 
ensure that small firms know how to avoid workplace accidents 
and ill health. 
Frank Davies, Chairman of the Health and Safety Commission 
[In Safety and Health PractitionerVol.15, No.4. p16] April1997 
More than twenty years after the introduction of the Health and Safety at 
Work, etc. Act 1974 (the Act) the Chairman of the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC), the body with prime responsibility for administering the 
law and practice on occupational health and safety in the UK, was still 
expressing concern about the risk of accidents in smaller businesses. The 
fundamental concern of this thesis is to examine how small businesses 
manage safety. 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It describes reasons for 
conducting this research. It outlines the rationale behind the studies, the form 
and structure of the research and particularly focuses on the research 
questions. The studies looked at the manner in which small businesses 
managed health and safety, and their success in scaling down techniques 
practised by large businesses. 
The research employed three methods of data collection, qualitative 
questionnaires, focus group interviews and case studies. The questionnaires 
and focus groups were the initial phase and the case studies formed the main 
phase of the research. Some businesses in the sample were subjected to all 
three data gathering techniques. The results were triangulated to test the 
1 
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reliability of data gathered by each method. The adoption of multiple methods 
of data collection and the triangulation of results were designed to provide a 
richer picture. 
The businesses were rated on their safety performance, based on the 
observations and evidence from the case studies. This rating allowed the 
organizations to be ranked, on the basis of relative 'success' in managing 
safety. The'methodology thus provides an empirical basis for discriminating 
between good and bad performance, in safety management. 
It was recognised at the outset that the data production, from the case studies 
particularly would rely heavily on the researcher's -powers of observation and 
selection. The researcher in this instance brought specialist skills to the study, 
she had previously undergone formal training as an enforcement officer. This 
training included instruction in inspection techniques and risk appraisal, as 
well as the legal framework. This academic foundation had been built on with 
15 years experience of inspection and audit. 
1.1 SPAN OF THE RESEARCH 
The first data collection method was a postal survey of businesses. The initial 
survey was administered to different respondents in each of the three 
tranches: October 1994 (Tranch 1), January 1995 (Tranch 2) and June 1995 
(Tranch 3). Phase one of the study was then extended to include a series of 
focus groups. There were three focus groups held, in February 1995, March 
1995 and May 1995. 
The results from the initial phase were used to guide the design of the main 
study, the case studies. Data gathering for the case studies included 
inspections, observation, face to face interviews and documentary research. 
This phase was undertaken between January 1996 and March 1999. 
1.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS RESEARCH 
Accidents and incidents are still occurring despite the introduction of controls, 
2 
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in the Act (HSWA, 1974). Studies, undertaken by the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), have indicated around 27,000,000 days a year can be lost 
through work-related injury or ill-health (Beresford, 1996). The lack of 
prevention, of accidents and ill health is an important spur for this research. 
Many of these accidents are said to occur in small firms (HSC, 1995). 
The accident rate seems to be disproportionate across business sectors; and 
the small business sector is causing concern. "Accidents involving fatal and 
serious injuries .... are 40% more likely to happen in premises with fewer than 
50 workers, than in premises with more than 100 workers" (HSC, 1995). 
There was the suspicion, based on anecdotal evidence during enforcement 
inspections, that many small businesses could not cope with the demands 
being placed on them by new generalised legislation. This view was shared 
by the HSC, "We know that many small firms find health and safety laws 
difficult to understand. ... important health and safety messages about what 
needs to be done, often don't get through." [Frank Oavies] (HSC, 1995, p1). 
The small business sector represents a sizeable proportion of all businesses 
in the UK. Small firms, and the self-employed, represent 99 per cent of all 
firms (Bacon, 1996; Small Firms Statistics Unit, 1995). Larger firms are sub-
contracting peripheral activities. This greater use of contractors and agency 
staff has resulted in nearly 3.5 million firms (90%) employing fewer than 5 
people. Within the UK private sector 44 per cent of all employment is within 
smaller firms (with fewer than 50 employees). Small firms are therefore an 
important consideration when it comes to improving occupational health and 
safety generally. 
It is predicted there will be a continued increase in the small business sector 
and that this sector will increase its share of total employment in the UK 
(HSC, 1998, page Xl). Table 1.1 shows the numbers of businesses and their 
share of employment for each size band in the United Kingdom, in 1993. This 
rise in the small business sector is not confined to the UK. Since this research 
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started in 1994, small businesses have become increasingly important. In the 
United States the sector continues to grow, the 'small business optimism 
index' for April, and May 2000, was 100.5 [1986 = 100] (S80, 2000). In South 
Korea there is also a reported growth in the number of SME's (small and 
medium sized enterprises); from 19,285 in 1998 to 29,976 in 1999 (Du Mars, 
2000). 
Table 1.1 Numbers of businesses and their share of employment for each 
size band in the United Kingdom, 1993. 
Size-band Number of businesses Share'of total employment 
(number of Employees) 1993 
+ percentage of businesses 
Oto 4 3,202,000 (89%) 22% 
5to 9 177,000 (5%) 6% 
10 to 19 107,000 I (3%) 7% 
20 to 49 59,000 I (2%) 9% 
50 to 99 19,000 (0.5%) 6% 
100 to 499 14,000 (0.25%) 13% 
500 and above I 3,000 (0.25%) 37% 
Total 3,581,000 100% 100% 
The information is from the Small Firms Statistics Unit of the Department of Trade and 
Industry. Published in Health and Safety in Small Firms an HSC Discussion Document (DOE 
4 C150 12/95) 
There is a belief that small UK businesses find it difficult to manage safety 
(HSC, 1995). It has been reported (Ibbetson, 2000) that a small business's 
can be staid, their attitude to change is determined by the size of the 
organization, with the very smallest reluctant to make any changes to the day 
to day running of their undertaking. This reluctance to manage change can 
influence how safety is managed. It has been identified by others that we 
need a better understanding of "how safety is influenced by the way in which 
we manage organizations" (Hale et ai, 1998, p1). 
In parallel with the rise of the smaller business has been a growth in 
4 
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sophistication of approaches to the management of safety, and the 
development of safety management systems. A new movement in safety has 
been highlighted (Haber et ai, 1990). This has been termed the "third age" of 
safety (Hale et ai, 1998, p3, Hale and Hovden, 1998). This movement focuses 
directly on the structure and functioning of management. However, in a review 
of safety research there were hardly any studies that evaluated the success of 
management programmes for organizations, almost all addressed process 
safety management (Hale and Hovden, 1998). "There is considerable lack of 
clarity about what is important for the management of safety, particularly in 
organizations other than machine-bureaucracies" (Hale et ai, 1998, p11). 
1.3 THE PARADOX 
The paradox arises in the conflict between the lack of sophistication in the 
managerial style of small businesses and the tendency towards increasingly 
sophisticated approaches to safety management. There are inherent 
differences between the operation and growth of small businesses and their 
larger cousins (Minztberg, 1979; Scott and Bruce, 1987; Rainnie, 1991). 
However, this research has had an economic or entrepreneurial focus. At the 
outset of this research very few investigations had focused on safety in small 
businesses. 
f 
Increasing 
sophistication 
of safety 
management 
I 
More small 
businesses 
! 
Figure 1.1 Paradox - the mismatch between the growing influence of the 
small business sector and the increasing sophistication of safety management 
systems. 
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Jones (1989) and Rainnie (1989) produced evidence that the small business 
sector is wide and diverse. While, the statutory controls imposed on 
employers are broadly common to all. 
The prevailing tenet of the Act (HSWA, 1974) was that one approach fits all. 
There is a suspicion that for enterprises smaller than 50 employees the focus, 
in safety regulation, on documentation and formal procedures did not 'fit' the 
competence and needs of very small businesses (Horden and Skage, 1994; 
Lammin, 1994). 
Therein lies the paradox; on one hand small business managers are 
championed for their perceived flexibility (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Moss-
Kanter, 1989; Birley, 1989; Stevenson and Sahlman, 1989; Oldfield, 1999; 
HELA 84/5, 2000). On the other hand when safety matters are considered 
they are expected to operate in a standardized manner, regardless of the size 
of the business. 
The crux of this thesis is the investigation of how safety is managed in small 
businesses. The studies will address how this style differs from the 
approaches championed by large employers, and expounded as good 
practice for all (HSC, 1992). The concern is that, what is good practice for 
some businesses may not necessarily transpose to others, which differ in 
terms of number of employees, managerial complexity and access to 
information and advice. 
Good practice and legislative control have historically been based on industry 
norms within the largest businesses. The contention is that there is a 
mismatch with the needs and abilities of the small employer; and as long as 
this mismatch continues small employers feel disadvantaged by the control 
system and non-availability of sources of advice. 
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1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
In examining how safety is managed in small businesses there are several 
concepts that need to be considered. The first is the concept of 'smallness' for 
businesses. It has been necessary to examine previous research 
methodologies in order to determine an initial working definition for 'small 
business' for this research. The initial working definition is derived in Chapter 
Two. 
There is no commonly accepted definition. In most counties there is no legal 
definition of a small business. In the UK the 1985 Companies Act 
distinguished between small and medium sized business by defining three 
sets of criteria: turnover, balance sheet totals and average weekly number of 
employees. The criterion applied in labour legislation is quantitative, usually 
relating to the number of employees. However, the concept itself is more 
economic than legal. 
A relative term like 'small' is inherently vague. Also, the purposes for which 
phrases such as 'small firms' are adopted in statistics and academic literature 
vary widely. An economist concerned with the relative contribution of small 
and big business to a nation's economic performance will consider a measure 
of 'smallness' appropriate which would be very different to that adopted by a 
student of organizational behaviour. The country, the period and the field of 
business activity all affect the view of what is 'small'. 
Qualitative approaches to conceptualizing small-scale organizations have 
been devised. It has been argued (Curran and Burrows, 1993) that they 
should theoretically offer a better way forward for research in small 
businesses. It has been claimed that it is no single measurable factor that 
precipitates a launch in the firm from small, to medium, to large (Scott and 
Bruce, 1987). 
There are precedents for using 'numbers of employees' as a determining 
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factor, for categorizing businesses by size. Batstone (1969) adopted an upper 
limit of 100 employees in the manufacturing sector, as did Ingham (1970). 
Previous researchers have not been able to reach a consensus. In practice 
adhoc quantitative definitions have been adopted. Quantitative definitions 
have mainly been based on the number of employees. 
The problem with adopting a purely quantitative definition of size is that it can 
suggest a false homogeneity, a danger of falling into the trap outlined by Goss 
(1991). Rainnie (1988 and 1991) also regards blanket notions of 'the small 
firm' as offering a dubious analytical category. It has been ~uggested that size 
measured by any quantitative definition does not provide a sufficiently robust 
criterion to isolate 'small firms' for the purpose of theory and analysis (Rainnie, 
1991). An alternative approach is required. 
It has been argued (Curran and Burrows, 1993) that non-quantitative 
approaches offer a theoretically more fruitful path for small business research. 
The base premise of most non-quantitative approaches is the notion of the 
'legally independent' business. This status is not sufficiently definitive on its 
own but the notion can be combined with other organizational characteristics 
(Scase and Goffee, 1982; Rainnie 1988 and 1991). 
Taking legal independence as a starting point and the elaborating on a 
grounded notion of size requires prior investigation (Curran and Stanworth 
1986). This definition, and testing of, the concept of 'smallness' will therefore 
be integral part of the initial stages of this research. 
The description of individual organizations within the study was an important 
element of the research. However, the small businesses are often grouped 
into what is collectively known as the "small business sector". 
The small business sector is a dynamic group, and as such presents some 
challenges. One difficulty arises in locating businesses, to access for 
research. The small firms sector is a hidden sector. Small businesses arise, 
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fold, change name, change location and operate quietly, officially unnoticed 
and unrecorded.· It has been shown that around one third of businesses 
cease trading within the three years of being set up (Ganguly and Bannock, 
1985). Other research has found a rapid turnover of businesses in some 
industry sectors (Stewart and Gallagher, 1985). The transient nature of small 
organizations has meant that during the research period some organizations 
will cease to exist and new starters will emerge. 
Another issue that arises in considering this investigation rests in the concept 
of 'management', as an activity. Small businesses do not manage health and 
safety in isolation (Seppala, 1998). Their approach to occupational health and 
safety is influenced by the manner in which these businesses manage day to 
day risks generally. 
When considering how an organization is managed it was thought beneficial 
to have a framework. Without such a framework the essentially disparate 
nature of managerial approaches, techniques of decision-making, and 
communication of decisions could be overwhelming. 
The framework chosen was the McKinsey 7 -S Framework® (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982). There is considerable emphasis on decision-making and 
control in this model. The model depicts the inter-relationship of seven 
elements of management. The seven elements include; organizational 
structure, managerial style, systems, skills, staff, strategy and shared values. 
The model is shown below, and repeated in the next chapter. Each element is 
considered in some detail in Chapter Two. 
The framework allows the systematic consideration of the elements of 
management. This leaves the concept of 'managing safety' to be defined. 
Safety can be defined as 'a state of freedom from unacceptable risk of 
personal harm' (Fido & Wood, 1989). This definition therefore implies that the 
management of safety results from those interventions that are designed to 
reduce the risk of personal harm. Risk assessment, determining the inherent 
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'safety' of a situation, is part of the overall process of managing safety. The 
various approaches to managing safety are considered further in Chapter 
Two. 
7 -s Framework® 
Figure 1.2 showing the McKinsey 7-S Framework® (from: Peters, T. and 
Waterman, R. In Search of Excellence 1982). 
The main concepts involved in the examination of 'how small businesses 
manage safety' have been outlined. The research required is primarily 
investigative. The research strategy will address the challenges imposed by 
this type of applied research in the small business sector. 
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1,5 THE RESEARCH STRATEGY 
Some academics consider that for successful organizational research the 
researcher needs to go into organizations (Daft, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979). 
Others have also advocated the collection and development of reliable 
knowledge of organizational behaviour by controlled observation (Scott, 
1984). 
This strategy, of controlled observation, has its merits, but to increase the 
rigour it is proposed to adopt a triangulated approach by also using survey 
methods and focus groups in the overall research strategy for this study. 
The studies were sequential. As phased research, it was expected to evolve 
as the knowledge base grew. However, an initial process for the study was 
proposed at the outset (Figure 1.3, below). 
1,6 THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE STUDY 
Small organizations are not scaled down replicas of large organizations 
(Burns, 1989; Larson and Clute, 1979; Stanworth and Curran, 1973). They 
differ in their structure, the sophistication of their systems and their approach 
to many issues. Yet, when enforcement bodies address small organizations 
they have usually failed to modify their approach or expectations. 
In trying to correct the perceived absence of safety management, within small 
businesses, the HSC have tended to exemplify successful large organizations 
as role models. They stated "Assessment of the quality of health and safety 
management is a very important element in HSE's approach.... work is 
directed at large companies .... but there are important spin-offs for~ smaller 
firms .. " (HSC, 1992). There has also been the suggestion that, when they do 
manage safety, small organizations are less inclined to demonstrate sound 
safety management practices (HSC, 1995). This belief that the good practice 
developed within large organizations can be transposed onto small 
organizations may be flawed. It may be necessary take into account how 
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these organizations manage their other activities, when devising any 
strategies intended to improve health and safety in small firms. 
The 
Framework 
The 
Literature 
Search 
The Research Process 
"How is safety managed 
in small businesses?" 
Generating a working 
concept of 'small' 
Postal Survey 
Focus Groups 
Refining a working 
concept of 'small' 
Case 
Studies 
Triangulation and testing 
Figure 1.3 Research Process - the evolution of the research through the 
three study phases. 
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It is contended in this thesis that it is not the case that small businesses fail to 
manage health and safety issues; it is rather that they manage these issues in 
a manner that suits them. From the examination of the existing literature it 
would seem not much is known about the barriers and motivators for safety 
management in small firms, and still less about what is actually going on, on a 
daily basis. Where there have been examinations of the workings of small 
organizations in the U.K. the studies have not, generally, extended to looking 
at specific areas such as safety management; and have certainly never 
examined the approach to safety management in the cOfltext of the overall 
management of an organization. 
The differences in managerial approaches seem to arise from a complex 
interaction of influences. There appear to be several modifying factors. These 
modifying factors may include the industry sector, the history of the 
organization, the individuals employed within the organization and external 
pressures. The basic tenet for this study is that health and safety 
management is not an isolated function. It is not a "bolt on" extra, but an 
integrated part of overall management. 
1.7 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The crux of this thesis is the investigation of how safety is managed in small 
businesses. The concern is that, what is good practice for some businesses 
may not necessarily transpose to others, which differ in terms of number of 
employees, managerial complexity and access to information and advice. 
This research is strongly based on the McKinsey 7 -s framework®. This 
framework has been used as a skeleton to facilitate the ordering and 
collection of data. 
The aim of the research is to identify how control and management of change, 
for safety improvements, are effected in small businesses. Where there is 
good practice, to highlight those parts of the approach that may be 
transferable to others, and if possible describe a method of transfer of that 
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good practice. 
The research includes initial pilots and a case study approach to the main 
study. Some businesses in the sample will be subjected to three methods of 
data collection. The results for these will be triangulated to test the reliability of 
data gathered. This triangulation of results was a deliberate decision to 
increase the likelihood of the findings being valid. 
The objectives of the research are: 
a. To review available literature on safety standards .and approaches in 
small businesses, and determine areas of agreed good practice, 
b. To analyse the motivation for, barriers to and approaches adopted for 
occupational health and safety management within organizations, with 
emphasis on small organizations, 
c. To examine the general management techniques and styles adopted in 
small businesses and to consider how they effect approaches to safety 
and health management, 
d. To examine a sample of small businesses and relate the observed 
'culture' for safety to the degree of legislative compliance, safety record 
and efforts to manage occupational health and safety within those 
organizations, 
e. To identify and describe good practice in occupational safety and 
health management in small businesses. 
1.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The scene of the study has been set and the researcher's motivation 
described. This outline included examination of the research problem, the 
proposed research strategy and the rationale. The emphasis of the research 
is on how safety management is achieved. 
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In the next chapter indicators of managerial success, gleaned from previous 
published research, will be identified. The models which some researchers 
have employed, in examining elements of managerial decision making will 
also be described. These models have been used by others to explain and 
describe complex interactions; and will be used as investigative tools, during 
the case studies. 
The elements of the research problem are examined in more detail. The 
concept of 'size' is considered in more closely. Testing the 'working concept' 
involved the adoption of a methodology that included investigative pilots in the 
research strategy. 
The outcome of the triangulation of the results of the three methods of data 
collection has been included. This triangulation of results was a deliberate 
decision to increase the likelihood of the findings being valid. The findings are 
also compared and contrasted with findings from previous research. The 
methodology has also evolved to include a rating system to enable 
comparison between 'good' and 'bad' safety management. 
Suggestions are then provided as to how the findings, of this inquiry, may be 
used to improve safety management practices. The aim will be to address the 
barriers that have been discovered during the studies, and to complement the 
good practices identified. The basis of the discussion is that the approaches 
advocated should 'fit' the organization. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Chapter Summary 
The evolution of the hypothesis for this research is outlined in 
this chapter. A framework is to be used to determine the 
boundaries of the inquiry. This chapter provides management 
indicators, from a literature search, so that typologies can be 
identified and categorized during the study. General 
management theories have been included only where 
necessary to set this study in context. The model for this study 
is based on the concept that safety management is an 
essential element in the total management scheme of a 
business. 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this study is to look at the manner in which small 
businesses manage health and safety and their success in scaling down 
techniques practiced by large businesses. Small businesses' approach to 
managing occupational health and safety is influenced by the manner in which 
these businesses manage day to day risks generally (Seppala, 1998). 
2.1 EVOLUTION OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
Some people have queried whether small businesses manage occupational 
health and safety at all. This notion has been promoted by enforcement 
bodies in more than one report (HM Chief Inspector of Factories, 1984; HSE, 
1993; HSC, 1997). 
There is little published data on the health and safety record of small firms. 
-
However, small businesses are perceived as having a poorer awareness, and 
a generally poorer performance than larger work units (Frick and Waiters, 
1998). This view stems from anecdotal evidence. "The majority [of new, small 
businesses] are not alert to hazards to which their employees are exposed 
and are not well briefed on health and safety legislation and practice" (HSE, 
1983). .... "Many small firms are completely ignorant about what the law 
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requires" (Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Factories, 1984). This fundamental 
belief in the lack of awareness, and management, was demonstrated, by the 
HSC's attempt to quantify the increased risk posed by 'small' employers. They 
concluded, 'the risk of an employee being injured in an accident could be as 
much as fifty per cent greater among workforces of less than a hundred.' 
(HSC, 1987). 
The enforcing authorities seem to have accepted the notion of an increased 
risk within small businesses being due to their size. Ignorance of the law and 
lack of alertness to hazards have been cited as causes ,but there is limited 
empirical evidence to back up those assertions (HSE, 1983; Her Majesty's 
Chief Inspector of Factories, 1984). 
In examining how safety is managed, within small businesses, there are 
several concepts that may need to be refined. The four main concepts were 
outlined briefly in Chapter One [Section 1.4]: 
• A definition of 'small business'. 
• Consideration of the nature of the small business sector. 
• The concept of 'management' and what constitutes a management 
process. 
• The concept of 'safety management' and what constitutes good, or bad, 
practice in this context. 
In this chapter each of these issues will be considered in turn. 
2.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORKING DEFINITION OF 'SMALL BUSINESS' 
It has been a criticism in the past that, when considering 'small' businesses, 
researchers have tended to hold preconceived notions of 'small' and 'large' 
(Burns, 1989; Goss, 1991). Some researchers have suggested that defining a 
small business, at the outset, is necessary to avoid misunderstanding of the 
term (Scott and Bruce, 1987). However, there appears to have been only 
limited discussion of an appropriate measure of size. 
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A relative term like 'small' is inherently vague. Also, the purposes for which 
phrases such as 'small firms' are adopted in statistics and academic literature 
vary widely. An economist concerned with the relative contribution of small 
and big business to a nation's economic performance will consider a measure 
of 'smallness' appropriate which would be very different to that adopted by a 
student of organizational behaviour. The country, the period and the field of 
business activity all affect the view of what is 'small' (Bolton, 1971; Burns, 
1989, p2-3). 
In this research it was considered preferable to allow a concept of size to 
emerge from the preliminary studies rather than adopting arbitrary numerical 
definitions. However, an initial working definition was necessary in order to 
refine the sampling criteria for the first study. 
A universal indicator of size has its advantages and disadvantages. One 
advantage is that direct comparisons are possible. The main disadvantage is 
that within a heterogeneous group one indicator may not suit all 
circumstances. Previous research supports the view that the small business 
sector is wide and diverse (Jones, 1989; Rainnie, 1989). 
Various criteria have therefore been used to define small enterprises. When 
faced with the task of classification the Bolton Committee was not able to 
simplify the statistical definition of small firms (Bolton, 1971). The International 
Labour Organization addressed the problem by using a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative indicators (ILO, 1986). 
It has been argued· that qualitative indicators should theoretically offer a better 
way forward for research in small businesses (Curran and Burrows, 1993). 
There are common factors within small businesses: how the businesses are 
run; how decisions are made, compared to 'large' companies; the degree of 
delegation, etc. This may not be of help in this research. The very essence of 
how the businesses are run, in terms of safety matters; and how decisions are 
reached is the very nub of the studies. 
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A definition may be needed in this instance that combines measurement and 
descriptive qualifications. This combined description was used by the Bolton 
Committee (Bolton, 1971). Their report described some dominant 
characteristics of a small UK business. The business was owner-managed in 
a personalized way and not through the medium of a formalized management 
structure. This personalized management was often considered to be the 
most characteristic factor. It was implicit that the owner actively participates in 
all aspects of management, and in all major decision making processes. The 
committee considered there was little devolution or delegation of authority 
(Bolton, 1971). 
They also considered that a small business was one that has a relatively 
small share of its market, not large enough to exert influence, to any 
significant extent. Later, Rainnie (1988 and 1991) saw a way forward in 
relating the small firm to its operating environment. This approach built on the 
work of Shutt and Whittington (1987). Rainnie's concept was based on a view 
of the large firms' role in controlling the operating environment. The 
independent nature but subservient position of small businesses has been 
reflected in other researcher's definitions. A small business venture has been 
defined as "any business that is independently owned and operated, not 
dominant in its field, and does not engage in any new marketing or innovative 
practice" (Carland et ai, 1984: p355). 
Previous research has identified a range of identities for small firms. These 
identities have been based on the degree of planning undertaken within the 
organization (Atkins and Lowe, 1996); and different ownership characteristics 
(Smith, 1967; Scase and Goffee, 1980; Finch, 1983; Birley, 1985, Kirkham, 
1987; and Chittenden et ai, 1993). In the 1970's some theorists interested in 
the concept of size concentrated almost exclusively on the structural aspects 
of firms (Kimberley, 1976; Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Pugh and Hinings, 1976). 
The diversity of the descriptive factors may reflect the essential homogeneity 
of the small business sector. However, even within such a heterogeneous 
group others have drawn a central contrast between the informal, individual 
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managerial style within small businesses and the formal, bureaucratic 
administration of large enterprises (Kets de Vries, 1977). 
There are obviously some descriptions that can be applied to 'small' 
businesses The base premise of some non-quantitative approaches has 
included the notion of the 'legal independence' of small businesses (Rainnie, 
1988). This status is not sufficiently definitive as the sole delimiter of the small 
business domain but the notion can be combined with other organizational 
characteristics (Scase and Goffee, 1982; Rainnie 1988 and 1991). For the 
purposes of this study legal independence will be taken .as a starting point. 
However, the question arises: Why use the term 'small' if it is going to relate to 
observable characteristics rather than size? 
2.1.2 SETTING THE QUANTITATIVE PARAMETERS OF 'SMALL' 
In looking for quantitative determinants of 'smallness' some researchers, 
writers and agencies have used turnover as a measure (Kelley and Souster, 
1994; DTI, 1994; Anon (The Economist), 1993). Others have claimed a 
relationship between sales turnover and employee numbers (Stanworth et ai, 
1992). However the relationship has not proved sustainable (Johnson, 1994). 
Turnover may be affected by economic inflation, therefore this characteristic 
can be unstable in the long term. Not all sectors are equally reactive to 
inflationary pressures which means changes experienced may not be the 
same for every business (Johnson, 1994). There is also an inherent difficulty 
of obtaining data on annual turnover from small private companies whose 
accounts are not published. 
Workforce information is often freely available. This makes a definition 
incorporating employee numbers attractive. There are precedents for using 
'numbers of employees' as a determining factor, for categorizing businesses 
by size (Batstone, 1969; Ingham 1970). 
In the early 1990's it was suggested that of nearly a quarter of a million 
businesses in the UK with fewer than 200 employees (Storey, 1991). Others 
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found that around two thirds of all small businesses in the UK consisted 
simply of an owner working alone without employees (Bannock and Oaly, 
1990). This raises the question of where the size thresholds should be set. 
Size thresholds, in terms of number of employees, do exist within the UK legal 
framework. Some of these definitions even apply to health and safety 
controls. In the UK certain duties under health and safety legislation are 
waived for small businesses, for example: the general requirements for a 
written safety policy under Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 are 
waived in organizations employing less than five. The Ind~strial Relations Act 
1971 had excluded enterprises with less than four workers from some 
provisions [this exemption was rescinded in 1975]. The Unemployment Act 
1980 used different thresholds again, by restricting its implications for 
enterprises with up to 20 employees [this limitation was lifted in 1985]. Thus 
even within UK statues there is no common agreement on a threshold for 
'small'. 
However, the European Union (EU) does have a set of standard definitions 
(see Table 2.1, below). Within this scheme of classification any business with 
less than 99 employees in the UK could be termed 'small' 
Table 2.1 The EU classification of small firms 
Number of Employees Classification 
0-9 Micro 
10-99 Small 
100-499 
I 
Medium 
I 
>500 I Large 
[Classification as shown by D. Frederick (2000)] 
Some researchers' have suggested that using the EU definition may not 
adequately reflect the position in the UK (Goss, 1991). Previous studies have 
shown that the majority of small UK firms have less than 20 employees 
(Storey, 1991). Others, in the early 1990's, have also sought to demonstrate 
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the 'minimalist' nature of workforces in the UK (Bannock and Daly, 1990). 
Their work showed that in the UK small businesses were most frequently 
found to have smaller-sized wo rkforces , see Figure 1 (below). Other 
researchers of the time concurred, finding only 20 per cent of small firms lay 
in the region of 5 to 50 employees (Stanworth et ai, 1992). 
r§''<> 0'<> 0'<> 0'<> 0'<> ~o~ :".04,O :".o.:f ° :".&1 ~o':;; ~v:. ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~0 OJ0 1;.0 9° <;:;0 
<.1" Rf'V n.,r? ~ [J Percentage of small ~ businesses in category 
From findings of: Bannock and Daly (1990). 
Figure 2.1 The distribution of businesses, by size of wo rkforce , within the 
UK small business sector. 
Some of the previous investigations therefore suggest that the upper limit of 
size, that would encompass the majority of small UK businesses, would be 
around 20 employees (Bannock and Daly, 1990; Storey, 1991). 
The classification in Australia, in a series of studies, has businesses with less 
-
than five employees labeled as 'micro-businesses' and those with less than 
twenty employees as 'small businesses' (Clayton, 1999; Clayton, 2000). 
While, during the same period, in the UK a survey into small businesses' 
attitude to innovation and change determined firms with more than 50 
employees were more likely to be regularly making changes, compared to 
smaller businesses (Ibbetson, 2000). This survey showed a sharp jump in 
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businesses claiming to proactively manage change when those businesses 
employed more than 25 people (Ibbetson, 2000). This gives a suggestion of 
potentially applicable thresholds, in the UK. 
2.1.3 THE 'WORKING DEFINITION' OF 'SMALL' BUSINESS. 
Following on from the findings of other research, for the purposes of the initial 
study a 'small' business will be taken to be: 'one with not more than 25 
employees under contract at anyone time, employed either full or part-time. It 
will be legally independent and will have no more than one administrative 
site'. 
However, in order not to exclude too many businesses from the initial 
investigation a second group of businesses has been identified. These 
businesses will still be legally independent, with only one administrative centre 
but with between 25 and 50 employees. This second group will initially be 
termed 'medium-sized'. 
2.2 CONSIDERATION OF THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR 
Having defined the concept of 'small' it is necessary to determine the context 
in which these small businesses operate. The operating environment has a 
bearing on the activities of a small business (Rainnie, 1988 and 1991). 
One concept of small businesses was based on a view that large firms control 
the operating environment of smaller undertakings (Rainnie, 1991). It seems 
there may be value in accounting for environmental influences. Small 
businesses may be considered to be open systems that exert influence, and 
are in turn influenced by external factors. 
It has been shown that the majority of new small businesses are formed in 
those market sectors where barriers to entry are low and in which there are 
already numerous small firms (Fim and Swales, 1978). There is some 
evidence that the size of businesses can be sector specific. In 1978, 23 per 
cent of employees were in manufacturing companies with workforces of less 
than 200 (Census of Production, 1979). At the same time, within the vehicle 
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industry only 7 per cent of firms had workforces of less than 200; conversely 
in the leather goods industry smaller firms predominated [61 % had less than 
200 employees] (Census of Production, 1979). 
There appears to be a case for considering the service sector as the true 
province for small businesses (Galbraith, 1975; Scase and Goffee, 1980). The 
service sector is the most attractive as entry requires less complex technical, 
human, managerial and financial resources (Gershuny, 1978). The high 
representation of service industries within the small business sector has also 
confirmed by researchers (Stanworth et ai, 1992). They ~Iso discovered that 
small service firms were notably younger than those in the manufacturing 
sector (Stanworth et ai, 1992). 
The relative importance of service industries within the small business sector 
and the shift from manufacturing has been well documented. The number of 
small businesses in the manufacturing sector had dropped from less than 20 
per cent, in 1978, to less than 10 per cent by 1984. (Gershuny, 1978, Census 
of Production, 1979; Curran and Burrows, 1988). 
There is a distinction to be made between organizations operating the service 
sector and those in the manufacturing sector. In a similar vein distinctions 
have been made between small firms operating in the high technology sector 
from traditional ones in services (Scott & Roberts 1988). The industry sector 
can be expected to influence how small firms within those sectors manage. It 
has been argued that a homogeneity should not be assumed to exist among 
small businesses (Goss, 1991). 
Having determined a working definition for 'small', and medium-sized, 
businesses and set the context of the study by briefly looking at the 
differentiation that exists within the small business sector the concept of 
management may need to be set in the context of this research. 
2.3 'MANAGEMENT' IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS RESEARCH 
It has been shown that often managing is a reactive rather than pro-active 
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process (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Some theorists have suggested that 
managerial reactions may be chosen as calculated responses to problems 
(Mintzberg et ai, 1976; Peters and Waterman, 1982; Johnson and Scholes, 
1989, p31). This rationalist approach has been encapsulated in a model: the 
'rational policy model'. 
More recently it has been suggested that 'rational' has come to have a very 
narrow meaning, when applied to managerial decisions, that so long as a 
problem can be quantified it can be solved (Smith, 1998). This concern about 
the dependence on the quantification of problems se~ms to have been 
increasing since the early 1980's (Wrapp, 1982: p35). However, echoes of 
this rational process can be seen in many 'of the prescriptive "Health and 
Safety Handbooks" available (Saunders & Wheeler, 1991). 
Some authors have held that the idea that implementation of managerial 
decision follows active choices, which were based on analyses, is flawed 
(Lindblom, 1959; Quinn, 1980; Pondy, 1983). There is an alternative model. 
Also described in the literature was the organizational process model. This 
model allows for fallibility within the decision-making process (Lindblom, 1959; 
Quinn, 1980). Within this model strategies may be realized, without the 
specific intent of managers, as the cumulative result of operational decisions. 
It seems to have been a theme over many years that management within 
businesses is involved with adaptation in response to changes (Orucker, 
1973; Glew et ai, 1979; Steiner, 1979, Fahey and Narayanan, 1986, Ibbetson, 
2000). Adaptation often involves many facets of influence and reaction. 
It was because of the number of variables involved in how an organization is 
managed that a framework was selected. The chosen framework was the 
McKinsey 7-S Framework®. There is considerable emphasis on decision-
making and control in this framework. The model depicts the inter-relationship 
of seven elements of management. The seven elements include: 
• organizational structure, 
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• strategy, 
• the organization's staff, 
• managerial style, 
• shared values and 'the culture' of the organization, 
• skills available to the business, and 
• 'systems' within the business. 
7-s Framework® 
Figure 2.2 showing the McKinsey 7-S Framework® (from: Peters. T. and 
Waterman. R. In Search of Excellence 1982). 
The figure 2.2 has been copied from Chapter One to make referral easier. 
The concepts encapsulated within the framework have been briefly explored 
through the literature search. Anyone of the elements may be the keystone 
that determines how safety is managed in small businesses. 
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2.3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
The traditional views about control and structure of a business can be traced 
back to the scientific theorists, like Taylor (1947). The scientific theorists 
postulated, among other things an optimum number of subordinates for each 
executive: the span of control (Urwick, 1956; Woodward, 1958). It has also 
been suggested that as an organization grows the need for supervision 
increases, so even a small company will have a full-time manager (Mintzberg, 
1979). 
However, not all businesses adopt the same structure. Some previous 
research suggests that there are various organizational types (Mintzberg, 
1979; Miller, 1986). The simplicity and one-dimensional nature of Mintzberg's 
models may make them useful, as exemplars of type. Other theorists have 
synthesized strategy and structure to produce the concept of organizational 
'configurations' (Miller, 1986). The increased complexity of Miller's model does 
not add value in the context of this study so Mintzberg's typologies will be 
used, as a way of simplifying information. 
Mintzberg has five basic typologies that he calls 'ideal' structural 
configurations. Only two, possibly three, types may be applicable to small 
businesses: 
• Simple Structure 
Mintzberg contends that this type has no real structure at all. This form of 
organization avoids all formal devices, such as: division of work. He has found 
there is usually no, or only a limited, technostructure [in Mintzberg's terms]: 
few controllers, designers, etc. and a non-existent managerial hierarchy. This 
type of organization is common in many very small businesses (Mintzberg, 
1979). 
• Machine Bureaucracy 
Mintzberg's notion of the machine bureaucracy follows Weber's model (1947) 
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with standardized assignments of duties, communication channels and rules. 
This structure has been typified in some manufacturing industries (Woodward, 
1965; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Lawrence & Lorsch, [1] 1967). It has been 
shown in these studies that direct supervision and standardization of work 
processes are preferred co-ordination mechanisms. However from the work of 
Kets de Vries it would seem such a structure should seldom be expected in a 
'small' business (Kets de Vries, 1977). 
• Adhocracy 
This form has been described as an organic, free flowing. structure with little 
formalization of behaviour, and a complex open network of communication 
(Mintzberg, 1983). 
A hybrid structure has also been identified which incorporates many 
characteristics of an Adhocracy. This hybrid was called the simplest structure 
and described as having "a Simple Structure. with the open lateral 
communication channels of the Adhocracy" (Mintzberg, 1983 and 1988: 
p533). He suggests that many small organizations retain this structure. 
The very nature of 'small' organizations seems to indicate that, of five possible 
typologies, there are only two pure types and one hybrid that should be 
anticipated within a sample of 'small' businesses. This limits the potential 
usefulness of any comparison of firms by structure alone. 
2.3.2 STRATEGY WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS 
Strategy will be considered as the second element of the framework for this 
research. Two different types of strategy have already been identified from 
previous research. These types depend on whether management decisions 
are rationally determined [Rational Policy model] or organic, even emergent 
[Organizational process model] (Johnson and Scholes, 1989: p31; Lindblom, 
1959). 
2.3.3 THE ORGANIZATION'S STAFF 
Strategies, however derived, are only plans. To be realized plans must involve 
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the people within the organization. Considering people as a pool of resources 
to be nurtured,· developed, guarded and allocated makes 'the staff' an 
influential element of the 7 -s framework® (Waterman et ai, 1980). 
Early management theorists viewed co-ordination as the binding of individual 
efforts to achieve a common goal (Fayol, 1930). Classical theorists placed 
emphasis on using rules, procedures and organizational hierarchy for co-
ordination (Mooney & Reilly, 1939). Later others favoured a reactive 
approach; with "co-ordination by feedback" (March & Simon; 1958). More 
recently theorists have seemed to favour 'mutual adjustment' (Galbraith, 1974; 
Mintzberg, 1983). 
It may be that co-ordination is not, necessarily, imposed on staff. In some 
studies it has been found that where people are doing unfamiliar tasks 
personal co-ordination increases significantly (Van de Ven et ai, 1976; Argote, 
1982). 
This combination of imposed 'organizational' co-ordination and personal co-
ordination has led to consideration of the complexities of interactions. Recent 
theorists have suggested that an organization is a system requiring both 
technology and a social organization of the people who use that technology. 
The concept of an organization as a 'sociotechnical' system comes from this 
combination of technology and social structure (see Cox and Cox, 1996). The 
staff are not isolated from their environment but are an integral part of an 
organization. 
How communication and co-ordination are effected within any organization is 
largely a function of managerial style (Handy, 1976). The style of 
management is another part of the framework. 
2.3.4 MANAGERIAL STYLE 
The management style is in effect an expression of the nature and character 
of the managers, those they manage, the tasks to be performed, and the 
organizational culture (Handy, 1976). Style will vary with each organization. It 
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has been suggested that a critical point for analysis, within an organization, is 
the perceptions of the participants in that organization (Weick, 1988). 
The Bolton Committee had already concluded that it was implicit that the 
owner actively participates in all aspects of management and in all major 
decision making processes (Bolton, 1971). The owner's perceptions may then 
influence how a small business is managed directly. Research in the late 
1980's presented empirical evidence to show: that the drive and personality of 
the executives affect organizational choices (Miller & Droge, 1986; Miller & 
Toulouse 1986; Miller et ai, 1988). 
In the work of Miller et al (1988:p552) the organizations were small so that 
decision making was highly centralized in the top manager. Miller and 
Toulouse (1986: p1397) had investigated the effects of the CEO's (Chief 
Executive Officer's] personality and found effects were more numerous in 
small organizations than large ones. 
The dominant psychological characteristics of 'small firm' owner-managers 
have been repeatedly reported as manifesting themselves in a distinct 
managerial style (Bolton, 1971; Miller and Toulouse, 1986). Kets de Vries 
(1985) summarized much of the literature available up to 1985 and he put 
forward the argument that small-business owners were autocratic, impulsive, 
and egocentric. He noted that forward planning was limited to the short term. 
It would be wrong to suggest that there is one type of 'small business' owner, 
but this work does provide some indicators of a type and may assist in the 
investigation phase when managerial style is being considered. 
2.3.5 SHARED VALUES AND THE CULTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION 
Ownership may influence not only the managerial style but also the culture of 
a 'small' business. It has been recognized that the culture of a business may 
be to do with ownership of a business "particularly in the case of small 
companies where the desire to perpetuate family ownership may be a very 
important influence on strategy" (Johnson and Scholes; 1989, p8). It has also 
been suggested there were three levels of culture: basic assumptions -
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unquestioned perceptions of 'how things work'; 'artefacts', such as buildings, 
documents and policies; and values - "What people agree" (Schein, 1985). 
Comparison of small businesses may, potentially, be achieved using one of 
these 'cultural' levels: by examining, and recording, the 'artefacts'. 
The exhibition of power may an element of organizational culture (Handy, 
1985; Alasuutari, 1995). Power is a recurring theme in the literature when 
considering culture and control in organizations. Power in this context means: 
the extent to which individuals or groups are able to persuade, induce or 
coerce others into following certain courses of action. 
Handy used the concept of power within a culture as one method of 
categorizing organizations. He suggested an organizational typology where 
types are differentiated between four distinct cultures: Power, Role, Task, or 
Peffion(Handy, 198~. 
There are many different potential sources of power within a business. These 
~rise from position within the organization, personal qualities and networking 
links. Some previous research suggested that the best approach for analysis 
may be to look for 'indicators of power' (Pfeffer, 1981). 
Table 2.2 Pfeffer's 'indicators of power'. 
Indicators of power Measures 
Status· Position within hierarchy, salary, 
reputation 
Claim on resources Size of budget, number of subordinates, 
-
Representation Access to the decision makers 
Symbols of power size !Iocation of offices, use of 
secretary, level of office furnishings etc'l 
I 
Use of first names or formal address, 
manner of dress, position on distribution 
lists for internal memos. etc. I 
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Some research suggests that the size of an organization affects power 
distribution (Pugh et ai, 1969; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967 [3]). In small 
companies a dominant owner-manager wields almost all the power (Pugh et 
ai, 1969). 
2.3.6 SKILLS AVAILABLE TO THE BUSINESS 
The influence of the owner-manager on a small business is a recurrent theme. 
Therefore, when considering the skills within some small businesses, those 
dominated by their owner-manger may be influenced by the personal skills of 
the manager. 
There are a number of theories about effectiveness of leadership within 
organizations (Bales, 1950; Bales and Salter, 1955; Ghiselli, 1963; Miner, 
1965; Blake and Mouton, 1980; Watson, 1980). The theories fall into three 
main categories: the trait, behavioural, and contingency theories. 
Trait theory subscribes to the view that effective leaders have a finite number 
of identifiable characteristics. Many studies have been inconclusive (Nutting, 
1923; Bird, 1940; Jenkins, 1947; Stogdill, 1948; Mann, 1959; Jacobs, 1970; 
Palmer, 1974; Stodgill, 1974) and have cast doubt on whether managerial 
effectiveness is a function of personality. Ghiselli (1971) found thirteen traits 
to managerial talent; six characterized effective managers, the most important 
being supervisory ability. 
Behavioural leadership theories focus on style of leadership: what they do and 
how they do it (Adair, 1983). Others have studied leadership style and 
focused on two dimensions: employee orientation and job orientation (Likert, 
1961). Of the leadership characteristics listed by Adair (1983) four of the nine 
dealt with communication skills. The others broadly related to planning and 
control. 
2.3.7 'SYSTEMS' WITHIN THE BUSINESS 
Communication, planning and control of an organization can scarcely be 
divorced from consideration of organizational systems. The 'systems' are all 
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the procedures that make the organization tick, both formal and informal. 
There are three distinct typologies for systems: the systems approach to 
failures, a hard systems approach and a soft systems approach. The concept 
of 'system' includes an implicit interconnected ness, and a potential for 
complex behaviour. 
Operations management is primarily concerned with the design and operation 
of efficient and effective control systems (Saunders & Wheeler, 1991). The 
hard systems approach relies on the underlying belief that there are people in 
organizations who know what is going on, can identify problems and 
objectives clearly, can translate these problems and objectives into 
operational terms and who have the controls and resources to implement the 
solutions. There are strong parallels with the rational model of management 
(Peters and Waterman, 1982; Johnson and Scholes, 1989). 
There was an early tendency for theorists to view the organization as a closed 
system (Emery and Trist, 1981). Open systems, on the other hand, are 
accepted as interacting with their wider environment and are believed to be 
self regulating and adaptable. One basic premise of this research will be that 
'small' businesses are open systems, and as such exposed to a variety of 
influences. 
Open systems may spontaneously reorganize towards states of greater 
complexity (Waldrop, 1989). This spontaneous reorganization is in line with 
organizational development theories (Scott and Bruce, 1987). This approach 
to organizations therefore seems more appropriate than the closed system 
model, and current systems thinking applied to organizations treats them as 
being open (Emery and Trist 1981, Buchanan and Huczynski 1985). -
Metaphors have been used as tools in conceptualizing systems (Flood and 
Jackson, 1991). There is precedent in the literature for using these typologies 
to think creatively about an organization. The typologies have been briefly 
outlined. 
• The machine metaphor 
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This 'machine metaphor' is typified by scientific management theories, as 
expounded, for example, by Taylor (1947). In this metaphor the human 
element is narrowed to consideration of the 'person-machine' fit. The 
weakness of the metaphor may be in assuming employees adopt a passive 
role. 
• The organic metaphor -
This metaphor promotes the idea of adaptability for survival, and flexibility for 
change. This metaphor fails to account for internal cultural pressures and the 
effects of internal conflict and subversion. 
• The viable systems metaphor 
This metaphor assumes a fully empowered workforce. 
• The cultural metaphor 
This metaphor is based on values and beliefs as important influences on the 
system. 
• The political metaphor 
This is based on the balance of power as a driver. 
Other researchers have argued that soft systems management is better able 
to cope with some problems than other systems based methodologies; 
because it provides better guidelines for interpretation of complex interrelated 
issues that exist in organizations (Jackson and Keys, 1984). The strengths of 
soft systems management also received empirical backing from one survey 
(Mingers and Taylor, 1992). 
Ho and Jackson (1987) have suggested that the models of Mintzberg (1983) 
and Ansoff (1984) can assist in rich picture building; as part of soft systems 
method (Checkland, 1981). The idea of a 'rich picture' is merely the 
combination of as many elements as possible to allow the fullest possible 
analysis of variables. 
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The five metaphors for conceptualizing systems may present further 
opportunities to differentiate between small businesses within the studies. 
One aim of this research is to use the typologies, indicators and metaphors, 
derived from previous work, to differentiate between 'small' businesses. The 
differentiation may facilitate a process of comparing and contrasting that, in 
turn, may highlight different managerial approaches, and their constraints. 
In this section some elements that may be said to influence management, 
and help define the concept, have been addressed., One management 
theorist, more than forty years ago, provided a broad definition of 
'management' by describing it as "a multi-purpose organ that manages a 
business and ... manages workers and work" (Orucker, 1955: p3). This 
concept of management, involving as it does more than one element may also 
apply to 'safety management'. 
2.4 THE CONCEPT OF MANAGING HEALTH AND SAFETY 
Some theorists have described the notion of management as being an 
amalgam of four central functions: planning; organizing; leadership; and 
control (Bird and Germain,1986). It has also been suggested that there may 
be two approaches to managing, an emphasis on systems and a behavioural 
emphasis (Watson, 1986). Human factors of safety came to dominate safety 
thinking in the 1960's and 1970's. This tradition has led to many studies of 
workplaces and procedures (Carter and Menkel, 1990; Hesse, Rasmussen 
and Jensen, 1994). These two approaches, system versus behaviour, are 
echoed in safety management in the engineering approaches (Humphreys, 
1988; see also Hollnagel, 1993) and behavioural approaches to safety 
management (Bailey, 1988; Krause and Hindley, 1989; Krause et ai, 1990; 
Krause, 1991). 
Safety can be defined as 'a state of freedom from unacceptable risk of 
personal harm' (Fido & Wood, 1989). Risk assessment, determining the 
inherent 'safety' of a situation, can therefore be considered part of the overall 
process of proactively managing safety. 
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The manifestation of a real risk to personal harm could be called an accident, 
when the event is unplanned. Accident causation was the early focus of 
attention in managing health and safety. Advancement in safety was 
perceived as being best achieved by avoiding a recurrence of an accident 
type (Heinrich, 1931). Safety management was, for a time, primarily a reactive 
process. 
The earliest accident causation models were simple sequence models. 
Heinrich has been credited with developing the first of this model type. His 
'domino theory' was based on a chain of events culminating in an accident. 
The view was that accident prevention required management intervention to 
prevent the unsafe act or avert the mechanical hazard (Heinrich, 1931). 
However, other theorists have suggested the 'domino theory' may be 
restrictive when used in a multi-cause situation (Petersen, 1978). 
The basic premise in multi-causality theory is that each failure may have more 
than one cause, and each cause may itself have multiple antecedents. 
However, for accident investigation it is still suggested that the use of the 
failure approach can be methodically pursued, by following each cause back 
to its root (see S. Cox & Tait, 1991; Johnson, 1975). It has been claimed that, 
another complication in analyzing causes of accidents may be that all relevant 
factors may not be apparent after the event, and may have occurred 
sometime earlier (Leplat, 1990; Malaterre, 1990; Wagenaar and Reason, 
1990). 
Reason (1990, [2]) distinguishes between failures that immediately precede 
an incident; as a result of operator errors or excessive demands placed on the 
operator by a work system; that he terms 'active' failures and other 'latent' 
failures. Latent failures he describes as those which result from management 
decisions, which are remote from the time and place of an incident. Heinrich's 
domino model has been further developed to include the effect of 
management on the model (Bird and Loftus, 1976; Bird and Germain, 1986). 
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Tripod Methodology is a tool which has been evolved to account for latent 
failures (Groeneweg, 1994). The original Tripod model consisted of accidents, 
unsafe acts and underlying causes. More recently this has extended to safety 
state of a company. The Tripod method focuses on the systemic factors in the 
'accident causation' model. Wagenaar pursued this notion by classifying latent 
errors (as conceptualized by Reason) into eleven general failure types [GFT's] 
(Wagenaar, 1996). 
Safety management seems to be constantly evolving as a discipline. It has 
moved from being primarily reactive (Booth, 1995). Some theorists have 
promoted the benefits of proactive intervention. "An over emphasis on 
accident investigation as a safety management tool may foster a reactive 
policy of waiting for accidents to happen before preventative action is taken." 
(Amis and Booth, 1992). Others have championed certain tools for proactive 
safety management. Waring (1990) in particular advocates systems thinking. 
Traditional approaches to safety management stemmed from operations 
management and were primarily concerned with the design and operation of 
efficient and effective systems whose purpose was to provide safety services 
(Saunders & Wheeler, 1991). Where systems failures occur, lack of control is 
often implicated as a contributory factor. 
The notion of 'control' has become important. It has been postulated that 
control is achieved by securing the commitment of all employees to safety 
objectives (Alexander et ai, 1994). This has led to control being seen as a 
foundation of a safety culture. 
In comparing the control paradigm to reality in an organization it be comes 
clear that interrelationships quickly become very complex. This has required 
an evolution in systems theory. Complexity theory has emerged relatively 
recently. It is implicit in Howarth's (1995) work that distinction can be made 
between more or less complex systems. 
It has been argued that a system is complex when consisting of a large 
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number of independent components; interacting with each other in diverse 
ways (Waldrop, ·1992). This issue of complexity is now central to current 
systems thinking. It is important for this study because it is relevant to how 
systems are managed. Simon (1981) observed that in any complex system 
each subsystem could have its own agenda. He showed that survival of the 
organization would depend on it seeking 'good enough' solutions to each of its 
important objectives. In his work, he demonstrated that it was impossible to 
optimize more than one objective, all others involve a trade off. 
There are important aspects in this work: for the relationship between profit 
and safety objectives in any profit oriented organization. Drucker (1955) 
stated: "Management must always, in every decision and action, put 
economic performance first." If this view holds then economic 'reality' may 
overshadow any safety management objective. 
Those organizations with a fully integrated management approach are often 
referred to as having a strong 'safety culture'. The culture theory has become 
one of the dominant themes in management literature since the 1980's 
(Brown and Starkey, 1994; Reichers and Schneider, 1990). However, the idea 
of an organizational safety culture did not gain widespread acceptance until 
the 1990's (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1991). The 
importance of the notion of safety culture has continued to grow (Cox, 1996; 
Lee, 1995). 
2.4.1 THE SAFETY CULTURE PARADIGM 
Corporate culture is 'a set of commonly held attitudes, values and beliefs that 
guide the behaviour of an organization's members'. (Martin, 1985). A safety 
culture is part of, and may be indistinct from; the corporate culture of the 
organization concerned (Waring, 1992). 
The safety-culture may be identifiable within the overall culture of a firm. 
There has been an argument put forward (Cox et ai, 1998) that an 
understanding of an organization's safety culture is necessary in order to 
make sense of that organization's safety performance (Booth and Lee, 1993; 
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CBI, 1990; Cox, Cheyne and Alexander, 1997}. There are at least two 
definitions of the qualities of a safety-culture. These definitions are based on 
approaches to safety management that have arisen from failure analysis: the 
engineering approach and the humanist or cultural model. 
It may be necessary to identify the characteristics of an organization where a 
safety culture is said to exist, to describe adequately what "safety culture" is. It 
has been postulated that an organization may have a positive attitude to 
criticism and comments from lower levels in the hierarchy and from outside. 
Also the organization may take into account the boundaries and patterns of 
communication when designing processes, procedures and working practices. 
There may also be documentary evidence to show that an organization 
promotes caring, about consequences of its activities and the effects of 
individual actions. The organization may also encourage involvement and 
commitment and is able to resolve conflict without causing alienation 
(Advisory Committee For Safety in Nuclear Installations, 1993; Griffiths, 1985; 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, 1991). 
More recently, researchers have used indicators to assist in classifying an 
organization's 'safety climate' (Cheyne and Cox, 1997). They acknowledge 
that there are no pre-determined characteristics of a good safety culture. 
However, by highlighting the dimensions of a safety culture it is possible to 
compare the phenomenon in different organizations. The following 
dimensions have been suggested as stating points for comparisons: norms 
and rules for effectively addressing hazards; positive attitudes to safety; and 
capacity for the perfection of safe practices (Cheyne and Cox, 1997). 
The notion of using indicators to assess both activities and results within an 
organization, as a means of measuring the success of safety management 
had been promulgated earlier (Petersen, 1989). The measures relate to 
results and managerial and supervisory activities; outcomes and outputs (see 
Table 2.3 below). 
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Table 2.3 Petersen's matrix for assessing the success of safety 
management. 
i For SupervISors For Managers ]-Forthe-·· _._- -.-- -_. --I 
!Activity Measures i-i\iu-mber OtSa-=-fe-tY--+-'-'N-um-"---be-r-O-f---'J---'ob---'-::-s-af~e-tY-i-~~~~~:!!.tiO"--___ -j 
1- - ! Inspections Analyses : Questionnaire or I iJinterviews 
t ! Number of workers Number of Job Safety : 
I trained observations I 
1 : 
l"N-um-b-e-r-o-f----:-H-a-za-r-d-+N-u-m-be-r-o-,-f-:-in-Cl-,--· d-e-nt-s-o-=-f I 
i Identification positive reinforcement I 
I exercises I 
I 
L----------l 
iNumberof 
! Supervisory 
I observations made 
I 
i Number of safety 
! meetings attended I I I •. 
~-=-~---~=--:-~---~--+=~~-~---~.~~---~---~ Results Measures I Safety sampling Safety sampling : Safety sampling 
I i , 
Inspection Results Inspection Results Safety Performance 
Indicator 
I Statistical Controls Control Charts ! Control Charts .. 
~i ~~-::--~ ____ ~_~~-::--__ ~! ~-::--~~ __ ~ 
! Critical Incident Cost of accidents or i Accident Frequency I Technique damage i 
~afe-T Scores least of-Property----
I I Damage 
I . i I~d~ I 
i · 
L-_____ ~I _____________ ~ ________ ~I ____________ ___ 
While investigating of "how" safety is managed in an organization it appears, 
from the literature, that latent (or managerial) failures are an important aspect 
that should not be omitted from the study. However, in a review of safety 
I 
research, 2 years ago, it was discovered hardly any studies had been 
reported that evaluated the success of health and safety management 
programmes for organizations; almost all addressed process safety 
management (Hale and Hovden, 1998). It was concluded, at the time, there 
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was a poor empirical basis for discriminating factors relating to good or bad 
performance. There was limited empirical evidence available that linked 
management and organizational characteristics to safety performance. "There 
is considerable lack of clarity about what is important for the management of 
safety, particularly in organizations other than machine-bureaucracies." (Hale 
et ai, 1998: p11). 
Safety management is seems may be proactive or reactive and based on a 
behavioural or systems approach. It may be a product of a safety culture. The 
safety culture, in a 'small' business may be superficially indistinct from the 
overall culture of the undertaking, but there are tools that may help in 
understanding the safety climate in each case. The management approach is 
unlikely to vary widely from the overall style of the organization. General 
theories of management practices may aid in gaining greater understanding of 
the processes observed during the studies. 
2.5 INTEGRATING 'SAFETY' INTO GENERAL MANAGEMENT. 
General management theories seem to have been developing in parallel with 
those of safety management. There is evidence of a separate focus: early 
safety theories focused on the unsafe act and operational processes, while 
general management theories have been centered on strategic planning and 
the organization as an entity (Andrews, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Porter, 1980, 
Moss-Kanter, 1985). 
There is evidence, in Reason's work particularly, that managerial decisions 
influence individual actions and therefore can contribute to safety directly. 
Reason's latent failures, managerial omissions, have been actively integrated 
into the tripod model in an attempt to correct this perceived imbalance in 
safety focus. It is against the results from the previous research that the issue 
of how safety is being managed, in each small business studied, will be 
tested. 
The flow of information, and the need for control is common to both branches 
of management theory. The use of systems modeling and paradigms to assist 
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problem solving is also a consistent theme. The differences emerge again in 
the detail. Safety management historically has used systems failure analysis 
in problem solving and a hard systems approach to guide the implementation 
of remedial measures. There seems to be a growing movement, by 
management theorists, to resist the adoption of a hard systems approach: the 
quest for the 'only right' decision. There appears to be a strong move towards 
adopting soft systems models. The use of "rich pictures" to include as much 
information into a decision process as possible and try to achieve a holistic 
overview has been promoted. This diversion of approach to problem 
resolution may become important in promoting occupational health and safety 
management as integral to an organization rather than a bolt on extra. 
It is also clear from the literature search that much of the safety research has 
been conducted within the manufacturing sectors. The results indicate that 
examples of good practice have emerged from major players in some sectors. 
There is no evidence of innovative good practice from small businesses being 
highlighted. 
2.6 FOCUS ON RESEARCH RELEVANT TO SMALL BUSINESSES 
A number of surveys of small businesses have been carried out to determine 
. the burden posed by managing health and safety. Several of these focused 
on statutory duties. The Forum of Private Business (FPB) survey (1993) was 
a survey with 1800 small firms responding. Of those responses 66% said 
there were too many laws that were too complicated. The Association of 
British Chambers of Commerce survey (1995) was a survey of 500 small 
firms. The results published indicated 68% of responses classified the 'rules' 
as being too complicated and 78% thought the 'rules' took too much time. 
These survey results seem to echo the feelings of the Bolton Committee 
(1971) regarding bureaucracy and shortage of managerial time in small 
businesses. 
In 1994 the Department of Employment (DoE) carried out a survey involving 
telephone interviews with 504 small firms and follow up visits to twenty (DoE, 
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1994). The aim of the study was to find the number of small firms who were 
doing more than satisfying basic statutory duties. The results of a survey by 
the Employment Department generated more concern and served to reinforce 
the worries, based on anecdotal evidence, that prompted this research. 
In the Employment Department's study there were twenty firms who put 
themselves forward as being exemplars of good health and safety practice. 
These firms were so confident in their approach that they welcomed 
investigation and opened their doors for assessment. The findings were not 
as encouraging as those managers had hoped. The visits .were made to firms 
who claimed to be doing more than satisfying their minimum legal duty under 
the regulations. Only three of these were assessed as doing more than they 
needed, "in most of these 20 firms it was found not enough action was being 
taken, although none of the problems need much money or time to put right" 
(HSE 1995). There do appear to be barriers to successful safety and health 
management in small businesses. This barrier does not seen to have been 
'unwillingness to manage', as evidenced by the confidence of the 20 
managers. 
There is limited information available in the literature about safety support 
services for small firms. A postal survey was conducted, of 33 UK trade 
associations, as part of some work on voluntary safety schemes (Vassie, 
1994). The purpose of the survey was to find what, if any, occupational health 
and safety support services were provided by 'trade organizations' for their 
members. Twelve associations (36%) returned completed questionnaires. 
The response was that information was generally provided to members via 
newsletters, fact sheets, publications' lists and product data. The results are 
summarized in Table 2.4 below. 
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Table 2.4 H&S Support Services offered by Trade associations to their 
members (Vassie, 1994). 
Trade Organization Membership Service. 
-
National Farmers Union Not specified Developing an assessment package 
National Federation of 153 firms with None specified 
Demolition Contractors <50 employees; 
15 firms with 
150-250 employees. 
1 Heating and Ventilation Safety awareness courses; Safety Not specified 
Contractors Advisors meetings. 
Engineering Employers 2500 firms with H&S Management Award Scheme 
Federation <50 employees; (Sheffield) 
2000 firms with 
50-250 employees, 
30 firms with 
<250 employees. 
Construction Employers 100 firms with Site-safety inspection service* 
Federation <50 employees; 
375 firms with 
50-250 employees 
Aluminium Federation Not specified Twice yearly workshops 
Asbestos Removal 120 firms with Tailored training cQurses-
Contractors <50 employees 
It is noteworthy that the timing of the distribution of the questionnaires 
coincided with the consultation process for a new set of health and safety 
regulations, the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994 
(CDM) (Vassie, 1994). These Regulations were laid before Parliament on 10 
January 1995. The well-publicized aim of these Regulations was to improve 
health and safety on construction sites in the UK. This service offered may 
well have been a precursor to the 'site-safety inspection service' offered, by 
the Construction Employers Federation, in response to the regulatory change. 
It should also be noted that the market sector in which members of the 
Asbestos Removal Contractors work is very highly regulated. This niche in the 
construction industry largely evolved in response to direct legislative controls. 
The methods imposed on this area of work by health and safety regulations 
went a long way to creating the niche. This sector is atypical; because of their 
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particular origins, and the service provided. 
The survey also sought to obtain information about what factors were believed 
to motivate members of trade organizations, to improve standards in health 
and safety (Vassie, 1994). The value of these results for the current research 
is that most [54.3 per cent] of those represented had less than 50 employees. 
The motivation for seeking to improve occupational health and safety 
standards was reported as being the wish to avoid (civil or criminal) legal 
action, and a concern that any action may increase iosurance premiums 
(Vassie, 1994). Other writers have described this fear of legal action (Selwyn 
1995). The original view of legislators was that laissez faire was not 
successful in controlling accidents and ill health at work, legal inducements 
were required. There have been several empirical studies which point to a 
lack of willingness; from companies of all sizes, across many industry sectors; 
to self-regulate effectively (Dawson et al., 1988;Pearce, 1990; Tombs, 1992). 
A postal survey of participants of the Commerce Magazine's 1994 Company 
of the Year Competition sought positive motivations in managing safety 
(Vassie, 1994[b]). 33 companies were identified as showing a positive attitude 
to health and safety. The size of these companies is not recorded. The survey 
instrument involved ranking a number of factors that may positively motivate 
managers to strive to improve health and safety. These ran kings may provide 
a benchmark for any motivators determined during this research. The 
rankings are shown in Table 2.5 below. 
Respondents were also asked to rate the importance of these factors. A scale 
of 1 to 4, (where 1 = very important and 4 = unimportant) was suggested. 
Table 2.6 is also below which shows the relative importance attributed to the 
factors influencing positive safety management (Vassie, 1994[b]) 
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Table 2.5 
Table 2.6 
Rank order of motivators for positive safety management. 
IRanking Influencing factors 
I 1 Moral consideralions 
I 2 Reduce lost time ~ Avoid court action 
I 4 Enhance company image 
5 Improve staff morale 
6 Reduce cost of accidents 
7 Avoid adverse publicity 
8 Avoid increased cost of insurance 
The relative importance attributed to the factors influencing 
positive safety management (Vassie. 1994[bD 
Influencing: factors ".' '<' . Mean rating: ......• •..... 
. ' ' .. . ...... <i: ..•. '. > 
Caring for employees 1.7 
Reduce lost time 1.75 
Enhance company image 1.85 
Reduce cost of accidents 1.95 
Avoid court action 2.25 
Minimize insurance costs 2.5 
The results of this work on motivation may be used later in preparation for the 
focus groups. It is intended to glean information about motivation from "small" 
business managers because motivation provides the impetus and direction for 
'how' safety management is practiced. Motivation for safety management has 
seldom been considered for "small businesses". 
More recently a framework has been devised to encourage small firms to 
manage health and safety (Walker et ai, 1997). This work was based on the 
findings of four projects undertaken within the Centre for Hazard and Risk 
46 
CHAPTER TWO - HYPOTHESIS SETTING; INCLUDING LITERATURE SEARCH 
Management (CHaRM) between 1995 and 1997. The comparison of the 
findings from the four studies revealed that there were both internally and 
externally generated motivators, influencing small firms to manage health and 
safety effectively. 
The internal motivation came from 'moral responsibility' and a caring ethos. 
There were also found to be a number of external motivations. The 
motivations included methods of enforcement of legislation, legal compliance 
imperatives and client pressure. The review of these studies also concluded 
that managers within small and medium-sized businesses do not consider 
cost of accidents to be a major influence on their decisions. 
The motivation review included organizations described as 'small', but 'small' 
was not defined (Walker et ai, 1997). However in one study, the Health and 
Safety Competition Winners Study, it was noted the size ranged from 40 to 
1700 employees, with a mean of 265 (HSE Small Firms Unit 1997). The 
majority of companies in this study were described as "medium-sized". It is 
worth noting that these papers are not unique in omitting definitions of size 
concepts. There is an inherent difficulty in defining what is meant by 'small' 
when reviewing past research. 
Very recently some Canadian research has been published (Simard et ai, 
2000). This work looked at the factors influencing occupational health and 
safety development in small businesses. Small in this instance was defined as 
those firms with less than 50 employees. The sample size for this research 
was very small, eight plants. However, this research identified four 'types' of 
small business [the researchers termed them dynamics]. The types were; 
formal, integrated, informal and withdrawal. The formal type showed a 
moderately participatory style of management with authoritative supervision, 
the integrated and informal firms had participatory styles of management and 
supervision, while the withdrawal type had an authoritative style (Simard et ai, 
2000). It was the integrated and informal types that were found to have more 
developed safety cultures. This linking of safety culture development to styles 
of management provides another area for inquiry. 
47 
CHAPTER TWO - HYPOTHESIS SETTING; INCLUDING LITERATURE SEARCH 
2.7 THE HYPOTHESIS 
There appears to be some evidence that people have discounted the 
hypothesis that small businesses manage occupational health and safety, this 
notion has been promoted by enforcement bodies in more than one report 
(HM Chief Inspector of Factories, 1984; HSE, 1993; HSC, 1997). There is little 
published data on the health and safety record of small firms. 
The hypothesis for this research is that: 
"Treating small businesses as scaled down replicas of 
large companies is inappropriate. Small firms do manage 
health and safety but in a mode suitable to themselves." 
The studies will be conducted using a sample of businesses from the East 
Midlands and the outputs will include recommendations to improve safety 
management within smaller businesses. The findings will be used to evaluate 
the differences in managerial approach to safety, and occupational health, 
issues and to identify thresholds of size, or organizational complexities, below 
which formalized, documented safety assessment or monitoring systems may 
be inoperable. 
2.8 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO 
The literature search has provided a framework by which the study can be 
approached systematically. Previous researchers have also suggested 
indicators of performance. These will allow observational data gathering to be 
grounded on established principles. The indicators of business type, i~ternal 
power distribution, managerial approaches and safety motivators can all be 
applied to allow categorization of businesses within the sample. 
In order to uncover good safety practice within the sample it may also be 
necessary to clarify the current theoretical basis for successful approaches. It 
has also been possible to highlight the differences between the control based, 
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engineering paradigms frequently championed within safety management 
texts and the evolution of strategies that general managers aspire to. 
The literature search also revealed that blind adoption of the EU definition of 
'small' could be detrimental to the research. The definition of the concept 
'small business' was seen as integral to the study. 
CHAPTER TWO NOTES 
The term "paradigms" has been used by Sheldon (1980), Pfeffer (1981) and Johnson (1987). 
Johnson, G. (1987) Strategic Change and the Management Process, Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
Pfeffer, J. (1981) "Management as symbolic action: the creation and maintenance of 
organizational paradigms", in L.L.Cummings and B.M.Staw (eds.) Research in Organizational 
Behaviour, Volume 3, pp1-15, JAI. Press, 1981 
Sheldon, A.(1980) "Organizational paradigms, a theory of organizational change", 
Organizational Dynamics, Volume 8, Number 3, pp61-711980. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
This chapter will describe the methods employed in this 
study; including methodological foundation and the 
reasoning behind the choice. The research will comprise 
initial pilots and a case study approach. Some 
businesses in the sample will contribute data, through 
three gathering techniques. Triangulation of data will test 
the reliability of data gathered. 
3.0 INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The hypothesis reflected the view that treating small businesses as scaled 
down replicas of large companies was inappropriate. The notion has been put 
forward that small firms do manage health and safety but in a mode suitable 
to them. 
There was a pre-existing conceptual framework for this study. The 
overarching variable in the hypothesis was concerned with size of the 
organization. The focus was on organizations as a concept. Four important 
concepts were the 'small' business, the 'small business sector', 'management' 
and 'safety management'. 
In Chapter Two the use of the McKinsey 7-S Framework®, to give structure to 
the study, was described (Section 2.3). By choosing to use a framework for 
the study, the targeted data had pre-existing conceptual tags. Conceptual 
tags included: roles, relationships and routines. 
During this research all terms, where possible, were taken from common 
English. Some terms required logical explication, to render concepts less 
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vague or ambiguous. [Logical explication - precise definition, or redefinition 
(Mandler and Kessen, 1959)]. Terms that required very precise initial 
definition included 'small business'. The preliminary definition of 'small' was 
discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.1.1). The hypothesis for this study 
required the definition and redefinition of the concept of 'small' when applied 
to a business. 
The notion of a pre-designed conceptual framework to orient data collection 
goes against the more loosely structured "grounded" approach to data 
gathering (Miles and Huberman, 1984). The adoption of a loose framework for 
this study was unavoidable to some extent. The volume of data expected 
dictated that a framework might be necessary to maintain the focus of the 
study. There was a perceived danger in adopting an unstructured approach. 
This danger stemmed from the mass of potential data, and the difficulty in 
achieving comparability across cases. The findings of previous researchers', 
about the heterogeneity within the small firms' sector, caused concern 
regarding difficulty in comparing characteristics, within small businesses 
(Jones, 1989; Rainnie, 1989; Goss, 1991). 
In order for the research design not to constrict, and so stifle true 
investigation, the conceptual framework evolved during the course of the 
study. The design was flexible, and allowed deviations, in the method and 
direction of the study. Following up issues as they emerged was an intentional 
device. 
The research design was necessarily constrained to some extent. The studies 
centre on organizational research where the previous work, of others, has 
developed an understanding to a point where an open design coul9 fail to 
build on that work, and could represent needless repetition. This study lies 
between the two extremes of a tight, pre-structured qualitative design and a 
loose, emergent one. The main motivation was practical. The looser the initial 
design, the less selective the data collection and the greater the likelihood of 
information overload. 
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Previous organizational researchers have suggested that no matter how small 
the sample, nor what the researcher's interest, it was important to go into an 
organization with a well-defined focus (Mintzberg, 1979). The design of the 
fieldwork, in this research, was to include multiple case studies, rather than 
single site. Still, the focusing and bounding of data collection was considered 
a useful method of anticipatory data reduction. 
The hypothesis included many areas of examination. The concept of 'small' 
had to be refined. There was also a need to show whether, or not, small 
businesses differed from large businesses, within the study. However, the 
primary area of investigation was the way small businesses manage safety. 
The first task was to define a 'small' business. The literature search generated 
an initial working definition. The definition required testing. This need to test a 
concept required a preliminary study. The preliminary study could be by postal 
questionnaire, but the overall design was to include field research. 
3.1 RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
There were a number of problems anticipated in conducting this research. 
The challenges have been outlined below. 
3.1.1. THE CHOICE OF METHODS 
At the start of this research it seemed this investigation may call for a variety 
of techniques for data collection. One previous organizational researcher had 
found that "simpler, more direct methodologies have yielded more useful 
results" (Mintzberg, 1979). He also claimed, "measuring in real organizational 
terms means first of all getting out into the field, into real organizations. 
Questionnaires often won't do ..... It is their inherent complexity and 9ynamic 
nature that characterize phenomena such as policy making. Simplification 
squeezes out the very thing on which the research should focus". This advice 
guided strongly towards field research. 
It was suspected that many of the actions and processes that contributed to 
'safety management' might be practised intuitively. If intuition were a 
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significant element of small business management then the research could 
not rely on reported data, first hand observation would be essential. Some 
managers may not be aware themselves of the significance of some of their 
routines. This absence of awareness could be expected to influence their 
reporting. 
While lack of awareness, among some managers, may affect reported data, 
so may managers' reticence about their practices. This reticence may create 
a lack of openness that would limit the depth of study possible. Again direct 
observation may help overcome this problem. 
However, to design a study, incorporating an element of observation, was 
believed to require a broad knowledge of the operating constraints of the 
small business sector. The use of language and idioms in relation to 
workplace safety, and the extent, location and nature of organizations within 
the small business sector, were also important. To achieve the initial 
understanding the value of a survey approach was recognized. 
Though refinement of language and idioms could better be achieved through 
verbal communication, than by survey instrument. The initial, investigative, 
phase of the study, therefore, was to include interviews. The interviews were 
scheduled to occur after the questionnaire, as the preliminary data should 
offer a basis for discussion. 
The initial survey should allow confirmation of the existence, location, industry 
type, and size of organizations that may be suitable for further study. The 
results of the survey should also yield data that would extend the range of 
information available about the businesses in the chosen sample. 
3.1.2. THE SAMPLE SELECTION. 
There was no adequate register of small businesses and no obvious way 
discovered to obtain comprehensive information about the small business 
sector directly. A variety of data bases were regularly trawled, sorted and 
checked for duplicate entries and applicability to the sampling parameters. 
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The sampling parameters are described later in the thesis (see Chapter 
Three, Section 3.2.1.3). 
3.1.3. THE HETEROGENEOUS NATURE OF THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR. 
From the literature search it was apparent that the small business sector was 
diverse (Goss, 1991). Previous researchers have argued that there are four 
assumptions that often lead to serious misunderstandings about the nature of 
small firms. These concern: 
a. the tendency to examine small firms without regard to their inter-
industrial differences and wider economic and social context; 
b. the special qualities attributed to all small firms, like: innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and harmony; 
c. the idea that all small firms are characterized by common 
interests and harmony between owners and workers; 
d. the attribution of uniform organizational structures to small firms 
Goss (1991). 
The issues concerning the lack of homogeneity in the sector have been 
discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.2). 
3.1.4. THE RESEARCHER'S ASSUMPTIONS. 
It has been a criticism in the past that researchers have tended to have pre-
conceived notions of 'small' and large'. It was intended that this study should. 
avoid this trap as far as possible. It was con'sidered important that a grounded 
conceptualization of size was an integral part of the initial study. 
3.1.5. THE VOLUME OF DATA FROM VARIOUS SOURCES AND OF VARIOUS TYPES. 
As three methods of data collection were planned, and as one involved direct 
observation, an enormous amount of data was anticipated. The framework 
was included in the design in an attempt to order the data in a logical manner 
that would assist the analysis and help in determining 'how' safety was 
managed. The dangers inherent in restricting data handling at the design 
stage were recognized. During the data sorting meta-matrices were employed 
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to sort and re-sort the data. Meta-matrices were an attempt to reduce the risk 
of inadvertently excluding an avenue of inquiry. 
3.1.6. THE INACCESSIBILITY OF SMALL FIRMS. 
Sampling issues were central to the ability to draw generalized conclusions 
from the findings. It was realized at the outset that the sample could be limited 
due to problems with accessibility. 
Given the importance attached to direct observations, in the design of the 
study, it was necessary to gain free access into a number of small 
businesses. The establishment of trust between the researcher and the 
business manager, sufficient to facilitate thorough inspections and allow the 
type of observations needed, presented a significant challenge in this 
research. 
Trust was established through two mechanisms. The first technique was to 
establish a strong association with a recognized university and a centre 
known for its expertise in risk assessment and safety related research and 
training, the Centre for Hazard and Risk Management (CHaRM). This link was 
established by using headed notepaper, laying out all correspondence out in 
formal business format and seeking the assistance of the, then, Director of 
CHaRM in allowing. use of her signature and title. 
The second means of establishing trust was via the business networks that 
existed. This entailed increasing the visibility of the researcher at venues 
associated with business and safety. This was achieved by speaking at 
safety training sessions (arranged by the local authority), and attending 
meetings. The meetings included; HSE breakfast meetings with managers of 
small businesses, those of the local Chamber of Commerce and those run by 
the local Training and Enterprise Council (TEe) for local businesses. In this 
way the researcher's name became more widely recognized among the 
businesses in the Leicestershire area, and was readily associated with health 
and safety management issues and local business activities. 
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A number of businesses were approached directly. These direct approaches 
were to organizations the researcher had previously visited, in a professional 
capacity, in the preceding five years. During these visits the distinction 
between any previous enforcement activities and the research had to be 
reinforced. A decision was required from the researcher at the outset about 
the ethical position in any conflict between data gathered as part of the 
research and any serious risks or imminent hazards identified. The solution 
adopted was to discuss the issue frankly with each business manager 
beforehand and to agree a method of feeding back information about any 
serious safety issues directly to the manager, should the need arise. 
As the research progressed some of the businesses who had been involved 
acted as 'referees' for the researcher when other managers needed 
reassurance. 
3.1.7. Low RESPONSE RATES. 
It was anticipated that in using a postal survey that there could be a low 
response rate. Response rates for other postal surveys, distributed to small 
and medium-sized businesses, had been generally low, <20 per cent (Fuller, 
Murphy and Vickerstaff, 1991; Storey, 1994). The poor response rate 
expected from a postal survey, coupled with the perceived need for direct 
observations, was a major factor in deciding to use three methods of data 
collection and to triangulate the results. 
3.1.8. THE VOLATILITY OF THE SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR. 
Some previous studies have shown that around one third of businesses cease 
trading within the three years of being set up (Ganguly and Bannock, 1985). 
Other research emphasized the rapid turnover of businesses in some. sectors 
(Stewart and Gallagher, 1985). This volatility was expected to cause some 
difficulties. One difficulty may arise in locating businesses, to access for 
research. 
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3.2 PRELIMINARY STUDY - BY SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
The first data collection method was a postal survey of businesses. Much of 
the previous work that had been done on attitudes to topics such as health 
and safety issues had not made allowance for the size of the undertaking 
(Pitblado et al 1990, Powell and Canter 1985; Ridley, 1990). 
The main purpose of an initial survey was to generate data from which to build 
follow on investigations, to refine the issues progressively. The researcher 
assumed responsibility for designing the survey and carrying it out, survey 
design is detailed in section 3.2.1.5 (below). 
The provision of information by survey was known to be limited and it was felt 
necessary to acknowledge those limitations. Determining the sample frame 
was considered crucial. The apparent reluctance of owner-managers to join 
schemes or societies (Bolton Committee, 1971; Kets de Vries, 1977) and the 
lack of data available for these organizations; even in the form of government 
statistics (Ganguly & Bannock, 1985) meant there was no readily identifiable 
group of subjects to survey. 
The initial working definition for the purposes of this study had legal 
independence, as a starting point. The initial working definition became a 
business 'with not more than 25 employees under contract at anyone time, 
employed either full or part-time. It will be legally independent and will have no 
more than one administrative site'. However, in order not to exclude too many 
businesses from the initial investigation a second group of businesses have 
been determined. These businesses will still be legally independent, with only 
one administrative centre but with between 25 and 50 employees (Chapter 
Two, Section 2.1.3). 
3.2.1 DEFINING THE SAMPLE 
The initial sample was geographically restricted in that it was centred on a 
single county: Leicestershire. Initially businesses were selected and 
compared with the working definition for 'fit'. A database was created and the 
sample selection was made from the database. The original assessment of 
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'fit', with the working criteria, was made on very limited information. 
3.2.1.1 COMPREHENSIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE 
Comprehensiveness of the sample was a prime consideration (Fowler, 1984), 
The available lists required supplementing with local knowledge and 
additional inputs from trade directories, telephone books, local authority 
registers, etc. As details of new organizations were discovered they were 
added to the list of subjects. 
It appeared, as new subjects were discovered, that those previously omitted 
from the database were not distinctive. There was no evidence that any 
unwitting omissions would cause a bias that may fundamentally damage any 
findings. The database used was accepted as being limited in terms of 
coverage. 
3.2.1.2 PROBABILITY OF SELECTION. 
The area of Leicestershire, at the start of the study, was divided into nine 
political constituencies: Leicester City, Charnwood, Harborough, Melton, 
Blaby, Oadby and Wigston, Hinckley, North West Leicestershire and Rutland. 
The area included 25,900 businesses registered for VAT (Mistry, 1995). 
Charnwood had 4,037 of those VAT registered businesses and Rutland 
accounted for 523. The VAT registered businesses did not include all 
businesses. These records could only provide a guide. The target businesses, 
the 'small' ones, are likely to be below the registration threshold and therefore 
invisible to the statistics (Ganguly & Bannock, 1985). 
The first questionnaire survey was targeted at 252 organizations. One 
problem soon emerged; during the course of the study some businesses 
ceased to exist and new starters emerged. This necessitated regular updating 
of the data-base. 
3.2.1.3 THE EFFICIENCY OF THE SAMPLING SCHEME 
Units were sampled randomly from the database. Ineligible subjects, that had 
escaped the initial sorting, had to be excluded on initial analysis of the returns. 
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This was made possible by the inclusion of a question [Question 1.5], about 
number of employees, in the survey instrument (see Section 3.2.1.5). 
It was considered desirable to restrict the potential sample group to those 
subjects within a defined district boundary. It was intended to follow the 
dictates of area probability (Fowler, 1984). 
Leicestershire was the county targeted. The county was already defined, on 
maps, and subdivision was allowed by following the prescribed political and 
geographical boundaries of its constituent districts. These district boundaries 
are clearly mapped and form mutually exclusive sub-areas. 
The nature of the information required from respondents made the selection 
of the recipient of the questionnaire within each organization, a critical one. 
The depth of information sought was not expected to be easy to report and 
would require specialist knowledge. The questioning therefore had to be 
aimed at the manager most knowledgeable in matters of occupational health 
and safety. 
The sample size was determined in terms of convenience, cost and limitations 
in time for assessing responses. The analysis plan could not be 
comprehensive for the initial survey as the first organizations were to be 
surveyed with very little prior knowledge of them. Outlining subgroups within 
the initial list for which separate estimates would be required was necessarily 
crude and hinged on complexity of organizational structure, number of 
employees and industry sector. It was not possible initially to estimate the 
fraction of the initial group that would fall into these subgroups, this was 
further complicated as each of the sub-group descriptors were not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
The survey data quality was dependent on the survey sample; as well as 
instrument design. The quality could be affected in three different ways: an 
exclusive sample frame may not have included necessary organizations. 
Some bias could be expected in the sample estimates, to the extent that 
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those excluded differed from those sampled. If sampling was not probabilistic 
there could be no statistical basis for assuming the sample to be 
representative of the target businesses. The design of a probability sample 
was expected to affect the sampling errors. 
3.2.1.4. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF NON-RESPONSE 
The sampling procedure for the initial questionnaire designated a specific set 
of 252 units. The quality of the sample data was known to depend on the 
proportion of that set from where data were actually collected. 
There were thought to be three reasons that those selected to be in the 
sample might not actually provide data. The survey entailed a risk that the 
survey instrument might not actually reach the respondents. This could be 
due to out of date contact addresses from the lists, or because the postal 
delivery increased the likelihood that the forms were filtered as 'junk mail' and 
never reached their target. Those persons asked to provide data may decline. 
This was a real risk in this pilot study, either because the target respondents 
were senior managers who are fully occupied in running their business, or 
because the issues of internal management were considered too sensitive to 
reveal impersonally to a stranger. 
It was also possible that those asked are unable to perform the required task. 
This could be because the questionnaire has been wrongly targeted or 
because the task of completing the survey was inappropriately delegated on 
receipt, or because the language used was unclear or too technical. 
3.2.1.5 DESIGN OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE: 
It was recognized that the design of the questionnaires themselves could 
influence the results obtained. Distortions and other quirks in the way 
questions were framed were known to be capable of invalidating the entire 
survey. 
The initial survey instrument was designed to incorporate predominately 
qualitative questions. The early questions were deliberately broad so as not to 
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delimit the study. The questions were formulated following a series of semi-
structured telephone interviews with managers of businesses within 
Loughborough and Leicester City. As the interviews progressed the 
questions were refined and formed the basis for the questionnaire. This 
approach, of developing broad questions, was subsequently found to be a 
recommended approach (Creswell, 1994). It has been suggested that broad 
questions, as part of a grounded theory approach, reflected an aim to 
discover (C reswe 11 , 1994). He suggested that each question should begin 
'how' or 'what'. The qualitative questions included in the initial survey were: 
1.1 How long have you held this position? 
1.3 What is the nature of the business? 
1 .4 When was the organization established ? 
1.5 How many employees does the company have? 
1.6 Which of the following levels of management does your company 
have? 
2.1 Who is responsible for giving advice on H&S matters in your company? 
2.2 How many hours a week are spent on this activity? 
2.3 Who else is involved? 
2.4 What are the main hazards in your workplace? 
2.6 What Health and Safety legislation are you aware of that affects your 
business? 
2.7 How many lost time accidents have you had in the past 5 years? 
2.8 Who enforces Health & Safety at your premises? 
2.9 If you have ever been visited by your enforcement agency, what was 
the outcome? 
2.10 What arrangements do you have in place for managing health and 
safety? 
2.11 a "What if anything prevents you from taking up training" [Tranche 1] 
2.11 b How do you update yourself on H&S issues? [Tranqhes 2 & 3] 
2.12 How do you consider the H&S legislation impacts on your company? 
NB. The numbering of the questions above reflects that used in the 
questionnaire, the numbers are therefore not consecutive in the list. 
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It was intended from the outset that questions would be subject to review and 
reformulation during the course of the study. The use of open-ended 
questions was a technique employed where possible to reduce the 
delimitation of the data gathering still further. However. questions 1.3; 1.6; 2.3; 
2.4; 2.6; 2.8; 2.9; and 2.10 were provided with alternative answers and tick 
boxes to aid the data sorting and collation of these data. Question 2.11 was 
initially an open question but was amended for Tranches 2 & 3. The amended 
question 2.11 was provided with alternative answers and tick boxes. A sample 
questionnaire is shown in Appendix 1. 
To counteract the limiting effect of providing tick boxes, questions 2.4; 2.6 and 
2.10 were provided with an open text facility at the end of each question. 
Question 2.11 had initially been an open question [Tranche 1] but on 
amending to tick boxes it too was designed with an open text facility at the 
end. 
Within the survey instrument there were also supplementary questions 
designed to elicit greater depth of information on a topic: 
1.2 Please give brief information about your previous work experience of 
relevance to health and safety e.g. specific training. 
2.5 Please list a few of the hazards you have identified and briefly describe 
the controls you use. 
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As the questions were qualitative they did not specify relationships between 
pre-identified variables. However, during the analysis of these data some 
hypotheses were generated. These hypotheses were very specific and 
assisted in the assessment of the relationship of the variables. One area 
where they were used particularly was to test the notion that small businesses 
may differ from large. This notion was fundamental to the study; in that 
treating small businesses as scaled down replicas of large companies is 
inappropriate. 
The hypotheses are in Chapter 4, Tables 4.20 and 4.21, 4.22 and 4.23, 4.24 
and 4.25. One hypothesis was based on the probability of a business (>25 
employees) having adequate, statutory, health and safety documentation 
being the same as for small businesses «25 employees): the null hypothesis 
that both groups of businesses [grouped according to size] had the same 
probabilities of having specified safety documentation. Another hypothesis 
tested the likelihood of a business (>25 employees) having undertaken risk 
assessments; the null hypothesis being that the likelihood is the same as for 
small businesses «25 employees). Another hypothesis tested whether the 
probability of a business (>25 employees) having implemented safety 
initiatives that exceed statutory minimum requirements is the same as for 
small businesses «25 employees). 
These hypotheses were generated and tested using the data obtained from 
questions 2.4; 2.5, 2.10 and 1.5. The null hypothesis was used in each case. 
The statistical test employed in each case was the chi-square test. Thus in the 
later use of hypotheses it was possible to investigate precise relations 
between identified variables, such as size of business. However, the main 
purpose of the initial survey questionnaire remained in the elicitation of 
qualitative data, information to guide the remainder of the study. 
As this questionnaire was a new design it was expected to show some 
defects. The questionnaire was therefore evaluated prior to being used as an 
instrument for data collection. The survey questionnaire was tested and 
piloted, prior to general distribution. The piloting was to ensure each question 
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addressed an issue relevant to the purpose of the survey. Those receiving the 
pilot surveys were asked to assess whether the function of the question was 
clear from one reading and whether the question was related to the 
information the survey was targeted to gathering. It was also requested that 
the questions were checked to ensure they were written in plain, simple 
language that was easy to follow. 
The initial piloting was with peers within CHaRM, and visitors to CHaRM. 
Some questions were amended in response to the feedback obtained. The 
changes were predominantly related to use of language and elimination of 
residual jargon. The questionnaires were then re-tested on a separate group 
of businessmen. (The pilot testing was also used to test the validity of the 
questions; this is covered in more detail in section 3.2.3 below.) 
The use of plain English was seen as particularly important, not only in 
phrasing questions but also for instructions, introductions for passages and 
the accompanying letter requesting participation. Difficult words and phrases, 
complex sentences and jargon, were all intentionally avoided as far as 
possible. Another problem was recognized as applying particularly to the 
initial survey: the questionnaire could be perceived as very daunting to 
complete. The other difficulties surrounded the targeting of the survey 
instrument. 
Nothing was known about the recipient except their name, job title and 
employing organization. There was a risk that questions may have been 
incorporated in the survey instrument of which respondents had no 
knowledge. 
It was also a concern with open questions that providing an answer may have 
been unwieldy in the space provided. The instruction accompanying the 
questions may have also served to confuse. The questionnaire had the 
potential to be too long or demanding. All these factors were expected to exert 
an influence on the rate of response. However, during the pilot testing few of 
these fears were realized. 
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It was decided that the initial questionnaire results would be used to identify 
any differences in results that could be attributed to 'size'. They could be used 
to refine the definition of 'small'; make comparisons between the approaches 
adopted by individual small businesses; identify how managerial approaches 
could be improved; set up a baseline for measuring change if any survey were 
to be subsequently repeated. 
The procedures used were known to have an important influence on the 
response rate. The first survey was by postal questionnair~. It was considered 
that non-respondents could introduce significant bias into the sample data but 
part of the purpose of this preliminary questionnaire was to trial postal survey 
as a data collection method. From the results of previous research, by others 
a low response rate was expected (Fuller, Murphy and Vickerstaff, 1991; 
Storey, 1994). 
3.2.1.6 BIAS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-RESPONSE 
It was known that the effects of non-response on the survey would depend on 
the percentage not responding and the extent to which those non-
respondents differ from the population as a whole. Where response rates are 
low the final sample can be deemed to have little relationship to the original 
sample. Those responding essentially self select and it can be deemed 
unlikely the data collected could provide any credible statistics about the 
group. 
There was no agreed standard for minimum acceptable response rate and it 
was known the nature of bias differs between postal, telephone, and personal 
interview procedures. It was believed that for most postal surveys people who 
have a particular interest in the research are generally more likely to return 
questionnaires than others. It therefore followed that the first postal 
questionnaire, with a low response rate could be presumed to be significantly 
biased in ways that are related directly to the purposes of the study (Donald 
1960). 
65 
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
To overcome the problem of bias, due to the method of data collection, the 
study has been designed to triangulate samples of results obtained from three 
different data collection methods. The notion of triangulation arises from the 
principles of navigation. Collection of data from three independent sources or 
by three different methods allows comparison of the findings (T. Cox, 1993; 
Glendon and McKenna, 1995). The use of sample triangulation was not 
intended to provide a universal remedy for any basic methodological 
weaknesses in the study. The rate of response was still an important 
consideration in the selection of the data collection procedure; and the 
problem of non-response was central to the decision not too pursue the use of 
postal surveys beyond the initial stage. 
3.2.2 THE PROCEDURE FOR THE SURVEY 
As has already been described, part of the development of the survey 
instrument involved piloting it on a small population. The purpose of this was 
to identify any errors in the survey's form and presentation. Piloting, amending 
and re-testing the survey instrument was deemed suitable for use. 
The questionnaire comprised three sections. Section 1 requested information 
about the business: the nature of the business by sector of operations, its age 
and its size, etc. Section 2 was concerned with the experience of the 
respondent and awareness of health and safety issues. Section 3 addressed 
current voluntary health and safety improvement schemes. The survey 
instrument has been reproduced in the Appendix 1. 
The survey distribution was in three tranches. The first postal questionnaire 
(Questionnaire 1 - the Charnwood questionnaire) was sent out initially to 250 
small and medium-sized companies in the local Charnwood area. 
In the second tranche of the survey a slightly modified questionnaire was sent 
to a random selection of 400 UK businesses from the CHaRM database. The 
ChaRM database has been described in Section 3.2.1 above; it covers the 
county of Leicestershire. The second modified questionnaire had extended 
questions and asked respondents to rank a list of factors suggested as 
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motivational factors for management to seek to improve standards in 
employees' health, safety, and working environment. Tranches 1 and 2 of the 
survey were carried out between October 1994 and March 1995. 
Tranche 3 was a survey of a further 100 Leicestershire firms these were 
randomly selected from Local Authority Economic Development Business 
Indices, TEC publications and Chambers of Trade and Commerce 
publications. Random selection was only employed after screening out those 
firms that had already been contacted and those that were obviously larger 
than the nominal (50 employee) threshold. 
3.2.3 ANALYSINGSURVEYDATA 
The survey sample was not so large nor could it be deemed so 
representative, of a heterogeneous group, that the chance of random error 
could be guaranteed to be negligible. Neither was there any suggestion that 
the survey instrument was perfect. Some error was expected to have 
occurred during the measurement process. 
The survey instrument has not been assumed to be perfectly reliable but a 
judgement as to the reliability must be included in any assessment of the 
data. In this study a form of test-retest reliability was built into the method, via 
triangulation of the results (T. Cox, 1993). The initial survey was administered 
to different respondents in three phases: October 1994 (Tranche 1), January 
1995 (Tranche 2) and June 1995 (Tranche 3). The focus groups were held in 
February 1995, March 1995 and May 1995. The inspections and interview 
phase was undertaken between January 1996 and March 1999. 
Some provision was also made for alternate form reliability testing w~thin the 
survey instrument itself (A copy of the questionnaire has been shown in 
Appendix 1). Question 2.5 in Section 1 invited respondents to describe 
methods used to control hazards. This was a free text question. During coding 
the answers were sorted into; hardware controls, systems of work and 
behaviour I training I attitude. Later in the questionnaire Question 2.10 
specifically asked about safety systems. This was a multiple answer tick box 
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question with a maximum of twelve answers. The twelve possible responses 
included systems of work in three places, behaviour I attitude in one box and 
training in one, one answer was left completely open. These questions used 
non-equivalent item rewording to test the reliability of the individual 
responses. The aim of these questions was to measure the prevalence of the 
conscious use of systems of work, as a hazard control measure, against other 
controls in the businesses. 
The validity of the survey instrument was not considered in isolation. However 
it was independently considered during the design stage qf the questionnaire. 
An important consideration was how well the instrument would measure what 
was intended. Several types of validity were considered: face validity, content 
validity, criterion validity and construct validity. 
The initial piloting had provided reassurance about the face validity of the 
instrument. The pilot testing had provided by a review of the items by 
untrained assessors. In this instance eight, impartial laymen, assessed the 
instrument. These persons were randomly selected and were visitors to 
CHaRM, local authority officers and administrative staff. The only criterion for 
selection, as an assessor, being that the person should not have specialist 
knowledge of health and safety management or small businesses. 
The assessors were asked to read the questionnaire and highlight any 
ambiguities in the questions, any jargon that obscured the question and any 
areas where the nature of the response required was not readily apparent. 
The feedback from these appraisals was reviewed and the questions and text 
were amended. The instrument was then re-tested on three newly selected 
individuals. 
Content validity was tested by peer review. The preliminary review was 
conducted between the researcher, a CHaRM lecturer and a Senior Research 
Fellow of CHaRM. Others with specialist knowledge of the subject matter 
were also invited to assess the content of the instrument. These included: 
local authority enforcement officers, safety consultants and businessmen. 
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A workshop was also held on 5 December 1994 (between Tranches 1 & 2). at 
CHaRM. This forum was designed to explore the central issues surrounding 
safety management in small businesses. Those invited included 
representatives from: the CHaRM Small Business Research Group, the 
University of Valencia (Spain) and TNO Preventative Health Care Institute 
(Netherlands). the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). the Royal SOCiety for 
the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA), the Training and Enterprise Council 
(TEC) and the Leicestershire Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The notes 
for the discussions at the forum were reviewed prior t~ distribution of the 
second tranche of questionnaires. Small amendments were deemed 
necessary as a result of the review. 
Question 2.11 in Tranches 2 & 3 differed from the first version in that in the 
first version the question was asked: "What if anything prevents you from 
taking up training". Training in small businesses was an area that was 
deemed worthy, by the workshop forum. of being researched as a stand -
alone issue. This question was also giving a very low response rate in the 
initial questionnaire. Therefore in Tranches 2 & 3 the question was amended 
to read "How do you update yourself on H&S issues?" This also changed from 
a free text question to a tick box with a free text option. 
Determining criterion validity was expected to be problematic. Ideally this 
survey instrument would be compared to another instrument. However, during 
1994/5 when the instrument was being administered there was very little 
published data available on research into safety management in small 
businesses. There were data on training in small businesses and Question 
1.2 of this instrument concerns the training history of the person undertaking 
the safety management role. 
No research could be found which assessed precisely the same variables. 
, 
The literature search provided no solution as none of the relevant stUdies had 
employed any statistical testing to their results. The outcome has been 
summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below. 
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Author 
Kirby 
(1990) 
Fuller, 
Murphy & 
Vickerstaff 
(1991) 
Cambridge 
Small 
Business 
Research 
Centre 
(1992) 
Johnson 
and 
Gubbins 
(1992) 
Abbott 
(1993) 
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The outcome of the first literature search, at the time of 
designing the survey instrument 
Sector.studied . Sample Survey Method Response I Statistical 
I' .. ' .. ' 
size Date .. . rate method' 
Small Telephone No statistical 
businesses 40 1988 survey 53% testing 
11-50 
employees 
Postal No statistical 
All sectors 197 1989 questionnaire 14% testing 
Manufacturing + Postal No statistical 
business 2028 1991 questionnaire 33% testing 
services Telephone 
1-500 interviews 
employees 
Independent Face-to-face No statistical 
employers with 50 N.S. interviews N.S testing 
5-50 employees 
Independent Face-to-face No statistical 
small firms < 25 81 N.S. interviews N.S testing 
employees. 
The final column indicates the problem encountered in testing concurrent reliability of the 
instrument. 
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Table 3.2 Outcome of the follow up literature search, at the time of 
analysing the survey instrument. 
Author Sector studied Sample Survey Method Response Statistical 
size Date rate method 
Curran, Owner- Telephone No statistical 
Blackbum, managed firms 751 1995 interviews 78% testing 
Kitching + 1-199 
North employees 
(1996) 
Matlay Owner- Telephone No statistical 
(1996) managed firms 2000 1993 interviews N.S. testing 
1-199 Face-to-face 
employees interviews 
Walker, Small firms who Telephone No statistical 
Cox + Tait had carried out 25 1995 interviews N.S. testing 
(1997) training 
The final column indicates the problem encountered in testing concurrent reliability of the 
instrument persisted. 
It has not been possible to evaluate concurrent validity of the survey 
instrument. There was no standard against which to judge the new survey 
instrument. It was decided it would not be helpful to show good correlation 
with some obscure index just because it was one of the few available. An 
accepted relevant standard could not be found despite exhaustive effort being 
expended. 
Construct validity was seen as an important method of assessing the survey 
instrument, because it was deemed important to have a measura of how 
meaningful the instrument was in practical use (Litwin, 1995). 
Univariate analysiS was employed to establish how many people gave each 
different response. It was recognized that were one question was analyzed in 
isolation the results may appear to speak for themselves, but it was 
considered important not to take these results at face value. Many of the 
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questions were simple factual questions and the results were taken to be 
straightforward. . 
Questions about people's subjective responses however, such as attitudes or 
opinions were seen as posing more serious problems. It was considered 
important when interpreting these responses that the respondents 
expectations were noted. 
Once the initial univariate analysis had been completed a bivariate analysis 
was undertaken. Initially three types of comparison were considered likely to 
provide interesting or useful findings: comparisons between industry sectors, 
comparisons between companies of different sizes and comparisons against 
other questions, on the survey form. 
The comparison against other questions was seen as a useful tool. This 
bivariate analysis was intended to provide well-focused results with clear, 
practical implications. There were still problems recognized with this 
technique. When interpreting the relationship between questions there was 
always the possibility that a particular result had been thrown up by chance, 
that it was purely coincidental. Tests of statistical significance were employed 
where possible to enable the author to say with reasonable confidence 
whether any finding was likely to be a coincidence. 
This issue, of results being produced by a random element, was further 
complicated by the low response rates. It was this problem that required the 
triangulation approach of the three separate data gathering methods in order 
to place increased confidence in the information obtained (Glendon and 
McKenna, 1995). 
3.2.3.1 ANALYSIS OF OPEN QUESTIONS AND CODING 
The survey instrument included open questions. This was a deliberate 
decision and was an attempt to gain insight into the reasoning behind some of 
the responses. The disadvantage was that the answers were difficult to 
analyze and represent. To analyze them a coding frame was devised as a 
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system of categorizing the classification of people's responses. 
The coding frames were designed to adequately summarize what 
respondents said, and make relevant distinctions between the main themes 
expressed. The coding system was an alpha-numeric system. The codes 
were determined for each question and a decoding reference sheet retained 
(the coding summary sheet has been reproduced in Appendix 5). Each 
response for each question was coded and had its own column on a 
spreadsheet. 
Coding the questionnaire was the initial phase of the analysis of the survey 
instrument. It involved trawling each respondents questionnaire and looking 
for missing data, free text responses, margin notes, etc. The ambiguous and 
multiple answers were categorized. Missing data was coded as 9. 
In this way the responses, even to open questions, could be transferred to a 
spreadsheet for analysis. In the pilot survey the open ended questions were 
found to provide some of the most interesting information, especially when 
respondents where specifying why they chose a certain response to the 
preceding question. These open-ended questions were seen as precursors to 
the questions of the focus groups. 
3.2.3.2 INTERPRETING THE SURVEY DATA 
The aim of the investigation went beyond finding out about those businesses 
with managers who responded to the survey. They were merely a sample of 
the wider sector, the small business sector. Generalizations from the results 
garnered in the survey can only be justified where statistical inferences can be 
drawn. 
During the analysis the first step has been to describe the results and scores 
and differences between the scores of groups of respondents. In drawing 
conclusions about the population an estimate of probability must be included 
that any generalized statement was true. Statistical tests have been employed 
during the analysis to give an estimate of the probabilities of the correctness 
73 
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
of the inference. The statistical tests have been used to account for the 
element of chance that could account for any of the recorded results. The 
choice of threshold for significance will directly influence the type of error that 
may occur. 
In most instances the threshold used was 0.05. If the threshold was too easy, 
for example 0.1, there was a danger of concluding that something was 
significant when only chance was at work (Type 1 error). On the other hand, if 
the probability threshold was set too low, it was too difficult, and there was 
likelihood that there will be a failure to reach a conclusion that something was 
Significant, even when there was an important influence other than chance 
(Type 2 error). A type 1 error involves a mistaken conclusion, while a type 2 
error was a failure to reach a conclusion that might have been inferred. 
By adopting a level of significance at 0.05 there was an acceptance that there 
was a 1 in 20 probability of drawing a flawed conclusion. When comparing two 
groups of scores a t-test has been used to test the hypotheses. This was a 
distribution-dependent test. This means that the test assumes that the random 
errors generally have a normal distribution. Distribution-free tests use less of 
the data; because they use less data they can be less efficient than the t-test 
in demonstrating real differences when they exist. 
All forms of the t-test share the same basic approach: a statistic was 
compared with its standard error. The standard error depended both on the 
amount of data and its variability. Large values of t indicate a significant result. 
This test makes most use of the information within the data by using the raw 
scores for the calculation. 
The t-test could not be used for all data. Where the results were based on 
frequencies the chi-squared test was used. Chi-squared compares the 
observed frequencies with expected frequencies. It was expected that 
frequencies follow from both the sample size and the null hypothesis that s 
being tested. Where there was only one degree of freedom the formula was 
adjusted to include Yates' correction for continuity. This correction reduces 
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type 1 error, where there was only one degree of freedom. 
Where the value of chi-square was large enough to be significant the null 
hypothesis was rejected. It was then concluded that something other than 
chance has caused the sample to depart from the expected probabilities. 
3.3 USING FOCUS GROUPS AS AN INITIAL STUDY. 
The postal survey included some open questions to encourage respondents 
to express their views. However, survey responses were limited by the nature 
of the collection method. To investigate motivations and perceptions about 
occupational health and safety management, in small firms, a more 
exploratory technique was required. It was necessary to employ a technique 
that would encourage expression of those views and allow concurrent 
examination of sentiments expressed. 
The preliminary technique considered was by interviewing a sample of 
managers. However, the choice of sample size made this option excessively 
time-consuming. A compromise was sought, focus groups are said to allow a 
greater number of people to be interviewed in the same time (Bellenger et 
al,1976; Krueger, 1994; MOrrison, 2000). There was also an advantage that 
they may make the interview situation less 'strange' for the interviewees and 
thus less of a strain. 
Focus groups combined elements of individual interviews and participant 
observation. The explicit use of group interaction was hoped to produce data 
and insights that were thought to be less accessible without the interaction of 
a group. The main advantage of this approach was seen as the opportunity to 
observe a large amount of interaction on a topic in a limited period. The 
disadvantages were that each group was fundamentally unnatural, and each 
group was limited in allowing only observation of verbal behaviour. 
The strength of this interview technique for the purpose of this study was seen 
as affording the opportunity to observe interaction on the topic of safety, as it 
applied to each firm. Other researchers have noted that interaction can lead to 
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spontaneous responses from participants as well as producing increased 
involvement (Bellenger et ai, 1976). An advantage of group interviewing was 
the participants' interaction among themselves. It was intended that this would 
replace their interaction with the interviewer, putting greater emphasis on the 
participants' points of view. It was acknowledged that the reduction of 
interviewer intrusion would result in the facilitator being less able to manage 
the data actually collected. 
The opportunity for statistical error was high but the method was designed to 
reveal where attitudes arise, how they are structured, and what broader 
significance they may have. One important factor was that the research could 
be cheaper and quicker, than individual interview techniques. The strength of 
the technique was reported to be that it allows the exploration of topics 
(Krueger 1994). The goal in using focus groups was to learn about 
participants' experiences within their own organization. "Focus groups are 
excellent at uncovering why participants think as they do" (Morgan 1988). 
The results from a self-contained focus group could stand alone, but this did 
not preclude the use of the results as part of a larger project. Focus groups 
were seen as lending themselves to the use of results to triangulate different 
forms of data collection on the same topic (Oenzin '1978, Fielding and Fielding 
1986). The independent, or self-contained, nature of the results was deemed 
to be crucial to their ability to contribute to triangulation. 
While it was known that the technique had been used historically for 
qualitative research, it was accepted that even with strict application of the 
protocols, outcomes could not be reliably predicted. The emphasis of each 
group was on revelation and disclosure. Care was taken with the protocol of 
each group, as the validity of the results was known to depend on the process 
as well as the outcome. It was considered important that the moderator 
maintained strict neutrality, as the success of the technique was expected to 
rely on the moderator's skill in guiding, without subverting. The idea of the 
group interview was derived from the method of interviewing individuals 
developed by Robert Merton (1946; see also Merton 1990). 
76 
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
The principal benefits of the method expected were the greater depth and 
breadth of information generated at lower cost than individual in-depth 
interviews, and the opportunity for researchers to learn the 'jargon' (Nahl, 
1951). Taylor and Fiske (1981) noted it was important to be clear about the 
approach of the focus group in relation to cognitive issues. It has been noted, 
by others, that focus groups were not limited to bland discussions about 
common topics (Morgan, 1988). Morgan and Spanish (1985) used focus 
groups to provoke discussion about topics about which the participants 
seldom think. 
This notion of stimulating ideas in an area, not know for regularly attracting 
managerial consideration, was seen as particularly relevant to this study. 
Anecdotal evidence collected during telephone interviews, as part of the 
development of the questionnaires, suggested that occupational safety may 
not have been thought of as a discrete issue and may not be a topic overtly 
considered by many managers. 
3.3.1 ERROR RATES ASSOCIATED WITH FOCUS GROUPS 
It was acknowledged that, in using focus groups, the opportunity for statistical 
error was high. There are two principal sources of error known: sampling 
error, and measurement error. However, Mintzberg (1979) stated "Too many 
of the results [in the field of organization theory] have been significant only in 
the statistical sense of the word". The consequence of the findings was 
important as the purpose of the research was to determine 'how' health and 
safety was managed in small businesses. To find out 'how' something was 
being done required an investigative approach with more depth than surveys 
and statistical analysis will allow. 
These group interviews would not be the only source of data. It was part of 
the design criteria for this study that the interview data was to be combined 
with data from other sources. If the outcomes from these group interviews 
were to be used as quantitative data, it was the results from other sources 
that can be used to justify the interpretation of responses (Dexter 1970). The 
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degree of sampling error was seen as a reflection of the degree to which the 
attitudes sampled for the study were truly representative of the population 
from which they were drawn. 
Regardless of the structure of the questions the resulting projections were 
recognized as having limited validity for a number of reasons. Respondents 
may not have chosen to tell the truth. The chosen measurement scale may 
not have adequately captured the complexities of the respondents' views. 
Respondents were themselves often unable to predict future behaviour. 
3.3.1.1 LIMITATION ON THE RELIABILITY OF A FOCUS GROUP STUDY: 
The reliability was a measure of the extent to which the results could be 
replicated in successive measurement attempts. The statistical reliability was 
known to reflect not only the manner in which respondents are selected but 
also the way the opinions are sampled. 
It was accepted that for this research, like any research, to be validated it 
must be possible to replicate the procedure and derive similar results. Since 
clearly, the repeat of any event cannot occupy the same space and time as 
the original this was impossible to achieve in the social world. Replications of 
procedure can only be the same in particular respects. As Popper put it "All 
the repetitions we experience are approximate repetition; [the repetition of an 
event cannot be identical] only more or less similar. ... Two things which are 
similar are always similar in certain respects." (Popper, 1959: pp420-1). 
It has been recognized that there would be some specific problems 
associated in repeating the data collection. Different respondents did not have 
identical backgrounds or characteristics. The effect of the researcher's 
intervention was not directly measurable since the business environments in 
which any subsequent actions took place are in continuous flux. It was 
therefore assumed at the outset of this project that strict replication to validate 
any findings would not be possible in principal, as Popper suggests, decisions 
had to be made about what constituted the essential features of the research. 
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There could be no precise and exhaustive description of the original exercise. 
Understanding this original project sufficiently to allow it to be replicated would 
involve deployment of tacit knowledge (Travis, 1981; Collins, 1985). The 
descriptions in this Chapter are designed to assist any future replication of this 
study. 
3.3.1.2 DETERMINING SAMPLE SIZE FOR THE FOCUS GROUP PILOT 
The number of self-contained groups to be held was determined by the total 
sample size, the total number of persons to be involved in this part of the data 
collection process. The number of persons accommodated within each group 
was limited and so the sample size directly influenced the number of group 
sessions. The duration of each discussion was between 1 hour 30 minutes 
and 2 hours. The group size was as flexible as possible and, at this stage of 
the research design, was modified regularly, as greater information was 
gleaned from the pilot. 
Only a very narrow range of group sizes was found to be practical. The initial 
group had a very low turn out rate, from seven (7) confirmed attendees only 
two (2) people attended (from an original sample of 35 small businesses). The 
second group had seven (7) respondents from an original nine (9) (from a 
total sample of 70). In view of this unavoidably low take-up rate, even with 
repetition, it was envisaged that the total number of respondents was unlikely 
to exceed 60. (In the event total number of respondents within the 'small 
business' focus groups was 15). This falls far short of the number of 
individual responses that would normally be regarded as necessary for 
statistical interpolation of results. However, at the design stage it had been 
recognized that results from focus groups alone could never be regarded as 
statistically representative. 
3.3.1.3 SAMPLING PROCEDURE ADOPTED FOR FOCUS GROUPS WITHIN THE PILOT STUDY 
Participants for the focus groups could not be selected on a wholly random 
basis. Convenience and fortuity governed the selection and number of 
respondents interviewed. The initial sample of thirty-five (35) was made 
randomly from the CHaRM data-base. This data base contained details of 
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Leicestershire businesses gathered from a variety of sources. 
The seven (7) individuals who first agreed to participate represented a very 
small success rate from initial contacts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
very small companies excluded themselves quoting 'time shortage' as the 
primary reason. Managers who expressed no interest in occupational health 
and safety as an issue also declined to attend. 
Companies with more than 50 employees were, intentionally, excluded from 
the sample. This exclusion was in line with the initial working criteria for 'small' 
and 'medium-sized'. However, the sample was further limited as self-
employed persons, businesses with no employees but the founder, were also 
excluded from the sample. Those respondents willing to travel to a central 
location and participate in the group differed from the general survey 
population, and were very much in the minority. 
3.3.1.4 Focus GROUP QUESTIONS - STRUCTURE AND SEQUENCE 
Statistical reliability was founded on the assumption that respondents would 
be asked every question in precisely the same way, time after time. In order to 
aggregate responses, and especially if the option of performing statistical 
procedures was to be retained, every respondent would have to be asked the 
same question, in the same words, and in a controlled sequence. This was 
not compatible with the focus groups in this study. 
The interviews were unique and the flow and wording of questions was 
spontaneous and variable. The premise of the focus groups was that 
supplementary questions varied in response to the character and 
requirements of each individual or group exchange. 
It became clear at an early stage that there was not always a common 
language within small businesses. There were few familiar terms, when 
'safety issues' were discussed within the group. It was considered necessary 
occasionally to elicit a definition of a term from a speaker, or to provide a 
definition for the benefit of the listeners. The successive rewording of 
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questions was an essential element of eliciting information of a more profound 
nature. 
3.3.1.5 liMITATIONS IN THE VALIDITY OF THE FOCUS GROUP STUDY: 
The flexibility maintained in phrasing, and rephrasing, questions; the 
interpretation of responses; and guidance of the participants in accordance 
with the requirements of the study was believed to elicit data with a high order 
of validity. The presence of other respondents, and group interaction, were 
also believed to have helped generate candid and richly detailed responses. 
However, the result of rephrasing was that, no two qualitative interviews were 
ever precisely the same, because they were improvisations. 
The method chosen for recording focus group data was aUdio-tape. The tapes 
were later transcribed. There were advantages in audio recording rather than 
contemporaneous note taking. Note taking would have involved specialist 
shorthand skills that were not available to the researcher. The act of taking 
notes may also have provided a distraction to participants. 
All interviewees gave permission to be recorded. The recorder was kept, as 
far as possible, out of the group's immediate vision and subjectively it seemed 
the participants forgot the record was being made. The tape recorder also 
provided a more complete, concrete and detailed record than field-notes, 
though non-verbal aspects were omitted. To minimize the visual omissions 
jotted notes were made covering non-verbal aspects of exchanges. 
All aspects of the study design were known to impact on the statistical 
reliability and validity of the findings: sample size; sampling procedure; and 
the method of data collection selected. Accepting the data as qualit~tive, did 
not mean accepting it at face value, it involved drawing inferences from what 
was said in the interviews. 
The main test of validity of each focus group compared to the others in the 
study was to conduct a key word count. This was an objective analysis of the 
verbatim texts of the interviews, The number of occurrences of key-words 
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were noted for each interview and then compared. This may demonstrate that 
the subject of discussions within each group exhibited a degree of 
consistency. 
There were limitations to the keyword count in that the groups involved 
individuals and each group was to receive minimal intervention so that 
discussions could range widely. This affected the count in some cases but 
has not been taken to be a negative aspect of the method. Wide ranging 
debate reflected the investigative nature of the data collection. Where different 
groups used different language to describe similar concepts the words have 
been grouped for the purposes of the count (see Section 4.2.3. and Table 
4.3.6 in Chapter 4). 
Validity was not seen as a characteristic of the data so much as a 
characteristic of the inferences that were drawn from the interview texts. 
Validity was taken to mean, in this context, the degree of relatedness between 
inferences made and actual events. The degree of relatedness itself was 
tested, as far as possible, by triangulating results, and determining 
consistency of findings (T. Cox, 1993). 
3.3.2 DESIGNING THE FOCUS GROUPS 
The design process followed a deliberate path. The main factor in the design 
was the need to explore those questions that remained unanswered from the 
postal survey. The number of group sessions, the types of people included in 
those groups and the composition of each group were seen as independent 
design elements. 
It was found that there were few universal precepts to guide the design 
process. There are no objective standards by which to measure the adequacy 
of a qualitative study. There does, however, seem to be general agreement 
that it was unwise to rely on a single group unless that group was believed to 
be uniquely representative of the relevant population, and cannot be 
duplicated. For this reason it was decided that there would be a series of 
groups within this study. 
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The rationale was practically based in that increasing the number of groups 
would be expected to add diversity and provide a steep learning curve for the 
moderators. It was acknowledged that the number of groups should be related 
to the number of respondent variables being investigated. Goldman (1987) 
suggests that most research issues can be addressed satisfactorily with no 
more than 6 groups, and that 4 are often adequate. In this case it was 
believed that the cost and time required for a protracted study would offset the 
advantages of choosing the group method without the findings having any 
increased reliability for statistical projections. 
There seems to be widespread agreement in the literature that the optimal 
number of respondents per group was between eight and ten (Krueger, 1994; 
Goldman, and Schwartz McDonald, 1987; Bellenger, Bernhardt, and 
Goldstrucker, 1976). The rationale was again practical in that this number was 
said to allow a diversity of views, with the benefits of interaction, without 
limiting the degree of participation of some members of the group. According 
to Goldman (1987) it was possible to conduct a group with as few as five, but 
where there are fewer than five it was noted that a 'make-up' group was often 
required. 
It seemed, from the literature, that people's perceptions were likely to vary 
with their position, in an organization, and the power the person wielded (Kets 
de Vries, 1977). Social locations may also determine the kind of information 
available to people, they may affect what it was possible for people to see and 
hear at first hand and what people get to know about (Leavitt, 1951). Initially 
managers of both small and medium-sized companies were targeted. 
Selection of 'managers' was an active design element. Because of ~ lack of 
intimate knowledge about the businesses or the managers their particular 
views were unknown so that no deliberate actions could be taken to control 
bias in any group. Their varying perspectives could be expected to filter their 
understanding and knowledge, particularly of a specialist area like 
occupational safety. Sophisticated control over this aspect was not possible 
during the construction of the groups. 
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However, it was seen as imperative that respondents were selected whose 
comments would be most relevant and most informative. It was for this reason 
that initial written contact was aimed at a manager who held responsibility or 
interest in occupational health and safety. The purpose of the group was not 
deemed to be a survey of general opinion, rather a focusing of attention on 
the issue of safety to gather detailed information. 
3.3.2.1 PROBABILITY OF SELECTION FOR THE FOCUS GROUPS 
The sample limitation for focus groups was geographically defined. This was 
consistent with the postal survey. Consistency of the sample base allowed for 
later triangulation. The use of the same sample population also saved time 
and effort in construction of a separate, and unnecessary, second database. 
The first geographical spread of respondents was determined by the defined 
boundaries of the postal survey, 'Charnwood Borough' in Leicestershire. The 
area was local to the research base, and had 4037, VAT registered, 
businesses (1993 figures). This base population was considered adequate to 
support further sampling. 
Charnwood as an area was clearly defined, with its boundaries marked on a 
map held on public record. The area was also a defined area in terms of 
government statistics generated, both locally and nationally. It was believed 
that this commonly accepted definition of the area might prove useful if it was 
necessary to research any statistical data generated from other sources 
(MORI polls, Census data, Local Authority statistics, etc.). 
There was detailed information available about the industrial and commercial 
profile of the area. This detail enabled a 'picture' of the local economy to be 
sketched that should allow comparisons with other areas when testing the 
generality of some of the findings. Information regarding the businesses within 
the area was available from a variety of sources. The data bases included the 
County Council's, the District Council's Economic Development Unit, the local 
Chamber of Commerce, and the local Chamber of Commerce and Trade. 
The 'Charnwood' area contained a mix of businesses. The western half of the 
84 
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 
borough was more industrialized with support industries for mineral extraction. 
There was also an overflow of the textile manufacturing and finishing industry 
from nearby Leicester and a growing number of both general, and light, 
industrial start-up units in six main centres within the district. These six 
centres also formed the commercial centres of the district and each contained 
retail units and a number of other service industries (Charnwood Borough 
Council, March 1995). 
In the event the sample population was broadened to include all of 
Leicestershire. This broadening of the catchment was a modification to the 
initial design. The rate of response meant that the number of 'eligible' 
businesses within the potential population was insufficient to generate the 
required number of returns. The decision increased the sample population six-
fold. In December 1993 there were 25,900 businesses registered for VAT in 
Leicestershire (including Rutland). The largest industry sector represented 
was production. 
Table 3.3 Distribution of industrial sectors in Leicestershire 
Leicestershire Businesses 
Agriculture 
Production 
Construction 
Transport 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Finance and related 
Catering 
Motor Trades 
Other services 
Number 
1,960 
4,315 
3,297 
1,244 
2,460 
3,970 
2,156 
1,617 
1,272 
3,609 
Percentage 
7.6% 
16.6% 
12.7% 
4.8% 
9.5% 
15.3% 
8.4% 
6.2% 
4.9% 
~ 13.9% 
Source: Census of Employment 1993, Office for National Statistics 
While the relative size of each sector was known for VAT registered 
companies those too small to reach the VAT threshold for turnover are missed 
from this count (Ganguly and Bannock, 1985). For the early part of the study 
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the assumption was made that the proportion of small businesses to large 
would remain constant in all sectors, and thus the sample could be stratified 
using a sectoral model. This assumption was known to have a high probability 
of being flawed but was adopted for convenience subject to later testing of 
any results. 
3.3.2.2 METHOD EMPLOYED IN RUNNING THE GROUPS 
The Focus Groups involved two facilitators, or interviewers, in each case. 
Small groups (3-7) of local managers from small businesses were invited to 
attend. There were three (3) focus groups held in all. The limitation was 
caused by the increasing difficulty in attracting participants who fitted the 
selection criteria. At least fifty (50) invitations were sent to a random selection 
of local small businesses for each group. 
The sessions were audio taped, transcribed and analyzed. This technique 
yielded a vast amount of qualitative data. The following questions were the 
basis of the Focus Groups February to July 1995: 
When was the last time 'health and safety' was brought to your attention? 
How many employees do you have? 
How many layers of management does the company have? 
How do you update yourself in health and safety? 
Who looks after health and safety in your company? 
Have you done any risk assessments? 
How do you manage health and safety? 
What systems have you got in place for managing health and safety, or 
What would help you manage H&S more effectively? 
What benefits can you think of, or have experienced from good H&S _ 
management? 
If you improved your standards in H&S would you want recognition for this 
achievement? 
Could good H&S management enhance business opportunities for you? 
The focus groups were run at during the lunch period in a commodious and 
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elegant meeting room at Loughborough University. This was deliberate stage 
setting to give the appropriate gravity to each group, It was deliberate, as the 
status of the participants in their own organization was high, that the facilities 
provided should reflect the facilitators appreciation of that status. The 
surroundings should meet the expectations of the participants. Refreshment 
was provided as a sandwich buffet for participants. Participants were 
encouraged to be informal by promoting open access to the buffet during the 
session. 
The provision of lunch and the timing of the sessions were part of the design 
of the sessions and were implemented after informal consultation with those 
invited to attend. 
3.3.3 ANAL YZING DATA FROM THE FOCUS GROUPS 
The transcripts of the interviews were long, complex and in a non-
standardized form. The interviews had been structured by the predetermined 
questions and this leant some form to the transcripts. It was far from clear 
when the information gathered could be said to be so comprehensive as to be 
effectively complete. In each exchange, between interviewer and interviewee, 
it became clear that the interviewee relied on what Polyani (1958) termed 
'tacit' knowledge. 
When initially analyzing data from this study it became clear that paradigmatic 
and story-like elements were bound together in much of the narrative. 
Recently there has been a move towards recapturing "narrative knowledge" 
for studies, such as this one, into the functioning of organizations (Bruner, 
1990; Mc Closkey, 1990; Skoldberg 1994; Boland and Tenkasi 1995; 
Czarniawska 1997). 
In some places in the results and discussion reported quoted speech has 
been incorporated. This was a deliberate decision, an attempt to allow the 
subjects to speak their own language (see: Eco, 1990). The descriptions used 
to convey some of the concepts were seen as being as important as the 
researchers interpretation of the message. This was not intended to focus on 
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the individual respondent particularly but to make the reader aware of the 
different vocabularies associated with safety and the management of safety 
within small businesses. 
To assess focus group data it was necessary to draw inferences from the 
words used and the context in which any issues were raised during 
discussions. What people said was produced in the context of a developing 
sequence of interaction. If what had already occurred was ignored there was 
a danger of drawing the wrong conclusions. Time was therefore an important 
consideration in the interpretation of the interview data. 
What was said at one point in the interview might have been influenced by the 
interviewee's interpretation of what had been said earlier. That interviewee 
might also be influenced by what might be said later, but was also likely to 
have been affected by what had happened in the field prior to the group 
meeting and what was anticipated in the near future. 
It was acknowledged that, there was a danger in assuming interview 
responses represented stable features of the person or their organization. 
This might have been so, but it could not be assumed. The triangulation of 
data sources, it was anticipated, would counteract this problem to some 
extent (T. Cox, 1993), by testing the reliability, and constancy of views 
expressed. 
The basis of this method of analysis was seeking, from each paragraph in the 
transcript, the categories, concepts or labels that could be used to account for 
the importance of the section. Once identified the concept was recorded. 
Relationships with other concepts, identified from the text, were also n~ted. 
To make full use of the information elicited during group sessions it was 
decided that repertory grid technique would also be used as a method of 
analyzing opinions. 
3.3.3.1 USING REPERTORY GRID TECHNIQUE TO ELICIT DATA FROM FOCUS GROUPS 
This technique used was based on Kelly's (1955) original work. He theorized 
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that people make sense of, and come to understand the world around them 
by organizing constructs of experiences. A 'construct' was a way of 
distinguishing similarity from difference, a discriminating technique. 
Constructs were originally seen as bipolar, one positive and the other 
negative (Bannister and Mair 1968, Kelly 1955). The system of constructs 
provides the mechanism for prediction and control in each individual. Since 
the original development of repertory grid techniques several researchers 
(Bannister 1959, Shaw and Gaines 1987) have relaxed the constant 
governing the dichotomous nature of the constructs so they are no longer 
assumed to be bipolar. This allowed the constructs to be measured on an 
ordinal scale. 
Kelly devised repertory grid technique as the methodical component of 
personal construct theory. The technique itself has three components. The 
first component is the 'Elements' that define the area of construing to be 
investigated. The second is, 'Constructs' which are ways that a person groups 
and differentiates between the elements. Finally there is a 'Linking 
mechanism' which shows how each element was judged on each construct. 
The grid offered a flexible methodology. In using the grid the assumption was 
made that the mathematical association between two constructs reflects the 
psychological relationship between them, for the subject (Stewart and 
Stewart, 1981). 
Administration of the technique was achieved in five stages: 
1. Eliciting the elements. 
2. Eliciting the constructs. 
3. Completing the grid. 
4. Analysis 
5. Interpretation. 
The elements were chosen to represent the domain of the investigation, 
namely: the management and controls available in small businesses that can 
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be applied to occupational safety issues. It was these elements which are 
seen as determining the focus of the grid. The elements chosen initially were: 
Managing Director, Operatives, Line Management, Equipment, Inspectors, 
Insurance Company, Safety Representative, Consultant, Health and Safety 
Laws, Costs, Working Environment, Investment, Beliefs, Control Systems, 
and Rewards. 
These elements were supplied by the investigator, but were elicited initially 
from the first focus group. The issue of whether to supply elements has been 
debated inconclusively (Hinkle, 1965; Fransella and. Bannister, 1977; 
Easterby-Smith, 1980; Shaw, 1980; Stewart and Stewart, 1981). It was 
necessary to identify elements relevant to the area of study. Pope and Keen 
(1981) have suggested that grids containing elicited, rather than imposed, 
elements suffer from vagueness. From the literature there appeared to be no 
simple relationship between the source of the elements and the validity of the 
grid. Hence, the decision was made to provide the elements in this instance. 
The elements chosen were considered to be representative of the area of 
investigation, and within the range of experience of the respondents. 
Kelly identified five principal approaches to the elicitation of constructs: Triadic 
elicitation, where the respondent was presented with three of the elements, 
this technique has been widely used (Bender, 1985; Bannister and Mair, 
1968; Pope and Keen, 1981). However, some researchers (Keen and Bell, 
1980) found that this technique did not always produce usable constructs. 
Kelly also advocated free response construct elicitation. This was the method 
chosen for this study. The constructs were extracted from conversation during 
the focus groups and respondents provided their personal constructs 
instinctively. It was acknowledged that constructs may evolve during 
consideration of a set of elements but that they can usually be applied to a 
further range of elements. It was this dimensional feature that was exploited to 
allow matrices of interrelationships between constructs and between elements 
to be inferred. 
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There was a quicker method that could have been used. Supply constructs 
are, according to Kelly, the fastest way to generate constructs. The technique 
involves the researcher providing predetermined constructs for the 
respondents to assign the necessary ratings. The supply of constructs, 
however, provides an uncertain basis for validity (Grover 1983). 
Kelly also advocated a laddering technique after some constructs have been 
elicited. By asking 'how' and 'why' questions, more specific constructs could 
be elicited. Kelly's (1955) original approach adopted a dichotomous grid-form 
across the elements, for each of the constructs. Bannister (1959) showed this 
could produce spurious relationships between constructs, so he (1959), and in 
association with Mair (1968), developed a grid grading approach. 
It was decided a similar approach to Bannister's grid grading should be 
adopted for this study. It was supposed rating would be less tedious for the 
respondents than ranking. 
The objectives of the repertory grid were the elicitation of the main criteria and 
sub-criteria which managers in small firms considered when debating 
occupational health and safety issues. To determine which factors are 
perceived as most influential in safety matters in small businesses. To obtain 
a sense of the degree of importance and the structure of the criteria and sub 
criteria perceived by each manager. 
A test grid session was run as suggested by Boose (1985) and Pope and 
Keen (1981); as a result of the experimental exercise some adjustments were 
made to the element descriptors. It was also discovered that some elements 
tended to dominate the type of constructs produced which was assessed as a 
potential distortion to the grid. To improve the quality and relevance of elicited 
constructs new constructs were enumerated from subsequent responses to 
additional questions. This 'Iaddering' was intended to assist in developing a 
hierarchy of sub values. 
Grading the grid was done by a rating system as advocated by Bannister 
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(1959). It was hoped that this would allow finer discriminations to be 
represented. The conversational aspect of the focus group had allowed 
elicitation of the elements. This same aspect allowed the subjects to indicate 
their acceptance of the pole descriptor for each construct before they were 
required to rate that construct. It also allowed for the subject to retrace the 
process and adjust ratings as they gained experience of the procedure. 
3.3.3.2 ANALYSIS OF VARIATION, MEAN RATING AND CONSTRUCT VARIABILITY WITHIN 
THE REPERTORY GRIDS 
According to Slater (1992) and Smith (1986) constructs which were found to 
account for most variation within each grid were constructs which possessed 
the most meaning for that person. 
There were a number of advantages believed to stem from the use of the 
repertory grid to analysis interview responses. Elicitation of a grid allows for 
clarification of the issues. It was a flexible approach that was easily adaptable. 
It allowed the subjects to make explicit what had been implicit in their thinking. 
It enabled not identification of common criteria applied to health and safety. 
The technique afforded comparison between managers from a selection of 
small businesses. The grids could be analyzed to find associations for further 
investigation. 
3.4 SECTORAL ANALYSIS 
As results, from the preliminary studies, began to emerge a single 'global' 
model was seen as being unfit to accommodate all small businesses. Specific 
'sectoral' models were needed. There are two main tasks in developing 
sectoral models: deciding how the models should be selected and deciding 
how many models should be developed. 
One starting point was the industrial sector classification. Industrial 
classifications are not always uniform, so for the purposes of this study it was 
initially decided to use the UK standard industrial classification (SIC). This 
was the preferred approach because the SIC was widely used throughout 
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government particularly for the production of employment statistics by 
industry. The latest revision, Standard Industrial Classification 1992 (SIC92) 
was able to reflect the current industrial composition of the UK. 
SIC92 allows a detailed classification of the service industries. This was 
deemed important for this study as the service sector had been identified 
early on as a growth sector for many small businesses. Unfortunately the 
precision in definitions used in SIC are slightly different from those used by 
the HSE when publicizing health and safety data for this sector. Using the SIC 
system in its purest form produces too many typologies. By grouping the 
typologies can be reduced. 
Table 3.4 Comparison of Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC) and 
Health and Safety Sectoral Groupings 
I Industry Description SIC 92 
. 
Retail I Retail sale motor vehicles, parts & 501, 
I accessories; retail automotive fuel. 503-505 
I Retail sale all other goods 52 
Travel agencies 63 
Wholesale !Wholesale & commission trade, except 51 
I motor vehicles and motor cycles 
Offices , Financial Intermediation 65 
I Insurance and pension funding 66 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 67 
Computer and related activities 72 
Other business activities 74 
Hotel and Hotels, restaurants, bars, tourist and short 55 
catering I stay accommodation, canteens and 
catering 
Residential Social work activities with accommodation 85.31 
care homes 
Consumerl I Recreational, cultural & sporting activities 92· 
leisure I Other service activities 93 
I servIces ._-1..-
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There was no uniform method of grouping. The Census of population in 1991 
used a classification for the industrial sectors that differed from those in the 
1995 Census of Employment. 
Many variables such as technology, markets, firm size etc. all appeared to be 
sensible bases for sectoral models. When more than one aspect was 
considered the partitioning lead to combinational problems during analysis. 
Thus including four sizes: 1-4, 5-10, 11-25, 26-50; three levels of technology 
and ten industry types (standard industrial classification), and the two market 
sectors of industrial or service would produce 240 cells. 
Even reducing the industry types to six left the probability of generating 144 
cells. Given the difficulty that had been encountered, in the preliminary 
stages, in contacting a wide number of small firms and achieving an adequate 
response rate any data obtained would be likely to present insufficient repeats 
to satisfactorily analyze. With the increased focus on industry sectors and 
smaller size groupings there were necessarily fewer individual firms in each 
grouping. 
Sectoral analysis was eventually discarded as an avenue because the size of 
the groupings became so small. The sample was considered to be essentially 
heterogeneous. 
The limited number of small businesses available for inclusion in the study, 
due to the low response rate for both the postal surveys and focus groups, 
inhibited sectoral analysis. The same limitation allowed consideration of a 
change in technique for data gathering. Having examined the limitations to the 
validity of the results of both the questionnaire and the focus groups. The 
question also arose about how well a quantitative approach could answer the 
question of how safety management is effected within small organisations. 
A different technique was sought that allowed greater depth of study of 
individual organizations. The question of 'how' seemed to call for a descriptive 
answer and this suggested a qualitative approach. In the last ten years more 
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researchers in applied fields have moved towards a qualitative paradigm 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). Some researchers have suggested that terms 
such as ethnography, field methods, qualitative enquiry, participant 
observation, naturalistic methods and case study have become synonymous 
(Smith L.M., 1992). 
Qualitiative data could provide well-grounded, rich descriptions and 
explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). It was the explanation of processes in the context of identified small 
businesses that was wanted, to contribute to answering the question of how 
safety is managed in those organisations. It was for this reason that 
inspection techniques were employed. Multi-case studies were chosen for the 
potential richness of data (Mintzberg, 1979). 
3.5 ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS - INSPECTION CASE STUDIES 
It was recognised that there were disadvantages to the case study approach. 
These included: the effort required to collect the data, the risk of data 
overload, the element of researcher bias, the time involved in sorting and 
processing the data, the adequacy of sampling, the generalizability of the 
findings, the credibility and quality of the conclusions. From a positivist 
standpoint the reliability and validity of the qualitatively derived findings were 
expected to be difficult to demonstrate Dawson, 1979; 1982; Ginsberg, 1990; 
Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
There was an array of qualitative approaches from which the main study 
method could have been chosen (Wolcott, 1992). Wolcott's emphasis has 
been on the 'naturalist' nature of most qualitative research (Wo I cott., 1982). 
The main study was to be conducted through contact with a 'normal' field 
Situation, reflecting the daily routines within the target small businesses. The 
role of the researcher was to gain a 'holistic' overview of safety management 
within small organisations; the protocols, arrangements and rules, both 
implicit and explicit. The intention was to capture data 'from the inside' 
through a process of deep attentiveness (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
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main task was to explicate the ways people in small businesses come to 
understand, account for and effect the management of day to day situations 
that affect their own safety, and that of others. The researcher has essentially 
been the main measurement device in the main study (Brown, 1984). 
The researcher was an active participant in the data collection process during 
the visits, that influence needs to be addressed. The researcher could have 
been witnessing, in each case, 'reflexive rationalisation' (May, 1997) of safety 
management. The researcher, by contributing to discussions or highlighting 
hazards, was effecting change on the organisations that were the subject of 
the study. Those engaging with the researcher during the visits were likely to 
interpreting and applying any new knowledge they were gleaning from the 
inspection and interview process. It would be a false assumption that the case 
studies were 'uncontaminated' by the research method itself. 
This contamination was not viewed as being catastrophic. It was part of the 
design of this research that the researcher should draw on her personal 
knowledge and experience in interpreting the settings that were visited. The 
researcher was formally trained as an enforcement officer. This training 
included inspection techniques, hazard spotting, risk appraisal, etc. The 
adaptation, made in response to the researcher's presence became part of 
the observations. Much of the qualitative assessment was based on areas 
that could not be readily changed, the condition of equipment, lighting, 
ventilation, noise, cleanliness, instruction manuals, accident records, etc. 
Equally inferences were drawn, if a hazard was discovered. whether it 
triggered a remedial response, was down played or was ignored. 
One of the advantages of qualitative data was seen to be that they focus on 
ordinary events in natural settings. The confidence was expected to arise from 
the 'local groundedness' of the data. The data was to be collected in close 
proximity to the management processes, rather than through the post or by 
telephone. Each case was to become a focused and bounded phenomenon, 
embedded in its context. The contextual influences were intended to be taken 
into account to increase the potential for understanding underlying issues. 
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As the fieldwork was to incorporate multi-case studies the constraints on the 
sample were seen as being identical as those for survey research. The 
question of which cases to look at became focal. Considering some 
researcher's strong views on the subject it was believed that the 'arms length' 
research adopted for the initial studies would need modifying for the main part 
of the research (Mintzberg, 1979). Direct data gathering was considered 
important, detailed inspection of some small business premises with the 
inspection data and observational data supplemented where possible by 
structured interviews, and documentary evidence. 
Despite empirical propositions depending on first hand observation for their 
development, there was an inherent danger of observational error. To 
minimize the observational error rate an observational strategy evolved. This 
involved mixed methods; the results were to be further tested by triangulating 
them with those found from the two pilot studies (Glendon and McKenna, 
1995). 
One part of the observational strategy included naturalistic observation, 
although the limitations pertaining to the researcher's presence were noted. 
This technique was used in the case studies. Observations were made of the 
behavi9ur of individuals within the target organizations. The decision was 
taken not to deliberately control, or manipulate, independent variables to elicit 
reactions. Rather the aim was to record behaviour as it ordinarily occurs, as 
far as possible. It was recognized that this naturalistic observation may be a 
false concept and a source of error, attributable to the researcher's own 
intervention, the act of observing and the application of personal perceptions. 
It has been Mintzberg (1979) argued that without a descriptive element the 
results of organizational research may be significant only in the statistical 
sense. He suggests it was the simpler more direct methodologies that have 
yielded results that are more useful; in-depth studies should not be precluded 
because of small sample size. 
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However, Popper (1968) does not include induction as part of the logic of 
scientific inquiry. Popper was not alone, Selye (1964) went further to describe 
generalizing beyond one's data as an 'intellectual immorality'; but 
hypothesizing depends on just that. Mintzberg postulates there are two 
essential steps in inductive research: the investigation of the observed 
phenomenon, looking for order: followed by taking the creative leap. 
Mintzberg understood the need for a well-defined focus to any organizational 
study. He has an expressed aversion to questionnaires as the main tool for 
data collection as "simplification squeezes out the very thing on which the 
research should focus". The emerging results from the pilot studies supported 
Mintzberg's view. The results were proving interesting but were not directly 
addressing 'how' small businesses manage health and safety. 
The design of this portion of the study was important to answering the 
fundamental research question. Critical design considerations included: where 
to observe, and when, who to talk to and what to ask, as well as what to 
record. This process not only decided what was and was not relevant to each 
case under study but also sampling from the data available within·each firm. It 
was seen as important to make the. criteria employed as explicit and 
systematic as possible to try to ensure each case had been adequately 
sampled. As the exploratory fieldwork was designed to incorporate multi-case 
studies the constraints on the sample were seen as being identical as those 
for survey research. The choice, of which cases to look at, was governed by 
the limitations of size definition within the conceptual framework. 
3.5.1 SAMPLING PROCEDURE FOR CASE STUDIES 
The poor response for the focus groups had required an expansi0f} of this 
database to include Leicestershire entirely. The database was used to ensure 
that no business had been, inadvertently, approached more than once for 
information. Those businesses that were included in all phases of this study 
were included deliberately, to allow triangulation of data. 
It became clear that the absence of specific data about small businesses 
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might cause problems in determining a stratified sample that adequately 
reflected the industry sectors within Leicestershire. To overcome this problem 
the main study focused on Rutland. 
3.S.1.1 PROBABILITY OF SELECTION FOR THE MAIN STUDY - THE CASE STUDIES 
It had already been decided, during the preliminary stages of this study, to 
use the UK standard industrial classification (SIC). The latest revision, 
Standard Industrial Classification 1992 (SIC92) was able to reflect the current 
industrial composition of the UK. Thus in selecting a sub-population for the 
remainder of the study it was possible to make a judgement about the 
applicability of that population in terms of industry sectors represented. Table 
3.S, below, shows the sectoral groupings for businesses in Rutland. 
Table 3.5 Sectoral groupings used for the main study. 
Businesses by sector Rutland % (1993) SIC 92 
Agriculture 0.5 
Energy & water 0.1 #1 
Manufacturing 20.5 
Construction 2.9 
Distribution and Catering 21.3 S01, S03-505, 51, 
52,55,63,8S.31 
Transport and communications 4 
Banking and finance I 8.3 6S, 66,67,70.3, 
72,74, 
Public Admin + Health 38 #2 
Other services 4.4 91,92,93 
#1 This category was not included in the final stages of the study because the industry 
was specialized and almost entirely composed of large businesses. 
#2 This category was only included in the final stages of the study as care 
homes/nursing homes because by definition it seldom contains other small private 
businesses. 
Rutland was one of the nine areas within the original catchment of 
"Leicestershire". Rutland presented a slight anomaly because of the very high 
proportion of small businesses across a wide range of industry sectors. By 
comparing Rutland employment patterns with those nationally the local 
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industry sectors should reveal their relative importance in the locality. Using 
employment captures all jobs and does not exclude small firms from the 
calculation of proportionality. 
Table 3.6 The proportional employment in Rutland, Leicestershire and 
Great Britain, by industry sector, compared to Great Britain as a 
whole. 
Description of Businesses 
Agriculture 
Production 
Construction 
Transport 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Finance and related 
Catering 
Motor Trades 
Other services 
Percentage in 
Rutland 
(1991) 
4.9% 
17.2% 
6.3% 
3.8% 
Not specified 
13.9% 
8.6% 
5.0% 
Not specified 
36.6% 
Percentage in 
Leicestershire 
(1991) 
7.6% 
16.6% 
12.7% 
4.8% 
9.5% 
15.3% 
8.4% 
6.2% 
4.9% 
13.9% 
Percentage in 
GB 
(1991) 
1.9% 
17.8% 
7.4% 
6.4% 
Not specified 
15% 
12% 
5.5% 
Not specified 
28.4% 
Among Rutland's residents there was proportionally greater employment in 
'agriculture' and 'other services', than would be expected if the County were to 
follow the average GB pattern. However, employment in agriculture within 
Leicestershire as a whole is at a higher rate than in Rutland. This was 
consistent with the character of the area. 
Not all people resident in Rutland work within the county. It was known that 
the commuting patterns were reflected in the 1997 MORI survey in the county 
(MORI and Rutland County Council 1997). This information provides a partial 
basis by which to judge the profile of businesses in the County (total number 
and size). Employment patterns provide a means of uncovering the officially 
invisible small businesses that are active in the economy. 
Complications arose in the comparison of results from the Population Census, 
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MORI poll and Census of Employment. The Census of Employment did not 
adopt precisely the same classification for the industrial sectors as the 1991 
Census of Population. However, these figures still add to the data of the 
previous census. The Employment Census was a survey of those persons 
within Rutland who worked for someone else. The comparison of the two sets 
of census figures available showed some differences between employment 
patterns within Rutland and those nationally. 
Table 3.7 Employment by Sector in Rutland. but excluding the self-
employed, comparison with average GB employment. by 
industry sector. 
Employment by sector Rutland% (1993) GB %(1993) , 
Ag riculture I 0.5 1.6 
Energy & water 0.1 1.3 
Manufacturing 20.5 18.1 
Construction 2.9 4 
Distribution and Catering 21.3 22.3 
Transport and comm. 's 4 6.2 I 
Banking and finance 8.3 16.3 
Public Admin + Health 38 25.8 
Other services 4.4 4.5 
Source: Census of Employment 1993, Office of National Statistics 
There were, and continue to be, more manufacturing businesses in Rutland 
than would be expected if national distribution were uniform. Manufacturers 
are well represented in the plastics sector and in instrument engineering but 
less so in the nationally declining sectors of mechanical engineering and 
knitwear. 
The proportion of those in distribution, hotels and restaurants was marginally 
lower than the national average. There was an active tourism industry 
(Rutland County Council 1998) but Rutland has few large hotels. It does have 
numerous small establishments, many of which employ only a very small 
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workforce, and then often on a casual basis. 
The census of employment (1993) showed there were 760 companies 
operating in Rutland. The county had a concentration of small companies, 
with over 75% of companies employing less than 10 people. By 1999 there 
were estimated to be 1080 companies (Rutland County Council estimate). 
There were still (1998) no companies employing more than 500 people. 11% 
of Rutland companies were within the manufacturing sector and 80% 
operated in the service sector. 
The 1993 Census of employment showed the number of companies in 
Rutland in each size category (based on number of employees); the Rutland 
County Council has provided estimates of the picture in 1999 (see Table 3.8, 
below). 
Table 3.8 Numbers of businesses in Rutland in 1993 and 1999; divided by 
size according to the number of employees. (Rutland County 
Council estimates). 
Size of business Number in Rutland 1993 Number in Rutland 1999 
1-10 570 793 
11-24 112 203 
25-49 72 75 
50-99 4 4 
100-199 1 2 
200-499 1 2 
With 92.2% of all firms in Rutland estimated to have less than 25 employees, 
and 73.4% being the smallest with no more than 10 employees, this lends 
confidence that in Rutland the industrial profile reflects small businesses 
adequately. 
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Gaining access to the businesses was crucial to achieving the research 
objectives. The vast majority of small firms in Rutland were small. To select 
those that were to be approached a manual database of Rutland businesses 
was used. This was a combination of the database used to derive statistics for 
economic development and the listing of business in the county for 
enforcement purposes. 
These lists were combined and sorted according to industry. The industry 
category lists were then sampled, by random number count, until the desired 
sample size was achieved. The owner, or a senior manager, of each identified 
business was then approached, by telephone call, and asked to allow the 
researcher access. In nearly every case the researcher was through 
professional contact. In only two instances was permission declined. In these 
cases alternative organisations, in the same industry sector were approached. 
In most cases the researcher knew the businesses. Visits had been made 
before, either as a customer or professionally. The location and layout of 
many of the premises was known and some of the employees knew the 
researcher, at least by sight. This made the process of being accepted into 
the environment much easier. 
The researcher was practised at entering different surroundings for the 
purposes of inspection, and was also familiar with many of the activities and 
processes that were being carried out within the businesses. Where specialist 
equipment was encountered the researcher often asked the machine operator 
about it, and how it worked; this opened up new avenues of inquiry in some 
cases. Spontaneous interviews were thus sometimes integrated into the 
observation process. 
3.5.1.2 SUPPLEMENTING OBSERVATIONS WITH STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
The study in Rutland was by inspection, interview and documentary search 
among a sample of businesses. The use of multiple case studies placed a 
time constraint on the research. This limited the time spent with each 
organization. Observations alone were not expected to be sufficient to 
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determine 'how' management was effected in anyone organization. The 
observ~tions would be supplemented with information gleaned from 
structured interviews, conducted during the visit. 
Becker and Geer (1960) in their work expressed concern that conclusions 
about the perspectives of participants should not be entirely reliant on 
solicited answers. Observational information would partly counteract this 
problem. However, it was for fear of contaminating the data, by the type of 
questioning, that interviewees were encouraged to talk at length. It was 
important to collect sufficient detail and to seek clarification if there appeared 
to be room for ambiguity in the response. It was anticipated that directive and 
non-directive questioning could produce different types of data. 
3.5.2 OBSERVATIONAL METHODS 
Observational data were recorded in field notes. The constant taking of notes 
was viewed as disruptive and the conduct of note taking was in keeping with 
the situation. The hosts were welcoming but, even so, open and continuous 
note taking was perceived as inappropriate, not least when engaged in active 
listening. There was also a concern that continuous note taking would prove 
disruptive to the conducted tours round the sites. There were however 
occasions when extensive notes could be taken without undue disruption. 
The observational notes were based on judgements as to the management of 
safety within the organization based on what was witnessed during the 
inspection, they were in effect intuitive measurements; employed so cross-
case comparisons could be made later. As a rule Petersen (1989) suggests 
that different measuring tools should be employed at different levels within an 
organization (Petersen's matrix was included in Chapter 2). 
The most common approach to bench marking safety management systems 
has been the development of auditing procedures. It was a technique for 
monitoring the safety performance of the organization, rather than individuals. 
Items for bench marking could include causes of accidents and near misses, 
or there might be an assessment of hazards and risks. (HSE, 1985; Chemical 
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Industries Association, 1977; Pitblado et aI, 1990; Powell and Canter, 1985; 
Bliselius and Franzen, 1985; Rosen, 1988). 
Despite including an assessment of hazards and risks safety auditing, in the 
context of this study, was not concerned solely with hazard spotting. The 
assessment was rather an analysis of the efficacy of management systems. A 
study by Baily (1988) concluded that the effectiveness of a safety programme 
depends on the quality of an organization's management systems. 
In order to allow for an audit there might need to be a base line from which to 
judge performance. The simplest techniques have used the company's own 
safety rules, its safety policy, its own or industry based codes of good practice 
to assess the degree to which good practice was adopted. 
The observational visits have been termed inspections. The use of this 
terminology was deliberate and reflects the researcher's background as an 
enforcement officer [Health and Safety at Work etc., Act 1974 (S. 20)]. 
This phase of the research presented the same challenges as are faced 
during an enforcement visit. The main challenges were how to effectively 
inspect a workplace, assess the hazards that exist there, investigate systems 
of work and work processes. The physical 'workplace' was not inspected 
alone. The inspection incorporated the employees' adopted method of 
working, the environment in which they worked and the availability of welfare 
facilities. Consideration was also given to the equipment being used, the 
substances being worked with, etc. The inspections were also seen as 
investigations and accordingly observations were allowed to trigger questions 
as well as provide data, some of the questions were then followed up in the 
plenary interviews. 
The inspections were by necessity ad hoc. Access time to each site was 
limited by the management's level of tolerance. Re-visits were not generally 
an option. The ad hoc inspection was a limited technique in that the inspector 
was accessing a snapshot of an environment that was constantly changing. 
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The ad hoc inspection was designed to be as comprehensive as possible, 
notwithstanding the narrow timeframe. The idea was to collect as much 
relevant information as possible with respect to the hazards to health and 
safety to which employees were exposed, to provide some form of base line 
for each case. 
It was accepted that the inspection process was complex and required a high 
degree of skill. The researcher was experienced in the technique. By 
accepting the purpose of the inspection was to elicit knowledge about the 
individual workplaces it was clear that what was being inspected had little 
influence, in real terms, on how it was to be inspected. Thus a single, unified 
system of workplace and process inspection could be formulated and used for 
all the wOrkplaces cited as cases in this study. 
3.5.2.1 DESIGNING THE DATA GATHERING BY INSPECTION 
It was very difficult to assess one's own efficiency when inspecting (Alcock, 
1982). It was therefore considered desirable that the method be standardized 
as far as possible. The three things considered to have the greatest capacity 
to provide observational indicators as to the firms approach to health and 
safety matters were: where work was performed; what was used at work and 
how work was performed. 
This was intentionally simplistic in the initial design, as it was memorable and 
so intuitively adhered to during each inspection. Where' - was a trigger to see 
if the workplace itself was unsafe due to its physical condition; this 
emphasized the physical hazards observed. What' - included machinery, 
equipment and appliances employed and also substances used or worked on. 
'How' - referred to the methods and systems of work observed. "How" was 
seen as the most complex aspect of the inspections as it includes formal and 
informal systems, protocols, habits and processes; few of which were 
uniformly applied throughout workplaces or processes. 
In addition to the three separate elements of inspection there were two 
cardinal questions that were common to each element of each inspection: 
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'what was wrong/' and 'why was it wrong?' 
These questions were introduced as an aid to observational development. 
The researcher was a trained observer in the field of health and safety. 
However, it was considered desirable that there be some prompt in the 
methodology to promote detailed observation during the visit. These 
questions were designed to induce a deeper investigation of issues, beyond 
the merely passive observation of the tableau enacted for the visitor's benefit. 
Attention to detail during the data collection stage was seen as very important. 
To structure the inspections a six-step code (see Alcock 1982) was followed: 
1. Structure 
2. Equipment 
3. Special hazards 
4. Common considerations 
5. Systems of work 
6. Other risks. 
The procedure followed was that the inspector started at a given point and 
proceeded to inspect only the structure, ignoring everything else. Once the 
structural survey was completed the inspector returned to the start point and 
repeated the route inspecting all the equipment but ignoring all else. This 
process was repeated a third time with the focus on special hazards. By the 
time the third pass was completed the bulk of the physical inspection had 
been completed. The next aspect was to examine the 'common 
considerations'. These 'common considerations' included first aid, fire escape, 
etc. This completed the physical inspection. The next stage of the inspection 
consisted of an examination of the systems of work actually employed within 
each organization. 
The inspection process was carried out in accordance with current guidance 
the most recent of which is HELA 67/1 (revised 1998) [ formerly LAC 67/1 and 
LAC(A)3/1/2]. The professional judgement of the researcher was employed in 
assessing the performance of various activities. This professional judgement 
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arises from formal training and more than 10 years practical experience, it is 
moderated annually by comparative peer review of sample assessment by 
other experienced and qualified enforcement officers. 
Professional judgement was used to assess each employer's performance, in 
relation to the hazards observed and the risks perceived to affect both 
employees and the public. The judgement was based on the 'standards' of 
safety, health and welfare observed during each visit. A subjective 
assessment was also made of the capacity of management to maintain high 
standards. 
Following each visit on return to base the field notes were re-sorted and data 
ordered under the nine headings (see Appendices). A numerical system was 
also applied to rate each organisation. The first numerical system adopted 
was the 'Inspection Rating System' (LAC 67/1). This system was based on 
that used by the HSE's Field Operations Division and has been available for 
use since 1997. This system is based on an established and tested system 
that has been adopted nationally by enforcers. The rating facilitates the 
identification of the contributions made by hazard and risk, to the overall 
assessment of a workplace; it also separates 'safety hazard and risk' from 
'health hazard and risk'. 
3.5.3 ANALYZING DATA FROM OBSERVATIONS, INSPECTIONS AND INTERVIEWS 
In the main this study has drawn on metaphors, comparing like with unlike to 
determine the parameters of any generalizations. Metaphors have been seen 
as a distinct stage in the analysis. By mixing narrative text in with the 
metaphors during the examination and appraisal of the data an attempt has 
been made to reduce some of the inherent ambiguity within the metaphors by 
putting them in context. 
A method for the conceptual analysis of information from case histories and 
similar interviews has been developed based on the technique of Grounded 
Theory (Glaser and Strauss,1967; Pigeon et ai, 1990). 
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The basic question of how to capture the complexity of reality and make 
convincing sense of it was considered the nub of the problem during analysis. 
The complexities were addressed by adopting various data collection 
methods and triangulating results to provide a broader picture, than was 
considered possible otherwise. The theory has evolved during this study, and 
has been frequently revisited to include as many concepts and linkages as 
possible. The data have also been examined and re-examined in detail to 
ensure the complexity was represented as fully as possible. 
The generation of the theory involved induction, deducti,on and verification. 
The induction stemmed from the author's background, previous research into 
the issues of the study and theoretical sensitivity from knowledge of technical 
literature. (Fann, 1980). The deduction process was assisted by drawing on 
past experiences enabling comparisons to be made to further lines of 
deduction. The role of the experience of the researcher in this study was 
considered to have a considerable bearing on this work. 
This observational approach could not in itself elicit comprehensive data 
about 'how' safety was being managed in each organization. Even with 
supplementary interviews the information was considered incomplete. To 
supplement the information a documentary search was made at each site. 
3.5.4 SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTARY INFORMATION 
Documentary evidence was seen as potentially a lesser source of data. If data 
were to be manufactured by interview then those data are often treated as 
being more 'scientific' than if picked up opportunistically by a researcher 
(Webb & Weick, 1979). However, this presupposes that data can only have a 
single purpose. 
Organizations control the actions of their employees by imposing constraints 
and effecting comparisons (Bird and Germain, 1986). The effort expended on 
these controls produce evidence, beyond the perception of the employees, of 
how control was exercised. Written documents index control. Safety controls 
in particular are often revealed in documentation like: annual reports, 
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employee handbooks, procedure manuals and accident recording books; also 
the degree of use of manuals and recording procedures was evidence in 
itself. 
It was considered helpful to incorporate information gleaned from documents 
produced for purposes other than this study. These documents included 
company safety policies, accident books, official accident notifications, 
training manuals, staff-training records and sickness records. These were all 
sources of data. It was hard to conceive of undertaking the study without 
paying some attention to documentary material. In many organizations, even 
those averse to bureaucratic practices, the use and production of such 
documents was an integral part of life. 
It was considered desirable to approach documents critically, not to take them 
at face value. These documents were known to be a product of the 
organization and their contents were liable to distortion. Anecdotally, from 
past inspections, a common distortion of the use of a document was 
expected, not entering accidents into the accident book. However rather than 
viewing the documents as inherently biased they were treated as products 
and were therefore examined for evidence to lend weight to, or refute the 
testimony of interviewees and the observations of the researcher. 
Data of this sort raised problems. Information was provided but its nature 
open a range of analytical problems. A degree of stringency was adopted in 
the investigative process. Systematic evaluation of all documents was 
undertaken. Allowances were made for secondary data sources. Secondary 
data have potential limitations in validity and reliability. However, secondary 
sources were still deemed useful. The weaknesses of the data were r~medied 
where possible. Comparisons were made through first hand investigation of 
their contexts of production and use. These comparisons either supported the 
documentary evidence or highlighted the anomalies presented by the data. 
Documentary records were seen as being important for several reasons. 
Unlike bureaucratic organizations the production of paperwork was not 
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generally taken to be a major preoccupation of small businesses (Weber, 
1947). However there are some records that are required by statute, the 
exigencies of record making can play an important part in the work that gets 
done, and the routines used to accomplish it. It would be inappropriate, 
therefore, to treat small companies as if they were illiterate oral cultures. The 
presence and significance of documentary products was expected to provide 
a wide basis for analysis, as well as a valuable source of information. 
3.5.4.1 ANALYSING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
Analysis was designed to include;' how the documents were written; how they 
were read; who wrote them; who read them; for what purpose were they 
made, kept and read, on what occasions and with what outcome. The detail of 
what was recorded and what omitted was also considered valuable in drawing 
inferences about the communication processes in the firms studied. 
3.5.5 ANALYSING THE FIELD NOTES 
The field-notes were subject to no particular ordering at the point of recording. 
The observation process was essentially systematic, so there was logic to the 
data, but records were not omitted merely because the note would be out of 
sequence with the record on the page. Symbols, such as lines and arrows, 
were used to connect thoughts within the field-notes and many mind-mapping 
techniques were used. This resulted in very rich, but untidy initial records. 
These notes were transcribed and sorted soon after each visit. 
3.5.5.1 RANKING OF EACH ORGANISATION, BASED ON THE 'STANDARDS' OF 
SAFETY, HEALTH AND WELFARE OBSERVED DURING EACH VISIT. 
Following each visit on return to base the field-notes had been re-sorted. A 
numerical system was applied to rate each organisation. The initial numerical 
rating system chosen was a tried and tested one (LAC 67/1). The ratings were 
applied to allocate a rating that allowed initial ranking of each organisation 
according to the overall risk that organisation presented to its employees and 
others. 
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It was expected that the hazards present in each premises may vary but that 
some variation may be due to the particular industry sector in which that 
organisation operated. However, it was also expected that observable 
standards of health and safety and management performance would also 
vary. The rating system was therefore based on the established criteria (LAC 
67/1): 
• Safety hazard -
The potential of a machine, activity or method of work, etc to cause harm. 
• Health hazard -
The potential for a substance, noise, method of work, etc. to cause harm. 
• Safety risk -
The likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard will be realised. 
• Health risk -
The likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard will be realised. 
• Welfare-
Quantifies the standard of welfare provision. 
• Public risk -
The likelihood that the public will be harmed by activities at a workplace. 
• Confidence in management-
Reflects the researchers confidence in management. 
These seven elements were each rated on a scale of 1-6 for each 
organisation, consistent with the guidance. There are indicative examples 
within the guidance to aid the rating process. These examples have been 
included in the appendices to this thesis. However, in summary, a rising scale 
of severity was used so that a negligible hazard would attract a score of 1 
while a major hazard would attract a score of 6. 
Each element of the rating system was then weighted. This weighting was 
achieved by applying a standard multiplier. This weighting was designed to 
reflect the relative significance of each element, by giving greater weight to 
health and safety risks and less emphasis to hazards and welfare. 
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Table 3.9 Weights of the elements of the inspection rating system 
Rating Element Weighting 
Safety_ Hazard 6 
Health Hazard 6 
Safety Risk 9 
Health Risk 9 
Welfare 5 
Public Risk 10 
Confidence in Management 10 
The weighted scores for each organisation were then totaled to give an 
overall score for each workplace. This score allowed' the ranking of the 
workplaces. The ranking was therefore based on hazards and risks observed 
and the controls in place to limit those risks. The detail of the rating process 
and the subsequent ranking has been addressed in Chapter 5. 
3.5.5.2 EMPLOYING CROSS CASE ANALYSIS 
The McKinsey7-S framework® (Peters & Waterman, 1989: p10) was used as 
a basic structuring device for sorting the observational data after the data had 
been gathered. This was not the first time this had been used Peters and 
Waterman (1989) used the same model in their research. The framework was 
intended to provide focus for explicit thoughts during the analysis. 
Consideration should not be limited to strategy and structure but also the 
softer side of management; the management style, systems, people, skills 
and shared values within each organization. 
The intention was to ensure that those areas of 'virtual' management were 
accorded proper weight in considering causes and effects within any 
management "system". There was a danger, during analysis, that the~se areas 
could be dismissed as irrational, intractable, intuitive or so informal as to not 
constitute 'management'. It was therefore an assumption in this study that 
areas of laissez faire or intuitive management could still constitute a 
management process, and as such should not be ignored. This assumption is 
consistent with the view that a decision to do nothing could still be a positive 
decision. 
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It was intended that emerging data would be assessed with a well grounded 
sense of reality, within the cultural context presented by each case. This study 
however has also used multi-case design and multiple methods. The aim was 
to increase the reliability of any generalizations. The problem was seeing 
processes and outcomes that occur across many cases, and understanding 
how these processes were influenced by specific local contextual variations. 
3.5.5.3 DESIGNING MULTI-CASE COMPARISON 
The argument for studying multiple comparison groups was made, initially, by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967). As Noblit and Hare (1983) said, " A meta-
ethnography must have a theory of social explanation that both preserves the 
uniqueness and entails comparison". The method of analysis selected 
entailed the use of meta-matrices. This method afforded the most achievable 
system of handling the vast quantities of textual information, generated during 
the case study visits. 
The meta-matrices were master charts used to assemble descriptive data 
from the many sites studied into a standard format. It was deemed important 
that the first chart should include all relevant data. From that chart data was 
partitioned, simplified, sorted and ordered in a variety of ways to refine the 
presentation of the concepts as they emerged. 
The multiple case analysis process involved revisiting the original data again 
and again, and collecting data from new sources whenever it was deemed 
necessary to give a fuller picture of 'reality'. 
The data that had been initially collected and recorded as field notes were 
then sorted into a matrix with fourteen main headings: 
Unique reference 
Structure 
Systems 
Strategy 
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Superordinate goals 
Industry sector 
Number of employees 
Motivation 
Main hazards 
Number of accidents 
Additional notes 
Once the matrices had been constructed it was decided to use some of the 
data to judge the relative safety performance of different businesses. 
Attributing notional scores to elements within the matrices did this. 
From the matrix three performance areas were selected, these were then 
allocated indicator scores: 
Accident book 
Book missing at the time of the visit or not kept Score 0 
Book there but not checked or used Score 1 
Book regularly inspected and accident stats. collated Score 2 
Electrical safety 
Electrical testing not done, or seen as dangerous 
Testing done and record kept 
Test record reviewed and faults remedied 
Safety Training 
No health and safety training 
Induction/basic job safety training 
On going training or needs assessment or llP* 
NB *lIP denotes participation in the Investors in People scheme 
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These scores were used to indicate safety performance so that the 
businesses could be grouped according to perceived performance and 
commonalties and differences between groups and between members in the 
same group could be assessed (see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5). 
The results from these methods were then to be incorporated into a 
measurement-matrix that related to the main indicators (see Appendix Three). 
It was expected that in this way the results combined would produce an 
estimate of achievement in safety management (see Section 5.1.1 and Figure 
5.1 in Chapter 5). From this perspective of 'achievement' it was intended to 
re-examine the matrices to gain a rich picture of each organization's safety 
climate. 
3.5.6 VALIDITY OF THE RESULTS 
It was accepted that for this research, like any research, to be validated it 
must be possible to replicate the procedure and derive similar results. In this 
research replications of procedure could only be the same in particular 
respects (Tilley, 1993, a.). As Popper put it "All the repetitions we experience 
are approximate repetition; [the repetition of an event cannot be identical] only 
more or less similar .... Two things which are similar are always similar in 
certain respects." (Popper, 1959: pp420-1). 
It was expected that there would be some specific problems associated in 
repeating the data collection. Different respondents did not have identical 
backgrounds or characteristics. The same individuals could not be reused in 
replication studies because their primary participation may have had an 
educative effect and may have altered their perceptions. These problems 
were exacerbated in the observational situations. 
The observations involved social intervention in the very act of observing 
because interest was being exhibited in a very specific area of activity that in 
many cases may hitherto have gone unnoticed. The intervention of the visit 
was known to have preCipitated reactions like the initiation of safety projects. 
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The effect of the researchers intervention was however not directly 
measurable since the business environments in which any subsequent 
actions took place were in continuous flux. It was therefore assumed at the 
outset of this project that strict replication to validate any findings would not be 
possible in principal, as Popper suggests, decisions had to be made about 
what constituted the essential features of the research. 
Understanding this research sufficiently to allow it to be replicated would 
involve deployment of tacit knowledge (Travis, 1981; Collins 1985). Both 
Gellner (1974) and Tilley (1993, b) have offered critiques on the desirable 
qualities of a successful replication. The precursors to these qualities were 
included in this project by design as far as possible. 
Pawson alone (1989) and together with Tilley (1992 & 1993) addressed 
scientific realism a-s an alternative stance for replication by emphasizing three 
linked features of projects: mechanisms, contexts and outcome patterns. 
This study has been conducted in the small business environment, and the 
firms clearly differ according to size and industry sector. There are features of 
the context in which the project was established. 
Some, inescapable, limitations to the study have made replication 
problematic. Therefore, the author has included certain basic detail that would 
be necessary to enable some generalizations to be inferred from the results. 
This information includes the detail about industry sectors and employment 
patterns in Leicestershire and Rutland (Tables 3.3,3.5,3.6,3.7 and 3.8). 
It was acknowledged that there may be a problem with 'ecological validity', or 
relating what was said in interviews and focus groups, with what was routinely 
done every day within the organizations (Bracht and Glass, 1968). It was also 
noted that although the research was to be exploratory it would inevitably 
involve selection and interpretation. Even though each firm studied was small 
scale and the focus was only to be on safety management this drew in many 
aspects of each business; and the people involved with the business. 
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It would not be possible to describe everything about the firm based on the 
observations made. It was in the nature of the research that inferences would 
be drawn. There were concerns about what this may do to the validity and 
reliability of the research. 'Critical commonsensism' suggests that you can 
never be certain of attaining truth totally beyond the possibility of invalidation 
(Almeder, 1980). 
3.5.6.1 TRIANGULATION OF THE RESULTS 
It was intended that data source triangulation be intentionally employed in this 
study, to test the validity of data. This was to be achieved by the comparison 
of data relating to the same phenomenon but deriving from different phases of 
the fieldwork, and the accounts of different participants. 
Technique triangulation was the main method to be employed, with data 
produced by different techniques being compared. To the extent that these 
techniques have different threats to their validity, they are presumed to 
provide a basis for triangulation (T. Cox, 1993; Glendon and McKenna, 1995). 
The idea of-reflexive triangulation was advocated strongly by Zelditch (1962) 
and Becker and Geer (1957). Popper (1959) advocated actively searching for 
exceptions, to the proposed theory, within the data. This comparative method 
was adopted during this study. 
Alternate forms reliability (Dane, 1990) was a technique also employed as 
test-retest reliability was not possible. The alternate forms reliability involved 
measuring safety performance within businesses, in two different ways and 
assessing the resulting categorization, according to performance to check for 
the consistency of the grouping. Venn diagrams were used to depict the 
groupings. The assumption was that the two forms of rating employed were 
different but also equivalent in terms of what they are measuring. 
The original conceptual framework for this study concerned roles, 
relationships, routines and organizational or cultural norms as they apply to 
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safety and ill-health issues in the workplace. It seemed natural to consider 
techniques for this study that had been effective for other studies of the 
climate within organizations - organizational culture. The safety climate within 
an organization can be regarded as a set of effects or organizational attributes 
(Petersen, 1989). It has been suggested that these attributes are measurable 
using a variety of methods. 
3.4.6.2 STATISTICAL TRIANGULATION 
Statistical tests have been employed during the analysis to give an estimate 
of the probabilities of the correctness of the inference .. The statistical tests 
have been used to account for the element of chance that could account for 
any of the recorded results. Where scores were not in pairs a two sample t-
test was used (MacRae, 1994). This test was used to evaluate the 
significance of the difference between the scores of two unrelated samples. 
Thus, this test leant itself for comparison of samples using different collection 
methods. There are two provisos in using the test: there was a possibility of 
outliers distorting the results; also, there was the possibility that the 
distribution of scores was not normal. A consideration arose, in comparing two 
disparate samples drawn from different populations. It was possible that those 
populations may have different variabilities. 
The chi-squared test was also applied to measure the deviation of ratios 
between two sets of data (MacRae, 1994; Litwin, 1995). A null hypothesis was 
proposed: that the observed occurrences were as predicted by theory. 
Statistical tests were applied. Thus, statistically it was determined whether the 
observed ratio deviated significantly from that predicted by the null 
hypothesis. The values of chi-squared, which may be obtained when there are 
only random deviations between observation and expectation, were tabulated 
in contingency tables. The greater the value of chi-squared the less probable 
it was that the deviation was random. The magnitude of chi-squared was 
affected also by the number of terms summed, the number of categories. 
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3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the methodological basis for this study. It has 
included a high degree of descriptive detail to assist in any future replication. 
It has also outlined the limitations of the sample population and the methods 
of data collection and analysis adopted. 
Chapters 4 and 5 contain the results obtained. Chapter 4 contains the 
findings of the postal surveys and the focus groups and Chapter 5 describes 
the multi-case studies and performance ratings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Results of the Phase One Studies 
This Chapter describes the findings 
of the two initial studies. These 
studies comprised an initial postal 
survey and a series of focus groups. 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
The research design for this study evolved over the period of the project. The 
results in this section are the findings from the pilot stages of the study. The 
initial pilot was by postal survey. Then a series of focus groups were held at 
the Centre for Hazard and Risk Management (CHaRM). 
Some of the results of the initial studies, as two separate methods of data 
collection were combined, compared and contrasted, with results from the 
main study. This triangulation of results was a deliberate decision [see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.6.1] to increase the likelihood of the findings being 
valid (T. Cox, 1993; Glendon and McKenna, 1995). 
4.1 POSTAL SURVEY PHASE 
The postal survey was the preliminary phase of this research. It was designed 
to clarify some of the research questions. 
4.1.1 RESPONSE RATE OF POSTAL SURVEY 
The postal questionnaire (the 'Charnwood' questionnaire [Tranche 1]-
Questionnaire 1 in the Appendices) was sent out to 250 businesses within 
Charnwood Borough Council boundaries. Twenty-nine questionnaires were 
returned completed. Six were returned incomplete as a result of the business 
having moved or closed. 
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In the second tranche of the survey a slightly modified questionnaire was sent 
to a random selection of 400 UK businesses from the CHaRM database [see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1.1]. A total of 69 questionnaires were completed and 
returned from tranche 2. 
Tranche 3 was a survey of a further 100 Charnwood based firms. 35 survey 
forms were returned completed. The results of tranches 1-3 have been 
combined. Collectively they comprise the pilot and initial survey. The overall 
response rate was over 17 per cent. The rate of response improved 
progressively over time as the researcher gained increase.d knowledge of the 
small firms sector, and the chosen locale, and as a consequence, targeting 
and follow up procedures improved. 
These responses rates are on a par with those reported in similar studies, 
using postal surveys distributed to small and medium sized businesses (Fuller, 
Murphy and Vickerstaff, 1991'; Storey, 1994). It was suspected that the 
respondents were positively biased towards health and safety issues. Those 
managers with an interest in health and safety management were more likely 
to respond to the survey. 
Table 4.1 Response rate from the initial survey. 
Tranche Sample size Number returned % Response 
1 250 29 11.6 
2 400 69 17.25 
3 100 35 35 
Total survey 750 133 17.73 av. 
Within the responses some questions were not answered. It is important to 
note the missing data at this stage. It was recognized at the outset that a 
frequently encountered problem in survey research is missing data. Attempts 
were made before and during the study to minimize this problem, by the 
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design of the data gathering instrument and procedures. The extent to which 
missing values presented a problem depended on the amount of data missing 
and whether data were missing at random. There is no consensus about how 
much missing data is too much. Table 4.2 (below) summarizes the missing 
data in this instance, the frequency with which questions within the survey 
instrument were missed. 
Table 4.2 Frequency of missed questions within the survey instrument. 
Question number Number oreases of Frequency of Notes 
missing data occurrence 
1.1 0 0 
1.2 6 4.5% Free text, personal 
infonnation requested 
1.3 0 0 
1.4 0 0 
1.5 0 0 
1.6 0 0 
2.1 0 0 
2.2 0 0 
2.3 12 9% Flawed question 
2.4 0 0 
2.5 5 4.5% Knowledge test 
2.6 0 0 
2.7 4 2.5% Knowledge test 
2.8 2 <1% Not coded for 
analysis 
2.9 5 4.5% Not coded for 
analysis 
~ 
2.10 0 0 
2.11(a) 15 49%* Question altered 
2.11 (b) 1 <1% 
2.12 1 <1% 
Q2. 11 * was only used in tranche 1 it was subsequently re-worded. 
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More important, than how many values were missing, was whether values 
were missing at random or systematically related to other variables in the 
study. This 'randomness' was assessed, by creating a 'missing value' variable. 
This 'missing value' variable was a coded dichotomy. The scores of the 
'missing value' variable were correlated with the scores of other study 
variables. A statistically significant variation indicated that the data were not 
missing at random. 
The results from questions 2.11 (a) and 2.3 were assumed not to be 
representative of the original population. Cohen and Cohen described 
procedures that take into account the scenario where data are not missing at 
random. Howell (2000) expanded their approach. However, these procedures 
are not suited to all kinds of data. As semi-open questions neither 2.11 (a) nor 
2.3 provided data suitable for this type of manipulation. Too much data were 
deemed to be missing from question 2.11 (a), any manipulation could not 
remedy the inherent unreliability. 
The results from questions 2.5 and 2.7 appeared to be randomly missing. 
Tabachnick and Fidel! (u.d) described several procedures that are appropriate 
for handling data that are missing at random. A favoured approach was to 
replace 'missing values' with estimates, from those subjects who provided 
real data. The simplest method was to replace missing values on a variable 
with mean known scores for that variable. This use of mean values had been 
adopted by Lubeck et al (1999) in their medical research. 
Questions 2.5 and 2.7 were testing the respondent's knowledge of health and 
safety. Question 2.5 was an open question that required careful consideration 
to recall hazards that had been identified and to summarize controls. This 
question also required the respondent to be willing to admit there were 
hazards inherent in the undertaking. 
2.5 Please list a few of the hazards you have identified and briefly 
describe the controls you use ... 
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Question 2.7 required recall over a long period, or access to reliable records. 
2.7 How many lost time accidents have you had in the past 5 years? 
Data from Question 2.7 were available for manipulation to account for missing 
the missing values. However, to replace the missing values with the mean 
known score was anticipated to cause problems because the standard 
deviation in the scores was so large. The technique was therefore deemed 
unsuitable in this instance and abandoned. 
The reasons for missing data varied. However, with hindsight 'Question 2.3' 
could have been expanded. 
The question was: 
2.3 Who else is involved [in giving advice on H&S matters in your 
company? {Please tick appropriate box(es)} 
D 
D 
D 
Senior management 
Safety Committee 
External consultants 
This question should have had one, possibly two; additional answers for this 
multiple tick box. In addition to "Senior Management", "Safety committee" and 
"External Consultants" should have been provision for "No-one", and possibly 
"other". These modifications may have reduced the incidence of missing data 
at this point. Modifications would also have allowed differentiation between 
respondents not completing because "No-one" else was involved, nil 
response, and those not completed for other reasons. On four occasions a 
margin note was included; "No-one" was inserted. 
The survey could not be adequately targeted at the outset, due to limited 
information on business size. To allow adequate interpretation of the results, it 
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was necessary to acknowledge the limitations imposed by the response rate, 
within the target sector of small and medium-sized businesses. 
4.1.1.1 RESPONSE RATE BY SIZE OF BUSINESS 
Table 4.3 summarizes the responses for the initial survey, broken down by 
size of business. Size is defined by number of employees but also includes the 
other qualifiers in the initial working definition: legal independence and no 
more than one administrative site. 
Table 4.3 Initial survey responses. broken down by size of business 
Tranche >250 staff 50-250 staff 25-50 staff 10- 25 staff <10 staff 
.. 
1 and 2 23 32 10 25 8 
3 0 3 7 6 19 
Total 23 35 17 31 27 
There were 133 questionnaires returned completed (out of 750) by the end of 
1995. The size range of firms sampled varied between 2 and 500 employees. 
The mean number of employees per firm for the whole sample was 64 (0' = 
6.75). Of this sample 58 responses were from businesses with less than 25 
employees. The targeting of the survey to the small business sector improved 
in the third tranche of the initial survey phase. The proportion of firms within 
the group of interest was 56.4 per cent (75 responses). 
From the literature search it was suggested that there might be a relationship 
between age and size of business. It has also been suggested, by some 
researchers (Scott & Bruce, 1987), that as businesses age they increase in 
sophistication (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.7). The responses were therefore 
further stratified to clarify size of business and age of business as two 
separate variables. 
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All firms within the sample which were less than two years old were small 
businesses [have less than 25 employees], there were only four of these 'new' 
businesses. Also, 64% [9/14] of firms which were less than 5 years old were 
small [have less than 25 employees]. Smaller firms within the sample tended 
to be younger than the larger organizations; but while smaller firms were on 
average younger they were not all in their infancy. Table 4.4 summarizes 
responses, showing how the age (in years) of businesses within the survey, 
relates to the number of employees within those businesses. 
Table 4.4 A breakdown of responses by age of organization and size. 
Age / size >250 staff 50-250 25-49 staff 10-24 <10 staff Total 
staff. staff 
< 2 years 0 0 0 4 0 4 
2 - <5 years 2 1 2 1 4 10 
5-<10 years 0 2 7 8 9 26 
10-25 years 4 7 0 6 6 23 
> 25 years 17 25 8 12 8 70 
The average age of companies within the sample was 25 years. The average 
age of the small firms (25 employees or less) was 21 years (with a range of 72 
years to 2.5 years). 60% [42170] of firms within the sample which were 
established more than 25 years ago had more than 50 employees. 
Table 4.5 (see below) is a modified table. This depicts the size of businesses 
compared to length of time that the organizations have been established. In 
this diagram shading has been employed to highlight the distribution of age vs. 
size characteristics. The darker the shading the more frequently that size/age 
profile recurred within the survey. 
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Table 4.5 Size of businesses compared to length of time the organizations 
have been established 
<5 years 5 to 9 years 10 to 24 25 to 49 >50 years 
Age 
No. of years years 
employees 
25 to 49 2 
10 to 24 
5 to 9 
<5 3 
Shading has been used to highlight patterns of distribution, the darker the tone the greater 
the number of businesses within the survey sample with that age/size profile. 
The examination of the sUNey data to determine the age and size profile of 
the smaller businesses within the sample showed that 81 % [9/11] of those 
smaller businesses, which had been established within the 5 years before the 
sUNey, had less than 25 employees. Among that group 27% [3/11] were the 
smallest businesses, employing less than 5 people. 
In the sub-group that had been established 4 years or longer 77% [17/22] had 
less than 25 employees. However 22% [5/22] still fell into the smallest 
category, those employing less than 5 people. 
Among those business that had survived for at least 25 years 71 % [20/28] still 
had less than 25 employees, but only 14% were still employing less than 5 
people. A significant proportion [43%, 12/28] of these well-established 
businesses, within the sample, had a directly employed workforce of between 
10 and 24 people. 
4.1.1.2 RESPONSE RATE BY INDUSTRY SECTOR 
The representation of various industry sectors within the survey was 
considered important. Table 4.6 (below) shows a summary of the response 
rate, broken down by industry sector, for the initial sUNey. All industry sectors 
were included in the sample 
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Table 4.6 Response rate. from various industry sectors to the survey 
Industry Sector Number in Number in Total Surveyed 
Tranche 1 & 2 Tranche 3 
Agriculture/Horticulture 3 0 3 
Engineering 25 4 29 
Timber / Joinery / Furniture, etc. 1 3 4 
Rubber & Plastics 3 1 4 
Wholesale Distribution 2 2 4 
Business Services 9 2 11 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 4 2 6 
Miscellaneous Services 9 2 11 
Chemicals and Chemical products 10 1 11 
Food / Drink / Tobacco 9 2 11 
Printing / Publishing and Paper 2 2 4 
Construction 8 1 9 
Hotels / Catering I Shops & Garages 7 9 16 
Transport and Communications 0 1 1 
Apparel & Textiles 6 3 9 
All categories 98 35 133 
The distribution of small firms within the sample was not uniform. Some 
industrial sectors showed a preponderance of small businesses. Table 4.7 is a 
matrix highlighting the distribution of small firms, within the survey sample, by 
sector. The matrix shows a concentration of small firms in the engineering and 
manufacturing sectors (in the range of 10-24 employees) while the 
concentration in the service sector is in the group of smallest businesses «5 
employees). The construction and joinery businesses were also represented in 
the group of smallest business «5 employees) but, within this sample, the 
printing and chemical industries tended to have larger organizations. 
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Table 4.7 Distribution of small firms. by industrial sector. 
Size Sector Joinery Construct' Service Manuf. Engineer Agriculture Printing Chemical 
<5 
5to 9 
10 to 24 
25 to 49 
Matrix using shading to enhance the visibility of the pattern of distribution 
4.1.2 RESULTS RELATING MANAGERIAL COMPLEXITY AND SIZE 
The issue of managerial complexity and size is essentially one of structure. It 
has been suggested there is a maximum span of control for managers 
(Urwick, 1956, Mileti et ai, 1977). Therefore, as the number of employees 
increases the number of managers should increase proportionally, provided 
the degree of control required remains constant. This increase in number does 
not necessarily affect the degree of hierarchy within any structure. An increase 
in the number of managers can create a broad structure that does little to alter 
vertical communication systems or paths of delegation. 
The examination of the hierarchical arrangement was designed to facilitate 
future examination, in the main study, of the communication structure. These 
findings were also to be used to indicate whether investigation of 
'disassociation' by distance between strategic managers and the operational 
areas was worthy of inclusion in the main study. Table 4.8 summarizes the 
survey responses and gives an indication of the managerial layers, within 
those organizations surveyed; and the variation in the number of hierarchical 
layers according to the size of the organization. 
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Table 4.8 Managerial layers within the organizations surveyed, compared 
to the size of those organizations. 
'. Size .• ' >250 staff ....• " 50~250 .·;c25~50,staff;:1(F25·:s#tft ;-C:'1(fs'taff'! 
. M"ri~gem.nt!(n'=23)~':~;i~~:~;~,' (n'~:1f,i'.\(~=·~~1·1··fri~ 2~fD 
,,~'~:y :.: ... :.; .. i:;.;;:·.~ ~· .... ·i:.~ '" "." .'., .... -.' ··:·::r·',< .:,.-,.,> >:. ... , .. ". ' ... ,.:... ~ .. ;,': 
•• ", .:.,:. -,:;:, ",'. ',::' {~~~ :: :. ,'.> -,' ',. :~.-:.;. :i'.:~~::<{: ::~<.~.;. "J ~~>/~./. ": .... ::.;-;~:"'\. '::.'<./:::~~. :, ... ,~:~'1.:'.:',: 
Owner/m'grs 9 27 11 31 27 
middle or line 17 31 10 1 
managers 
supervisors 17 27 9 17 6 
,:" ······as~%",'.'·~·::,: 74o/d, :i,..,\':77% '~< 53o/ci" ::;.'f. . ,':55rJ,r~;';~22% . .:'\ 
* Note: Where tables are used to display results the size of each 
relevant sample group will be denoted as Un " 
Within the sample all [58/58] the small firms « 25 employees) had owner-
managers or at least some top managers who held a proprietorial interest in 
the firm. The larger firms (>250 employees) within the sample only 
experienced executive control exercised by owners in 40% [9/23] of cases. 
For firms within the sample with less than 10 employees it is exceptional for 
them to have middle or line managers within their structures, only 4% [1/27] 
had such a layer. The incidence of middle or line managers occurring within 
the structure of the organizations within the sample increases with th~ size of 
the company. Of firms within the sample with 10 - 25 employees 19% [6/31] 
have a middle or line management layer within their structure. 
For firms within the sample with more than 25 employees it becomes probable 
that their structure will include this layer of management, of the medium sized 
firms (25 - 50 employees) 59% [10/17] did have middle or line managers. For 
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larger firms within the sample (> 50 employees) the incidence of their structure 
including a middle or line managers rises to 83% [48/58). 
Small firms within the sample « 25 employees) are more likely to have 
supervisory staff (40% [23/58]) than middle management (12% [7/58]). Again 
the incidence of supervisory staff within the organizational structure seems to 
increase with size of the organization. Firms within the sample with less than 
1 0 employees only have a 22% [6/27] probability of having supervisors; this 
probability increases to 55% [17/31] among respondents with 10 to 25 
employees. For large businesses with the sample (> 50 employees) the 
probability of having supervisory staff rises to 65% [49n5]. 
There is a low instance 26% [7/27], among the smaller firms « 10 employees) 
within the sample of having any managerial level other than upper 
management. This phenomenon may also account for the relatively high 
incidence, 54% [7/13], of complaints about bureaucracy, caused by current 
regulatory requirements, among this group. If a managerial approach to any 
issue, for example health and safety, placed heavy reliance on supervisory 
checks it would seem that 74% of the smaller firms, within this sample, would 
be ill equipped. 
Among firms within the sample with 10 to 50 employees the incidence of a 
supervisory layer within the structural hierarchy increases to 54% [26/48]. For 
the larger firms (with 50 to 250+ employees) this reliance on supervisory staff 
increases yet again to 76% [44/58] of firms within the sample. Table 4.9 allows 
comparison of the number of hierarchical layers in the businesses, within the 
survey sample, with the number of employees. Again shading has been used 
to highlight the distribution pattern of size vs. characteristics of hierarchy, 
within the survey results. 
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Table 4.9 Size of business (expressed as number of employees) compared 
to number of hierarchical layers reported in structure. 
Owner- Supervisory Middle managers Four managerial Hierarchical, >4 
tiers 
<5 
5 to 9 
10 to 24 
25 to 49 
>50 
Shading has been employed to highlight the distribution of size vs. characteristics of 
hierarchy. 
4.1.3 RESULTS INDICATING MANAGERIAL RESPONSE TO HEALTH AND SAFETY 
When looking specifically at health and safety management differences 
persisted. In the overall sample the percentage of firms where one manager 
accepted responsibility for health and safety along with his other duties was 
70% [93]. This figure rose to 78% [45] when only the small firms were 
examined. 
When asked how much specialist training this manager had received the 
average was none or very little for the sample as a whole and this very low 
training rate dropped even further when only the small firms were examined. 
The percentage of firms employing a specialist in health and safety was 17% 
[29], this did not include any of the smaller firms. 
In 28% [16] of small firms (25 employees or less) within the sample health and 
safety was seen as a bolt on issue, as a collective and very general 
responsibility of all managers. In all there were 133 respondents to this 
question (sample size 750). 
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Table 4.10 shows the results of the survey responses indicating which 
persons within businesses are responsible for giving advice on matters of 
health and safety. 
Table 4.10 Persons within businesses who are responsible for giving advice 
on matters of health and safety. as reported within the survey. 
. Job Description Number of responses . 
Designated Health & Safety Specialist 29 
Designated 'other' 59 
Managers collectively 24 
"Everyone" 2 
Consultants 12 
No-one 7 
"Designated 'other''' in Table 4.10 is an ambiguous category. Table 4.11 
(below) provides a break down of designated 'other' by main role. 
Table 4.11 Job Title of designated 'other'. the person who reportedly takes 
responsibility for H&S management 
Job Description of 'designated other' Number of responses. 
Partner, Director, or General Manager 42 
Human Resources or Personnel Manager 3 
Quality Manager 3 
No specified reason for delegation 11 
~ 
The responses have been further broken down to reveal whether or not size of 
business is a factor that influences the choice of the person who accepts 
responsibility for health and safety management. Table 4.12 shows the size of 
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firms where the Director(s) or Partner(s) are reported to be the designated 
'other', the non~specialist person who assumes responsibility for safety 
management. This classification excludes "General Managers" as the key to 
this examination of the data is the ownership interest. 
Table 4.12 Size distribution of businesses, within the sample, where the 
MD, Director(s) or Partner(s) are the persons who assume 
responsibility for safety management. 
Size 
Number of 
responses 
>250 staff 50-250 staff 25-50 staff 10- 25 staff <10 staff 
o 5 3 7 14 
Safety responsibility was assumed by a high number of owners in the smallest 
businesses, 52% (14/27). Comparing this finding, of a high number of owners 
assuming responsibility for safety, with the degree of managerial differentiation 
these same business reported (Table 4.9) there appears to be a curious 
anomaly. There were more owners reportedly assuming responsibility for 
safety issues than were retaining overall control of the management of the 
whole business. Among these 27 businesses only 10 reported that the main 
control was the owner-manager yet in 14 instances it is the owner who reports 
responsibility for safety management. Thus there appeared to be either a 
reluctance to delegate safety management, even where other areas of 
management were apparently shared, or delegated, or to report that such 
delegation had occurred. 
This anomaly persisted among the group of businesses with 10-25 employees. 
Within this group 7 responses (22%) indicated that the 'owner' retained 
responsibility for safety management. Within this group there was much more 
managerial differentiation and more opportunities for delegation; yet 
responsibility was still retained by the owner. It has been shown by the survey 
that the owner was frequently a person lacking specialist knowledge. 
The knowledge base of these non-specialists was examined within the survey. 
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These data were reliant upon the respondent's own classification of their 
formal training, or knowledge base. Table 4.13 (below) summarizes the 
training profile of non-specialists who assumed the responsibility for safety 
management [designated 'other']. 
4.1.3. 1 RESULTS CONCERNING HEALTH AND SAFETY TRAINING 
Within the sample where a manager was designated as the provider of health 
and safety information to a business in 79% of cases s/he had at least a basic 
awareness of health and safety issues. There was also a 47% probability s/he 
would have undergone some formal training. Table 4.13 (below) summarizes 
the training profile of non-specialists [designated 'other] who assumed primary 
responsibility for managing safety. 
Within the same sample, where it is an owner who is designated as the source 
of such information and guidance, there is a 59% probability that s/he will have 
received no relevant training at all. Where an owner has sought training the 
preferred means has been reading or self study methods to raise basic 
awareness or the attendance of non-certificated day courses or seminars. 
Table 4.13 A training profile of non-specialists who report responsibility for 
health and safety management. in businesses within the survey. 
Designation 
IOSH Diploma o o 
IOSH Certificate 1 5 
Day Courses 5 4 
Basic Awareness 6 6 
None 17 4 
'.', '.J. ~ 
. \,' ;.~ >',::"'" 
*NB. Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding. 
Where alternative diplomas or certificates have been quoted they have been 
classified to the nearest equivalent. 
Where 'owners' are a Partner or Director (n = 29) and for managers (n = 19). 
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The owner is likely to have received no specialist occupational health or safety 
training 79% (23/29). However, from the previous examination of results it was 
clear that some sizes of business were more likely to place reliance on the 
'owner', for health and safety advice and managerial input. By applying 
weighting, to account for the stratification of the sample by size, the relative 
importance of training to each group of business (according to the number of 
people they employ) can be assessed. This weighting was derived from the 
frequency of occurrence of 'types' within the sample. A type was derived from 
a categorization of sizes of business and the probability of a designated 'other' 
being the nominee for safety responsibility. The calculated need for health and 
safety training increases as the weighted-score increases. Table 4.14 (below) 
shows how the weighted-score was calculated. 
From this weighting exercise it becomes clear that the need for training arises 
most markedly among the smallest « 10 employees) business, within the 
survey. This is logical as the availability of alternative, trained, staff for the 
primary safety role is reduced in smaller organizations. The training deficit 
reduces progressively as the size of the business increases. 
Table 4.14 Relative need for training. within each group of businesses 
(according to the size of business) 
Size affirm >250 staff 50-250 staff 25-50 staff 10- 25 staff <10 staff 
"owner(s)" 0 5 3 7 14 
designated 
weighting factor x5.78 x3.8 x7.8 x4.3 x4.9 
relative need for 
training 0 19 23.4 30.1 -68.6 
[Where responses = 133 (Sample size 750)) 
4.1.3.2 USE OF DESIGNATED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
The previous examination of the data focused on the use made of non-
specialists. Some businesses do have access to specialist knowledge about 
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health and safety. Some of this knowledge is internal to the organization; 
some must be accessed externally. Table 4.15 (below) summarizes the size 
profile of companies, within the sample (133 responses, sample size 750), 
with access to internal, trained safety speCialists (where safety is a significant 
portion of their role within the company although not necessarily their 
exclusive role). Conversely, Table 4.16 shows the size profile of companies, 
within the sample, where no internal source of health and safety advice is 
available. The responses, reported in this table, show 'no-one' or 'external' 
consultants as sources of advice: (from 133 responses, sample size 750]. 
Table 4.15 Size profile of businesses, within the sample, with access to 
internal. trained safety specialists . 
. ·Size of firm .. >250 staff . SO.;.2S0 staff 2S;'SOstaff 10-2Sstaff ... <10 staff 
. ... 
..... 
.. 
. . 
.... 'c· .. ' . - .. 
Number with 9 17 1* 0 0 
specialist 
Number 
expressed as 39% 49% 7% 0 0 
% of sample 
* Note - The firm in the 25-50 employee category with a specialist adviser had 
40+ employees. 
Table 4.16 Size profile of businesses, within the sample, where no internal 
source of health and safety advice is reportedly available. 
Size affirm >2S0staff SO-250 staff 25~50 staff 10- 25 staff <10 staff . 
Number with -
'no-one' 1 0 2 1 3 
Number with 
consultants 1 4 1 3 3 
When the data regarding trained employees and internal sources of 
information used in the businesses within the sample were examined there 
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were indications that the availability of advice was related to the size of a 
business. It seems four times more likely that a firm will have no internal 
source of advice on health and safety issues if it has less than 25 employees 
than if it has more than 50 employees. 
The lack of internal sources of advice is consistent with the finding that the 
use of consultants for health and safety advice and guidance was weighted 
towards the smaller firm, in this sample. Other research has shown that small 
business owner-managers are generally unwilling to seek external guidance 
and advice (Bibbings, 1995). Within this survey sample 50% of businesses 
with less than 25 employees used consultants, while of the larger businesses, 
with more than 250 employees, the use of health and safety consultants 
decreased sharply to 8%. The most use of health and safety consultants 
would seem to be by small firms with fewer than 25 employees. 
4.1.3.3 SOURCES OF SAFETY INFORMATION 
A matrix summarizing the sources of safety information; that were reported 
during the initial survey is shown as Table 4.17. These data have been sorted 
and presented according to the size of businesses tendering the response. 
Shading has been employed to highlight distribution of results. 
Table 4.17 Sources of safety information reported, by size of business 
NONE Enforcer Trade Press Consultants CD ROM Suppliers 
Assoc. 
<5 
5 to 9 
10 to 24 
25 to 49 
The results of the phase one survey indicate that for small business the most 
common source of health and safety information is the enforcer [either Health 
and Safety Executive Inspectors, or Local Authority Environmental Health 
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Officers (or Technical Officers)]. Heavy reliance is placed on the press for 
information by all small businesses, although trade associations are also used. 
It is alarming that among the very smallest businesses a number reported 
having no source of information on which the felt they could rely. It may be 
that this absence of trusted information may act as a barrier to some of these 
businesses attaining legislative compliance and pursuing sound risk 
management practices. Ignorance is no excuse in failing to achieve legislative 
compliance but it is frequently cited (anecdotally) as a causal factor. 
4.1.4 INDICATORS OF ACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
Indicators of basic legislative compliance were distilled from the data. Basic 
legislative compliance was chosen as a measurable level of attainment that 
should be universal among those businesses surveyed. The survey was 
exclusively based in England so there were no cross-border complications 
relating to applicability of legislation. 
The Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 (1974) applied uniformly across 
all participating businesses, except where the de minimus level for number of 
employees allowed exclusions. Where the Act and supplementary legislation 
failed to apply, due to the low number of employees in that business, this was 
true of a group of businesses of that size and was not peculiar to an industrial 
sector. 
The basic compliance indicators were therefore intended to provide a guide as 
to the rate of attainment, of the minimum acceptable standard of health and 
safety management and risk control, among businesses within the survey. 
Table 4.18 (below) shows the categorization of businesses according to their 
compliance indicators, and shows the relative performance of businesses 
according to their size. 
The basic legislative compliance indicators are strikingly different between 
small and large firms within the sample. For the largest firms in the sample (> 
250) there is a 100% [23/23] legislative compliance rate for both: 
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documentation, for example - safety policy; and procedures, such as risk 
assessments. 
For firms with between 50 and 250 employees the compliance rates fall 
slightly, and begin to show a variation between the basic documentation 
requirements and those activities that are both labour intensive and require 
specialist skills, so have a need for training or out-sourcing. Of this group 
there was 94% [33/35] compliance with the documentation provision but only 
86% [30/35] compliance with risk assessments. 
Table 4.18 Indicators of active safety management - groupings according to 
relative attainment. 
Basic legislative 
requirements-
documentation 
Basic legislative 
requirements-
No 
documentation 
Basic legislative 
requirements-
risk assessments 
Basic legislative 
requirements-
No 
risk assessments 
Proactive 
initiatives 
Only legal 
minimum 
23 
o 
23 
o 
19 
4 
33 17 
2 o 
30 17 
5 o 
25 12 
11 5 
Where number of responses = 133 (sample 750) 
25 16 
6 11 
16 13 
15 14 
5 4 
26 23 
The medium sized (25-50 employee) firms within the sample "appear to have 
coped better; in that like their much larger counterparts they achieved 100% 
[17/17] compliance in both categories. The average compliance rates for firms 
with more than 25 employees is therefore: 97% [73/75] for the documentation 
and 93% [70/75] for the risk assessments. 
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For the smaller firms within the sample basic legislative compliance has 
apparently proved more difficult. Only 80% [25/31] of firms with between 10 
and 25 employees managed to comply with the statutory documentary 
requirements. This figure was even lower at 52% [16/31] for the same group 
when the need for risk assessments was addressed. 
For the group of smallest companies «10 employees) within the sample the 
picture is even more pronounced. The compliance rate for basic 
documentation was only 59% [16/27]; while for risk assessments the rate fell 
to 48% [13/27] compliance. 
This picture of under-performance, revealed by the survey reflects, to some 
extent, the findings of a study undertaken by the Department of Employment 
(DoE) (1994). The DoE study's aim had been to find the number of small 
businesses who were doing more than the legal minimum to satisfy some of 
the regulations (Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992, 
Electricity at Work Regulations 1989, Control of Substances Hazardous to 
Health Regulations 1988 [COSHH - now superceded], Manual Handling 
Regulations 1992 and the Display Screen Equipment Regulations 1992). 
Telephone interviews with representatives from 504 small firms, by 
Employment Department researchers, revealed only 18% that felt more had 
been done than was necessary, in those businesses, to meet basic legislative 
requirements. Where a higher than minimum performance was described, 
twenty of these interviews were followed up. In most of those twenty 
businesses, researchers found that, contrary to the representative's 
perception, not enough was being done. 
To further examine this issue of minimum attainment, among participating 
businesses in this study, it was decided to compare the accident rates (per 
100 employees) between the largest business in the sample (>250 
employees) and the smallest businesses in the sample. It has already been 
stated that a primary purpose of managerial intervention in safety matters is to 
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reduce the incidence of accidents (Chapters 1 and 2). In comparing the 
accident rates of large (>250 employees) and small (<25 business) one is 
provided with an outcome measurement of the success, or otherwise of 
managerial intervention. 
The success in managing safety, as adjudged by the indicators of active 
safety management, between these groups, of large and small businesses, 
was markedly different. For the largest firms in the sample (> 250) there is a 
reported 100% [23/23] legislative compliance rate for both: documentation and 
procedures. While for the smaller businesses' (<25 employee) attainment was 
lower at: 70% (41/58) for documentation and only 50% (19/58) undertaking 
essential risk assessments. There is no direct cause and effect, between 
managerial intervention and the occurrence of accidents; but if the accident 
rates cannot be influenced by the intervention of managers then the basic 
premise of this study is flawed. 
Statistical tests have been used to account for the element of chance that 
could account for any variation between the groups, for the recorded accident 
results. A two-sample t-test was used. These data are shown in Table 4.19 
below. This t-test was used to evaluate the significance of the difference 
between the scores of the two unrelated samples. From the application of the 
t-test in this instance: .f:.. = 0.6 
For the test to be regarded as significant t. must equal or exceed 2.306. As 
.f:.. = 0.6 the threshold of significance has not been reached. The result is not 
significant at the 0.05 level. The two size categories do not show significantly 
different results. Thus the statistical tests applied suggests that in comparing 
the accident rates between large and small businesses within the survey 
sample there was no significant difference, between the two groups, in the 
accident rates reported. However, a potential problem has been identified with 
the reporting of accident rates in this survey. For firms with less than 25 staff 
within the sample only 16% [9/58] even collected accident data. Given the 
small number of firms within the sample able to provide these data the 
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analysis of the incidence of accidents was necessarily limited (see also 
Section 4.1.4.1 on the use of loss control methods and Table 4.26 on the 
incidence of accidents, later in this chapter). 
Table 4.19 A comparison of accident rates 
Accident rate (per Accident rate (per I 
100 employees) in L2 100 employees) in S2 businesses >250 businesses <25 
employees [L] 
I 
employees [s] 
(nL =14) (ns =24) 
1.2 1.44 0 0 
4.5 20.25 0 0 
4.1 16.81 7.1 50.41 
4.67 21.77 0 0 
0 0 0 I 0 
1.67 2.77 0 0 
1 I 1 22.2 492.84 
0.25 i 0.0625 0 0 
0.65 0.4225 0 0 
4.167 17.36 17.39 302.41 
1.54 I 2.3716 0 0 
7.33 53.77 0 0 
14.85 I 220.5 0 0 
I 0 I 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 0 
14.28 203.92 
0 I 0 
11.76 138.3 
8.33 69.44 
i 0 0 
I 0 I 0 
35.29 1245.38 
LL = 45.9 L L Z = 358.486 LS = 116.35 L 5 2 = 2502.7 
Accident rates (per 100 employees) between the largest companies in the sample, with 
accident data available, (>250, where n =13) and the smallest companies in the sample, with 
accident data available, «25 employees, where n =24) 
The manner in which small firms manage health and safety was initially tested 
by analyzing the survey data to test the degree of legislative compliance 
achieved by businesses of different sizes. The chi-squared test was used to 
test hypotheses posed to account for the observed variations (Litwin, 1995). 
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Testing the null hypothesis that the probabilities of a business (>25 
employees) having adequate, statutory, health and safety documentation is 
the same as for small businesses (<25 employees): 
Table 4.20 The frequency of responses indicating adequate or inadequate 
safety documentation within two groups of businesses, sorted 
by size. 
Businesses with Small businesses < Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employ~es 
Adequate 
documentation 50 41 91 
reported 
Inadequate 
documentation 2 17 19 
reported 
n 52 58 110 ' 
Table 4.21 The expected frequency, of the incidence of adequate and 
inadequate documentation, based on the null hypothesis that 
both groups have the same probabilities of having the 
documentation 
Businesses with Small businesses < Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employees 
Adequate 
documentation 43 48 91 
reported 
Inadequate 
documentation 9 10 19 
reported -
n 52 58 110 
Chi-squared = 9.629375 
Chi-squared must be >6.63 to be significant at the 0.01 level. 
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The analysis produced a significant result so the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. The inference is that small businesses within the sample «25 
employees) are less likely to have adequate safety documentation than larger 
businesses. This analysis was repeated by comparing businesses with 
between 1 0 and 25 employees and those with less than 1 O. No significant 
difference in performance was noted between these two sub-groups. 
Previous research reviews have identified traits that support the view of a 
general tendency towards reduced bureaucracy, and formality, within smaller 
firms (Kets de Vries, 1977). Given this aversion to bureaucracy that has 
emerged in other studies of small business (Berryman, 1983) it may be the 
production of documentation that is the barrier. It was therefore decided to 
analyze reported data for the incidence of carrying out risk assessments. 
Testing the null hypothesis that the likelihood of a business (>25 employees) 
having undertaken risk assessments is the same as for small businesses «25 
employees): 
Table 4.22 The frequency of responses indicating the incidence of risk 
assessments within two groups of businesses sorted by size. 
Businesses with Small businesses < 
.. Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
emJ)l~ees 
Adequate risk 
assessments 47 29 ,' .. 76 
reported 
Inadequate, or no, 
Risk assessments 5 29 34 
reported 
n 52 58 110 
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Table 4.23 The expected frequency of the incidence of risk assessments 
based on the null hypothesis that both groups have the same 
probabilities of having completed them. 
Businesses with Small businesses < Total-
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employees 
Adequate risk 
assessments 36 40 76 •. 
reported 
Inadequate, or no, ... 
Risk assessments 16 18 34 
reported : ... 
n 52 58 110 . . 
Chi-squared = ~ ([O-E]- 0.5)2/E = 20.8 
Chi-squared must be >6.63 to be significant at the 0.01 level. 
The lack of achievement of even the basic statutory minimum is likely also to 
impact on the firm's attitude to other proactive initiatives to improve the health 
and safety climate. This seems to hold true from the sampled data: Only 15% 
[4/27] of the smallest businesses «10 employees) within the sample 
undertook anything but the minimum necessary to fulfil their statutory duties. 
This figure was approximately the same, at 16% [5/31], for the other small 
firms (10 - 25 employees) within the sample. Medium sized and large 
businesses (25-250+ employees) within the sample are much more likely to 
introduce initiatives aimed at general improvements which extend beyond their 
minimum duties; 75% [56/75] of the sample had such initiatives on going at 
the time of the survey. It was therefore decided to analyze further reported 
data for the incidence of pro-active initiatives that exceed statutory minimum 
requirements. 
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Testing the null hypothesis that the probabilities of a business (>25 employees) 
having implemented safety initiatives that exceed statutory minimum 
requirements is the same as for small businesses «25 employees): 
Table 4.24 The frequency of responses indicating the incidence of pro-active 
safety initiatives within two groups of businesses sorted by size 
Businesses with Small businesses < Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employees 
Pro-active 
initiatives reported 37 9 46 
... 
No pro-active 
initiative beyond 15 49 64 
the statutory 
minima rE~Qorted ... 
n 52 58 110 
Table 4.25 The expected frequency of the incidence of pro-active safety 
initiatives above the statutory minima based on the null 
hypothesis that both groups have the same probabilities of 
having completed them 
Businesses with Small businesses < Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employees 
Adequate risk 
assessments 21.75 24.25 46 
reported 
Inadequate, or no, 
Risk assessments 30.25 33.75 64 
reported 
n 52 58 110 
Chi-squared = L ([O-E] - 0.5)2/E = 28.867 
Chi-squared must be >6.63 to be significant at the 0.01 level 
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The analysis has produced a significant result for chi-squared so the null 
hypothesis, that both groups have the same probabilities of having undertaken 
pro-active safety initiatives, can be rejected. Small businesses within the 
sample «25 employees) were significantly less likely to undertaken pro-active 
safety initiatives, beyond those required by the legislation, than larger 
businesses within the survey sample. 
4.1.4.1 USE OF THE LOSS CONTROL METHOD FOR MANAGING SAFETY 
The avoidance of accidents has been identified as an important benefit of 
safety investment (Oavies and Teasdale, 1994). The threat of costs incurred 
from accidents is both explicit and implicit in some promotional material aimed 
at encouraging businesses to manage health and safety; for example" Be Safe 
- save money: The cost of accidents - a guide for small firms" (HSE, 1994). 
The next analysis aims to discover the size profile of firms who measure the 
incidence of accidents. 
Table 4.26 Businesses that actively measure the incidence of accidents, 
sorted by size. 
>250 staff 50-250 staff 25-50 staff 10- 25 staff . <10 staff . 
(n = 23) (n = 35) (n = 17) (n = 31) ... (n = 27) .... 
Accident data 14 26 15 0 9 
collected 
No accident 7 5 0 11 3 
data 
No accidents I 2 4 2 20 16 
Does not arise 
For the purposes of the survey question, accidents were defined as: 
"accidents resulting in a loss of work time" 
For firms with less than 25 staff within the sample only 16% [9/58] even collect 
accident data. For medium sized firms and large firms (25 - 250+) in the 
sample the percentage that routinely capture this type of data is significantly 
higher at 73% [55/75]. 
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In comparing the- reported accident rates between large and small businesses 
within the survey sample there was no apparently significant difference, 
between the two groups, in the accident rates reported. Given the limitations 
of the small number of firms within the sample able to provide the data the 
analysis of the incidence of accidents by firm size is necessarily limited. 
Table 4.27 Reported incidence of accidents, broken down by size of 
business. 
Size of firm >250 staff 50-250 staff 25-50 staff <10 staff 
(n =14) . (n = 26).-, (n =15) (n =9) 
. 
< 5 accidents total 4 10 14 9 
5-10 accidents total 1 9 1 0 
11 - 20 accidents in total 0 5 0 0 
21- 30 accidents total 4 0 0 0 
>30 accidents 5 2 0 0 
Where n = the number of firms in each group with data available for the 
preceding 5 years 
It was considered inappropriate to calculate the accident rate as a proportion 
of total man-hours worked per year because there was some evidence in the 
returns that there may have been a degree of under-reporting or 
approximating by the smaller firms. Responses included notes in some 
instances: 
"2 or 3"; 
"various - none serious"; 
"1 personally have reported 6"; 
These notes have cast some doubt on the reliability of this portion of the data. 
No further inferences will be drawn from these accident data. 
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4.1.4.2 ATTITUDES EXPRESSED ABOUT SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATION 
The initial survey included an open question asking for the respondent's view 
about the impact of current health and safety legislation on their business. The 
views expressed have been categorized as: positive, negative and resigned, 
ambivalent, or neutral. Only 62% of those who replied to the questionnaire 
chose to make any comment to this question (83 responses were received, 
from 750 survey forms sent out which included the question). 
Table 4.28 Summary of the respondents' views about the impact of current 
health and safety legislation. 
Impact >2S0 staff SO-2S0 staff 2S-S0staff 10-25 staff <10 staff . Total 
.. .. 
Cn =23) Cn = 35) ... (n = 17) . (n= 31) (n =27) (0 = 133) 
.c. .-
positive 4 7 3 1 0 15 
negative 6 10 2 16 16 50 
ambivalent 2 9 3 3 1 18 
No response 11 9 9 11 10 50 
Of those, within the sample, who expressed a view 60% [50/83] felt that 
current health and safety legislation had a negative impact on their business. 
This figure rose to 86% [32/37] when only firms from within the sample with 
fewer than 25 employees were considered. The figure peaked at 94% [16/17] 
for the smallest businesses «10 employees). However, the number of 
responses received from this group alone was very small and this percentage 
will be treated with extreme caution; only as a possible indicator of the 
prevailing view subject to later confirmation from the qualitative data. The 
reasons given for negative responses have been categorized, ranked and 
divided by size of firm. 
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Table 4.29 Summary of the reasons given for negative responses, about the 
impact of current health and safety legislation. 
>250 staff 50·250 25·50 staff 10- 25 staff <10 staff .... Total 
Reasons given staff, for negative . , 
responses (n= 6) (n=10) (n =2) (n == 16) (n=16) :(n=:50) 
increased 
bureaucracy 3 5 1 6 8 23 
cost 1 3 1 7 7 19 
volume of 
regulations 2 1 0 4 1 8 
complexity of 
duties 0 3 1 1 0 5 
The 'reasons' have been categorized and divided by size of firm; they are 
displayed in rank order, based on total responses. 
The sum of the number of responses (55) exceeds the total number of respondents 
from the sample who expressed a view (50), because some respondents gave more 
than one reason for their view. 
Increased bureaucracy was the most commonly cit~d problem 40% [7/50]. A 
large minority of those who expressed themselves negatively disposed 
towards current health and safety legislation cited this as a problem. The 
levels of perception of this as a problem varied with company size. 50% [3/61 
of firms within the sample which expressed a negative view and which had 
more than 250 employees felt increased bureaucracy was a problem. 
The figure for the medium sized companies in the sample who expressed 
similar sentiments was lower, at 42% [12/28]. While the smallest firms «10 
employees) within the sample who felt that the current controls were 
burdensome to their businesses, 50% [8/161 cited bureaucracy as a problem. 
All those within the sample, who expressed a negative view, cited 'cost' as an 
important impact of health and safety legislation. 
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This view of health and safety legislation imposing a cost burden on 
businesses is broadly consistent with the findings of the survey conducted by 
the British Chamber of Commerce [BCC] (1995). In the BCC survey of small 
businesses 61% "thought the rules cost too much". 
The distribution of this view between respondents from various sizes of 
organization, in this study, was clearly skewed towards the smaller ones. Of 
the smallest firms «10 employees) within the sample who expressed a 
negative view, 47% [7/16] cited cost incurred by complying with statutory 
duties as an important factor; almost as many who had a problem with the 
increased bureaucracy created. Even among the next group (10 to 25 
employees) a significant minority 39% [7/18] felt that costs may be prohibitive 
and severely damage trading. For the medium and larger firms (25-250 
employees) the impact was apparently less acutely felt with only 20% [5/25] 
making similar complaints. 
Some respondents were explicit about their views on the impact of the 
increased costs incurred in complying with current statutory duties: 
"very expensive to implement" - (larger firm, 50 to 250 employees) 
"compliance in certain areas is expensive" - (small firm, less than 10 
employees) 
"costly against a 19w economy background" - (small firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
"will add to the running cost of the business"- (small firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
"if they [recent legislative changes in the six-pack] were implemented 100% 
they would bankrupt most businesses" - (small firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
After costs it was the volume of the legislation that was the most commonly 
cited grievance by all firms within the sample [8/50]. It was the small firms with 
between 10 and 25 staff from within the sample that most frequently 
mentioned this as a problem; 50% [4/8] of those who detailed this as an issue 
were in this group. They also had some telling comments to make in the free 
text: 
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" much of health and safety legislation is irrelevant and impossible to 
implement .. "- (small firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
"[legislation] is considerable and not fully addressed" [within the firm]- (small 
firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
"too much" [legislation]. - (small firm, 10 to 25 employees) 
This view regarding the volume of legislation reflects the findings in the BCC 
(1995) study. In that survey of small businesses, 78% thought the "rules" took 
too much time, and 68% thought them too complicated. The Forum of Private 
Business [FPB] (1993) had also undertaken a survey, of 1800 small 
businesses. In the FPB study, 66% of respondents said there were too many 
laws, which were too complicated. This perception of legislation, as 
complicated, drew parallels with the findings from the initial questionnaire 
responses. 
The fourth barrier, inhibiting compliance and earning a negative reception for 
the legislation, identified in this initial phase of the study, was the complexity of 
the regulations. Surprisingly this irritation was expressed most frequently by 
the medium to large firms (50 to 250 employees) 30% [3/10] of firms within this 
size category in the sample expressed this view. Only 6% [1/16] of firms with 
between 10 and 25 employees in the sample mentioned this and no firms 
[0/10] with less than 10 employees considered this an aspect worth noting. 
It is possible that the smaller firms did not cite the complexity of regulations as 
a problem because of a lack of awareness of the content of the regulations. 
Legislative knowledge was tested by another question in the survey, Question 
2.6: "What Health and Safety legislation are you aware of that affects your 
business?" . 
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Table 4.30 Idehtified gaps in awareness of some recent [at the time of the 
survey1 safety legislation. according to size of business. 
"6-pack" COSHH 
<5 13 7 
5 to 9 9 7 
10 to 24 19 13 
25 to 49 7 0 
Electricity 
5 
0 
11 
0 
, 
No gaps noted 
2 
o 
8 
10 
The results seem to confirm that there is a gap in knowledge among smaller 
businesses. Only those businesses with more than 10 employees 
demonstrated comprehensive knowledge of recent safety legislation, 
examples of legislation were provided in the survey. 
Not all respondents view the legislative requirements negatively. 11 % [15/133] 
of all firms responding had a positive view to express about legislative 
controls. The distribution of this positive view by size of firm was not even. 
73% [11/15] of the positive views expressed were provided by firms with more 
than 50 employees. 
The FPB Survey (1993) had a similarly positive response, overall, to safety 
legislation. In that study 75% of respondents agreed that health and safety 
laws are necessary. 
In this initial survey the larger firms (with 50 to 250+ employees) clearly 
stressed the importance of legislation in "setting the agenda". Only one of the 
small companies (with 10 to 25 employees), among those asked, noted any 
benefit at all to health and safety law; that comment was grudging: "Helpful -
but at a cost". 
The positive statements that were submitted on the survey forms indicated 
some common areas where regulation can apparently have a positive impact. 
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As a driver for change: 
"It provides an incentive to give health and safety matters due attention .. "-
(a firm with 50 - 250 employees). 
"Advantage to company by encouraging staff to take safety into account" -
(a firm with 50 - 250 employees). 
"Induces better controls and better working procedures" -
(a firm with> 250 employees) 
Providing a skeleton to build the approach on: 
"Focuses the mind" - (a firm with 50 - 250 employees) 
"Legislation gives the company a framework with which to address health and 
safety" - (a firm with 50 - 250 employees) 
"Gives [the] company tangible goals I practices to achieve" - (a firm with more 
than 250 employees). 
A matrix showing some of the positive reasons given for managing safety is 
below. Out of 98 respondents from the first two survey tranches (sample size 
650) there were 22 positive opinions expressed about managing health and 
safety these have been summarized in the matrix (Table 4.31). Those 
elements essential to any management method are broken down by size of 
business to illustrate the differences that seem to arise between different sizes 
of organization. 
Some managers of small businesses described some of the essential 
elements of any management method. These essentials included: minimum 
paperwork and low cost. Where as, the mangers in large businesses had 
different priorities. Those managers demanded, of any safety management 
e 
method, that it should: integrate with their existing ISO systems; incur minimal 
increase in workload; include training for all members of the organization and 
recognition for the company's achievements; integrate with other management 
systems and have a mechanism to ensure employee involvement throughout. 
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Table 4.31 A matrix showing positive reasons given for managing safety 
and those elements essential in any management method. 
Small Medium Large 
i(n=33) I(n = 42) (n = 23) 
Motivation for 'Improve safety of Improve safety of I (not mentioned) 
managing employees employees 
I safety 
Support Training I Goal setting 
employee opportunities i 
development I 
I 
(not mentioned) Senchmarking ISenchmarking 
: 
Achieve Enhance company I Internal and external :. 
recognition for image I image 
company 
I 
Elements Minimum Easy to maintain I Must integrate with 
essential in any paperwork I existing ISO systems 
management 
method I Low cost Reasonable cost vs. Must incur minimal 
benefit increase in workload 
(not mentioned) . (not mentioned) Must include training for 
all , 
I I (not mentioned) (not mentioned) I Employee involvement 
I important . 
Must include Must include Must include recognition 
recognition for recognition for for achievements within 
achievements achievements industry 
(not mentioned) (not mentioned) I Must integrate with I other management 
systems -
4.1.4.3 RESULTS INDICATING USE OF STANDARDS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
Management by objectives was apparently not uppermost in the minds of the 
respondents from small companies « 25 employees) but clearly was a 
significant aspect for managers of some of the largest firms. The more 
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classically formal approach adopted by larger firms was tested to some extent 
by the survey. Respondents were asked if they worked to formal or 
documented quality standards such as SS 5750 (now ISO 9000 series). 
Table 4.32 The use of documented quality systems. broken down by size of 
business. 
Size >250 staff 50;.250 staff . 25-50 staff 1 O~ 25 staff. <10 staff Total 
I·· (n=23) (0=35)' '(n= 17) (h ::.31) 1;(n=27)< . (n =133) 
'. .' :.: , 
8S5750 18 27 11 8 0 64 
As% 78% 77% 65% 26% 0 48% 
Among those respondents, that indicated they had chosen to attain the 
8S5750 [now IS09000 series] quality award, 13 stated the main motivation 
was customer pressure. Those larger businesses [with more than 50 
employees] within the sample were more than 5.5 times more likely to have 
adopted a formal (hard) systems approach to quality management than those 
firms within the sample that had less than 25 employees. 
The systems in use within an organization cannot be fully explored via a postal 
survey. To properly examine systems, and other management techniques and 
processes, in use in small businesses it is necessary to elicit responses face 
to face so that follow up questions can be used to clarify the information 
offered. Phase one of the study was extended to include a series of focus 
groups to achieve this richer picture building. 
4.2 RESULTS FROM THE FOCUS GROUPS 
Focus group work was seen as one way of counteracting the constrained 
responses to the questionnaire and allowing a deeper investigation of the 
issues. To truly understand motivations and occupational health and safety 
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management in small firms it was considered necessary to employ a technique 
that would encourage expression of those views and allow concurrent 
examination of sentiments expressed. The Focus Groups involved two 
facilitators or interviewers in each case, and limited groups (3-7) of local 
managers from small businesses. There were three focus groups held in the 
series. 
It was known too that the results from a self-contained focus group could 
stand on its own, but that this did not preclude the use of the results as part of 
a larger project. Focus groups were seen as lending themselves to the use of 
results to triangulate different forms of data collection on the same topic 
(Oenzin 1978, Fielding and Fielding 1986). The validity of the results was 
known to depend on the process as well as the outcome so care was taken, in 
'\ 
moderating the discussions, to minimize bias. However, the opportunity for 
statistical error was high. There were two principal sources of error known: 
sampling error, and measurement error. 
The degree of sampling error was seen as a reflection of the degree to which 
the attitudes sampled for the study were truly representative of the population 
from which they were drawn. Measurement error concerned how successfully 
the required data had been captured, the validity of the data. 
For each group there were at least 50 invitations sent to a random selection of 
local small businesses. There was on average an 11 % positive response rate 
to the invitations sent out. The low response rates from the survey and the low 
acceptance rate for group work was an ever-present concern. The focus 
groups involved a total of 15 managers of small businesses. 
The main test of validity of each focus group compared to the others in the 
study was to conduct a key word count. This was an objective analysis .of the 
verbatim texts of the interviews. This was used to demonstrate that the 
subject of discussions within each group exhibited a degree of consistency. 
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The transcripts of the interviews were long and complex. The interviews had 
been structured by the predetermined questions and this leant some form to 
the transcripts. When initially analyzing data from this study it became clear 
that paradigmatic and story-like elements were bound together in much of the 
narrative. Recently there has been a move towards recapturing "narrative 
knowledge" for studies, such as this one, into the functioning of organizations 
(Bruner, 1990; Mc Closkey, 1990; Skoldberg 1994; Boland and Tenkasi 1995; 
Czarniawska 1997). 
Quoted speech has been incorporated into the text as a deliberate attempt to 
allow the subjects to speak their own language (see: Eco, 1990). The 
descriptions used to convey some of the concepts were deemed as important 
as the researcher's interpretation of the message. 
The basis of this method of analysis was seeking, from each paragraph in the 
transcript, the categories, concepts or labels that could be used to account for 
the importance of the section. Once identified the concept was recorded. 
Relationships with other concepts, identified from the text, were also noted. To 
make full use of the information elicited during group sessions it was decide 
that repertory grid technique would also be used as a method of analyzing 
opinions. 
4.2.1 INITIAL SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
From the initial superficial scan of the transcripts a broad impression of the 
discussions was obtained. Participants in the groups considered health and 
safety to be important in so far as they cared about their workforce, this was a 
repeated theme that engendered no detractions. Participants reported that 
they realized the importance of the workforce to the success of their trusiness. 
However, they expressed concerns about the scope of their legal 'duty of 
care'. They were unclear about what they must do. They were also concerned 
about the limiting effect of both time and financial resources that prevented 
them from doing all they felt they were capable of implementing. The groups 
each reached a consensus about the value of their workforce and concerns 
about achieving legislative compliance. 
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The positive views regarding health and safety, as a concept, was found to be 
broadly consistent with the findings of the BCC (1995) survey. The concerns 
about limited managerial time and financial resources are also echoed in the 
BCC survey results. The perceived cost of legislative compliance was 
interesting when compared to the earlier FPB survey (1993). 
In the focus groups, the legal duty was obviously a cause of concern but was 
set against the other pressures of business survival. Concern was also 
expressed about the mass of health and safety guidance, and the tendency for 
prescriptive solutions to be absent. Managers often felt the goal setting nature 
of the guidance difficult to interpret. They expressed a wish to be told not only 
what was required but also the optimum way to achieve it. 
In general, the participants did not see the cost of accidents or the 
enhancement of business opportunities as motivators for improving health and 
safety. Fear of the perceived legal outcome for non-compliance and caring for 
employee welfare appear to be more significant motivators. The perceived 
benefit of good health and safety management was overt care of the 
wo rkforce. Any means of assistance, to achieve improvement, for example 
when writing a policy, or carrying out a risk assessment was agreed, within all 
groups, to be beneficial. 
The tack of appreCiation of the opportunity to reduce costs through positive 
safety management, by reducing the incidence of accidents is reflected also in 
the BCC survey. The BCC survey (1995) found that 60% of very small 
businesses, those businesses that employed two to five people, reported that 
they knew how much work-related illness cost their business; while for larger 
businesses (those employing >50) only 19% had that information. Of those 
who reported knowing the cost, 76% thought that cost was less than 1 % of 
their annual turnover. This may explain the lack of appreCiation of this aspect 
as a motivator. Either the business has failed to quantify the cost, or that cost 
is seen as negligible. 
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The managers involved in the groups had had a range of experiences with 
B85750, the quality system. In general they considered it highly bureaucratic. 
In some cases they had pursued accreditation for fear of losing business. The 
main fears expressed included: the volume of documentation required, the 
cost of using consultants and finding staff time. Some managers had been 
required to submit safety policies when tendering for some contracts. They 
had not generally found this to be an onerous task. 
This initial, superficial, summary of the transcripts did not provide the required 
depth of understanding of the issues involved. Repertory grid analysis (Kelly, 
1955; Bannister, 1959; Shaw and Gaines 1987) was therefore employed to 
provide a different perspective on the results. 
4.2.2 RESULTS OF THE REPERTORY GRID ANALYSES 
These data from the repertory grids consisted of fully rated grids gained 
through elicitation techniques involving 15 managers of small businesses. The 
Elements were provided and the constructs elicited from the focus groups. 
Table 4.33 The elements used in the repertory grid analysis 
· .... - ..... Ef --- .' .... ··:seif -.--.--.. ------.-.---.--.--.- .---. ------.- ------- ------. 
:~-=:=~=~~--~=.· ••• _ •• ~·3~t~W:~~~~I=-=_~==~~=~====:===_==! 
c___. _. __ .... _.~4, ... "_'_'_'. ____ J~q':l.ip.!!)~D1 __ . ___ .. _. __________ . ____ . __ .. _____ ..... _ ..... _._ ... 
· E5 : Irl_!?pe.~!.9~_._ ... ____ .... _ .._. __ .. _ .. __ ._._._ ... _......_ .. _ ... '''_' 
· .'. E6. '. . Insurance Company ... ; 
-.~ .. ·-.··.~~·.-·:)~t~ '.--" -" --. -: $afejy. Rep!~~~6i~t.i~~~~~=~~·~.·~·_-:~_..·-.~~·:·.:. ".~-:': ~~ .. ~ .. _.-:~_~-.. ~_ -.! 
· ... ,._. _ .. E?. Con~L.llt?rlt_ ... __ ........ _ ....... ,,_ .. _._. ... .............. .. 
........... _. I::~.. . Enf~r~~~D.t 2f tI~~.~tl1....~ .. §§f~tyh§YY._._ ............ _ ... _ ... __ ... _ ........ . 
E10 Costs 
•• • •• '~ •••• ~ ••• ,~, ~ • •• - ._ •••• ___ .......... " __ "~,, __ ._~ •• '~_''' __ •• "_ ~'_'" 0 ___ .,. ". __ ....... _"_~_'_"" __ "" • _. __ '_'_'." ._, ", ... _.- ........ _.~._'.' , __ ., 
E11;W()~king E:r"I~.if().I1!T!~!1.L ... __ .... .._...... .... _ .... ; 
E12 -Investments 
.~. '_e~ .__ • __ ••••• , •• ____ ••••• ___ ._~~_~ -'._ •••• ~ ...... __ ._._ ... _. __ •• ___ •• __ • __ •• _._ .. _ ••• ___ ~_._ .... _." ... __ ••••••••••• _ •• _.~. __ ._._."._. 
E13 _ Workif1gF'f9ctt~~s __ ._._........._ ............. ,_. 
E14 . Beliefs 
E 15 'Contiol.Sy~teri'ls·.~-··.·~:"·~·:.::··_~· _.. . ...... ....... _._, '. 
E16 Rewards 
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Table 4.34 The constructs used in the repertory grid analysis. 
CONSTRUCTS 
" ' 
C1 Impact on health and safety issues OR Have no effect 
C2 Directs the company's approach OR Has no influence 
ca Has no effect on unsafe behaviour OR Causes unsafe behaviour 
C4 Creates safe working OR Has no effect 
CS Promotes working safely OR Promotes unsafe work 
CS Promotes search for hazards OR Prevents vigilance 
CT Promotes assessment of risk OR Prevents risk assessment 
A scale of 1-5 was used, as a rising scale, to rate each construct according to 
agreement between the right-hand or left-hand statements. 
4.2.2.1 Results from "JK" 
The results of the repertory grid analysis of the views expressed by one 
member of the focus groups, "JK", have been included to demonstrate how 
the technique was used in this study. 
Table 4.35 An example of a grid: Grid 'JK'. 
C2i 2 3! 2: 5; 2; 3 i 1 : 2; 5: 
i , . ! I l 
C3;-'4:' 5·:· .. 4:·· .. 5;_ .. 1')'· .. 1·_--: -'f'F'---'S,'-1';""'s,-- --·1:· .. · .. ·5';·· .. '2~· .. ·· .. 1, 
_ . .-___ i .~._.'._ . , , : __ ~ .. _ .... ___ .. _ .. __ .: __ ..... _. __ ........ " .... h.~." __ • __ -.. __ .. " .. _;. ____ ._ ... " •.• ~_._." .•.• _"_.; ___ ~_. __ . __ .. !._ ..... ~ .. _ ........ . 
3; 
4: 
C6; 2: 1: 
" 
4: 
1 I 
," 
31 
4: 31 
3: 
" i' 
C7 3: 1 3: 41 1; 
5i _i 2 : ; 
2 
2' 
3i 4; 
1 4' 
...... ,,- ..... 
3; 4 2' 
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In this grid (Table 4.35) the respondent had no experience of working with 
safety representatives in his business, this element was therefore left blank. 
Other grids are included in the appendices. 
The manager, who completed the first grid, was from a technically advanced 
company with 30 employees. He rated Inspectors and the law, cost, working 
environment and working practices, investment and beliefs all as having a 
significant impact on the consideration of occupational safety issues by this 
manager, within this company. Of these factors only: the law, cost, 
investment, working environment and beliefs were rated as having a 
controlling influence on the company's approach to safety. The controlling 
factors could be grouped as legal, financial costs and cultural or moral. 
The elements considered the 'controlling factors' by this person appear to be 
consistent with the responses given in the survey, by managers of businesses 
of approximately the same size. The motivation to actively manage safety; 
impelled by the 'threat of legal action' versus the barrier created by the 
perceived 'cost of the duties imposed by legislation' are recurrent themes. The 
moral obligation was expressed openly in each focus group by several 
speakers and can be summarized by one quote " no-one wants to see 
anybody hurt". Beliefs were the only factor rated as creating safe working 
practices. 
The impact of the respondent on safety issues, as Managing Director, was 
seen as most closely mimicking the impact of line managers. It appears the 
interviewee rated his own influence as similar to that of his line-managers. 
This suggests he may see his small management team as a cohesive group 
presenting a united impulsion. This impression was reinforced during the 
interview: " I have got three managers below me basically; you could say 
three, you could say four; because my wife runs the Finance Department. 
We've got a Production Director, a Marketing Director, and a Studio Manager; 
and then my wife does the Finance Office. I do all the creative and client 
contact. Basically that's the whole business". 
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The effect of the management team was also rated as very closely correlated 
with the effects. of the control systems. The interviewee was proud of the 
control systems in place " We have a job procedures manual so we can 
actually include certain things in that. We have a job procedure for every 
individual department and this is part of our 'Investors in People' thing." "It has 
been said we could get 855750 with our present management systems". 
The effect of operatives on the safety process was rated most closely with the 
effect of machinery. This association of operatives with machinery seems to 
be consistent with the assessment that the workforce are faced with greatest 
risk when using machinery. " .. the environments change so greatly. You work 
with machines that are spinning around at high speed ... and saws and routers 
and machinery-centres [sic] and then you've got the other things where you've 
got typewriters, a computer, a switchboard, plotters and things like that." 
The constructs although derived from a focused discussion were imposed on 
the respondent for the purpose of this examination. However, the rating 
derived could equally be a true reflection of the interviewee's thoughts: "In 
practice it is more dangerous to have the guard on." "If I was to set up [the 
guards] on one piece of equipment to pass through one sheet of material it 
could take an hour and a half to set up. With priCing and everything you just 
wouldn't be able to do it in practical terms" "A circular saw which you buy 
today is no different from one you would have bought 50 years ago in 
essence". 
The lack of correlation between the rating for the influence of line managers 
and the organizational beliefs is interesting because it implies that the line 
managers' beliefs are not seen by the Managing Director as reflecting the 
organizational beliefs. 
4.2.2.2 The results from "JD" 
Grid "JD" [in Appendix 2] was completed by an owner of a textile business 
with just three employees. The greatest positive impact on safety in this 
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business was seen as being 'line management' in this case a co-owner, and 
deputy, to the respondent. The discussions included relevant comments to 
support this: "My 'Number 2' originally worked for an American Company 
[name supplied]; who are very conscious of every safety aspect of every plant 
they have" .... "it is a thing he has with him so if there is anything that looks 
untoward he will raise it or he will do something about it himself'. 
There was clearly great reliance placed on the 'No. 2'. However, there was an 
anomaly in that the respondent rated his greatest positive impact on health 
and safety management within the business in directing of the safety 
management approach. 
The influence of the threat of enforcement and inspection recurs in the 
analysis of the responses as a motivator. However, the managerial approach 
outline is very pragmatic. "you want a safe environment because nobody 
wants accidents and people want to work, so you adapt it [the safety of the 
environment] to the best local practice." There is clearly a willingness to 
accept a lesser standard than 'safe' implicit in this comment. 
Paradoxically it was the control systems, and rewards, that were believed, by 
this member of the group, to have the greatest negative impact on safety 
management, within his business. This analysis is consistent with the negative 
views expressed to the group; in this case about mechanized control of the 
working environment "you could have some elaborate way of controlling the 
fumes and so on" ... "if somebody wanted to be difficult". [The fumes in this 
case were carcinogenic organic chemicals - Carbon-tetra-chloride]. 
Rewards were explicitly linked to profit by this respondent. The focus of his 
comments about safety systems stressed the effects on profits, and generally 
eXCluded any references to safety issues. "People are slightly more aware of 
quality. If it [the product] is not done properly, and he [a producer] has to redo 
it, it's not profitable and that is the real judge. That's always the incentive." ... 
Investment in safety was not an issue that this manager considered a priority. 
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This seems to be due to financial pressure that he currently perceives himself 
to be under. "We don't spend money on something that is not absolutely vital. 
We are talking about survival [of the business] not return [on investment, as 
an indicator of profitability]." 
Safety was depicted as an issue apart, separate from the concerns of 
managing the business. "Its just one of those extra things we should be doing 
but in the meantime we've got to get some fabric out, invoice it and get the 
money in." 
4.2.3 USING KEY WORD COUNTS TO TEST RELIABILITY 
Each focus group was run on a different day (between February and May 
1995) with a different set of people. Confidence in the consistency of the 
debates is important, if the data elicited from the transcripts are to be useful. 
The focus group discussions were only loosely controlled (Bellenger et ai, 
1976; Merton et ai, 1990; Krueger, 1994). The consistency could only be 
effected by using predetermined questions and by curtailing discussions that 
strayed from the subject of those questions. The same questions were put, in 
the same order to each group. However, supplementary questions and follow 
up questions were included whenever the facilitator deemed clarification of a 
point was necessary. 
There was a potential for the discussion within the groups to lose focus. The 
first check on this was made during the group and was applied by the 
facilitator. The second check is retrospective and is by a 'key word count'. This 
key word count allows an objective assessment of the total content of the 
discussions for the duration of each group meeting. 
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Table 4.36 The Key Word Count for the focus groups 
Man-machine interface o 4 
4 2 
5 0 
Employees Staffing 1 1 0 
People 1 0 5 
ConsultanUconsultancy 2 5 1 
Training 2 4 11 
(Safety) Advice 3 11 3 
Enforcement visits 5 6 1 
4 0 0 
Legislative control Legislatellegislation 5 0 0 
Law 4 6 1 
Regulations 0 12 9 
Risk assessments Safe/safest 6 6. 3 
Dangerous 1 3 1 
Hazard 3 2 1 
Risk / Risk Assessment 7 8 3 
(Safety) Audits 0 0 5 
accident 2 6 4 
Quality/BS5750llS0 90001 31 si 8 
Financial constraints Money 2 6 5 
Cash 0 2 3 
Investment 1 0 1 
Profit 2 2 1 
Insure/insurance 0 23 1 
Problem [ H&S] 7 33 2 
The key word count shows that common topics were discussed witbin each 
group. There is noticeable variation in Group Two's focus on insurers. This 
has been reflected in the analysis and stems from the concerns of members of 
the group rather than irrelevant or off beat discussions within the group. 
The high incidence of the word 'problem', used in 'Group Two', reflects the 
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term routinely applied in relation to the concept of safety management by one 
respondent. Her use of language was such that the word recurred regularly 
throughout the session. 
In the key word analyses several words have been clustered under a common 
subject heading. This clustering is to allow for differences that occur through 
use of jargon and different phraseology within groups. Terminology variations 
were noted, between groups, for example members of Group One talked 
about the "law" in abstract while in Groups Two and Three specifically referred 
to "regulations", Groups Two and Three were using the term regulation 
deliberately; and it was often specified which were being referred to. 
These variations between the groups illustrate the difference in experience 
and knowledge between the participants. The variations do not indicate that 
the subjects covered, or basic contents were altered by the change in 
language. 
To test the comparability, of the scope of the discussions in the focus groups, 
the frequency of occurrence of key words mentioned during each group was 
analyzed. 
There appears to be a significant variation between the focus group 
discussions, from the key word analysis. This variation cannot be attributed to 
mere chance. The first focus group (FG1) concentrated on the man-machine 
interface more than the other groups. This first group also repeatedly 
mentioned employees and behavioural impacts on safety. 
Having identified that not all discussions were centred on similar issues it was 
considered necessary to compare two groups to see if any discussions were 
similarly focused or if all three varied. 
In comparing Focus Group 1 and 2 there is an apparently significant variation 
in the frequency of key words between groups 1 and 2. Members of Focus 
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Group 1 were discussing the man-machine interface much more than the 
second group. Group 1 also focused on enforcement visits more than the 
second group. 
Focus Group 1 was the first group held. It was therefore considered 
reasonable to compare groups 2 and 3, when the skills of the facilitator could 
be expected to have increased. 
When comparing the results, of the key word group analysis for Focus Groups 
2 and 3 there is no significant variation in the frequency of the key words 
between these two groups. 
4.3 SUMMARY OF THE INITIAL RESULTS 
The initial surveys and focus groups were designed to investigate the common 
terminology applied to safety in the small business sector. To refine the 
definitions of 'small' and 'medium' in relation to the size of businesses and to 
begin to discover some barriers that hinder small businesses in managing 
safety. 
4.3.1 DEMONSTRATING THAT SMALL BUSINESSES DIFFER FROM LARGE, 
Organizational practices cannot be neatly predicted and sorted as being 
precisely determined by organizational size, in terms of number of employees 
or turnover. However, the hypothesis was that size was a significant indicator 
of the sophistication of the management techniques likely to be demonstrated. 
For the purposes of the study the categorization was made in terms of 
average number of full-time equivalent employees at anyone time. 
The phase one studies have provided evidence that there were differ~nces, in 
motivation and approach to safety management, between small businesses 
[with less than 25 employees] and larger undertakings. The small business 
sector is not a homogenous group but within the sector there are variations 
that can be attributed to size. 
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Using safety management differences as a marker there seem to be sub 
divisions that can be applied within the small business sector: less than 5 
employees, 5-10 employees, 11-25 employees and 26 to 50 employees. 
Within the survey sample (133 questionnaires returned completed, out of 750) 
58 responses were from 'micro' to 'small businesses'. The overall size range of 
organizations contacted was between 2 and 500 employees. It was 
exceptional for 'micro' and 'mini' businesses to have middle or line managers 
within their structure. The incidence of middle or line managers occurring 
within the structure increased with the size of the company. This increase in 
the management function with size of organization seems logical when 
compared to results of past research. This lack of middle management in 
smaller firms could be'expected to have implications for owners and managers 
needing to delegate health and safety management tasks. 
4.3.2 MOTIVATION TO MANAGE SAFETY, WITHIN SMALLER BUSINESSES 
From the focus group discussions a picture of perceptions of the owners, and 
managers of small, mini and micro-businesses emerged. In general, 
participants considered health and safety to be important as they cared about 
their workforce. However, they expressed concerns about the scope of their 
legal 'duty of care'. 
There is evidence that a number of those who participated in the initial study 
adopted a very passive approach to safety management or attempted to 
intentionally transfer their duty of care to a third party, by using consultants or 
relying on their insurers. There were also those who did not perceive the risk 
of an untoward event as real. 
4.3.3 BARRIERS TO MANAGING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN SMALLER BUSINESSES 
From existing literature (BCC, 1995; Walker and Cox, 1995; Walker, Cox and 
Tait, 1997) not much is known about the barriers to safety management in 
small firms, and still less about what is actually going on, on a daily basis. The 
small firms sector is a hidden sector. Businesses arise, fold, merge, change 
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name, change location and operate quietly, officially unnoticed and unrecorded 
(Ganguly and Bannock, 1985). Where there have been examinations of the 
workings of small organizations in the U.K. (Curran and Stanworth, 1981; Kets 
de Vries, 1985; Miller et ai, 1988; Burns and Dewhurst, 1989) the studies have 
not extended to looking at specific areas such as safety management. Small 
business specialist researchers have certainly never examined the approach 
to safety management in the context of the overall management of an 
organization. 
The findings, from the phase one studies, have provided some evidence of 
barriers to safety management. These barriers appear to be both internally 
and externally located. The main external barrier seems to be an absence of 
accessible, reliable, competent advice source for small businesses. 
This problem seems to be compounded by the complexity of the official 
guidance on the relevant Acts and regulations. The apparent reliance on the 
general media for safety information seems to have skewed perceptions, and 
engendered fear of enforcement action. This fear was not based on the 
personal experiences of those, who participated in the initial study, but was a 
widely expressed phenomenon. 
4.3.4 COMPARISON OF FINDINGS FROM SURVEY DATA AND FOCUS GROUPS 
Both the survey and the focus group discussions repeatedly revealed a limited 
safety knowledge and lack of access to necessary skills. The percentage of 
organizations where one manager accepted responsibility for health and safety 
along with his other duties was 78 per cent [45/58] when only the 'small', 'mini' 
and 'micro' firms were examined. Most of these managers had received no or 
very little specialist training. None of the smaller firms employed a h~alth and 
safety specialist. 
In three-quarters of small firms it was the senior manager or proprietor who 
was nominally responsible for disseminating health and safety advice among 
the employees. Where it was an owner who assumed the responsibility for 
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managing safety it was likely (59% of those in that category) that slhe will 
have received no relevant training at all. During focus group discussions 
managers were clearly worried about both the volume of health and safety 
guidance, and the tendency for prescriptive solutions to be absent. They were 
echoing the findings of the survey, where respondents often expressed a wish 
to be told not only what was required but also the optimum way to achieve it. 
There were three other barriers, to pro-actively managing safety to ensure 
compliance, that were identified. The barriers were the volume of necessary 
documentation, the cost of using consultants, and finding staff time. Some 
managers had been required to submit safety policies when tendering for 
some contracts. They had not generally found this to be an onerous task. 
However when this view is compared with the survey results those managers 
who were content in their ability to produce a safety policy was only 59 per 
cent [16127]. 
Just over half of the 'small' firms were ·confident that their approach ensured 
they fulfilled their statutory duties. Less than half of the 'mini' and 'micro' 
businesses had even made the attempt at assessing risks in a structured way. 
Comments indicated that they did not know where to start. The problem 
seemed to revolve around documenting policies and risk assessments, and 
exposing them for scrutiny outside the organization. The comments about 
safety documents recurred during the research it was therefore necessary to 
investigate more precisely the barriers to recording policies and risk 
assessments. 
4.3.5 EARLY INDICATIONS OF APPROACHES TO SAFETY MANAGEMENT. 
When one manager's conceptual framework was examined through repertory 
grid analysis some interesting para"els with accepted models emerged, whilst 
the manager expressed no deep knowledge of current health and safety 
management thinking. Inspectors and the law, cost and investment, working 
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environment and working practices, and beliefs were all rated as having a 
significant impact on the consideration of occupational safety issues. 
From the literature it is suggested an organization may adopt a model of safety 
that has as its focus the safe worker, the safe system, or the safe 
organization. There are believed to be essential differences among these 
three models. An occupational safety management approach typically accepts 
a traditional safety philosophy of error causation. This philosophy 
automatically questions a person's motivation to carry out a task safely, if 
there is an accident (Lucas 1990). 
It is this emphasis on error causation that became a characteristic of the focus 
group discussions. The focus on the worker was a recurring theme. This was 
particularly true among those who described a. passive management style. 
The other models of safety management, described in the literature, were not 
exemplified in the discussions. 
One of the mainstream models, from the literature, rests on the concept of 
system induced error. This incorporates the notion that human failures are 
caused by certain preconditions in the workplace. These preconditions are 
often thought to be directly attributable to management decisions or 
organizational policies. Reason (1990) argued that organizational and 
management decision failures may contribute to accidents through latent 
failures. It is not surprising; given this emphasis on the role of managerial 
decision failures that, participants with a very laissez-faire attitude should fail 
to acknowledge this model, during the discussions. 
There has been a growing awareness that organizational and management 
factors can have a significant influence on the level of risk presented by any 
task (Smith and Harris 1990). A study by 8aily (1988) concluded that the 
effectiveness of safety programmes depends on the quality of an 
organization's management systems. 
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The results from the initial study provided direction to the next stage of the 
research by suggesting avenues of investigation: testing the metaphors 
derived and investigating how safety is managed particularly in those small 
businesses where the approach appears passive. 
4.3.6 ASSESSING THE SUCCESS IN MEETING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
It was deemed essential from the outset that the concept of 'small', when 
applied as a descriptor of businesses, must be refined. One key area of 
investigation had been whether small businesses differ from large businesses. 
The initial surveys allowed greater confidence in defining the concept of 
'small'. 
The main purpose of the investigation has been to discover the way small 
businesses manage safety. One of the original objectives of the research was: 
a) "to analyze the motivation for, barriers to and approaches adopted for 
occupational health and safety management within organizations, with 
emphasis on smaller organizations". 
From the initial studies some motivators and barriers have been identified. 
However, due to the nature of the research methods employed, a thorough 
investigation of the management approaches adopted has not been possible. 
The main study has been designed specifically to investigate 'how' small 
businesses manage health and safety. 
This investigation of 'how' managers intervene to reduce risks and promote 
safe practices was a key element of this research from the outset. A specific 
research objective has been set to reflect this focus. The objective: 
b) "to examine the general management techniques and styles adppted in 
small businesses and how to consider how they effect approaches to 
safety and health management". 
This has not been addressed in any depth by the phase one studies 
The initial studies have revealed ownership profiles, common structures and 
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hierarchy. They have also shown how some managers perceive their role in 
relation to safety management. There has also been assessment of the skills 
that are commonly available to assist in the management process. 
the research techniques used for phase one were not suited to examining 
whether those businesses were informal or formal in their communications and 
systems, whether communications were vertical or horizontal or how they 
conducted their day to day business. This was the primary area of 
investigation for the main study. 
The other research objectives were carried forward as objectives for the main 
study: 
d) "to examine a sample of small businesses and relate the observed 
'culture' for safety to the degree of legislative compliance, safety record and 
efforts to manage occupational health and safety within those organizations. 
This objective gave a steer, in conjunction with the initial findings, to the 
approach for the main study. To relate the observed culture to performance 
markers required an ethnographic approach (Flin et ai, 2000). 
An ethnographic approach is consistent with the work of A. Cheyne and S. 
Cox (1997 and 2000) on safety climates measurement within the offshore 
sector. They produced a grid to show the areas of study for which different 
research techniques may be appropriate. Their grid has been modified (Table 
4.37, below) to determine how the information from the initial studies and the 
main study could be integrated to .answer the research questions. 
There was another area of investigation that remained to be accomplished in 
the main study phase. This was: "to identify and describe good pr?ctice in 
occupational safety and health management in small businesses. These 
results are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Table 4.37 A matrix to indicate how the information from phase one and the 
main study could be integrated to answer the research 
questions. 
Organizationl," Systems! 
Envir6n~enL:' . 
Questionnaires Size Systems 
Sector Management Stylel 
Age Formalization 
Complexity 
Structure 
Focus Groups Size Bureaucracy 
Strategy Networking 
Core Business Benchmarking 
Ethos Performanc~, ' 
Measurement 
Observation! Iuse of Manual! 
Documentation Objectives Computerized 
Performance- Feedback systems 
Monitoring Management style I 
Accident Stats. communication 
Safety Policy 
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~ ',,', 
< '~'><.-. ;' . ., ," .. =-., , . 
. '. "': .-,.,',-. ,?,~ ~~". "\-. ";" ; .. " .. ---;~:'-{': /. 
" 
Past Experience 
Beliefs 
Managerial Style 
Training logs 
Training plans 
Observable errors I bad practice 
Safel Unsafe behaviours 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Results of the Main Study 
This Chapter describes the findings of the main study. 
This study follows on from an initial, three phase, 
questionnaire survey and a series of focus groups. The 
main study comprised a multi-case investigation using 
observational visits, interviews with managers and 
documentary research 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
The research design for this phase of the study evolved from the knowledge 
gleaned from the initial phases of the study. The fieldwork, in this study, was 
designed to include multiple case research, rather than single site. The results 
in this section are the findings from the multi-case study. A case study 
approach was deemed appropriate because the main purpose of the research 
is to inquire into the way small businesses manage safety (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Other more recent research has also adopted the case study approach 
(Lindsay, 1998; Stuart, 1999; Simard et ai, 2000) 
An understanding of how managerial tasks are allocated was an important 
issue when considering safety management in smaller businesses. A person 
who assumes responsibility for a task needs the necessary skills to enable 
them to fulfil the role. The initial survey showed, very few smaller businesses 
to have a large enough workforce to justify employment of a dedicated safety 
professional (see Table 4.15 in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3.2). The skills within 
the workforce may, therefore, be a significant influence on the way health-and 
safety management is perceived, and effected, in many small organizations. 
The complexity of change, in a safety strategy may require the subdivision of 
control within an organization (Peters and Waterman, 1982). It seems this 
may pose a problem for small businesses with the simplest structure, or a 
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patriarchal ethos (Mintzberg, 1983 and 1988, Birley, 1989). To successfully 
effect control it has been suggested that it is crucial to identify those aspects 
that are critical to success, or failure of the strategy (Quinn, 1980). 
Research into organizational change has shown that when a firm becomes 
involved in the real problems of implementing change managers need a 
method of identifying progress, and the extent of any deviation from the plan 
(Argenti, 1980; Quinn, 1980; Johnson and Scholes, 1989). This has 
traditionally meant the establishment and use of control and information 
systems within a business (Cooke and Slack, 1984). It is those 
communication and control mechanisms that were to be part of the 
observational phase of the case studies. 
The use of case studies as a third method of data collection has synergistic 
benefits for the study. The use of three separate methods of data collection to 
explore one area allows for the possibility of triangulating these data (T. Cox, 
1993; Glendon and McKenna, 1995). 
The immediate purpose of the case study visits was to observe practices and 
procedures, view documents and make an assessment of those hazards and 
risks present at the time. This data was recorded in field notes and an active 
evaluation of visible management processes and control methods was also 
made during each visit, and recorded. 
Each inspection involved a comprehensive examination of the activities being 
undertaken at, the time. The inspection process was carried out in accordance 
with current guidance the most recent of which is HELA 67/1 (revised 1998) [ 
formerly LAC 67/1 and LAC(A)3/1/2]. The professional judgement of the 
researcher was employed in assessing the performance of various activities. 
This professional judgement arises from formal training and more than 10 
years practical experience, it is moderated annually by comparative peer 
review of sample assessment by other experienced and qualified enforcement 
officers. 
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Professional judgement was used to assess each employer's performance, in 
relation to the hazards observed and the risks perceived to affect both 
employees and the public. The judgement was based on the 'standards' of 
safety, health and welfare observed during each visit. A subjective 
assessment was also made of the capacity of management to maintain high 
standards. This subjective assessment concerns the nub of this research. 
This assessment was therefore re-evaluated at a later stage. The purpose at 
this stage was to provide an impressionistic assessment of managerial 
capacity against which later rating and evaluation could be compared. 
Following each visit on return to base the field-notes were re-sorted. A 
numerical system was also applied to rate each organization, and data were 
then ordered under the fourteen main headings. 
The first numerical system adopted was the 'Inspection Rating System' (LAC 
67/1). This system was based on that used by the HSE's Field Operations 
Division and has been available for use since 1997. This system has 
advantages. It is based on an established and tested system that has been 
adopted nationally by enforcers, it facilitates the identification of the 
contributions made by hazard and risk to the overall assessment of a 
workplace and it separates 'safety hazard and risk' from 'health hazard and 
risk'. 
The origins of the inspection rating system and the justifications for adopting 
this scheme have been addressed in Chapter 3. This rating system was used 
as the first method of ranking the workplaces on the basis of the observations 
made. The ranking was based on hazards and risks observed and the 
controls in place to limit those risks. The observations in the field notes were 
compared to the indicative examples within the guidance note (LAC 67/1) and 
the corresponding rating score was applied. The indicative examples have 
been included in the appendices to this thesis. 
The score for each element was then weighted, by applying a standard 
multiplier. This weighting was designed to reflect the relative significance of 
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each element, by giving greater weight to health and safety risks and less 
emphasis to hazards and welfare. The weighted scores for each organization 
were then summed to give an overall score for each workplace. This score 
allowed the ranking of the workplaces. The ranking itself provided the first 
means by which numerical comparison of the workplaces could be made, 
based on risks and controls. 
The second function of this phase of the research was to provide a third 
method of data collection. This third method was to afford the opportunity to 
test the reliability of the data by comparing separate but 'equivalent' versions 
of the same measure. 
5.0.1 OPPORTUNITIES FOR TESTING THE RELIABILITY OF THE DATA. 
By using data from questionnaires, focus groups and observational case 
studies opportunities arose to test the reliability of the data by comparing 
separate but 'equivalent' versions of the same measure. 
As part of the statistical testing alternate forms reliability (Dane, 1990) was 
employed on data obtained by each collection method. Test-retest was not 
available as a technique to test the reliability of results because the subjects 
were dynamic in this instance. The act of collecting data either by focus group 
or case study observation was anticipated to have influenced the managers 
contacted. 
The method adopted for testing reliability involved the comparison of 
performance scores derived from the data. This was achieved by scoring one 
set of performance measures and then re-scoring performance, using 
different criteria. The relative performance according to each set of measures 
could then be objectively compared. It was also possible to calculate the 
correlation of one set of scores with the other (Chapter 3). 
By the completion of the study three sets of results were combined, compared 
and contrasted. This triangulation of results was a deliberate decision [see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4.6.1] to increase the likelihood of the findings being 
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valid. It had been acknowledged that 'ecological validity' may be difficult to 
demonstrate> Relating that which was reported in the survey and said in the 
focus groups and interviews with that which was routinely done everyday 
within the organizations (Bracht and Glass: 1968). 
The case study phase therefore had two distinct functions in the research 
design. The primary purpose was to address those areas of investigation that 
the survey and focus group research had left unexplored, or had not provided 
sufficient insight. There was one main area of investigation that remained to 
be accomplished in the main study phase. This was: 
e) "To identify and describe good practice in occupational safety and 
health management in small businesses". 
5.1 RESULTS OF THE SECOND STAGE - THE MAIN STUDY 
The main study was undertaken in businesses in Rutland and Leicestershire. 
The data collections were by inspection, interview and documentary search. 
There were 39 individual case studies included in this part of the data 
gathering. The range of business size extended from 3 to 48 employees. The 
mean size in the sample was 16 employees. The median was 11 employees. 
In the sample, there were 5 businesses with less than 5 employees, 14 
businesses with between 5 and 10 employees, 14 businesses with between 
11 and 25 employees and 6 larger businesses (26 to 50 employees). 
The data were initially collected as contemporaneous field notes. These field 
notes were an account of the observations made during the inspections and 
notes of responses to questions posed during the visit. The inspection 
process was structured and followed the same procedure in each case, i"!. that 
each time Alcock's (1982) six step code was followed. 
The field notes were initially freely collected and on occasion personal 
shorthand was used to minimise writing time. The notes were in a bound 
notebook and sometimes included sketches of guarding or floor plans. The 7-
s's were used as mental prompts to try and ensure a comprehensiveness was 
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achieved during each visit. The thoroughness of the inspection was seen as 
important as a return visit was often not an option. The field notes also 
recorded the receptiveness of the organization's management to the 
inspection, and noted were the admission had been granted only by 
protracted negotiation. The openness of the managers to the notion scrutiny 
was regarded at the time as a potential indicator of their own view of the 
organization's performance in each case. Summaries of the case studies 
have been included in the appendices. 
During the process of data analysis the field notes for each case were re-
organized and edited several times. During the re-writing of the field notes it 
was a challenge to maintain focus. With 39 cases the volume of the notes was 
considerable and it was necessary to continually focus on the main question 
of 'How' management was being effected. Wolcott (1990:46) acknowledged 
this need to retain focus in order to manage data volume. Much data was also 
'ditched' in the sorting processes, as Wolcott also advocates. Data was 
'ditched' that was considered not to contribute to the answer of the central 
question of 'how'. 
A decision was taken early on not to include long descriptive text in the thesis, 
but rather to present some of the cases as summaries. With 39 cases the 
descriptions could be overwhelming, by the sheer volume of information 
presented. The evidence, during the analysis, was extracted from the field 
notes and redrafted texts, rather than the summaries. Specific instances from 
the field notes have been used to enrich the descriptions of some of the 
instances and observations used as evidence. This approach has also been 
advocated by Geertz (1973). 
It was decided the only a selection of cases would be presented within the 
body of this thesis. To present the whole set, of 39, produced a document that 
was too bulky. Therefore 25 of the cases are summarized over the next few 
pages. These cases have been chosen because they exhibit different styles 
of management within the same industry sector, different degrees of success 
in managing safety, or contrasting approaches within different sectors. 
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Case 1 
Unique Reference: L395 
Industry Sector: Warehousing & Distribution Trade: Book distributors 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Attitude positive but delegation was inappropriate. Some bad practices observed during 
the visit. Some effort to manage from the top. Overall achievement not satisfactory, but 
there were elements of sound practice to build on. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
11/39. Score of 136 [in range 89 to 294] where <125 is lowest risk. Medium risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Questionable performance 
Background to company 
This was a family firm established for approximately 25 years. There were 46 
employees; 40 female and 6 male. The main activity was warehousing and distribution 
of books to libraries. 
The premises were purpose built in the early 1970's. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: Executive, supervisors 
and operatives. The founder was Managing Director and the Directors were recruited 
externally for their expertise. Minimal training or liaison devises were observed to be in 
use. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was little evidence of planning within the company. The operating environment on 
a business level, as described by managers, was taken to be simple and static (Johnson 
and Scholes 1989), in that the environment was not too difficult to understand and was 
not undergoing Significant change. The influence of safety issues on the operating 
environment should have impacted on the company but managers were unaware of this. 
This lack of awareness seemed to be due to a lack of environmental scanning within the 
company. 
The systems within the company 
It was not possible to assess all formal and informal procedures that made the company 
'tick', however, most procedures observed were informal, as there was little formalisation 
in any area except 'Orders' and 'Accounts' which used stand alone computers. Some 
formal procedures required by statute were in place in a limited way, for example: the 
accident book was correctly kept available on the shop floor in the warehouse, the last 
two known accidents were properly entered and a senior operative checked the 
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and first-aid kit on a monthly basis; but while shortages noted after the first aid kit 
inspection were reported (as was the need for a new accident book) no action was 
initiated to remedy any hazards identified in the substance of each accident report, 
neither was there any mechanism for doing so. There was no collation of accident data 
from the record at any stage and there had been no risk assessments made. 
The latest accident, at the time of visiting, had occurred when a broken wooden ladder 
had been used to gain access to a concrete crossbeam in the roof whilst holes were 
drilled to run new cabling. There was no formalized system of work for this activity and 
there was no safety policy within the company. No risk assessment had, been made. The 
accident resulted in the maintenance man fracturing his arm in two places. The accident 
was noted in the accident book but had not been reported to the enforcing authority 
(Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1982*). The 
remedial work undertaken to prevent recurrence of the accident was limited to the 
injured person removing the ladder and storing it at the back of the warehouse. Due to 
the height of the beam and the density of concrete being drilled the correct method for 
the work should have included provision of a tower scaffold, in the opinion of the 
researcher. When reporting procedures were examined it emerged that the injured 
maintenance man was also nominally 'responsible' for safety, although he had received 
no training. 
The style of management 
The culture was such that status was exhibited in the sumptuousness of decoration and 
,furnishings of the Board Room. 'Junior' Directors acted as managers and had individual 
offices but these were cramped and shabbily furnished and each provided secondary 
storage space for administrative paperwork. Operatives spoke about managers in a 
formal manner, Mr x or Mrs y whilst managers used the first names of subordinate staff 
when describing them. 
This formal approach seemed to be an overt mechanism of preserving status within the 
organisation. This difference in status appeared to create a gap between managers and 
operatives that translated into a communication barrier. Many informal reporting 
procedures broke down because the manager was perceived as 'not wanting to be 
bothered with that' so that in practice many operatives were making judgements as to 
the value of the information before deciding whether to make a report, even a verbal 
report. This communication gap showed as different perceptions of the workings of the 
firm at different levels. Managers seemed to be quite naive about safety but were also 
unaware of many of the entries in the accident book. 
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Staff 
The majority of employees were unskilled women. Training for warehouse jobs involved 
new recruits being placed with 'old hands' to watch and learn for an hour and then 
working under the loose supervision of their mentor for a few days. The work demanded 
no special skills and was rapidly learnt through repetition. Other staff such as: credit 
control clerks and receptionists were recruited for their existing skills. There was no 
evidence of developmental training either in-house or using external providers. This lack 
of training extended to the maintenance man who was given 'responsibility' for safety 
issues but who lacked rudimentary knowledge of the subject and had no previous 
experience. 
Skiils 
The company recruited unskilled staff for warehousing duties and these made up 36 of 
the 46 employees (78% of the workforce). Administration personnel were recruited for 
their administrative skills and directors had specialist skills in accountancy and 
personnel. No one in the company was formally trained as a manager, or in strategiC 
planning or in safety matters. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company gleaned from discussions with managers and staff 
seemed to be: the provision of stable employment for the work force and attaining 
customer satisfaction by the accurate fulfilling of orders. This was not a mission driven 
business and the executive displayed not entrepreneurial zeal. The ideal of continued 
customer satisfaction could be translated as a quality goal but there was no obvious 
drive for quality and no formalized systems to gauge attainment. 
References: 
Johnson,G. and Scholes, K (1989) Exploring corporate strategy, Prentice-Hall, London 
Mintzberg, H. (1979) 'A Typology of Organisational Structure', in D. Miller, and P. 
Friesen, (eds.) Organisations: A Quantum View, Prentice-Hall. 
*Note 
The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1982 
have subsequently been amended and are now The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995, which came into force on 1 April 1996. 
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Industry Sector: Agriculture 
Case 2 
Trade: Fruit and Vegetable packers 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Attitude to safety, expressed positively. Some serious hazards observed during the visit. 
Little effort to manage from the top, except buying in a consultancy service. Overall 
achievement not satisfactory potential for serious accident with fork-lift truck. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
26/39. Score of 190 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk. 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor Performance 
Background to company 
These premises are located on a small industrial estate and trade from recently 
refurbished premises that they first occupied in September 1995. The accommodation 
comprises offices, packing and storage areas together with welfare facilities for the 15 
staff engaged in the packing of fruit and vegetables. The premises are suitable for the 
activity however the surfaces are cheaply finished with painted breeze-block walls and 
painted concrete floors that are likely to require regular maintenance. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: directors, supervisors 
and operatives. There was also extensive use of long term contractors for, reactive, 
machinery maintenance and for transport. The founder was Managing Director and the 
Directors were family members. There were two directors, an accountant, receptionist, 
clerk/secretary, two transport drivers, a pack house manager, a quality controller and 
five packing staff. Minimal training or liaison devises were observed to be in use. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was little evidence of long term planning within the company. The operating 
environment, as described by managers, was taken to be a niche market. The operation 
was kept deliberately small. The environment was not too difficult to understand and 
was based on traditional agricultural practices. The sector was not undergoing 
significant change however there were pressures from an economic recession in 
agriculture, and the potential for growth of the organic market was being watched. The 
influence of safety issues on the operating environment impacted on the company but 
managers were not consciously aware of this. 
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The systems within the company 
In general, health and safety standards seen during the visit were satisfactory although 
the monitoring of standards and practices was inadequate. There was no documented 
health and safety policy. However, the managers were aware of these deficiencies and 
were keen to ensure full compliance with statutory requirements. Any system to monitor 
health and safety was absent. There were no clear lines of responsibility within the 
management team, tasks undertaken by members of the family were spontaneous and 
the responsibilities were fluid. There were no systems for preventative maintenance for 
the conveyors, electrical installation, the boiler, the fork lift truck nor even the van. Also 
there was no accident book available at the time of the visit. 
There were no sophisticated quality systems in place. Records were maintained by the 
quality controller; of incoming goods and stock control procedures. The quality controller 
was not a manager but rather a fault spotter. She was employed to walk the floor of the 
packing-house and observe the quality of the product on the conveyor and inspect the 
finished packs for evidence of spoilage, misaligned labels, etc. 
The stvle of management 
The trappings of status were minimal. The offices were functional rather than luxurious. 
The finishes of the walls and floor were to a higher standard than the production areas. 
The office walls were plastered and colour washed and the floors had course carpeting. 
Operatives spoke about managers in a formal manner, Mr x or Mrs x whilst managers 
used the first names of subordinate staff when describing them. This formal approach 
seemed to be an overt mechanism of preserving status within the organisation. 
Managers seemed to be quite naive about safety, no accident records were available 
but, it was reported by managers that, no major accidents had been recorded since 
these premises were occupied. The laissez-faire style of management seemed to exist 
with regard to safety. Only major accidents were reportedly significant in judging their 
performance, according to the managers. This laissez-faire attitude was most clearly 
evident in the management of the fork lift truck. The usual driver had been employed 
already trained. However, there was no method by which access to the fork lift truck was 
-
restricted to the trained driver, no inspection protocols prior to use, no warning signs in 
the loading area, no pedestrian warning device fitted to the truck, and no control of 
where the truck was parked. 
Staff 
The majority of employees were unskilled. Women worked on the packing line and as 
clerk and receptionist, whilst men were the drivers and managers. No specific training 
was required for packing. New recruits were teamed with 'old hands' to work under the 
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loose supervision of their mentor for a few days. The work demanded no special skills 
and was rapidly leamt through repetition. Others e.g. drivers, were recruited for their 
existing skills. There was little evidence of developmental training either in-house or 
using external providers. The only exception was the training of the receptionist as a 
first-aider. Her training had been scheduled but not yet completed at the time of the visit. 
Skills 
The company recruited unskilled staff for packing duties and these made up 5 of the 15 
employees (33% of the workforce). Administration personnel were recruited for their 
administrative skills and a specialist was recruited for their skills in accountancy. The 
fork lift truck driver was also recruited for his certificated training. _. No one in the 
company was formally trained as a manager, or in strategic planning or in safety 
matters. However, the company did use a health and safety consultancy. This 
consultancy service offered 2 days on-site work a year and an emergency advice line in 
case of accidentlincidentlenforcement action. 
The super-ordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company gleaned from discussions with managers and staff 
seemed to be: slowly increasing the tumover of the company while keeping the 
workforce small, and attaining customer satisfaction by the packing and delivery of fresh 
undamaged foods. This was a mission driven business but the executive displayed no 
entrepreneurial zeal. There was a quality goal but there was no obvious drive for quality, 
the formalized quality systems were very simple. The super-ordinate goal was to 
increase turnover and thus profitability without becoming 'unmanageable'. 
Unique Reference: L 196 
Industry Sector: Catering 
Case 3 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Bakery 
Negative attitude expressed by owner. Some unguarded machinery, bad practices and 
structural defects to premises observed during the visit. No visible effort to manage from 
the top. Overall achievement was unsatisfactory'. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
25/39. Score of 178 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The premises were occupied by two businesses. The target business was a patisserie 
bakery with counter and administration area on the ground floor and the bakery and 
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preparation room in the basement. The business had been in operation on this site for 
approximately four years. The business was co-located with the proprietor's father's 
business. The key contacts with whom discussions were held during the visit were the 
proprietor and his mother. At the time of the visit there were nine staff employed, 
including full time and part-time. These staff consisted of a Head Chef, Deputy Head 
Chef, Chefs, general purpose staff and a driver. 
There were visible defects to the building structure that were immediately apparent. The 
floor tiles were lifting. The threshold and ramp between two rooms were worn. The 
internal door handles, in the staff toilets, had been broken off and not replaced. At the 
entrance to the toilets a wooden structural beam was being supported on a can on a 
block of wood; that, in turn, rested on a refrigerator. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: executive and operatives. 
The founder was the proprietor and the partners were family members. There were 
three partners. In the cooking process there was a formal hierarchy with the Head Chef, 
Deputy Head Chef supervising other operatives. Minimal training or liaison devises were 
observed to be in use outside the cooking process. In any decision-making scenarios 
that arose during the visit the proprietor deferred to his father. The father was the 
freeholder of the premises occupied by the business. In the absence of the father the 
mother provided guidance, but always in terms of purporting to relay the fathers 
wishes/preferences. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of planning within the company. The operating environment was 
simple and static (Johnson and Scholes 1989). The retail outlet was small and primarily 
services the local catering trade. The catering sector locally provided a sizeable, 
relatively stable customer base. This firm operated in a niche market and there was no 
evidence of local competition. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practised. The inadequacies in stock control were a clear 
example. There was no documented procedure for routine inspection and maintenance 
for machines, guards and safety devices. However, there was a dough brake machine 
and several mixing machines with dangerous moving parts that would normally warrant 
such a procedure. There were no accident records available at the time of the visit. 
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Where systems did exist they were primarily concerned with product quality following 
preparation. For example, there was documented monitoring of refrigerator 
temperatures. 
The style of management 
There was no evidence of effective proactive management of any safety risks, in 
particular specific risk areas remained uncontrolled. These specific risk areas included 
fire risk, electrical hazards, manual handling, and machinery hazards. The firm was 
essentially a patriarchy where the father wielded absolute power. Within the overall 
structure of the firm was a sub-structure for the cooking process where the Head Chef 
oversaw the process through a formal hierarchy. The Head Chef had power to control 
the product quality. However, in matters of policy and investment the Head Chef 
deferred in all cases to the father, who was not the titular head of the business. The 
proprietor was also the Head Chef at the time of the visit, but this appeared to be a new 
development. Previously it seemed the proprietor had felt relatively powerless due to his 
position within the family and his inexperience. Completion of his training as a Chef had 
allowed him to influence and control the product production. 
The father's patriarchal, autocratic approach to the business was never outlined in the 
interviews, but it was impliCit in observed reactions through out the visit. It was also 
noted that there had been an enforcement visit by an Environmental Health Officer 
(EHO) 18 months prior to this visit. From the correspondence seen during the visit 
recommendations were offered following the visit. However, no action had resulted 
within the organisation. Enquiries were not condusive but the mother suggested her 
spouse did not value the recommendations and had rejected the EHO's findings. This 
was taken as a possible indication of the father's views about external advice. 
Staff 
The majority of employees were unskilled, except for the Chefs who were specifically 
employed for their skills. Until recently, it was reported, all Chefs were employed 
because of their proven pastry skills. Now the proprietor had completed his training he 
felt confident to assume the role of Head Chef. 
Skills 
The company recruited unskilled staff for serving and preparation duties and these 
made up 6 of the 9 employees (66% of the workforce). No one in the company was 
formally trained as a manager, or in strategic planning or in safety matters. 
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The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company gleaned from discussions with managers seemed to 
be: the provision of employment for the proprietor and attaining customer satisfaction by 
providing a quality product. There was a 'quality' goal but there was no obvious drive for 
quality except in the final cooking and presentation. 'First in' 'first out' stock control was 
in operation. However, there was an open dirty bag of hazelnut flour in the preparation 
area, at the time of the visit. A pack of desiccated coconut, in the same area, had a 'best 
before date' that had expired 17 months prior to the visit. There was additional evidence 
that not all stock levels were monitored and stock was not adequately rotated. In 
addition, there was no supplier vetting system and no documented inspection system for 
incoming goods. 
References: 
Johnson,G. and Scholes, K. (1989) Exploring corporate strategy, Prentice-Hall, London 
Mintzberg, H. (1979) 'A Typology of Organisational Structure', in D. Miller, and P. 
Friesen, (eds.) Organisations: A Quantum View, Prentice-Hall. 
Unigue Reference: 01196 
Industry Sector: Manufacture 
Reclamation 
Case 4 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Plastics 
Attitude negative. Some unguarded/dangerous machinery, bad practices and noisy 
working conditions observed during the visit. No visible effort to manage safety, no 
interest. Overall achievement unsatisfactory, the worst premises in the sample. There 
was a documented report from a consultant made available. This indicated that 
recommendations made one year earlier by that safety consultant had not been 
implemented or otherwise addressed. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
39/39. Score of 294 [in range 89 to 2941 where >181 starts the highest risk range 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The person who conducted the visit and the main interviewee in this study was the 
Managing Director of the business. The business involved the reclamation of waste 
polyethylene, using mainly crumbing and compounding machines. The premises 
comprised a single storied building that housed the working area and an adjoining 
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warehouse, together 'with a rest room that doubled as an office and adjacent toilet 
facilities. The accommodation was shared with two other companies, one 'related' 
through partial joint ownership, the other unconnected. The associated firm produced 
plastic film, the other produced plastic bags from rolls of plastic film. 
The single storied building had exits front and rear. However, the building was so 
congested with materials and machinery that there was significant risk of entrapment in 
case of fire. The materials used and stored would burn easily and emit toxic heavy fume 
during combustion, the temperature of the burn would also climb rapidly. However, not 
only was housekeeping poor but, it was claimed, no practice fire drill.s had ever been 
held. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure was two tier, executive and 
operatives. The founder was the proprietor. The proprietor maintained personal control 
of all aspects of the business, according to his own description. There were seven 
operatives at the time of the visit. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of formal planning within the company. The company had been 
established within the last 3 years. The founder had a vision that he articulated when 
questioned but it had a short-term focus. The main objective was to generate sufficient 
income to meet loan repayments, pay the staff's wages and provide an income for the 
proprietor and his family. The operating environment was changing, a growth industry. If 
any strategy existed it could be characterized as an emergent coping strategy - more 
likely to react to cash-flow imbalance than safety or other organizational issues. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practised. There were few control systems. The 
- e 
inadequacies in stock control were a clear example. The product has an inherent 
combustion risk, yet the premises were congested and, although access was possible to 
all escape routes the arrangement of stored goods made obstructions likely. No fire 
practice drills had been held, despite a recommendation (from a consultant employed by 
the manager) that drills should be held at least annually. 
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Despite the fire hazard there was no permit to work scheme or any other control over 
electrical installation work or maintenance. There were trailing cables leading to several 
machines that had badly made joints (taped) or 'temporary' extensions. There were 
exposed wires where the insulation had been damaged by traffic over the cables. 
There was no system for immobilizing the fork lift trucks when not in use. Ignition keys 
were seen to have been left in both fork lift trucks while they were unattended. 
There was evidence that the machine metaphor may apply, with the owners focus on 
task rather than people. In discussions with the owner-manager, the staff were not 
characterized as being an active element of the firms operation and development. 
The style of management 
The day to day management style was laissez faire. There was evidence of a lack of 
day to day supervision throughout the premises. The stock storage and the damaged 
cables were evidence of an absence of routine intervention. The stored materials were 
liable to topple and there was inadequate access around the stacks. On some machines 
there were also rotating shafts that were not enclosed. The remedy would not have been 
costly, the simplest way to guard these would have been to encase them in loose 
cardboard or plastic sleeves. 
There was also an exposed cutter, the interlock switch on the hood was inoperative, the 
plunger was missing and the switch had been by-passed. The cutter could be used 
without the hood in position. The risk posed by the cutter was such that a Prohibition 
Notice may have been justified. 
Yet there was evidence of an engineering approach to safety management, where any 
effort was being made; for example in providing ear-defenders, the guarding of some 
machines, and the regular testing of the air-receiver. The behavioural; aspects of safety 
were not being addressed in any overt way, for example there was no training, not even 
basic fork lift training. There was no feeling of control (Alexander et ai, 1994). Ey~n 
responsibility for control of the building blurred because the space was shared. There 
was no commitment to safe working demonstrated by the M.D., there were obvious 
hazards present that posed a high risk; also there was no commitment by the 
employees, as demonstrated by the failure to use the PPE provided. This organisation 
could fit the description of the withdrawal type (Simard et ai, 2000). 
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There was also evidence of a degree of autocracy. The Managing Director described 
himself as the person who controlled all aspects of the business. He maintained his 
status by apparently remaining detached, aloof, from his staff. He approached no one 
and engaged no one in conversation, during the walk around the premises. There was 
evidence that external consultants had been used for time to time but also evidence that 
the owner sometimes failed to act on their advice. In addition to the consultant's report, 
which showed a recurrence of safety issues there was an electrical test certificate that 
showed some areas as 'unsatisfactory'. There was no evidence the repairs had been 
effected, and visible defects were observed during the visit. 
The operatives did not seem to react to the presence of the M.D .. They did not 
acknowledge his presence, no one raise a query with him or carried a message to him 
throughout the visit. 
His regular intervention was not, apparently, expected. There was no one who seemed 
to have adopted the role of supervisor. Each person seemed involved in his own task 
and communication was minimal. Talking was difficult due to the noisy environment. 
Staff 
The majority of employees were unskilled. Staff had been trained to recognize different 
fire extinguishers but none had been trained in their use. 
There were no observable rules or procedures, beyond the basic rules of attendance for 
a normal working day and continued operation of the machinery. Ear defenders were 
provided, some areas were very noisy (probably above 85dB; it was impossible to 
communicate in long sentences because of the effort required in shouting.) However, 
some of the machine operators failed to wear the ear-muffs and did not appear self-
conscious without them, even in the presence of the M.D .. It was inferred there were no 
rules about wearing the ear-defenders. 
Skills 
The company mainly recruited unskilled staff. A large part of the work involves 
employees feeding waste into 'agglomerating' machines. This is low skilled physj~al 
labour. There were two fork-lift trucks in use and the drivers had not been properly 
trained. No one in the company was formally trained as a manager, or in strategiC 
planning or in safety matters. 
The owner focused on the manufacturing process during the interview. He seldom 
mentioned his employees. He was very task oriented. He found it difficult to express 
himself at times and could not fluently articulate his vision. During the walk around the 
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unit he failed to make eye contact with any member of his staff. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company, gleaned from discussions seemed to be ongoing 
employment for the proprietor and the operatives. The M.D. described the business as 
profit oriented. 
Unique Reference: 01496 
Industry Sector: Service 
Case 5 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Care Home 
The proprietor took a keen interest in the running of the home. Good communications 
management by walking about [MBWA] and formal briefings. Signs and notices were 
clearly displayed, for example detailing actions in case of fire. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
2139. Score of 101 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Adequate safety performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a privately owned care home. It did not have its maximum quota of 
residents during the visit, it was only at 213 capacity. The premises was a large two storied 
house, that has been a care home for more than 25 years, leading to an adjOining 
bungalow extension. Up to 16 staff were employed, most were part-time. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure (Mintzberg 
1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: the proprietor, supervisors and 
general staff. The founder was the proprietor. The proprietor maintained personal control 
of the business. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of a strategy. The business appeared to be failing and resident 
numbers deClining. 
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The systems within the company 
There were a number of documented systems within this business and evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. Many of the documented systems were control 
systems. The accident recording system was maintained, sixteen accidents, involving 
minor injuries had been recorded in the preceding 12 months, only one related to a 
member of staff. Most accidents were bumps or falls, by frail residents. Weekly fire 
alarm checks were made and documented in the Fire Precautions Log Book. Records of 
testing the passenger hoists are kept, powered hoist were tested six monthly and 
manual hoists annually. The system for control of drugs and pharmaceuticals requires 
the activity was restricted to suitably trained and qualified staff, this system seems to be 
rigorously enforced. 
The style of management 
The proprietor has a hands on style. MBWA She actively supervises day to day running 
and personally reviews documented procedures. She is involved in daily briefings with 
supervisory staff at shift changes. 
Staff 
Existing skills were sought. Direct supervision was practiced. 
Skills 
Training was actively promoted. Employees had been trained, and were aware of, 
emergency action in the event of fire. Training sessions were quarterly and drills every 
six months. Employees were trained in manual handling techniques; most staff received 
certificated training off-site. Appropriate training was actively encouraged, for example 
all food handlers were trained to basic food hygiene standard. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The expressed priority was the maintenance of high standards of care and management 
to ensure the well-being of the residents. 
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Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Fabric Finishing 
No effort made. History of H&S prosecutions. Family business with strong emphasis on 
cost minimization. The equipment was poorly maintained, for example the heat 
exchanger was dripping oily residue into a biscuit tin. The floor beneath the biscuit tin 
was heavily oil stained indicating prolonged contamination. 
Much of the pollution control equipment was on a mezzanine floor above the process 
area. This floor was poorly supported and seemed structurally inadequate for the load. 
The floor was canted and the joists creaked if any load was put on the access ladder. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
35/39. Score of 229 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a purpose built two storied industrial building. It had operated for six 
years. It had a workforce of 47. The working environment, in the factory, was hot and 
humid. In the process area one became uncomfortable very quickly. There was a 
pervasive smell of cleaning solvent and no evidence of extract ventilation. The discharge 
from the stenters was by flues that extended through the roof. However, the chinese-hat 
termini of the flues allowed the effluvia to sink back down and the hydrocarbons from the 
process created a blue haze around the factory. The hydrocarbons induced sneezing in 
susceptible individuals both inside and outside the factory. 
Management structure: 
This was a family business but still there was a formal hierarchy within the company, 
although a simple structure (Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure 
comprised: the Managing Director (the eldest brother), two other directors (two other 
brothers), a dispatch manager and a production manager (nephews/sons of the 
directors) a receptionist and machine operators, loaders and drivers. All business was 
conducted between the family and between the staff in urdu, except for the receptionist 
who spoke only english. All of the managers of this firm spoke fluent english. It was not 
possible to determine if the machine operators and loaders spoke a second language as 
they spoke only urdu during the visit. The use of language reinforced the tight knit 
relationships within this firm. 
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Strategy formulation: 
There was an expansion strategy outlined by the M.O. during the interview .. The 
business appeared to be growing and there had been recent acquisitions of extra 
machines to increase capacity. 
The systems within the company 
There were a few documented systems within this business these mainly consisted of 
delivery notes and invoices. These systems were maintained by the receptionist. There 
were no computers or word processors in the factory. The receptionist had a manual 
typewriter. 
The stenters were equipped with automated control systems to maintain temperature 
and throughput. The temperature control settings had been over-ridden to increase the 
operating temperature above the recommended maximum. 
The pollution control equipment needed close monitoring to operate effectively. It was 
explained, during the visit, that excessive temperatures caused the heat exchanger to 
split and reduced the efficiency of the electro-static precipitator. The heat exchanger 
element was seen to be split and leaking on inspection and the quality of the emissions 
to atmosphere, from the flues, was very poor. It was inferred that the controls had been 
inadequate to prevent failure of the system. 
The style of management 
The management style was autocratic and exclusive. The use of language to exclude 
visitors from some of the conversations being conducted in their hearing was taken as 
evidence of this exclusivity. All enquiries were routed through the M.O. The machine 
operators were monitored by supervisors. The drivers were co-ordinated by the 
receptionist who checked loads, destinations, driving times, etc. 
The MD maintained his status by being physically removed from the process area. His 
office was on the far side of the building and at first floor level. The MD's office was 
accessed from a carpeted corridor. Whereas the factory was bare concrete and -the 
reception area floor covering was poorly worn carpet tiles. The MD's office was very 
large and the 'partners' desk was situated in the centre of the space. His chair was a 
leather executive chair. The other directors' offices were on the ground floor and had 
glazed walls without blinds. The desks provided reduced in size as the seniority of the 
occupant reduced, so that the dispatch manager and a production manager shared an 
office and occupied typists' desks. 
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Staff 
Most staff were employed unskilled, except drivers who were employed for their driving 
ability. The receptionist was not a trained typist or bookkeeper but had been an office 
junior before being employed here. Training for machine operators was provided by 
shadowing existing staff and was limited to specific tasks. The jobs were broken down 
into discrete tasks and the process appeared to follow the principles of scientific 
management. The manufacturing process was a continuous process but the individual's 
tasks were very simple. There was no evidence that staff were rotated between tasks. 
Skills 
The staff were largely untrained. The machine operators controlled the temperature of 
the stenters and the rate of feed of the material but they did not undertake any routine 
maintenance or cleaning. The stenters were excessively coated with fluff and fibres that 
presented a fire risk. 
The managers exhibited detailed knowledge of marketing theory. The second 
generation were being encouraged to undergo formal studies. One son had completed 
his business degree and retumed to work in the family firm. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
These were not expressed. However, cost minimization was a recurring theme of the 
interview. The product was not a quality product but was aimed at the 'cheap end of the 
market', a niche market supplying manufacturers who produced clothing for sale by 
market traders. [The stenters were set not merely to dry the fabric but to induce 
stretching, to increase the yardage, the result of this was the overheating of the oils in 
the fabric causing the release of hydrocarbons by high temperature oxidation.] 
Another recurring theme was family. The business was to provide long-term security for 
the M.D.'s son and nephews, who were expected to take an increasingly senior role in 
the business. Also this business formed part of a network of 'family' businesses. Within 
the extended family there existed, the equivalent of, vertical integration. The product 
was supplied to a cousin who ran a clothing factory, he in turn supplied another relative 
who operated market stalls. There was a synergy described by the MD and these family 
linkages seemed to be a core part of the business strategy. 
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Industrv Sector: Service 
Case 7 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Care Home 
The manager took a personal role in the running of the home. Management by walking 
about [MBWA] and formal briefings. Cautionary notices were clearly displayed at every 
hot water outlet. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
3/39. Score of 101 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Adequate safety performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a care home, operated as a charitable trust. Its residents are housed 
in the ground floor of the two storey main building (eleven residents), and in ten 
bungalows (fifteen residents) built in the grounds .. The first floor of the house had the 
staff room, manager's bedroom, guest rooms and bathrooms. The residents' lounges, 
bathrooms, kitchen, storerooms and offices were all on the ground floor. Up to 45 staff 
were employed, most were part-time. Staff were mainly care staff but there were also 4 
administrative staff and 4 gardeners. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the organisation, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: the manager, supervisors 
and general staff. The manager was a professional manager experienced in running this 
type of operation. The manager kept personal control of the business. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was evidence of a strategy, the Board of the charitable Trust met regularly. The 
Trust had clear aims, to continue to provide comfortable accommodation on a 'not for 
profit' basis. 
The systems within the company 
There were some documented systems within this organisation and some evidence of 
systematic procedures being practised. Many of the documented systems were control 
systems. Weekly fire alarm checks were said to be made but these had not been 
documented in the Fire Control Log Book. The accident recording system was 
maintained, sixteen accidents, involving minor injuries had been recorded in the 
preceding 6 months. 
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Some accidents were trips or falls, by frail residents. However, there had been nine 
accidents to staff during the period; 5 from manual handling, 3 incidents involving 
chemical 'fumes' and 1 slip. The 'fume' incident had occurred when a member of staff 
suffered effects on entering a room where the resident had left plastic on a hot hob. 
Records of testing the portable electrical appliances were kept. Details of the 
inspections, the findings and the remedial action were recorded. Damaged or faulty 
appliances were taken out of use; until effective repairs had been completed by a 
competent person. This system was well known among the staff questioned and was 
documented. 
There was a full inventory of hazardous substances available for inspection. This 
inventory showed amendments that indicated it was regularly reviewed. The use of 
hazardous substances was restricted to trained authorized personnel only. There were 
full written instructions available on the safe use of these substances. 
Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations and medicines were stored, and reportedly 
administered, in accordance with the organization's documented procedures. The 
procedures were, said to be, reviewed regularly to ensure they were suitable and 
relevant and there was evidence of independent audit of the procedures by the 
Community Pharmacist. Recommendations following the pharmaCist's audit were in 
writing. 
The style of management 
The manager had a hands on style. MBWA. She actively supervises day to day running 
and personally reviews documented procedures. She is resident on site and able to be 
contacted at most times, staff are aware that she wishes to be included in any incidents 
or decisions. 
Staff 
Staff were employed with existing skills. Training was a part of the employment process, 
from induction on .. Direct supervision was practiced. 
Skills 
Training in manual handling techniques was included in the induction programme for 
new care staff. There was also inclusion of the manual handling requirements for each 
resident within individual care plans. Employees had been trained, and were aware of, 
emergency action in the event of fire. It was reported that fire drills were held. Key 
members of staff had been trained in the use of fire extinguishers. 
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The superordinate goals of the company 
The Trust had clear aims, to continue to provide comfortable accommodation on a 'not 
for profit' basis. The staff were striving to maintain the perceived high standards of the 
Board, as articulated by the manager. The manager was not directly involved in the 
strategic direction of the organisation, this was determined and driven by the Board of 
the Trust. However, it was the manager's values and expectations that were repeated by 
staff during the interviews. The manager lived on site and claimed to feel personally 
responsible for the welfare of the residents and the smooth running of the Home. 
Unique Reference: 0996 
Industry Sector: Service 
CaseS 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Hotel 
From observations and discussions it was clear that considerable effort was being 
afforded to maintain established health and safety arrangements. However there were a 
number of items that required attention. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
8/39. Score of 114 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Adequate safety performance 
Background to company 
The hotel had bar, restaurant, conference and leisure facilities. There were 52 bedrooms 
on the ground and first floor offering accommodation for one hundred and thirteen 
guests, in single, double and family rooms. Twenty-three full time staff and twenty part 
time staff were, said to be, employed at the time of the visit. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: the operations manager, 
supervisors and general staff. The proprietor was absent and delegated all decisions to 
the operations manager. The operations manager took personal control of the business. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was evidence of a strategy. The business was being geared up for expansion. 
Alterations were proposed to provide additional conference facilities and improve the 
203 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Case 8 .•• cont ... 
catering facilities. The focus of the business was set to shift from accommodation to 
conference and training facilities. The alteration programmed was in discrete phases 
and trade was to continue throughout the period of structural alterations. 
The systems within the company 
There were a number of documented systems within this business and evidence of 
some systematic procedures being practised. Many of the documented systems were 
control systems. The accident recording system was maintained, fourteen accidents, 
involving minor injuries had been recorded in the preceding 9 months. There were 
different causes for the accidents generally: stepping on or striking a stationary object 2; 
handling or carrying 1; slip, trip or fall on the same level 4; fall from height 1; bums 4; cut 
1; chemical rash 1. 
There was evidence that portable electrical appliances were regularly inspected and 
tested by a competent person. D~tails of these inspections, their findings and the 
remedial action taken are available in the Hotel's records. Each portable electrical 
appliance was uniquely identified with a number. 
The style of management 
The operations manager had a 'hands on' style. MBWA. He actively supervised day to 
day running and personally instructs builders and maintenance contractors.. He is 
involved in briefings staff at shift changes, particularly temporary or casual catering or 
service staff. 
Staff 
Staff were employed unskilled, a significant proportion (>46%) were part time or casual, 
as is the common in the hotel/catering sector. Direct supervision was practiced. 
Skills 
Employees had been trained, and were aware of, emergency action in the event of fire. 
It was said fire drills were held. Key members of staff had been trained in the use of fire 
extinguishers. Not all food handlers were trained to basic food hygiene standard. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
There were no clear superordinate goals articulated. The aim seemed to be to keep the 
facilities as fully utilized as possible. Standards were set so as not to deter repeat 
custom rather than achieve excellence in service or a lUXUry environment. Some of the 
structural and equipment defects were in the public areas and appeared to be of long 
standing. For example no external emergency lighting was provided to the double doors 
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of the restaurant, which acted as a fire escape; there was no emergency lighting unit for 
the fire exit doors on the ground floor bedroom wing; in the Leisure Centre the wall 
mounted Jacuzzi operating button was loose; and there was disorganized and 
inappropriate storage of equipment (such as overhead projectors, flip charts, etc.) in the 
Conference Room, to which guests had access. 
Standards appeared lax. The hotel seemed scruffy and worn. There was also evidence 
of staff taking shortcuts, by not putting equipment away. This seemed to stem from the 
operations manager. He was focus on the alterations and the new direction for the 
business. A significant amount of his time was taken up in negotiating building contracts, 
constructing schedules and preparing, marketing materials for the new conference 
facilities. He had no designated deputy and without his personal intervention on a 
regular basis it seemed that the standards were not maintained. 
Unique Reference: R199 
Industry Sector: Service 
Case 9 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Hotel 
The joint owners had, only recently, acquired the Hotel . The Hotel was in run down 
condition prior to purchase. The new owners are striving to improve health and safety 
standards but have yet to complete their refurbishment programme or implement 
adequate control procedures or management practices. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
27/39. Score of 190 [in range 89 to 294] where >181 starts the highest risk range 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor safety performance 
Background to company 
The hotel is a three storey Victorian property which has been converted and extended to 
provide hotel accommodation which includes reception area, restaurant, two function 
.. ~ 
rooms with bars and residential accommodation with 16 en-suite bedrooms. The hotel 
had been taken over by the present owners three months before the visit. In the 
previous three months the owners had embarked upon a major refurbishment 
programme. The kitchen had already been completed at the time of the visit. Still in the 
programme, and yet to be finished, were redecoration and refurbishment of bedrooms 
and public areas and the conversion of a bar, on the lower ground floor, to a children's 
play area. The Hotel can accommodate up to 250 people seated, for functions and 
dinners and is licensed for 530 caoacitv for dancino. 
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Management structure: 
This hotel had joint managing directors, 4 full time staff and 10 part-time or casual staff 
(FTE 8 staff). 
Strategy formulation: 
There was evidence of a strategy. The business was being geared up for improvement 
and expansion. Alterations were in-train to improve the facilities. The alteration 
programmed was in discrete phases and trade was to continue throughout the period of 
structural alterations. 
The systems within the company 
There were some documented systems within this business and evidence of some 
systematic procedures being practiced. Most of the documented systems were control 
systems. The accident recording system was by a log book but no accidents had been 
recorded in the preceding three months, since the new owners took over. The weekly 
testing of the fire alarm system was recorded in the Fire Precautions Logbook together 
with details of regular testing of the emergency lighting system. However there 
appeared to have been no fire evacuation drills since the new owners took over. There 
were no certificates demonstrating the annual servicing of the gas fired boilers or 
heating appliances. There was no evidence that the portable electrical equipment had 
been tested, and no register, of the equipment held, was kept. Hazardous substances 
data sheets were not available. 
The style of management 
One of the jOint managing directors assumes responsibility for day to day running of the 
Hotel. He personally intervenes to remedy observed problems or defects. MBWA 
Staff 
Staff were employed unskilled, a significant proportion (>70%) were part time or casual, 
as is the common in the hotel/catering sector. Direct supervision was practiced. 
Skills 
Employees had not been trained, and were unaware of, emergency action in the event 
of fire. No fire drills had been held. Not all food handlers were trained to basic food 
hygiene standard. The business had not settled into its routines at the time of the visit, 
firstly because of the recent change in ownership and secondly because of the on-going 
renovations. The skills profile was not clear and training needs had yet to be identified 
by the owners. 
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The superordinate goals of the company 
The superordinate goals were of quality and excellence. One of the joint managing 
directors was almost zealous in his articulation of this commitment to the achievement 
and maintenance of high standards of health, safety and hygiene within the premises. 
Evidence of this commitment was borne out in the achievement since the Hotel was 
taken over. The restaurant area had been completed to a very high standard and the 
complete refurbishment and re-equipment of the restaurant kitchen had also been to a 
very high standard. 
Refurbishment and redecoration was on-going throughout the premises and included 
the installation of a small cocktail bar in the main function room. Completion of the 
refurbishment programme was anticipated within 6 weeks of the visit. As part of the 
refurbishment specialists had been engaged to renew the fire control system. This 
demonstrated the commitment to high standards in areas not visible to guests as well as 
in cosmetic improvement. 
Unique Reference: 01096 
Industry Sector. Manufacture 
Case 10 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Joinery 
Some dangerous machinery and noisy working conditions were observed during the 
visit. Employees operating the woodworking machinery were identified as being 
particularly at risk. The partners expressed an interest in health and safety but their 
managerial approach needed support. This gap had been identified and a remedy 
sought, consultants had been invited in to produce a Health and Safety Policy and. 
introduce a management control system to address health and safety issues. 
Ranking based on hazardlrisk scoring: 
28/39. Score of 193 [in range 89 to 294] where >181 starts the highest risk range 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The company provided site and workshop joinery services to the construction industry. 
The property consisted of an office, a workshop and store. There was a wide range of 
woodworking machinery in the workshop. The premises were somewhat cramped. 
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as being an active element of the firms operation and development. 
The style of management 
The day to day management style was laissez faire the partners worked as part of the 
team. Their background was as joiners. They did not attempt to demonstrate their status 
as business owners.. There was evidence of a lack of day to day supervision 
throughout the premises. 
Yet there was evidence of an engineering approach to safety management, where any 
effort was being made; for example in the guarding of some of the wood working 
machines, and the ad hoc testing of the portable electric-power tools. ''The behavioural; 
aspects of safety were not being addressed in any overt way, for example there was 
minimal training. There was no feeling of control (Alexander et ai, 1994). The 
responsibility for safety management had been delegated almost entirely to the 
employees. The partners saw their main function as winning the contracts to secure the 
longevity of the business and helping to provide the expert joinery skills. There was no 
consistent commitment to safe working demonstrated by the partners. There were 
obvious hazards present that posed a high risk; also there was no commitment by the 
employees, as demonstrated by the failure to adequately adjust the grinding machine 
before use. This organisation could fit the description of the withdrawal type (Simard "et 
al,2000). 
Staff 
There were eleven employees, including two working partners and a part-time member 
of staff in the office. 
Skills 
Employees were generally selected for their woodworking skills and experience with 
operating wood working machinery. Within their areas of expertise there was evidence 
that these machinists were competent. The cutter guards were properly adjusted to the 
work, the riving knives were seen to be in place and properly adjusted, push sticks and 
push blocks were provided and used, false fences were provided and used. It was in 
areas of work outside of their span of experience that standards seemed to slip. The 
poor operation of the main dust extraction equipment was an example of this. As was 
the lack of edge protection of the mezzanine storage area. 
Employees suggested they were aware of action to take in case of fire, but no advisory 
notices were displayed and fire drills had not been carried out. Fork-lift operators were 
fully trained to the required standard and were instructed in the safe operation of the 
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Management structure: 
There was an informal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure was two tier, partners and 
operatives. There were eleven employees, including two working partners and a part-
time member of staff in the office. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was evidence of formal planning within the company. The premises were 
cramped at the time of the visit, but within 8 weeks the expressed intention was to move 
the main machinery and assembly operations to larger premises situated across the 
road. The operating environment was changing, a growth industry. The strategy could 
be characterised as an emergent coping strategy - to react to organisational issues 
such as cramped working conditions in a climate of growth for the business's main 
customers, the local construction industry. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practised. There were few control systems. There was an 
accident book but it was not clear if accidents were being actively recorded. The 
accident record was scant and it was not possible to identify causes from the entries. 
There was no documentary evidence that the permanent electrical installation had been 
inspected or tested, and no programme of 5 yearly inspection. The electrical distribution 
panel was properly enclosed. There was no formal register of portable electric 
equipment nor testing of that equipment. Portable electrical appliances were apparently 
inspected on an ad hoc basis, despite being taken out of the workshop for use on site 
regularly. There was no planned approach to electrical testing and inspection. 
The main dust extraction system was not apparently subject to testing and inspection 
every fourteen months. This local exhaust ventilation did not seem to be performing 
adequately at the time of the visit. 
There was no system for immobilizing the fork-lift trucks when not in use. Ignition keys 
were seen to have been left in both fork-lift trucks while they were unattended. This was 
despite the claim, made during the interview, that the use of the fork lift truck was 
restricted to trained, authorized persons only. 
There was evidence that the machine metaphor may apply, with the partners' focus on 
task rather than people. In discussions with the partners, the staff were not described 
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vehicle and the safety precautions to be observed. The operators of the grinding 
machines claimed they were also trained, and instructed in the method and precautions 
for safe operation. However, the grinding machine was not securely mounted at the time 
of the visit and no employee had been trained how to replace an abrasive wheel. 
Suitable eye screening was not provided and the tool rest was inadequately adjusted. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
There were no apparent superordinate goals the business was task oriented and the 
focus was clearly on 'getting the job done'. It was suggested that time was of the 
essence in most instances as the joinery formed only part of the construction phase for 
most contracts. Delays in the joinery delayed the whole project. 
Unique Reference: 01396 
Industrv Sector: Manufacture 
Production 
Case 11 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Chemical 
The principle risks, at the 'bitumen blend' manufacturing unit, were associated with fire 
and the contact with hazardous substances. Both of these hazards areas have been 
properly addressed. The management exhibited an awareness of that which needs to be 
done to control the major hazards and the main risks were well contained. In general the 
attitude of the management to towards issues of health and safety was very positive. 
However, some hazards were not readily identified. For example a large section of 
racking in the warehouse was not cross braced, nor tied to the building structure. The 
safe working loads were not marked on the racks. It was showing signs of instability. In 
addition some stacks of palletised loads seemed unstable. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
21/39. Score of 171 [in range 89 to 294] medium risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The products from the manufacturing process were bitumen blends, water-based 
emulsions, phenolic resins, and synthetiC resins. Fire was a hazard because of the large 
quantities of highly flammable liquids stored on site. Many of the chemical substances 
in the manufacturing process are known to be prejudicial to health. The unit comprised 
administration, production areas and stores. 
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Management structure: 
There was an formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure was three tier, directors, foreman 
and operatives. There were eight employees, including the foreman. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of formal planning within the company, any strategy was 
emergent, reactive to changing circumstances. However in a stable niche market there 
was no evidence of change in progress. 
The systems within the company 
There were some documented systems within this business and some evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. There were some control systems. There was a 
hot work permit system in place, due to the highly flammable areas around the site. 
There was an accident book. The accident record was examined for the preceding 12 
months. There were 5 accidents recorded as having occurred during the period; 4 were 
burns and 1 was a cut to the hand. Two of these accidents were formally reportable 
under RIDDOR. 
There was a written scheme for the periodic examination of the air receiver. 
Condensate was reportedly drained from the receiver regularly although there was no 
documentary evidence of this instruction. However, there was evidence that neither the 
electrode holder, cables nor welding equipment (kept in the same area) were regularly 
inspected, all were in visibly poor condition. 
There was documentary evidence that the permanent electrical installation had been 
inspected, and there was a programme of 5 yearly inspections. However, there were a 
number of open fuse boxes and hanging wires visible during the visit. It was suggested 
during the interview that these electrical systems were redundant, but they were not 
marked as such. Some of the electrical conduit in the main switchgear room had missing 
colour codes. There were also trailing cables to the switchgear's cooling system, andU=le 
earthing cable was inadequately protected from damage. Thus the documentary 
evidence conflicted with the observations during the visit. 
There was no formal register of portable electric equipment nor testing of that 
equipment. Portable electrical appliances were not apparently inspected. There was no 
planned approach to electrical testing and inspection. 
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All fork-lift trucks were regularly serviced and detailed records kept. The use of fork-lift 
trucks was restricted to employees who had been trained to the prescribed standard. 
However, similar arrangements were not in place for the use of the abrasive wheels, 
also the grinders were, apparently, neither regularly tested nor inspected. The wheels 
were also not adequately marked with their safe operating speed. 
The style of management 
The day to day management style was by direct supervision, on the part of the foreman. 
There was evidence of a lack of day to day supervision throughout the premises. There 
were spills of liquid in places on the floor. The removable safety rail in'the loading area, 
mezzanine floor, was cumbersome and difficult to replace; it was down and not replaced 
throughout the visit. There was also a lack of suitable guarding to enclose a rotating 
spindle and chuck of a drill. This presented a hazard and there was a clear risk of 
entanglement. The failure to use the guards and to clean up spills seemed to have 
arisen from inadequate supervision. 
The responsibility for safety management had been delegated almost entirely to the 
foreman. There were obvious hazards present that posed a high risk; also there was no 
commitment by the employees, as demonstrated by the failure to report the problems 
with the electrical system, or clean up spills. This organisation could fit the description of 
the withdrawal type (Simard et ai, 2000). 
Staff 
There were eight employees, including the foreman. 
Skills 
Employees had been trained in emergency action in the event of fire. There was 
evidence that practice drills had been held. A licence to store petroleum products had 
been granted to this site (Petroleum Consolidation Act 1928). This licence was 
conditional and the site was subject to regular audit by the Petroleum Inspector. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
There were no apparent superordinate goals the business was task oriented. The focus 
was on the accepted hazards of fire and chemicals, these were championed by the 
directors and were actively addressed. The other hazards apparent on site were neither 
acknowledged nor addressed. 
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Industry Sector: Primary Extraction Trade: Quarrying 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
The Director was keen to point out the company's god safety record and he expressed a 
desire to build on this. The main hazards associated with the operation were seen to be 
machine guarding, noise and vehicle movements. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
25/39. Score of 178 [in range 89 to 294] medium risk, where high risk is >181 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Questionable performance 
Background to company 
The company quarry a large tract of land which is remotely situated. The company were 
accustomed to being regularly inspected by both the Alkaline Inspector and the Health 
and Safety Executive (HSE). No enforcement action has been initiated as a result of any 
visit. There is recurring comment from the HSE, in the documentation, in respect of 
standards of edge protection in the quarry, the acuteness of the incline of the quarry 
road and the non-segregation of traffic movements. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure was 2 Directors, 3 partners, 12 
people in stone haulage, 19 in the quarry and 2 administrators. The Quarry Manager 
was a de facto appointment, he was not appointed in writing and his responsibilities has 
not been enumerated. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of formal planning within the company. The operating 
environment was simple and static at the time of the visit. 
The systems within the company 
There were some documented systems within this business and some evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. There were some control systems. 
There was an accident book. The accident record was examined for the preceding 12 
months. There was 1 accident recorded during the period; this arose ff~m battery acid 
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splashing into a worker's eye. The very low incidence of reported accidents was a 
concern. It was considered there may be a problem with under-reporting. There was an 
insurance claim outstanding that related to an incident some time before the visit. 
There was no formal system to ensure that operatives carried out daily checks and so 
that defeds noted were confirmed as rectified or reported to the Quarry Manager. The 
checks were deemed necessary to include: the position and condition of guarding; that 
the equipment in use was 'fit for purpose', that the work area had been made suitable, 
level stable and clear; that all necessary PPE was available. All of these areas had been 
poorly addressed during the visit. 
There was documentary evidence that the permanent electrical installation had been 
inspected, and there was a programme inspections consistent with the lEE Regs.. A 
certificate showing details of the last inspection and test was available. The access to 
the electrical switch gear was unobstructed. There were no trailing cables observed and 
all cable runs were properly protected by trunking or conduit. Low voltage portable 
electrical equipment was provided for use in accordance with recognised good practice 
in the industry. However, there was no formal safe system of work prescribed by the 
company for electrical isolation whilst working on plant and equipment. 
There was apparently no written scheme for the periodic examination of the air receiver. 
Records of maintenance work carried out were kept. Condensate was reportedly 
drained from the receiver regularly although there was no documentary evidence of this 
instruction. 
The style of management 
The day to day management style was by direct supervision, on the part of the Quarry 
Manager. There was evidence of a lack of day to day supervision throughout the 
operation. The condition and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was not 
apparently checked regularly. Some defective equipment was seen and some workers 
were failing to wear standard equipment during the visit. Employees had allegedly"not 
been instructed in the use of PPE, nor their duty to use it. The failure to use PPE 
seemed to have arisen from inadequate supervision. 
There was evidence that responsibilities for monitoring had been delegated to sub-
ordinates. However, it seemed that the directors were failing to ensure that those 
subordinates were actually carrying out the monitoring. 
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Staff 
The company employed 48 people at the time of the visit. 
Skills 
There was a demonstrable failure to train an adequate number of employees in 
mounting abrasive wheel . 
The superordinate goals of the company 
These were not clearly articulated during the visit. There seemed to be a sense that 
quarrying was an inherently dangerous industry. , It had also been considered there may 
have been a problem with the under-reporting. of accidents. Under-reporting of accidents 
together with an acceptance of heightened risk can create an unsafe working climate. 
Bravado rather than risk assessment seemed to arise at times. 
Unigue Reference: R398 
Industry Sector: Retail 
Case 13 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Books 
This was not a business rather a hobby. The shop was run more as a private collection 
than a retail enterprise. The owner seldom spent time in the shop. It was, said to be, run 
by his wife. However, the owner was present during the visit and his wife deferred to him 
regularly during the conversation. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
18/39. Score of 163 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The premises was a traditional stone 17th century building. The windows were mullio~~d 
and the threshold a sandstone step, giving an impression of antiquity. The space was 
extremely cramped and smelled of dust. The rooms lacked natural light. There were 
visible defects to the building structure that were immediately apparent. The threshold 
and ramp between two rooms were worn and dished and the treads of the narrow 
staircase were uneven and sloping. The premises had the ambience of a museum vault 
rather than a shop. 
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The rooms were crammed floor to ceiling with stock. The books were contained in free-
standing bookcases, piled on tables and stacked on the floor. The bookcases and tables 
themselves appeared to be genuine antiques, some were damaged and worn. In one 
place a rickety bookcase (holding a considerable weight of stacked books) had been 
propped by wedging a book under one leg. This interim remedy had apparently 
persisted for a while as the dust was thick on the upper cover of the book, implying that 
it had lain unmoved for some time. 
Management structure: 
This organisation was a true adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979). All employees worked in the 
shop part-time and did so as friends of the owner. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of planning. This seemed more a hobby, than a business. Profit 
was not the driver and competitors were irrelevant in this context. There was no effort to 
market the goods or advertise the location of the shop. There were few customers 
during the visit, and those that came appeared to be long-term friends and 
acquaintances; although the owners wife did comment that tourists were attracted by 
the "quaintness" of the shop, in the summer. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practised. The inadequacies in stock control were a clear 
example. There were no accident records available at the time of the visit. There was no 
evidence of routine maintenance of the fabric, decor or furnishings. 
The style of management 
The proprietor was essentially absent and presented himself as playing no part in the 
running of the business. There was no evidence of effective proactive management of 
any safety risks. These specific risk areas included fire risk, electrical hazards, manual 
handling, and storage. The organisation was essentially a patriarchy where the owner 
wielded absolute power. In matters of policy and investment the wife in all cases 
deferred to her husband, who was not the titular head of the business. 
The husband's patronizing approach to the business was never outlined in the 
interviews, but it was implicit in observed reactions throughout the visit. The owner was 
present during the visit because his wife had arranged for it to be so. During the 
interview even if questioned directly, in the presence of her husband, the wife cast her 
eyes down lowered her voice and permitted her husband to answer. 
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There was no evidence of recent investment, except in acquisition of stock. It emerged 
that the husband had long collected old books as a hobby. The wife suggested her 
spouse did not consider investment in the fabric of the building, or storage facilities as a 
necessary expense. This comment was consistent with the 'temporary' repairs seen. 
Also the wiring was of the old 'two strand' type (no earth) and the insulation appeared in 
poor repair; this suggested that re-wiring was needed. 
Staff 
The employees were unskilled, although all were well-educated, literate and literary. 
Skills 
There was no training of staff, beyond use of the till. It seemed employees were 
attracted to the shop by their shared interest in books. There were, apparently, long 
gaps between customer visits. During these lulls the staff present discussed books or 
picked books off the shelf to examine or read, if a visitor was in the shop they could be 
included in wide ranging conversations. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the organisation gleaned from discussions with the owner seemed to 
be to keep his wife occupied. Any income generated from the business was treated as a 
bonus. The owner was independently wealthy and had numerous other business and 
property interests. Neither the owner, nor his wife, were dependent on the business for 
an income. The main aim was to enjoy the books and meet people with a shared 
interest. 
Case 14 
Unique Reference: 01695 
Industry Sector: Manufacturing Trade: Cartons/Boxes 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
No evidence of any modernization since 1920's, old original presses, wiring looks 
original. No evidence of active management or acknowledgement of hazards. 
'Dangerous' practices allowed during visit. Guillotine in use - amputation risk. No 
evidence that any effort is being expended to comply with legislation. No HSWA poster, 
safety policy a photocopy of someone else's. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
37/39. Score of 233 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
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Background to company 
The business had been established in the 1920's; but had been bought by the present 
owner less than 18 months prior to the visit. In terms of managerial experience the 
owner-manager was very new to the organisation. The building was a traditionally 
constructed, single storey, 1920's factory with concrete floors, angle iron roof and metal 
windows. The factory was cold, undecorated and poorly lit. The windows were dirty 
restricting light into the premises and the strip lights were hung from the roof trusses so 
were high above the floor. The equipment was old and heavy, cast iron pieces, and the 
old original presses. 
There were trailing wires and the wiring seemed original, some of tne electric fittings 
were Bakelite although some wall plates had been replaced with plastic covers. There 
was waste cardboard, cardboard off-cuts and cardboard crumb under most machines. 
Management structure: 
This organisation ostensibly had a simple structure (Mintzberg 1979) but the 
relationships between the workforce were politically very complex. There was a obvious 
divide between the owner and the workforce, with little contact or communication 
between them. There was owner-manager and operatives; two discreet and separate 
layers within, that which is essentially, a very small organization. The workforce was 
stratified on basis of age, experience and familial ties. The behaviour and allegiances 
within the group seemed patriarchal. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of long term planning. This business sought to increase 
adaptability of its unskilled workforce by taking on (regular) casual temporary staff to 
meet demand. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. Accidents were not recorded There was some 
evidence of subversion of some of the owner's systems, by some employees;- for 
example accidents were reported to other employees but not to the owner. 
The inspection revealed that there were observable systems in place, but they excluded 
the owner-manager from the communication loop. The owner-manager was simply 
excluded from all communication pathways, unless she specifically addressed one of 
the workers. 
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There was a document presented as a safety policy, but it was an unaltered photocopy 
of another organization's policy. The apparent naivete with which the copy policy was 
presented for examination during the visit suggests that the owner's awareness of her 
statutory obligations was severely limited. 
The style of management 
There were strong familial links between employees, from which the owner was 
excluded. The owner recognised this, she commented of her employees that all their 
daughters or sons come to work here too. Accidents were reported to other employees 
but not to the owner. There was no evidence of active safety management. No evidence 
of results of time spent or any investment made. 
There was friction between the owner-manager and the employees. In discussions there 
. were frequent disparaging remarks made about the employees as a group, although not 
about individuals within that group. There seemed to be an antagonism between some 
of the employees and the owner as the inspection was in progress. The manager had an 
office separate from the production area. She seemed more comfortable, and relaxed, in 
her office than out in the factory. 
Staff 
At the time of the visit there were 6 staff on the payroll. These employees were 
unskilled. There were strong familial links between employees. 
Skills 
The owner was unfamiliar with this industry sector prior to purchasing this factory. She 
admitted to having limited knowledge about the process and equipment although she 
had been actively striving to increase her knowledge. There was scant appreciation of 
the hazards present in the process nor the risks they posed. The owner noted, during 
the walk around, that the guillotine looked dangerous but did not immediately appreciate 
the imminent risk of amputation that it posed, by virtue of its condition and manner of 
use. 
There was no evidence of a systematic training programme, nor identification of training 
need, there was evidence of unsafe practices routinely performed. The prevalence of 
observable unsafe practices, during the visit, suggests that no effective training had 
been undertaken. 
During discussions the owner-manager described the staff as unskilled and repeatedly 
implied they were, and even described them as, un educable. 
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The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the organisation gleaned from discussions with the owner seemed to 
be to run the business as a tax write off, apparently that was the motivation for the 
purchase. The super-ordinate goals of the organisation did not stem from the owner-
manager. There was a demonstrable lack of communication between the owner-
manager and the workforce. The owner-manager saw her employees as something she 
had 'inherited' when she bought the company. 
The workforce was stratified with strong familial ties and acted like a patriarchy. The 
main values of the company gleaned from discussions with some of the employees 
seemed to be the provision of stable employment, not only for this generation but the 
next. There was a long family tradition of working in this factory and there was a degree 
of 'ownership' articulated by some of the machine operators, particularly the older ones. 
This 'ownership' conflict may conceivably have been at the root of the frictions that were 
observed, but other causes could not be eliminated. 
Unique Reference: L795 
Industry Sector. Manufacturing 
Case 15 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Tannery 
Old traditional family business. Low technology. Very poor working environment: wet, 
dirty, humid and dangerous chemicals. Very 'Victorian' type of process. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
19/39. Score of 163 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
This business was based on a traditional process and was a family run firm. Labour-
intensive process in basic brick built building. The whole factory had been recently 
rewired. The wiring and electrical fittings all looked new. 
Management structure: 
This organisation had a simple structure (Mintzberg 1979). The structure had three tiers 
Director, Factory Manager and Operatives. Father is owner-manager, son took over as 
manager 5 years ago. 
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Strategy formulation: . 
There was evidence from the discussions that the son was attempting to plan for the 
future, to antiCipate changes in the operating environment. The closure of shoe factories 
in Northampton was discussed, and the effect on the UK shoe industry and the local 
demand for shoe quality leather. The growing environmental movement was also 
discussed and the influence that Black Listing of chemicals has on the process. 
The systems within the company 
There were a few documented systems within this business. The evidence of systematic 
procedures being practiced related solely to the tanning process, which is rather like a 
recipe. Very little evidence of active H&S management. It was a very poor working 
environment. Inappropriate manual handling was seen. The strict handling and control of 
chemicals espoused but used drums were stock piled and ignored, in the yard. 
Risk assessments had been carried out but they were not comprehensive, some 
hazards were omitted, e.g. Heavy/difficult loads; water + electricity; caustic effects on 
skin, etc. There had been a COSHH assessment carried out and documented. This 
assessment highlighted - surface coating spray. The remedial action had been to 
discontinue use of solvents. Local Exhaust Ventilation (LEV) was in use; as a result of a 
risk assessment, however the atmosphere was still very humid. 
Accidents were said to be recorded, there had been no accidents in last 5 years 
according to the Manager. There were none shown in the records. However, during the 
inspection it became evident there had been incidents: A strained back during lifting -
not reported, or recorded in accident book; a cut hand not reported or recorded. 
The style of management 
Patriarchal management, this had been a family firm for generations and was passed 
down from father to son. The owner was the Factory Manager's father. The Factory 
Manager was being groomed for succession. The employees were of long-standing and 
were treated as family. The form of address preserved status. "Mr X" was the owner and 
"Young Mr X" or "Mr 'Michael" was the form of address adopted for the Factory 
Manager. This business exemplified 'traditional values' in all areas from the traditional 
method of manufacture, the forms of address, the patriarchal attitudes and the design 
and decor of the building. 
The Factory Manager carried out day to day supervision, and as the owner increasingly 
withdrew his direct involvement, the organisation had very flat structure. However, it was 
a very small undertaking anyway. 
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Staff 
Small workforce, 8 employees at premises at time of visit. 
Skills 
Factory Manager takes on H&S role - no formal specific training, the Research 
Association supplies documentation and runs seminars. No confidence expressed in 
ability. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the organisation gleaned from discussions with the owner seemed a 
desire to continue to run a traditional tannery. Both father and son were very negative 
towards all legislative controls, seen as cost with no benefit. Both were equally proud 
that the business continued to trade much as it had done for years. It was seen as a 
plus that although some accommodation had been made for technological changes, and 
black listing of some ingredients, the process remained very similar to the 'Victorian' 
process. The process remained manual. The themes of 'tradition' and 'family' recurred 
during the discussions. The patriarchal approach to staff relations exemplified their 
notion of family. 
Unique Reference: 0596 
Industry Sector: Manufacture 
Case 16 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Joinery 
A great emphasis was placed on personal responsibility in this enterprise. Skilled and 
experienced staff were employed to operate the woodworking machines. There was a 
heavy reliance placed on each individual's skill. The firm was not hierarchical and 
exhibited variable success at managing unsafe situations. There was very good 
awareness of safety where an individual had prior experience of an issue arising 
however there was no extrapolation of this awareness into unknown situations. Noisy 
working conditions were observed during the visit. Employees operating the 
woodworking machinery were identified as being particularly at risk from the noise. 
There was a large amount of expensive woods stored in the store and workshop areas, 
also sawdust extracted from the LEV and from sweepings was bagged up and kept, 
using valuable space. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
30/39. Score of 196 [in range 89 to 294] where >181 starts the highest risk range 
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Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The company provided high quality crafted kitchen units to the construction industry. 
Where appropriate they would also supply matching tables and chairs. These products 
were for the quality market, they were made of fine woods not fibre-board or untreated 
pine. Their main customers were developers building 'executive style' homes or smaller 
builders providing bespoke kitchens. 
The firm was essentially a partnership which had expanded. The firm was based in a 
modem light industrial unit, on an industrial estate. The unit was of brick and metal 
cladding with concrete floors. It was well lit with both natural light and artificial lighting. It 
was well ventilated. The accommodation comprised an office, workshop and store. The 
office was a glass partitioned modular office and was a functional noise enclosure, away 
from the woodworking machinery noise. The office was used for making and taking 
telephone calls and for desk-space for book-keeping; it was used for little else and was 
unoccupied for long periods during the visit. 
Management structure: 
The firm was an adhocracy (Mintzberg: 1979).Staff adopted tasks according to their 
existing skills. There was complete openness, the manager was comfortable discussing 
all aspects of the business in the workshop and he frequently included employees, as 
they were paSSing, into the conversation to help him illustrate a point or to seek 
corroboration. 
There were two partners, one part-time clerklbook-keeper (one partner's wife) and 
eleven wood workers at the time of the visit. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of any structured strategic planning within the company. There 
was no safety policy and no health and safety strategy. There was evidence of so_me 
forward planning: the partners had noticed a downturn in demand in late autumn of the 
previous year and had attributed it to a seasonal downturn, due to bad weather affecting 
the construction industry. Their response for the coming year was to diversify, by 
switching production to balsa wood boxes during the autumn and the run-up to 
Christmas. These boxes were intended for a customer for packaging mail-order 
Christmas gifts. This diversification was expected to keep both men and machines fully 
occupied during the slack period. 
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The systems within the company 
There were very few observable documented systems within this business. Stock 
control, invoicing and accounting were all manual systems and the clerical tasks were 
performed by one of the partners' wives on an ad hoc basis. There was an accident 
book but there was no routine for checking it, to see if any accidents were reportable 
(RIDDOR) or whether there were recurring problems. 
There was no system for evacuation in case of fire, despite the fire risk being increased 
by the wood and sawdust stored in the workshop. The dust extraction system was not 
apparently subject to testing and inspection every fourteen months. This local exhaust 
ventilation did not seem to be performing adequately at the time of the visit. There was 
no register of portable electrical appliance, nor system of routine testing. 
The records of the fork lift truck inspections were kept by a third party, the service 
engineer, and were not available for inspection. 
The style of management 
The day to day management style was very open, management by walking about. 
Nearly all communications within the organisation were direct and verbal. There was 
personal control exercised by one of the partners, the other was passive and preferred 
to operate his machines. It appeared, and emerged during the interview, that one 
partner was a partner by virtue of his start-up investment, rather than active participation 
in control of the organisation. There was an overall informality to the observed 
interactions. There was great emphasis on personal responsibilities, particularly when 
operating the WOOd-working machinery.; this was part of the partners' perception of them 
all comprising a team of equals. 
The responsibility for safety management had been delegated to the employees, but the 
active partners still adopted responsibility himself. During the visit, the active partner 
showed himself willing to directly intervene in another's work when he felt there was a 
risk of injury. He stopped one, long-haired, employee from operating a lathe and as~ed 
him to tie his hair back before proceeding. 
However, the active partner described his main function as winning the contracts to 
secure the longevity of the business and helping to provide the expert joinery skills. This 
perception of his was supported by his actions in securing the autumn box contract. 
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Staff 
There were eleven employees most of whom had been colleagues of the partners in 
another large joinery business. Some of the less experienced machinists were 
developing their skills with assistance from more experienced colleagues. 
Skills 
Employees were deliberately selected for their craftsmanship with wood. This included 
experience with operating all types of wood working machinery. Each employee worked 
on a piece, as far as possible, from start to finish - moving between the machines as 
necessary, and where necessary this included hand finishing. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The over riding ethos was one of quality and creativity. The partners described the 
business as a co-operative enterprise where they all shared the same desire to work in 
wood and produce quality items using their skill. However, there was evidence, in 
discussions with some employees, that some staff were not enamoured with the autumn 
box production process because of the lack of skill required and the monotony of the 
tasks. Also the boxes were produced along the lines of mass production, patterns were 
cut, the wood was cut to size en-mass and then they were all fixed together. This 
production process was very different from their normal working methods. 
Unigue Reference: R298 
Industrv Sector: Retail 
Case 17 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Wine Merchant 
This business was not a thriving enterprise and appeared run down. There was little 
evidence of active safety management. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
24/39. Score of 176 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
This business occupied a very small, one room, lock-up shop; in a 1ih century 
sandstone building. It was not a thriving enterprise and appeared run down. There was 
little evidence of active safety management. The windows were small and mullioned and 
the interior of the shop very dark «150 lux). The ceiling was very low in places. The 
space was extremely cramped with high (5 feet, 152 centimetres) free standing wine 
racks lining the walls and forming islands. 
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The aisles between the racks were only 18 inches (46 centimetres wide) so great care 
had to be exercised when moving so as not to dislodge bottles on the racks. The 
proprietor had to sidle down the aisles, sideways, because the space was less than 
shoulder width. 
The building structure was not easy to inspect because of the low light levels, and 
inaccessibility, but it appeared reasonably sound; except for the uneven floor. There was 
thick dust and fluff on the floor beneath the wine racks. 
Management structure: 
This was a very small business with a very simple structure. The owner, one part-time 
shop assistant (to cover his days-off) and a part time book-keeper. The book-keeper did 
not work at the shop premises, he worked from his home. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no long term plan for this business. The shop was making a loss, at the time 
of the visit, the owner said he was keeping it going as an occupation until he felt ready to 
retire. He had already reached state retirement age. The business was described as 
being run as a therapy, against boredom. The owner had already taken early retirement 
from a job 'in the City'. His main hobby was described as "drinking fine wine" so, he said, 
he decided to open a shop. The wines were expensive and aimed at connoisseurs and 
collectors, like himself. There were few customers during the visit, and those that came 
appeared to be long-term friends and acquaintances. He also, reportedly, supplied wine 
by post, by advertising in specialist wine collectors' magazines. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. The exception was stock control which was 
vigorous There were formal import record and VAT records. The accounts were manual 
and obtained from the ledger roll on the till. The ledger roll was reconciled against the 
purchase ledger. 
There were no accident records available at the time of the visit. There was no evidence 
of routine maintenance of the fabric, decor or furnishings. 
The style of management 
The owner spent most of his time alone in the shop. His shop assistant provided cover 
for his absences. The owner was dictatorial in his handling of the shop assistant, he 
acted in an almost despotiC manner. 
226 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Case 17 .. cont.. 
Staff 
The shop assistant was young and unskilled. The book-keeper was employed because 
of his accounting skills. 
Skills 
There was very little interaction between the owner and those he employed. No training 
was offered the shop assistant beyond instruction on correct use of the till. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The correct keeping of a wide selection of fine wines was the overarching principle of 
this enterprise; this was merely an extension of the owner's hobby. He"was keeping the 
business going as an occupation until he felt ready to retire. The business was being run 
as an antidote to boredom. These very personal motivations may account for the self-
centredness exhibited in dealing with his assistant and almost bullying stance when 
challenged. 
Unique Reference: 0296 
Industry Sector: Service 
Case 18 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Nursing Home 
These premises are subject to regular enforcement visits by the local Environmental 
Health Officer. Safety performance was not good overall. Staff had relevant 
qualifications and experience. Prompted hazard identification was particularly slick. The 
proprietor used a health and safety consultant to conduct an annual audit of the 
premises for safety. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
7/39. Score of 111 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor safety performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a nursing-home run by its proprietor, with an assistant. The residents 
were housed in one building and the home cares for confused and infirm residents with 
conditions that need nursing care. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the organisation, although a Simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The proprietor ran the business and had an 
assistant manager. There were 18 other nursing and care staff. The proprietor was a 
former nurse. 
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Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of any strategy. The operating environment was simple and 
stable the home relied on local authority referrals and demand had consistently 
exceeded the places the home could offer. The fees charged to the local authority were 
on a regulated scale and the income was 'guaranteed'. 
The systems within the company 
There were some documented systems within this organisation and some evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. Few of the systems were documented, control 
systems particularly seemed reliant on custom and practice. 
The accident recording system was maintained, three accidents, involving minor injuries 
had been recorded in the preceding 12 months. Drugs and pharmaceutical preparations 
and medicines were stored, and reportedly administered, in accordance with the 
organization's documented procedures. There was no evidence of a monitoring or audit 
system to ensure that the documented procedures were adhered to. There appeared to 
be no regular monitoring of control systems, or procedures generally, there was total 
reliance on the annual visit by the health and safety consultant. 
There were no records of testing portable electrical appliances kept. No details of any 
inspections, findings nor remedial actions were recorded. There was no agreed 
procedure to have damaged or faulty appliances taken out of use, until effective repairs 
had been completed. Among the staff questioned it was suggested that they were 
expected to 'use their own initiative'. 
The style of management 
The organisation was hierarchical the proprietor took pains to maintain her status. She 
was called Mrs X in preference to using her first name and she referred to the Assistant 
Manager as 'my assistant' in preference to using her name. The proprietor was formerly 
a trained nurse. She described herself as supervising the daily running of the home but 
there was no evidence of regular monitoring of procedures or checks of the premises. 
There was heavy reliance placed on the medically qualified nursing staff to exercise 
judgement and act independently if the need arose. This reliance on the initiative of 
individuals seemed at odds with the proprietor's expressed desire to centralize control 
and 'be in charge'. 
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Staff 
The proprietor employed an assistant, to deputize in her absence, and 18 other nursing 
and care staff. 
Skills 
Qualified staff were deliberately employed, these were medically trained nursing staff 
and auxiliaries. The proprietor claimed she avoided using agency nurses where 
possible. 
Training in manual handling techniques was included in the induction programme for 
new care staff. There was also inclusion of the manual handling requirements for each 
resident within individual care plans. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The proprietor's overarching goal was to maintain registration of the home by satisfying 
the regulators. She was keen to maintain standards of care to a level where she could 
continue to attract local authority placements. 
Unique Reference: 0396 
Industry Sector: Manufacture 
Production 
Case 19 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Chemical 
Some areas of this process were assessed as inherently hazardous. The prinCiple risks 
were associated with fire and the contact with hazardous substances. There were few 
obvious monitoring systems !)f procedures and controls seemed inadequate. The 
director spoke very positively about safety management. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
36/39. Score of 230 [in range 89 to 294] medium risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The premises consisted of an director's office, an administration office, manufacturing 
space and a store. Fire was, in the opinion of the researcher, a hazard because of the 
quantities of highly flammable liquids stored on site. Many of the substances involved in 
the manufacturing process were known to be prejudicial to health. 
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Management structure: 
There was a formal, three tier hierarchy within the company: director, foreman and 
labour. A simple structure (Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted, with only 32 staff little 
complexity was demanded. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was a documented health and safety strategy. This document had been 
developed with external assistance, from a health and safety consultant. However, there 
was a demonstrable failure to make progress despite the efforts, claimed to have been, 
expended. The failure seemed to have arisen from a poor risk perception; there was a 
very 'macho' attitude exhibited with a high tolerance of risk. Comments' made included" 
of course it's a dangerous chemical. They all are. That's part of the job." 
The systems within the company 
There were very few formal systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced, with the exception of the production process 
which was formulaic. There were very few control systems. There was no formal register 
of electrical equipment, nor testing of that equipment. Portable electrical appliances 
were not apparently inspected. There was no planned approach to electrical testing or 
inspection. There were no documented monitoring systems. There was no record of 
routine inspection or checks, of any sort, being carried out. 
There was some evidence that when ad hoc checks had been made they proved 
inadequate. For example the director, when interviewed, claimed he regularly walked 
around the process area, and had last done so that morning. However, the researcher's 
inspection revealed a fire escape blocked with stored waste packaging and a nominally 
empty chemical drum, this collection did not seem to have accumulated within the 
previous two hours. The inference was drawn that either the director had failed to spot 
the blocked fire escape or had failed to ensure remedial action was taken. There was an 
accident book. The accident record was examined for the preceding 12 months. There 
were 5 accidents recorded as having occurred during the period; two of these accidents 
were formally reportable under RIDDOR. 
The style of management 
The director described himself as having a very pro-active style of 'hands-on' 
management. Management by walking about. In practice the organisation was 
hierarchical with the director spending most of his time (during the period of the visit) in 
his office. In describing how the organisation worked he indicated that he relied on the 
foreman to relay information to him from the process area. 
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The responsibility for safety management had been delegated almost entirely to the 
foreman. He undertook direct supervision of the workforce but seemed to exercise little 
authority over them. He was untrained in supervisory techniques or health and safety 
management. He had been promoted to foreman because of his experience in the 
industry. However much of the risk tolerance seemed to stem from, or be reinforced by, 
him. During the visit when any hazards were identified the risks were frequently played 
down, or dismissed, by the foreman. One statement was made: "that little pot of solvent 
might be a problem in a shop but we've got tonnes of the stuff around here. We're used 
to dealing with stuff like that." This statement arose in relation to an open tin of volatile 
solvent, with known carcinogenic properties. The tin had been decanted from the bulk 
drum for use then left standing uncovered, for a long period, near a work-space. The 
solvent was not needed for the work in hand at the time. 
Staff 
There were thirty-two employees, including the foreman. 
Skills 
There was no evidence that any staff had received training. The foreman, on his 
promotion, had not had his training needs assessed nor had he been prepared for his 
new role. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The company operated in a low technology niche market. The director was positively 
disposed towards the notion of managing health and safety risks. He had invested in 
some consultancy to help him develop a strategy document. The development process 
for this strategy had not involved the foreman, or any other employee. The strategy was 
assessed as failing, by the researcher. 
The director's displayed attitude to safety management did not seem to be shared by his 
employees. They were task oriented. The culture was one of risk-taking and 
acceptance of 'danger'. The manager seemed unaware of the divergence between his 
expressed, and documented, safety priorities and the practices adopted in the 
manufacturing area. The director's actions, during the inspection, tended to conflict with 
his positive statements. He was not initiating regular, thorough, checks of the process. 
Although he obviously appreciated the need for monitoring, because he described his 
activities in that area during the interview; albeit that he may have exaggerated the 
thoroughness or frequency of his checks. There was no evidence of formal monitoring 
systems and, during the visit, the director tended to confine himself to his office; rather 
than spend long periods in the process area. 
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Case 20 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Grocer 
Attitude negative. Some bad practices and structural defects to premises observed 
during the visit. No visible effort to manage from the top. Overall achievement 
unsatisfactory. 
Ranking based on hazardlrisk scoring: 
31/39. Score of 209 [in range 89 to 294] where 181+ is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The premises were occupied by two businesses. The target business was a grocer's 
shop on the ground floor. The business had been in operation on this site for 
approximately twenty years. The business was co-located with the proprietor's son's 
business. The key contact, with whom discussions were held during the visit were the 
proprietor and his wife. At the time of the visit there were six staff employed, including 
full time and part-time. 
There was apparently no programmed maintenance. There were visible defects to the 
building structure that were immediately apparent. The floor tiles were lifting. The 
threshold was worn. The internal door handles, in the staff toilets, had been broken off 
and not replaced. At the entrance to the toilets a wooden structural beam was being 
supported on a can on a block of wood; that, in turn, rested on a refrigerator. The wiring 
to the refrigerator had been damaged and repaired with tape. 
There were· no records of testing portable electrical appliances kept. No details of any 
inspections, findings nor remedial actions were recorded. There was no agreed 
procedure to have damaged or faulty appliances taken out of use, until effective repairs 
had been completed. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure comprised: executive and operatives. 
The founder was the proprietor and his partner was his wife. Minimal training or liaison 
devises were observed to be in use. The father was the freeholder of the premises 
occupied by the business. 
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Strategy formulation: . 
There was no evidence of planning within the company. The operating environment was 
simple and static (Johnson and Scholes 1989). The retail outlet was small and primarily 
serviced the village residents. There was no local competition, but supermarkets and 
specialist shops were in the nearby town, 8 miles north. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. The inadequacies in stock control were a clear 
example. There was no documented procedure for routine inspection. There were no 
accident records available at the time of the visit. 
The style of management 
There was no evidence of effective proactive management, specific risks remained 
uncontrolled. These specific risk areas included fire risk, electrical hazards and manual 
handling. The firm was essentially a patriarchy where the father wielded absolute power. 
The father's patriarchal, autocratic approach to the business was never outlined in the 
interviews, but it was implicit in observed reactions throughout the visit. It was also noted 
that there had been an enforcement visit by an Environmental Health Officer (EHO), 18 
months prior to this visit. From the correspondence seen during the visit 
recommendations were offered following the visit. However, no action had resulted 
within the organisation. Inquiries were not conclusive but the wife suggested her spouse 
did not value the recommendations and had rejected the EHO's findings. This was taken 
as a possible indication of the father's views about external advice. 
Skills 
The company recruited unskilled staff for serving in the shop. No one in the company 
was formally trained as a manager, or in strategic planning or in safety matters. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company, gleaned from discussions with the owner, was to 
generate sufficient income to support his family and to provide a viable business to pass 
on to his son, when he retired. There was evidence that quality was not a major factor, 
not all stocks were monitored and stock was not adequately rotated, bags of dried fruit 
were found past their sell-by dates and tubs of pate were being displayed past their use-
by date. In addition, there was no supplier vetting system and no documented inspection 
system for incoming goods. 
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Reclamation 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Case 21 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Plastics 
The proprietor of this business had been a traveller who was anxious to distance himself 
from "boring conformists" and was anxious to let the researcher know he still lived in a 
"van". He portrayed a negative attitude to regulations in general and safety regulations in 
particular. Some bad practices and noisy working conditions observed during the visit. 
No visible effort to manage safety, no interest. Overall achievement unsatisfactory, one 
of the worst premises in the sample. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
338/39. Score of 249 [in range 89 to 294] where >181 starts the highest risk range 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The proprietor was the main interviewee in this study. The business involved the 
reclamation of waste polyethylene. The premises comprised a single storey building 
which housed the working area and an adjoining yard area. The site resembled a 
'scrapyard' 
The single storey building had exits to the front. The building was so congested with 
materials that there was significant risk of entrapment in case of fire. The materials used 
and stored would bum easily and emit toxic heavy fume during combustion, the 
temperature of the bum would also climb rapidly. However, not only was housekeeping 
poor but, it was claimed, no practice fire drills had ever been held. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal hierarchy within the company, although a simple structure 
(Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted. The structure was two tier, proprietor and 
labourers/drivers. The founder was the proprietor. The proprietor maintained personal 
control of all aspects of the business, according to his own description. There were six 
labourers on site at the time of the visit. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of formal planning within the company. The company had been 
established for approximately seven years. The main objective was to generate 
sufficient income to support the proprietor and also to pay the staffs wages. 
234 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Case 21 ... cont ... 
The proprietor also had an interest in a near by scrap yard, dealing in scrap metal. 
The systems within the company 
There were very few documented systems within this business and little evidence of 
systematic procedures being practiced. There were few control systems. The 
inadequacies in stock control were a clear example. The product has an inherent 
combustion risk, yet the premises were congested, both inside and in the yard. In case 
of fire the Fire Service would not have been able to gain access to the main building 
through the yard. No fire practice drills had been held. 
Despite the fire hazard there was no permit to work scheme or any other control over 
electrical installation work or maintenance. There were frayed cables, taped joints and 
over loaded sockets. There were exposed wires where the insulation had been 
damaged by traffic over the cables. 
There was no system for immobilizing the fork-lift trucks when not in use. Ignition keys 
were seen to have been left in both fork-lift trucks while they were unattended. 
The style of management 
There was evidence of a lack of day to day supervision throughout the premises. The 
stock storage and the damaged cables were evidence of an absence of routine 
intervention. There was no commitment to safe working demonstrated by the proprietor. 
There were obvious hazards present that posed a high risk; also there was no 
commitment by the employees. The employees were all friends of the proprietor. They 
did not acknowledge that any serious incident could arise from their activity. 
The employees seemed self reliant and acted on their own initiative. Each person 
seemed involved in his own task and communication was minimal. Talking was difficult 
due to the noisy environment. The only occasion when the proprietor issued instructions 
was to direct a driver to an address to collect waste. 
Staff 
The majority of employees were unskilled labourers. Staff had been employed for their 
strength and fitness as there was heavy manual work involved in moving the waste 
around. 
There were no observable rules or procedures, not even the basic rules of attendance 
for a normal working day. The proprietor suggested that "if they turn up they get paid, if 
they don't ... they don't". 
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Skills 
The proprietor said that he mainly recruited unskilled staff who were known to him. A 
large part of the work involved low skilled physical labour. There was a fork-lift truck in 
use but the drivers had not been properly trained. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The main values of the company, gleaned from discussions seemed to be ongoing 
employment for the proprietor and the operatives. The M.D. described the business as 
profit oriented. 
Unique Reference: 0796 
Industry Sector: Service 
Case 22 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Care Home 
This home was owned and operated by two partners. The business was failing and 
standards were slipping. There was evidence that planned repairs had not been carried 
out. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
6/39. Score of 110 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Questionable safety performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a privately owned care home. It did had few residents staying at the 
time of the visit. The premises was a large two storied house, that has been a care 
home around 5 years. Up to 6 staff were employed, most were part-time. 
Management structure: 
There home was run by a partnership. The structure comprised: the two owners 
supervisors and general staff. The business partnership had formed to run this home 5 
years earlier. The partners maintained personal control of the business. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of a strategy. The business appeared to be failing and resident 
numbers declining. The partners seemed resigned to imminent closure. 
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The systems within the company 
There were a few documented systems within this business. There was a health and 
safety policy but no safety strategy. . There were no fire alarm checks but a Fire 
Precautions Log Book was kept. There was no formal register of portable electric 
equipment, nor testing of that equipment. Portable electrical appliances were not 
apparently inspected. There was no planned approach to electrical testing and 
inspection 
The accident recording system was maintained, fourteen accidents, involving minor 
injuries had been recorded in the preceding 12 months, only one related to a member of 
staff. Most accidents were falls by frail residents. 
There was evidence that some of the controls were failing. Cleaning had become a 
casualty of the straitened conditions that now pertained. The cleaner had been made 
redundant three weeks before the visit and standards of hygiene were slipping. The 
premises smelled faintly of stale urine. The carpet in the residents' lounge showed 
evidence of spills not having been properly cleaned up. The corners of the architrave at 
floor level were gathering dust and the kitchen worktops were greasy, with spills down 
the front of the cupboards. 
From the observations it was inferred that cleaning was still being done but only 
superficially. In discussions with one of the partners it became clear that since the 
cleaner had gone that each of the care staffwere required to take on a share of cleaning 
duties. 
The style of management 
The partners had a 'hands on' style. They both expressed a preference for actively 
supervising day to day running. However, it was clear that they were distracted with 
administration at the time of the visit. They were seeking to retain their registration, to 
extend their business loan and trying to find new residents. They were not confident that 
they could save the business and had no clear plan on how to proceed. 
Staff 
Some staff were employed with existing skills, other were trained 'on the job'. Direct 
supervision was said to be practiced, but observations suggested that there were too 
few staff on duty at anyone time to care for the patients, clean, cook and do the laundry. 
There were no designated supervisors this was a role the partners claimed as their own. 
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Skills 
Employees had been trained, and were aware of, emergency action in the event of fire. 
Some employees were trained in manual handling techniques. Three of those employed 
at the home were trained first-aiders. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The expressed priority was to save the home if possible. The business was failing and 
declining standards were accepted, by the partners, as an unavoidable consequence of 
this failure. The staff were aware of the decreasing number of residents and some were 
actively looking for employment elsewhere. 
Unique Reference: 01296 
Industrv Sector: Manufacture 
Case 23 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: Chemical Production 
The process involved the production of synthetic resins. Some hazards had not been 
identified, for example damaged cabling. Some of the machinery was poorly guarded. 
The electrical installation showed earth leakage and should be tested and examined by 
a competent electrician. However, this organisation was exhibiting successful risk 
management in many areas. The regular liaison with the Fire Service was particularly 
good. Generally controls appeared good with permit to work systems in place. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
10/39. Score of 129 [in range 89 to 294] medium risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Adequate performance 
Background to company 
The company manufactured synthetic resins. The premises were small with a general 
administration office, a manufacturing area and a storage yard. The materials of ~he 
process and the products were highly flammable. 
Management structure: 
There was a formal, three tier hierarchy within the company: director, supervisors and 
store-personnelldrivers/mixers. A simple structure (Mintzberg 1979) had been adopted, 
with only 30 staff little complexity was demanded. 
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A tendency towards separating into divisions was already apparent. The director 
described the parts of the business in terms of separate functions: stores, production, 
administration and logistics. Most areas had two tiers with a supervisor co-ordinating 
daily work. This meant that the only person with an overview was the director. Transfer 
of staff between disciplines was restricted, for example for a store-person to make a 
delivery he had to check with his supervisor first, and possibly the supervisor of the 
regular drivers, either could deter him from making the delivery. 
Strategy formulation: 
The director stated that there was a documented health and safety strategy. On 
examination it was found this was not a coherent strategy rather a collection of 
piecemeal initiatives. The intentions were good but there was no clear direction to the 
improvements being sought, there was neither a clearly defined aim nor any clear 
objectives to the overall plan. This document had been developed with external 
aSSistance, from a health and safety consultant. 
However, there was a demonstrable success in risk control in many areas of the 
process. The success seemed to arise from the innate ability of the manager rather than 
any logical scheme of progressive assessment and control. 
The systems within the company 
There were some formal systems within this business and evidence of systematic 
procedures being practiced. Control systems were identified during the visit. There was 
a written scheme of inspection for the pressure system. Noise exposure was subject to 
regular monitoring and noise controls were in place. 
A permit to work scheme was in operation at the time of the visit. Strict operating 
procedures were also adopted as part of the manufacturing process. 
There was an accident book. The accident record was examined for the preceding 12 
months. There were 5 accidents recorded as having occurred during the period; two of 
these accidents were formally reportable under RIDDOR. 
However, there was no formal register of electrical equipment, nor testing of that 
equipment. Portable electrical appliances were not apparently inspected. There was no 
planned approach to electrical testing or inspection. 
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The style of management 
The director had previous working experience in the industry, but in a much larger 
business. The responsibility for day to day safety management in this organisation had 
been delegated to the supervisors. The lines of responsibility were clearly understood. 
The director saw his role as offering the lead and determining the priorities for safety 
management. The evidence for this was his recently introduced safety initiatives. The 
director was a charismatic leader .. He had a very positive attitude to active management 
of safety risks. 
Staff 
There were thirty employees between stores, production, administration and logistiCS. 
Skills 
All staff were properly trained and supervised and training records were kept. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
Safety was a priority for the director of this firm. He had a desire to make improvements 
to ensure safety was a priority, and the staff seemed to be in agreement. There were 
control systems throughout the organisation both documented and informal. These 
controls were, apparently,' used by all personnel. This acceptance may have arisen 
because of the acceptance of the hazard posed tjy the highly flammable nature of the 
product and the hazardous chemicals. 
Unique Reference: L893 
Industry Sector: Transport 
Case 24 
Initial classification of safety management following visit: 
Trade: PSV 
This was a small transport business primarily running single deck coaches. This was a 
young company and the owner was trying to grow the company. 
Ranking based on hazard/risk scoring: 
33/39. Score of 216 [in range 89 to 294] where 181 + is highest risk 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Poor performance 
Background to company 
The coaches, that were the main asset, of this transport business were acquired 
second-hand and they were old. They had all been painted to display the company 
livery,. Many of the diesel engines smoked excessively and inside the seating was 
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showing signs of wear, and damage, in places. 
The mechanical maintenance was carried out by the company's own mechanic. There 
was a large modern industrial unit attached to the small office unit. This large unit had 
been converted to a bus garage by installing some post lifts and a large inspection pit. 
This space also stored spare tyres, wheels, parts and equipment. 
There was not sufficient garaging space at the premises so the coaches were parked 
overnight. in quiet streets, or on the roads of a local industrial estate. 
Management structure: 
The owner-manager managed the business. His wife acted as 
clerkldispatcher/scheduler. The organisation was run as a formal hierarchy but the 
structure was very flat. 
Strategy formulation: 
There was no evidence of a documented strategy. There was no safety policy or safety 
strategy. The owner was trying to grow the business by bidding for council contracts. He 
had no written business plan. 
The systems within the company 
There were no documented systems to be seen within this business and little evidence 
of systematic procedures being practiced. There were accident records available. It 
seemed that the accident book was not reviewed by the owner. There was one accident 
recorded. The recorded accident involved acid bums sustained while charging a battery. 
During discussions with the mechanic it became clear that this was the second incident 
involving battery charging. Batteries were charged in situ, in the well of the coaches, 
because the batteries were heavy. [This practice reduced the handling required and the 
time taken in charging. This practice was also inherently dangerous because the 
coaches were an enclosed space and charging releases gases from the battery.] In the 
first (unrecorded) incident there had been an explosion as the mechanic disconnected 
the charger. 
There were no safe systems of work prescribed by the owner. The absence of battery 
charging protocols was a case in point. There was no system for examination of testing 
of the air receiver either. 
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The style of management 
The owner described himself as "The Boss·, he admitted, during the interview, that he 
found it hard to delegate. His wife deputized in his absence but she reported that her 
husband still felt a need to check on any decisions that had been made in his absence. 
The owner was aggressively protective when discussing his business. 
The owner maintained his personal status within the organisation by having the drivers 
and the mechanic call him Mr x, while he chose to use their first names when 
addressing them. 
Staff 
There were 18 staff employed: 16 drivers, a mechanic and the owner's wife. 
Skills 
All the drivers were qualified PSV drivers, as was the owner. The mechanic was fully 
trained having served an apprenticeship in a bus depot garage. All staff were employed 
as experienced/time served specialists. 
No training was offered. No one held first-aid certificates at the garage, and a young 
driver had been refused permission for day release to train as a mechanic. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The organisation was task oriented. The owner's main priority was to gain as many 
council contracts as possible. The method of winning contracts was described as being 
by running the cheapest possible vehicles as cheaply as possible. 
Case 25 
Unique Reference: R498 
Industry Sector: Food Manufacture Trade: Brewing 
nitial classification of safety management following visit: 
This organisation had a formal hierarchy, formally delegated responsibilities and strict 
control systems. The production process was tightly regulated and monitored. The 
waste water plant, on an adjacent site, was physically distanced from the production 
process and was not subject to such rigorous controls. The approach to safety was that 
adopted for product quality: manuals, safe systems of work, permits to work, direct 
supervision and programmed monitoring. 
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Ranking based on hazardlrisk scoring: 
9/39. Score of 115 [in range 89 to 294] 
Classification by performance indicator scoring: Adequate performance 
Background to company 
This premises was a purpose built brewery. It was an old established family firm that 
had become a public limited company by offering a portion of its stock. There were 
shareholders. 
It was still a small business, although it occupied a sizeable acreage. The premises 
comprised: an administration block with executive offices and board room, brew house, 
temperature controlled warehouse; and, some distance away, a waste water treatment 
works. 
Management structure: 
This had been originally a family business but at the time of the visit there was a board 
of directors that had be brought in from outside the family. There was a formal hierarchy 
within the company. The structure comprised: the Managing Director, other directors, a 
quality manager, reception and administration staff, supervisors, brewers, warehouse 
staff and laboratory staff.. There was a direct supervisory structure with division of 
responsibilities based on specialist skills; for example the Production Director was an 
experienced brewer and the brew house was his domain, the quality manager was an 
organic chemist and he controlled the sampling and laboratory work. This divisional 
approach had not been expected in such a small-scale organisation. 
Strategy formulation: 
This organisation operated in a niche market. The barriers to entry were high due to the 
large initial capital investment required to cover set up costs, to buy the plant and 
equipment, etc. This company was an established supplier to multiple retailers. This 
made it a potential target for a predatory take-over. The motive for a take-over could be 
for another brewer to gain better product placement, through the established 
supermarket contracts, and thereby gain market share. There were breweries in Europe, 
in particular, which were looking for entry to the UK market. 
The company's aim was to retain independent small brewery status, so the strategy was 
one of protection. Investment was controlled so that the gearing was maintained. 
Dividends were maintained in order that stockholders were content. Product quality was 
emphasized in the marketing strategy and this included portraying a sound record of 
performance in both environmental and safety matters. 
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The systems within the company 
There was a plethora of systems that operated within this organisation. Many systems 
were formal control systems; these included restricted access areas and permit to work 
systems. There were fully documented procedures and comprehensive manuals on the 
brewing recipe, process, safe systems of work, etc. There was also a training strategy 
(Employee Development Programme) and centralized training records. 
However the waste-water treatment plant was not subject to such rigorous controls. 
There was no routine structural maintenance programme and the quality of discharge 
water too frequently fell below the prescribed minimum, based on pH. There were 
operation manuals for this plant and this included routine chemical dosing and cleaning, 
detailed in the manual. There were also routine samples taken for testing of water 
quality by the laboratory. However, when standards fell or defects were noted that 
required capital investment the repair/remedy was not implemented. This had lead to 
statutory notices being served in the past. The structural defects were serious, two of 
the metal sludge holding and digestion tanks were holed, due to the action of H2S and' 
water which created acid conditions that corroded the fabric of the tank. These holes 
permitted the release of H2S to the working environment, and in lower concentrations to 
nearby homes. It was inferred from this scenario that systems alone were not sufficient 
to ensure standards were maintained. 
The style of management 
The management style was relaxed but formal. Each of the directors had a personal 
office, each manager also had an office in the main administration block, the supervisors 
had modular shelters on the brew house or adjacent to the warehouse. The status of the 
occupant, within the hierarchy, was reflected in the size and appointments of the space 
they occupied. However, functionality appeared to remain a priority. No office could be 
described as sumptuous even the board-room was functional and plainly decorated. 
The directors were referred to as Mr x or Mr Y but this was not universally applied, the 
young receptionist often called directors by their first names. It was the older brewers 
who seemed to adopt a more deferential tone and approach. 
The style of management was not completely open. The directors' office doors were 
generally kept closed. When employees wanted to see a director in his office they had to 
make an appointment. However both the Production Director and quality manager were 
frequently out of their offices, spending significant amounts of time in the brew house 
speaking to the supervisor or observing the brewers at work. Supervisors had open-door 
policies, one supervisor had no door to his office space at all. 
244 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Case 25 .•. cont •.. 
Staff 
There were 16 people employed at the time of the visit. There were also contract 
drivers; and a specialist contractor to operate the waste-water treatment plant. The 
directors retained control of their contractors so that the drivers, although employed by a 
third party, were exclusively driving for the company. 
The water treatment contractor had a member of staff regularly based at the works. That 
operator reported to his own manager who then reported to the Production Director of 
the brewery; but he also worked closely with the laboratory staff and was able to request 
water tests directly, without reference to a third party. The Production Director, when he 
visited the treatment works, was able to request a change in operating procedures; he 
did not have to make a formal request of the contractor's Company and wait for them to 
instruct their staff. 
Skills 
Staff were employed already skilled or semi-skilled. There was a standard induction 
training programme and an on-going employee development programme. The training 
programme included health and safety awareness training and safety management 
training for supervisors. 
The superordinate goals of the company 
The goal was to retain independence by avoiding a take-over. The method was to 
produce a unique, quality, product for the mass market, for distribution through multiple 
retailers. 
The focus of the business was on the product and there was a 'quality' ethos. This 
motivation was inferred from the comparison between the management and control of 
the brewing process and that of the waste-water treatment works. The treatment works 
lacked the strict controls of the production process, although ostensibly both had 
operation manuals and chemical testing programmes. 
The data production from these case studies, and the 14 not displayed above, 
relied heavily on the researcher's powers of observation and selection. The 
researcher came to this research after having undergone formal instruction 
and training in inspection techniques and risk appraisal, in the context of 
health and safety and premises inspection. The instruction had been 
reinforced by 15 years post-qualification experience of applying inspection 
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and audit techniques, regularly. The quality of observation and. the 
consistency of risk appraisal has been maintained, and standardized as far as 
possible, through regular formalized peer reviews. The researcher was 
conscious that she was actively drawing on past experience in interpreting the 
settings, actions and interactions recorded during each visit. Sayer (1992) 
supports the notion that one cannot observe events or relationships free from 
theories or concepts. In this research the observer became part of the cases 
being studied and brought to each setting her own experience. This was not 
seen as an essentially negative aspect to the research, rather it was viewed 
as an opportunity to enrich the studies by bringing a depth and breadth of 
knowledge that enriched the data collection, and data sorting processes. 
After the 'data ditching' process (after Wolcott: 1990), to focus the records, 
the remaining data were sorted into matrices with common headings to 
facilitate comparisons. The cases were also subjectively rated according to 
their perceived performance in managing safety. This perception was based 
on the initial impressions from the inspection visit. This amounted to little more 
than noting those organisations that seemed to be successfully managing 
safety issues and those which appeared to be struggling. The scoring system 
allowed an more stratified analysis of some elements of safety management 
and also assisted in producing a relative ranking. As the inspection rating 
system allowed the workplaces to be ranked. A table was used to score and 
weight each organization visited. 
Table 5.0 Scoring procedure for inspection safety rating system. 
Inspection Ratings Score (1) Multiplier (2) Total (1)x(2) 
Safety Hazard 1 to 6 6 6 to 36 
Health Hazard 1 to 6 6 6 to 36 
Safety Risk 1 to 6 9 9 to 54 
Health Risk 1 to 6 9 9 to 54 
Welfare 1 to 6 5 5 to 30 
Public Risk 1 to 6 10 10 to 60 
Confidence in 1 to 6 10 10 to 60 
Management 
Total 55 to 330 
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Results of the scoring process and the subsequent ranking of 
the 39 premises visited. 
ID Safety Health Health Safety Welfare Public Confidence in Total 
Hazard Hazard Risk Risk Risk Management weighted 
Key: Lowest hazard/risk 
Highest hazardlrisk 
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After the initial ranking the detailed analysis of the data still remained to be 
done. It was within the detail that examples of good, and bad, practice were 
expected. The discovery of examples of good, and bad, practice would then 
be related back to the ranking position of each workplace. The data that had 
been initially collected as field notes was re-sorted into a matrix with the 
fourteen main headings: 
A unique identification reference; 
Structure of the organization; 
Systems within the organization; 
Strategy observed; 
Managerial style; 
The type of staff; 
The skills available within the business; 
The superordinate goals propounded by senior managers; 
The industry sector; the number of employees; 
Evidence of motivation to manage [or not manage] safety; 
The main hazards observed; 
The number of accidents; and 
Additional notes (see chapter 3, section 3.4.5.1). 
The construction on the matrix involved more 'ditching of data' (Wolcott: 
1990). However, the construction of the matrix was intended to assist in 
comparison of the cases. After collation of the data, and construction of the 
first matrix, three performance areas were selected. These areas were 
chosen as potential indicators of overall safety performance within each 
business. The initial safety rating system had allowed a ranking but had not 
specifically addressed performance. 
The three supplementary performance indicators were chosen because they 
were subject to less interpretation. There should be corroborative evidence 
from each visit to determine whether, or not, an accident book was available, 
together with electrical testing records and records of safety training. If the 
evidence was missing in each case a score of 0 was attributed. If the 
documents were there but were poorly kept or out of date, etc then a score of 
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1 was given. Evidence that the documents were properly kept suggested 
adequate arrangements in this area and attracted a score of 2. In this way the 
three supplementary elements were scored. In this case these scores were 
being used to rate safety performance so that the businesses could be 
grouped according to perceived performance. The resulting scoring sheet is 
shown in Appendix Three. 
In summary, the scores were assessed as follows: from the meta-matrices, 
three performance areas were selected, these were then allocated indicator 
scores: 
Accident book 
Book missing at the time of the visit or not kept Score 0 
Book there but not checked or used Score 1 
Book regularly inspected and accident stats. collated Score 2 
Electrical safety 
Electrical testing not done, or seen as dangerous 
Testing done and record kept 
Test record reviewed and faults remedied 
Safety Training 
No health and safety training 
Induction/basic job safety training 
On going training or needs assessment or lip· 
NB *IIP denotes participation in the Investors in People scheme 
Score 0 
Score 1 
Score 2 
Score 0 
Score 1 
Score 2 
These scores were applied and then aggregated, to indicate safety 
performance. The scores were limited so each business could score between 
o and 6. The aggregate score allowed businesses to be grouped according to 
this rating of perceived performance. This assessment of performance was 
also checked against the preliminary ranking to discover any apparent 
anomalies in scoring. Once the groupings had been moderated each group 
was analysed in detail. Commonalties and differences between groups, and 
between members in the same group could be assessed. 
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5.1.1 USING PERFORMANCE INDICATORS TO SORT BUSINESSES ACCORDING TO 
THEIR SAFETY PERFORMANCE 
Among the thirty-nine businesses studied, the area where the safety 
performance was weakest was in electrical testing, with only 13 points scored 
out of a possible 78. The next area of poor performance was accident 
recording (27 points scored); and the third area was training. Overall 
performance was not good. However, the degree of achievement varied 
significantly between the businesses. 
The degree of variation in performance that was noted after comparing the 
scores provided for an opportunity to rank, or group, the scores. It was 
decided to group the businesses according to the calculated performance 
indicator. For the first grouping a total performance indicator of 2 or less was 
considered as under-performance, an indicator score of 4 or more was 
considered adequate and in the first instance those scoring 3 were put in to a 
neutral area. Using this criteria of the thirty-nine businesses 8 performed 
adequately, 6 were indeterminate and 25 (66%) under-performed. 
This sorting of businesses on the basis of performance allowed comparison of 
common factors in under-performers in an attempt to identify common 
barriers. The grouping also allowed these businesses to be compared, or 
contrasted with adequate performers. Figure 5.1 (see below) shows a Venn 
diagram depicting the groupings of businesses in the sample. This diagram 
has been chosen to show the sets created by the grouping process. The sets 
are A (those businesses exhibiting adequate performance) and B (those 
businesses exhibiting poor performance). A n 8 represents those six 
businesses not readily classified. 
The mean score for the whole sample (A u B) was 1.92, [median 1], with a 
standard deviation of 1.65. The mean score for the adequate performers (A) 
was 4.625 [median 4]; and the standard deviation of scores among this group 
was calculated at 0.857. For the poor performers (8) the mean score was 0.8 
[median 1]; the standard deviation of scores in this group was 0.63. 
250 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
This grouping of businesses was arithmetically derived but the scoring 
method adopted could be described as arbitrary. Some method of checking 
the reasonableness of the groupings was needed, to increase confidence in 
the grouping process. 
5.2 ALTERNATE FORMS RELIABILITY-SEEKING EQUIVALENT 
VERSIONS OF THE SAME MEASURE 
The adequacy of the grouping criteria needed to be tested. The results, 
concerning the adequacy of the safety performance of the thirty-nine 
businesses, were therefore examined using five criteria. 
AnB 
Questionable 
Performance 
IR498l 
10896 I L-J EJ 
~ 10996 I 1°1296 1 
~ 
1°1096 EJ ~ 
~ EJ ~ I-L2_9_6---,.,r 
1°1695 
1"-0-14-96---' 
Performance 
Figure 5.1 Venn Diagram showing poor performers, adequate performers 
and those with indeterminate scores, based on performance 
indicator scoring 
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The criteria chosen, by which to judge adequacy of safety performance, were 
aspects of organizational behaviour which could be tested during the visits by 
observation, documentary evidence or investigative interviews. Hazard 
identification; both prompted and cold was one factor chosen. The concept 
of hazard identification is one of 'spotting the danger'. Prompted hazard 
identification follows an accident or near miss where an untoward event has 
highlighted a hazard. Cold hazard identification occurs when no concrete 
evidence of previous mishaps, either in the organization or in the industrial 
sector, is immediately available but the assessor judges something a hazard 
on the basis of the balance of probabilities in the context in ~hich it is found. 
The indicator was derived from observed examples of satisfactory 
identification of hazard, or observable failure to identify. Observed incidents of 
good and bad practice were recorded. 
Hazard acknowledgement and observable, or expressed risk perception was 
taken as another indicator. Hazard acknowledgement extends the 
identification process; it includes an appreCiation of risk. Hazards may be 
identified, by managers only to have their likely effect immediately discounted. 
The expressed grounds for discounting a hazard may be the perception of the 
very low risk of an untoward event associated with that hazard. During the 
interview phase the perception of the low risk may be demonstrably flawed. 
Low risk perception may arise from a lack of imagination on the part of the 
manager or from a deliberate ignorance of risk; 'it'll never happen to us'. 
The method of risk assessment and use of the assessment as an action 
trigger was a third indicator. A systematic and justifiable assessment, of a risk, 
was taken to be a positive factor. A system that allowed actions to be based 
on the assessment was also seen as positive. 
The actual choice of action or remedy was taken as another indicator. 
Some choices were demonstrably inappropriate. Mending a loose guard on a 
piece of equipment with sticky tape is a remedy; but not an appropriate one. 
This type of inappropriate remedy was observed on a number of occasions 
during the visits. 
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Communication of the outcomes of a risk assessment, or the presence of 
an alerting procedure was also taken as an indicator. Some managers 
claimed to have undertaken a risk assessment but this was not conveyed to 
operatives. In some cases experienced machine operators assessed the risk 
presented by a task differently from their manager. In some businesses, it was 
observed, workers have no method of letting each other know when 
equipment is faulty and should not. be used, other than chance conversations. 
These five criteria could then be scored to provide a ranking, by which the 
businesses could be sorted according to performance. The results of applying 
the scores have been tabulated; the tables are included in Appendix 4. These 
areas were selected as performance indicators; it is not intended to suggest 
these factors if addressed in isolation can guarantee sound safety 
performance. 
5.2.1 ALTERNATIVE RATING OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 
The performance level, for each of the five criteria, has been rated to ease 
comparisons. A simple scoring system has been devised to reflect the 
subjective assessment, the scoring system is shown in Table 5.1. (see 
below). 
This rating is separate from the overall performance rating score from which 
the Venn sorting was initially derived. It is acknowledged that overall safety 
performance is not determined, merely, by the process of: hazard 
identification, acknowledgement, risk assessment, choice of remedy or 
communication of risk. 
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Table 5.1 Scoring system to reflect the subjective assessment of strengths 
and weaknesses in performance 
2 good or very good performance, examples _of good practice 
identified . .. . 
1 
o 
-1 
-2 bad practices observed or willfuldisregard~ 
Once these scores are applied to reflect the safety performance of individual 
business a comparison can be made between the sets created by the initial 
sorting. Scores were applied for each of the criteria for each business. The 
businesses were then compared according to the original groupings. 
5.2.2 RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON OF RATING SYSTEMS. 
The altemate scoring exercise confirms that the scoring for the performance 
of the intermediate group does lie between that for the better and worse 
performing groups. Table 5.2 (see below) shows the scores for each area of 
activity and allows comparisons between the sets: A, B and A fl B. 
Statistical tests were applied to allow a judgement to be made that the 
groupings identified were indeed reasonable indicators of performance and 
that sorting had been appropriate. The mean score for each group, and the 
standard deviation has been calculated to check the grouping rationale. The 
results of this calculation are in Table 5.3. 
The groups still show evidence of overlap. The borderline and poor 
performance groups are too small for the data to be conclusive. This casts 
doubt on the assignment of some businesses to the performance groups 
(based on the statistical analysis of the performance indicator scores alone). 
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However the results are not so skewed as to seriously undermine further 
investigation of the data based on these groups. 
Table 5.2 Average scores obtained from performance rating process, 
using original groupings 
Perfonnance Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
group Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
Adequate 1.3 1.3 1.1 1 1.1 
performers 
Intermediate 0.41 -0.25 0.17 0.17 0.25 
group 
Poor -0.64 -0.84 -0.92 -1 -0.8 
performers 
Table 5.3 Statistical comparison of the groups of businesses, based on 
their safety performance rating. 
Score range Mean score . Standard deviation 
c 
Adequate o to 10 6.13 4.925 
Performers 
Borderline Group -2 to 5 1.33 2.56 
Poor performers -9 to 3 -4.4 3.07 
5.3 USING THE 7-S FRAMEWORK® TO COMPARE BUSINESSES IN 
THE DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE GROUPS 
The 7-S Framework® has been the framework for ordering data throughout 
these studies. The framework represents the interconnected elements that 
can be said to determine 'how' an organization operates (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982). 
5.3.1 EXAMINING STRUCTURAL AND OWNERSHIP DIFFERENCES 
The first comparison made, between those businesses under-performing and 
those performing adequately, was the comparison of structural differences. 
This was chosen to be the first area of comparison because the 7-s 
framework (McKinsey 7-S Framework® - Peters and Waterman,1982) was 
being used to guide the data sorting, as well as the data collection phase. 
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During the initial studies it had been revealed that in three-quarters of small 
firms it was the senior manager or proprietor who was nominally responsible 
for disseminating health and safety advice among the employees. Where it 
was an owner who assumed the responsibility for managing safety it was 
likely (59% of those in that category) that slhe would have received no 
relevant training at all. Therefore the ownership profile could be expected to 
have a bearing on the adequacy of safety performance. Table 5.4 shows the 
structural comparisons. 
More than a third of small businesses found to be under-performing were 
family businesses (For examples see cases: 2, 3, 6, 13 and 15, and also the 
fabric printing company [L293 - not in the displayed case summaries). These 
seem to fit the profile suggested by the pilot studies of small businesses with 
limited access to necessary advice and guidance and a lack of necessary 
skills, in safety management. It was these family businesses and single 
owner-manager businesses that formed the majority (76%, 19/25) of those 
business which were failing to achieve the minimum standards of safety 
practice. 
Among those businesses that were managing to achieve adequate results 
from their safety management practices it was the profile of a "silent owner 
with a professional manager" that was frequently represented (37%, 3/8) in 
this group (For example see Case 7). Case 25 also demonstrates the point 
although in the case of this brewery the 'silent owners' were shareholders. 
The professional manager was often a person with experience of more than 
one business, and formal management training. The Board structure was also 
represented well in this group (50%, 4/8). In the pilot studies it was noted~ that 
there was an increase in the management function with size of organization. 
From the pilot results it was suggested it could be lack of managers in smaller 
firms that had implications for owners and managers needing to delegate 
health and safety management tasks. The Board structure gives more scope 
for individual members of the Board to develop specialisms (for example see 
Case 25). Within a Board there is a greater chance of a 'safety champion' 
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emerging; one who has time and skills to push the notion of good safety 
practice at a strategic level. 
Table 5.4 A comparison of structural differences between poor safety 
performers and those who performed adequately. 
Under- Adequate 
I performers performance 
Family business 36% (9/25) 0 0,-
Single owner-manager 40% (10/25) 13% [(1/8) . 
Partnership 20% (5125) 0 0 
Silent owner 1 professional 4% (1/25) 37% (3/8) 
manager '. . ",.' 
Board 0 0 50% '(4/8)' 
5.3.2 EXAMINING THE DIFFERENCES IN MANAGERIAL STYLE 
From the pilots studies it has already emerged that a number of those 
managers, who participated in the pilot, adopted a very passive approach to 
safety management or attempted to intentionally transfer their duty of care to 
a third party, by using consultants or relying on their insurers. There were also 
those who did not perceive the risk of an untoward event as real. The 
management style was therefore seen as being a key area of investigation in 
determining good practice, and barriers to achievement. 
In the main study, this prevalence of a laissez-faire attitude was still apparent, 
among the group of under-performers. Almost a quarter (24%, 6/25) of the 
businesses, that were not performing well in areas of safety, were categorized 
as exhibiting a laissez-faire or passive managerial style. In the young 
manufacturing company [01196 - Case 4] the owner-manager described his 
main concerns as the gaining of new customers, and balancing cash ~ow. 
During the visit, to this plastic reclamation plant, there appeared to be no 
active supervision. The owner approached no one during the walkabout and 
engaged no one in conversation. There was no feeling of order or control in 
the plant. The owner never made eye contact with any employee and many 
potentially dangerous practices went unchallenged. 
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Among those businesses that were performing adequately, in achieving safety 
management outcomes, all could be described as hierarchical organizations 
(For examples see Cases 5, 7, 8 and 25). Each of these hierarchies had well 
established delegation channels, and routes of communications. Roles and 
responsibilities within the structure were also well understood, even where 
they had not been formalized or documented. 
Of those in the group of poor performers a number had an autocratic owner, 
or senior manager (For examples see cases 3, 6, 17, 20 and 24). The 
autocrat resisted any pressures to delegate either tasks or authority. 
In the results from the pilots, the percentage of organizations where one 
manager accepted responsibility for health and safety along with his other 
duties was 78 per cent [45/58] when only the 'small', 'mini' and 'micro' firms 
were examined. Most of these managers had received no or very little 
specialist training. Table 5.5 summarizes the differences observed in 
managerial styles during the main study phase. 
Table 5.5 A comparison of the differences in managerial style between 
poor safety performers and those who performed adequately. 
Under- Adequate performance 
I performers 
Hierarchical with established 12% (3/2?) 
delegation channels 100% (8/8) 
Autocratic I No delegation 56% (14/25) 0 
Passive I Laissez Faire 24% (6/25) 0 
Day to day supervision I Management 8% . (2/25); 0 
By Walking About [MBWA] 
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5.3.3 ASSESSING THE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS BETWEEN GROUPINGS, BY 
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Analysis by Industry sector was limited by the size of the sample. The 
businesses were apparently randomly distributed between the groups. Most 
industrial sectors occur in more than one group. For example cases 5, 7, 18 
and 22 were all in the residential care sector. In cases 5 and 7 the 
organisations were deemed to be performing adequately. The home in case 
22 was deemed to be managing safely less successfully and the home in 
Case 18 was assessed as not performing adequately, it was classified as 
poor. 
Within the cases studied the industrial sector of the business did not seem to 
determine the success of that business, in managing safety (see Figure 5.2 
below). However, the industrial sector was expected to exert an influence that 
may affect the approach to safety adopted by the business; and the nature of 
issues addressed. The brewery (case 25) was focused on control measures 
and quality standards, primarily because the brewing process was so 
sensitive. This notion of control had been transferred in to the area of safety 
management. The manner of managing safety in this plant was traceable, 
back to the manufacturing process itself. 
5.3.4 RE-TESTING THE CONCEPT OF SIZE AS AN INFLUENCE ON SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
The results from the pilot- studies indicated that, using safety management 
differences as a marker, there seems to be natural sub divisions within the 
small business sector: less than 5 employees, 5-10 employees, 11-25 
employees and 26 to 50 employees. If this theory holds then there shoufd be 
observable differences in the performance of the smallest businesses and the 
larger ones, in the main study phase. 
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C.Adequate Performance ------------... 
CnD 
Questionable 
Performance 
D. Poor 
Performance 
Figure 5.2 Venn Diagram showing Industry sectors of poor performers. 
adequate performers and those with indeterminate scores 
[based on performance indicator scoring]. 
The criteria for the sub division of the sample of organisations, according to 
their size, have been amended slightly between the pilot stage and the main 
study. The two smallest size-divisions have been combined to create a larger 
group of organisations. This combination was necessary because of the small 
sample size, after stratification. Even after combining the two smallest 
divisions there were still on only 16 cases in the new group. 
There were observable differences in performance, according to the size of 
the business observed. Table 5.6 summarizes the distribution of businesses 
of varying size between the performance groupings. In the performance 
groups more than 80% (87.5%,7/8) of the businesses performing adequately 
had more than 10 employees. In that same group there was only one of the 
260 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
smallest organizations. Whilst in the group of businesses that were under-
performing, 64% (16125) were the smallest businesses. 
Table 5.6 A comparison of differences in size [expressed as number of 
employees) between poor safety performers and those who 
performed adequately. 
Size Under performers Adequate performers 
(by number of employees) 
< 10 64% (16125) 12.5% .... (118) 
10 - 25 28% (7125) 50% .. (4/8) 
26 - 50 8% . (2125) 37.5% (318) 
5.3.5 EXAMINING THE DIFFERENT MANAGERS' ATTITUDES TO SAFETY 
... 
... 
The pilot studies provided some evidence that there were differences, 
between managers, in motivation and approach to safety management. From 
the focus group discussions a picture of perceptions of the owners, and 
managers of small, mini and micro-businesses emerged. In general, 
participants considered health and safety to be important as they cared about 
their workforce. However, this positive view was not universal. Table 5.7 
summarizes some of the attitudes that managers exhibited, or expressed 
within the case study interviews. 
Table 5.7 The "management" attitude to safety (expressed by managers 
during the case study interview) 
-
Attitude to safety Under-performers Adequate performance 
Very positive I enthusiastic 4% (1125) 25% (2/8). 
Positive 32% (8125)·· 75% (5/8) 
Negative 56% (14125). 0 0. 
Very negative I hostile 8% (2125) 0 0. 
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The pilots also revealed that the apparent reliance, that some managers of 
smaller businesses place, on the general media for safety information. This 
media influence seems to have skewed perceptions, and engendered fear of 
enforcement action. This fear was not based on the personal experiences of 
those within the pilots but was a widely expressed phenomenon. In some 
cases this fear was expressed as a general negativity towards enforcement, 
the legislative duties themselves and the expectation that the manager should 
assume responsibility for the safety and welfare of others. 
Also from the pilots there is evidence that a number of man~gers adopted a 
very passive approach to safety management. Some of these appear to adopt 
this approach because of a lack of knowledge, and confidence on how to 
tackle that area of the business operations; others seem ambivalent to safety 
as an issue. 
In the main study phase it was found that none of the businesses that were 
successfully managing safety had a negative attitude towards the process. 
This is not very surprising. However, in 36 per cent (9/25) of cases, the 
business found to be under-performing had a manager who was positive, or 
very positive to the idea of managing safety issues. This suggests that 
although there is a desire to succeed some barrier must exist that is 
frustrating that desire. 
5.3.6 SKILLS VARIATION AND PERFORMANCE 
The findings, from the pilot studies, have provided evidence of barriers to 
safety management. The focus of these barriers appear to be both internal 
and external. The main external barrier seems to be an absence of 
accessible, reliable, competent advice source for small businesses. Botb the 
survey and the focus group discussions repeatedly revealed a limited safety 
knowledge and lack of access to necessary skills among managers. Table 5.8 
(below) shows the skills profiles within the businesses that acted as case 
studies. 
The classification of unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled and professional is adapted 
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from training research 0Nest Midlands Business [WMB] Survey 1995 in: 
Storey and Westhead, 1997). The WMB Survey (1995) used the 
classifications: unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, clerical, supervisory and 
managerial. 
The main study seems to confirm the importance of skills in relation to safety 
management. The skilled and professionally base businesses exhibit a higher 
rate of success than other businesses; whilst smaller business, within the 
study, reliant on unskilled staff have a high incidence of under-performing. 
Table 5.8 The differences in level of skills between poor safety performers 
and those who performed adequately. 
Skills of employees Under-performers Adequate performance 
Unskilled 64% (16/2S) . 0 0 
•• 
". 
Un / Semi-skilled mix 20% (S/2S) 12.S% (1/8) 
Semi-skilled 16% (4/2S) 
. : 0 0 ..•... 
'.' 
Skilled 0 0 2S% . (2/8), 
Skilled/professional mix 0 0 62.S% ' (S/8) 
5.3.7 THE EFFECT OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEMS ON SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE 
During the main study there was some evidence to confirm that some small 
businesses had systems in place. These systems were generally concerned 
with day to day running of the business: payroll, invoicing, etc. In each case 
the systems used were practically based and showed evidence of having 
evolved. 
Among those small businesses that were under-performing, in terms of the 
selected indicators, there was a distinct difference in their use of systems, 
when compared to those performing adequately. The fruit and vegetable 
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packers (case 2) had no monitoring systems, nor any schedule of 
programmed maintenance. They were using dangerously broken equipment 
during the visit. The bakery (case 3) was also without control systems or a 
schedule of planned maintenance. They had foodstuffs past their use-by data 
and structural disrepair. The fabric finishers (case 6) also lacked monitoring 
systems or a scheme of planned maintenance; they had a long term leak to 
their heat exchanger. 
One joinery firm too had no system of programmed maintenance, no even 
when it was statutorily required and the period of checks prescribed, they had 
local exhaust ventilation that was apparently never checked. Some of the 
small businesses did have control systems, for example one chemical 
production company (Case 11). They had a written scheme of periodic 
examination for their air receiver and a regular service plan for their fork-lift 
trucks but even here the systems were not comprehensive; there was no 
scheme for testing portable electrical appliances. 
Within the majority of these businesses there was no evidence of formalized 
or documented systems. During the visits it was observed that operations 
were pursued and controlled by custom' and practice of the individuals rather 
than an overtly systematic approach imposed, sanctioned or even recognized 
. by the manager. Those' managing safety adequately had a number of 
documented systems, examples include one of the hotels (case 8), the 
brewery (case 25) and two of the care homes (cases 5 and 7). The 
warehouse [L393 - not a case summary] also demonstrated some sound 
control systems although their performance was rated as questionable 
because of a tendency to under-estimate risk severity. Table 5.9 (see below) 
summarizes the findings. 
These results indicate that there are observable differences between those 
businesses that appear to manage occupational health and safety effiCiently 
and those that fail to achieve desired results. The possible barrier to success 
is clearly an area in need of examination. 
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Table 5.9 A matrix for comparison of differences in management systems 
between poor safety performers and those who performed 
adequately. 
Use of systems Under- Adequate Notes 
performers I performers 
Yes, established Quality control systems, 
systems well used 0 75% (6/8) Documented monitoring I 
control procedure, permit to 
work system, formal 
recording, training record 
and review systems. 
Have documented 3rd party supplied safety 
systems unused / system- unopened, Safe 
Systems in place for very 44% (11/25) 25%(2/8) system of work for blasting, 
specific functions only Worksheet -docket -account 
reconciliation; Written 
procedures for security 
tasks e.g. cashing up and 
locking up, financial 
systems (manual). 
No evidence of Not even accounting system 
formalized or 56% (14/25) 0 for PAYE or VAT, double 
documented systems - entry book keeping by 3rd 
operations by custom party based on bundle of 
and practice scraps provided. Control all intuitive I autocratic. 
To investigate the performance of the businesses in each group further; with a 
particular emphasis on discovering areas of good practice and areas of 
weakness; it was decided to use different rating criteria. The use of the five 
headings: hazard identification, hazard acknowledgement, risk assessment, 
remedy choice and communication of risk; were designed to focus the 
investigation on 'how' safety management is effected. 
5.4 RESULTS OF THE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ANALYSIS 
The aim of this part of the investigation was to provide a comparison of what 
is done well, the evidence for that assessment and examination of how it is 
done well. The identification of successes should facilitate the distillation of 
good practice. 
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The corollary was to examine what is done poorly, the evidence for that 
summation and examination of the barriers that contributed to under-
performance. The identification of the barriers to success should be the first 
step in seeking solutions. The results of this exercise have been tabulated; 
the tables are included in Appendix Four. 
To ease comparisons the scoring system used in the alternate forms reliability 
testing was adopted. The scoring table has been copied for ease of reference. 
This scoring is based on the risk rating system adopted in local authority 
inspections (HSE). 
Table 5.10 A scoring system to reflect the subjective assessment of 
strengths and weaknesses in performance. 
2 good or very good performance, examples of good practice 
identified . 
1 ! good performance 
0 variable performance, some parts right, evidence of some 
omissions 
-1 I poor performance 
-2 bad practices observed or willful disregard. 
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5.4.1 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT (USING THE 
5 CRITERIA) AMONG THOSE BUSINESSES OBSERVED AS PART OF THE MAIN 
STUDY. 
The adequate performers appeared to have performed well across the range 
of indicators (see Table 5.11). The areas in which on average they performed 
best were in hazard identification and hazard acknowledgement; whilst the 
area causing some problems seemed to be choice of remedy. This 
information in itself does not lend much to advancing this investigation. The 
value lies in the comparison between performance levels. The strengths of 
this group were therefore compared to the group of poor performers. The 
ratings for the group of poorer performers are in Table 5.12 ( below). 
Table 5.11 The indicator ratings for each of the five performance areas. for 
those businesses in the sample deemed to be performing 
adequately. 
Business I . Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy··. .. Communication 
.. 
.. Unique l(jentificati~n ACknowlecjge~ent assessment· Choice 
reference .. 
-.,:, 
Care home 2 2 2 1 2 
0296 
Care home 1 1 2 0 0 
0896 
Hotel 0 0 1 0 -1 
0996 
Chemical 0 1 1 2 2 
01296 
Care Home 2 2 0 1 2 
01496 
Brewery 2 2 2 2 2 
r498 
Chemical 2 1 0 1 1 
r499 
Home 1 2 1 2 2 
r599 
TOTAL 10 11 9 9 10 
Average 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.3 
score 
267 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
Table 5.12 The indicator ratings for each of the five performance areas, for 
those businesses in the sample deemed to be performing less 
than adequately. 
Business I 
- Hazard 
Unique Identification 
reference ' , 
-
Chemical 
-1 
0396 
Reclamation 
-2 
0496 
Joinery 0 
0596 
Agriculture 
-1 
0695 
Bakery 0 
1196 
-1 
-1 
01096 
Plastics 
-2 
01196 
Bitumen 
-1 
01396 
Quarry Prod. 
-1 
r198 
Designers 1 
1495 
Wholesaler 2 
1595 
Manufacture 2 
01695 
Wine 
-2 
r298 
Books 2 
r398 
Stentering 
-2 
1193 
Screen print 0 
1293 
Tyre fitter 
-2 
1493 
Car Valet 
-1 
1593 
Distribution 1 
1693 
Club 
-1 
1793 
Transport 
-2 
1893 
Catering 
-2 
1--_- r19!!-,-
Assembly 
1-----
-1 
r299 
Finance 
r399 
TOTAL 
Average 
Score 
I -1 
-16 
-0.64 
I 
Hazard Risk Remedy Communicatron --' 
- -
Acknowledgement , assessment Choice' 
-, of risk .-
-~ 
-2 I -1 -1 -2 
-2 -1 -1 -2 
1 0 1 1 
-2 -2 -2 -2 
0 0 0 -1 
-2 -1 -2 -1 
o -1 1 2 
-2 -1 -1 -2 
0 -1 -1 0 
-1 -1 0 -1 
0 1 -2 -2 
-1 -1 -1 -1 
-2 -1 -2 -2 
-2 -1 -2 -2 
-1 -1 0 -1 
-2 -2 I -2 0 
1 -1 -2 0 
-1 -1 -2 0 
0 0 1 0 
0 -1 -2 -1 
-1 -1 1 2 
-1 -2 -1 -1 
-
-1 -1 -2 0 
---
-1 -1 -2 -2 
0 -1 -1 -2 
-21 -23 -25 -20 I 
-0.84 -0.92 -1 -0.8 
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Among the poorer performers all indicators are down when compared with the 
other grouping (see Table 5.12). This seems to indicate that overall they are 
performing less well; rather than having encountered any specific difficulties 
that those businesses in the other group had avoided. The areas where the 
poor performers had, on average, most difficulty seem to be primarily in 
seeking remedies to problems. Risk assessments also seem to cause 
difficulty. The area that seems to be handled better, on average, was hazard 
identification. 
To compare the performance between the two performance groups more 
easily the score gap has been arithmetically calculated for each performance 
indicator. 
Table 5.13 A comparison between adequate and poor performers, for each 
. of the five performance indicators. 
group. , ... 
I Adequate 
I performers 
Poor 
performers 
Average 
Rating 
-0.64 
0;66 
-0.84 -0.92 
0.23 0.09 
Communication·' 
1 "l
ofrtSk 
1.1 "id I 
-1 -0.8 
0 o~ 15 
Using the average rating between the two groups highlights the areas of 
difference in achievement, between those two groups. The area of greatest 
variation in average group performance is in choice of remedy; the next 
indicator showing wide variation between the groups is risk assessmenf and 
third is effective communication of risk. The area of activity that exhibits the 
most consistent performance, on average within the two groups, is hazard 
identification. 
Communication of risk was only the fourth lowest score out of the five 
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indicators in the initial rating. However, the comparison between the two 
gro'ups' has revealed,that on average, communication of risk' is less successful 
among poor performers than within the adequate performance group. All 
businesses within the 'poor performers' group exhibited poor or variable 
performance in communicating risk with the exception of: two joinery 
workshops [ref.:01096 and ref.:0596], and a snooker club [ref.: 1793]. The 
communication techniques of these businesses will therefore be examined 
further as possible examples of good practice, and in an attempt to distill 
commonalties. The management attitude to health and safety, the primary 
method of communication routinely used, the method of effecting control and 
the means of achieving feedback are summarized in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 A matrix allowing comparison of description of managerial 
approaches among adequate performers. 
Unique Management· Primary method' Method of control ' Feedback " 
Identifier' 'stance on H&S of communication .. ' 
Joinery Management very Spoken word, small MBWA, Manager on floor Open team, feedback 
workshop keen on sound Health team informal, regularly, fault detected direct and verbal to owner. 
and Safety record management by results in immediate Staff feel able to discuss 
walking about, owner verbal instruction from any issue with owner and 
01096 on shop floor several manager to operative. No judge urgency of contact 
times an hour. written records kept no required prepared to 
written communications interrupt meetings if 
between staff. necessary. 
Snooker Management stance Important procedures MBWA very casual Open team, experienced 
Club neutral or laissez faire written does not atmosphere any menber staff only employed 
due to perception of include any H&S of staff empowered to Feedback timely by verbal 
1793 inherently safe advice. take urgent decisions. communication. 
environment. Primary Regular enforcement visit 
Experienced staff communication within provide focus of control 
keen onH&S the team verbal. over long term issues. 
~ 
Joinery Management very Spoken word, small MBWA, Manager on floor Open team, feedback 
workshop keen on sound Health team informal, MBWA, regularly, fault detected direct and verbal to owner. 
and Safety record owner on shop floor results in immediate 
0596 several times an hour. verbal instruction from 
manager to operative. 
, 
In the table, "MBWA" (Peters and Waterman, 1982) has been used to 
270 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
abbreviate the term 'Management By Walking About'. This is a management 
style characterized by high visibility of the manager in the work place, where 
the manager visits the shop floor to observe rather than relying on reports. 
This management style was common to all three of these cases. 
Some other commonalties did seem to emerge from the comparison of 
approaches. In two businesses the manager exhibited a positive desire for a 
sound safety record, in the third the manager seemed much less focused on 
this as a goal. However, the manager, who claimed to adopt a laissez-faire 
attitude, because of an "inherently safe" [his perception] e~vironment; had 
experienced staff who had assumed responsibility for health and safety. He 
had effectively, if apparently unconsciously, delegated 'health and safety' to a 
champion within the workforce. 
From this initial investigation it seems there must be leadership to promote 
safety; an open management style, that encourages rapid and direct vertical 
and horizontal communication; and timely feedback. It was therefore decided 
to examine those small businesses with borderline safety performance. To 
discover, in particular, in which areas they were under-performing; Table 5.15 
(see below) shows the summary results. 
The most troublesome area for these businesses with borderline performance 
was hazard acknowledgement, an example of this was one of the quarries 
(case 12). Assessment of risk also showed as a weak area. Choice of remedy 
was also poor compared with the adequate and poor performers. 
Across all three groups it is risk assessment and choice of remedial action 
that are the weakest elements of safety performance. This is in line with the 
views expressed during the pilot focus groups, by the managers of these type 
of businesses. In the pilot studies it had been discovered less than half of the 
'mini' and 'micro' businesses had even made the attempt at assessing risks in 
a structured way. Comments indicated that they did not know where to start. 
The problem seemed to revolve around documenting policies and risk 
assessments, and exposing them for scrutiny outside the organization. 
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Table 5.15 The indicator ratings for each of the five performance areas for 
those businesses in the sample deemed to have borderline 
performance. 
Unique Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
Quarry Prod. 2 0 1 0 1 
0196 
Care Home 0 -1 0 0 1 0796 
Warehouse 0 -1 0 -1 0 
1393 
Warehouse 0 -1 0 1 0 
1395 
Joinery 1 0 1 1 -1 
1695 
Care Home 2 I 0 0 1 2 01596 
TOTAL 5 -3 2 I 2 3 
. , 
5.5 TRIANGULATING THE RESULTS 
Triangulation has been used in this study as a technique to test convergent 
validity (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4.6.1). By using several methods to obtain 
the same information about a concept and demonstrating that each produces 
similar results one can increase confidence in the validity of the data 
gathering process. 
Standard error rates have been calculated as a measure that expresses the 
uncertainty that exists about the true value (MacRae, 1994). This involves 
accounting simultaneously for the variability of the results and the amount of 
data. Recurrent t-tests have been used to compare results between the 
survey instrument, focus group findings and case study findings. In each case 
-
the score is compared to its standards error. The scores have been paired so 
that the questionnaire responses have been compared to the case study 
findings, and then with the focus group outcomes. The case study findings 
have then been separately compared with the focus group results. 
The responses about the tiers of management, within the respondents' 
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businesses, have been standardized as scores on a 1-100 scale. Table 5.16 
summarizes the results obtained regarding tiers of management observed in 
businesses of different size. The results obtained from the survey, focus 
groups and observational phases have been tabulated in close proximity to 
ease the comparison process. 
Table 5.16 Comparing the data gathering regarding tiers of management; 
and displaying the standardized scores as a function of business 
size, to allow triangulation of data. 
Size of Management Survey results Focus group Case study 
business tiers findings findings. 
<10 employees (n=27) (n=3) (n=19) 
Owner-manager 100 100 100 
Middle 3.7 0 0 
management 
Supervisors 22.2 33.3 15.8 
10-24 . (n=31) (n=6) (n=11) 
employees 
Owner-manager 100 100 100 
Middle 19.35 20 36.4 
management 
Supervisors 54.8 20 45.5 
25-49 (n=17) (n=4) (n=8) 
employees 
Owner-manager 64.7 75 75 
Middle 58.8 50 50 
management 
Supervisors 52.9 50 50. 
All three sets of data have been combined in Table 5.16. However, the direct 
comparison of two sets of data at one time is the preferred procedure. Testing 
in pairs allows the use of the Hest. Initially the survey responses and case 
study findings were tested, as two complete data sets. Table 5.17 
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summarizes the findings of the survey, in the pilot phase and those of the 
main observational study. 
Table 5.17 Comparing the data gathering regarding tiers of management; 
and displaying the standardized scores as a function of business 
size. to allow comparison of data from the survey and case 
studies; including calculation of the difference (d) and of d2 to 
facilitate at-test. 
Size of Tiers of Survey data Case study Difference (d) , d" 
business management findings· 
<10 
Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
em.J)lo'Lees 
Middle 3.7 0 3.7 13.7 
management 
Supervisors 22.2 15.8 6.4 41.4 
10-24 Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
employees 
Middle 19.4 36.4 -17 289.3 
management 
Supervisors 54.8 45.5 9.3. 88 . 
2549 Owner-manager 64.7 75 -10.3 106.1 
employees 
Middle 58.8 50 8.8 77.8 
management 
Supervisors 52.9 50 2.9 8.6 
Ld = 4 Ld2 = 625 
Statistical tests have been employed during the analysis to give an estimate 
of the probabilities of the correctness of the inference. The statistical tests 
have been used to account for the element of chance that could account for 
any of the recorded results. The t-test was used. This test was used to 
evaluate the significance of the difference between the scores of the two 
unrelated samples. This test leant itself to comparison of samples using 
different collection methods. 
From the application of the t-test in this instance: t. = 0.149 
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For the result of the test to be significant t. must equal or exceed 2.306, it 
does not and so the result is not significant at the 0.05 level. The two methods 
do not produce significantly different results. 
It was decided to refine the testing procedure to test whether any of the 
results for specific sizes of businesses are significantly different, between data 
collection methods. It was decided to recalculate the t-test for each of the sub-
samples. The first run of tests was to compare the survey results with the 
case study findings for each of the groups of businesses: <10 employees, 10 
to 24 employees and 25 to 50 employees. The standardized scores, and the 
calculation of the differences between those scores were tabulated. 
Table 5.18 The standardized scores and initial calculations of the 
differences between the data collection methods (the survey and 
the case studies), for the data relating to managerial layers 
within the smallest businesses. 
<10 Survey . Case . study Difference (d)' (d<!)< . 
employees results' findings, I, , , 
Owner.;. 100 100 0 0 
manager 
Middle 3.7 0 3.7 13.7 
management 
Supervisors 22.2 15.7 6.4 41.4 
l:d = 10.1 l:d2 = 55.1 
(l:d)2=1 02.7 
The t-test was again used to evaluate the significance of the difference 
between the scores of the two unrelated samples. 
From the application of the t-test in this instance: t. = 1.828 
To be significant t. must equal or exceed 4.303, it does not and so the result 
is not significant at the 0.05 level. Thus the survey and case studies are not 
producing significantly different results regarding the lack of differentiation 
within the structure, into managerial layers, in the smallest businesses. 
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The second test, of·this series, was to compare the survey results with the 
case study findings for businesses with 10 to 24 employees. The standardized 
scores, and the calculation of the differences between those scores, are 
summarized in Table 5. 19. 
Table 5.19 The standardized scores and initial calculations of the 
differences between the data collection methods (the survey and 
the case studies), for the data relating to managerial layers 
within the businesses with between 10 and 25 employees (10 to 
24 inclusive). 
10 to 24 Survey results Case study 
em 10 ees findin s 
Owner~ 100 100 
mana er 
Middle· 19.4 36.4 -17 289.3 
54.8 45.5 88.1 
Ld2 = 377.4 
For consistency the t-test was used to evaluate the significance of the 
difference between the scores of the two unrelated samples. 
From the application of the t-test in this instance: t. = 0.327 
To be significant t. must equal or exceed 4.303, it does not so the result is 
not significant at the 0.05 level. This seems to indicate that the number of 
managerial layers discovered during the case studies were on average similar 
to those reported during the survey. However, the sample size for the case 
studies was very small (n=11). 
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The next test, of this series, was to compare the survey results with the case 
study findings for businesses with 25 to 50 employees. The standardized 
scores, and the calculation of the differences between those scores, are 
summarized in Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20 The standardized scores and initial calculations of the 
differences between the data collection methods (the survey and 
the case studies), for the data relating to managerial layers 
within the businesses with between 25 and 50 employees. 
25 to 50 Survey Case study Difference (d) (d 
employees . results findings 
Own er- 64.7 75 -10.3 106.1 
mana er 
Middle 58.8 50 8.8 77.8 
52.9 50 8.64 
l:d2 = 192.5 
For consistency the t-test continued to be used to evaluate the significance of 
the difference between the scores of the two unrelated samples. 
To be significant t. must equal or exceed 4.303. In this instance t. = 0.086 
therefore the result is not significant the survey instrument does not differ 
significantly from the estimation of the number of managerial layers 
discovered during the case studies. However, the sample size for the 25 to 50 
employee business covered in the case studies was again very small (n=8), 
The second run of tests was to compare the case study findings with the 
focus group outcomes for each of the groups of businesses: <10 employees, 
10 to 24 employees and 25 to 50 employees. Again it was decided to look at 
the findings systematically for each group of businesses. 
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Table 5.21 The standardized scores and initial calculations of the 
differences between the data collection methods (the case 
studies and the focus groups), for the data relating to 
managerial layers within the smallest businesses. 
<10 -Case study Focus group Difference (d) (d. 
employees, ~ findirlgs . ~~ outcomes 
Owner- 100 100 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
15.8 33.3 307.8 
~d2 = 307.8 
To be significant t. must equal or exceed 4.303. t. = 0.99 the result is not 
significant for this group. The focus group responses tend on average to 
confirm the estimate of the number of managerial layers in small businesses; 
when compared to the case study findings. 
However, the sample size for the < 10 employee businesses in the focus 
groups was very small (n=3). Representation of the sub groups within the 
focus group data means all the samples are small once they have been 
categorized into sub groups. It is because of the sample limitations that the 
sub group data are not going to be tested further. The whole group results will 
be tested. 
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Table 5.22 Comparing the data gathering regarding tiers of management; 
and displaying the standardized scores as a function of business 
size, to allow comparison of data from the focus groups and 
case studies: including calculation of the difference (d) and of d2 
to facilitate at-test. 
Size of . Tiers of Focus group .Casestudy Difference (d) d:l. 
business management data findings 
<10 
Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
employees 
Middle 0 0 0 0 
management 
Supervisors 33.3 15.8 17.5 306.25 
10-24 Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
. ·employees 
Middle 20 36.4 -16.4 268.96 
management 
Supervisors 20 45.5 -25.5 650.25 
25-49 Owner-manager 75 75 0 0 
empl~ees 
Middle 50 50 0 0 
management 
Supervisors 50 50 0 0 
Ed = -24.4 Ed2 = 
1225.46 
For consistency the t-test continued to be used, to evaluate the significance of 
the difference between the scores of the two unrelated samples. 
From the application of the t-test in this instance: t. = 0.675 
To be significant t. must equal or exceed 2.306, it does not so the result is 
not significant at the 0.05 level. The two methods do not produce significantly 
different results. 
The statistical tests applied so far suggest that there is no significant 
difference in the results obtained from the surveyor the case studies, or from 
the focus groups and case studies. If this suggestion hold there should be no 
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significant difference in results obtained from the survey and the focus groups. 
This test merely double checks the conclusion that the triangulation of the 
data has revealed no significant disparity in results. 
Table 5.23 Comparing the data gathering regarding tiers of management; 
and displaying the standardized scores as a function of business 
size. to allow comparison of data from the focus groups and the 
survey: including calculation of the difference (d) and of d2 to 
facilitate at-test. 
Size of Tiers of . Focus group Survey data Difference (d) d" 
business management data '.: 
Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
<10 
empIoyees 
Middle management 0 3.7 3.7 13.69 
Supervisors 33.3 22.2 11.1 123.21 
10-24 Owner-manager 100 100 0 0 
employees 
Middle management 20 19.4 0.6 0.36 
Supervisors 20 54.8 34.8 1211.04 
25-49 Owner-manager 75 64.7 -10.3 106.09 
employees 
Middle management 50 58.8 8.8 77.44 
Supervisors 50 52.9 2.9 8.41 
~d = 51.6 ~d2= 
1540.24 
For consistency the t-test continued to be used, to evaluate the significance of 
the difference between the scores of the two unrelated samples. 
From the application of the t-test in this instance: -l = 1.37 
To be Significant -l must equal or exceed 2.306, it does not so the result is 
not significant at the 0.05 level. The two methods do not produce signific~mtly 
different results. 
The number of participants in the focus groups was only small therefore only 
two complete sets of data were available for triangulation. By comparing the 
similarities and differences in the data it is hoped to gauge the suitability of the 
data collection method. 
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5.5.1 RESULTS OF THE TRIANGULATION 
It is expected that. there would be some specific problems associated in 
repeating any data collection, to allow an assessment of the reliability of the 
findings by test-retest (Dane, 1990). Different respondents did not have 
identical backgrounds or characteristics. The same individuals could not be 
reused in replication studies because their primary partiCipation may have had 
an educative effect and may have altered their perceptions. The observations 
involved social intervention in the very act of observing because interest was 
being exhibited in a very specific area of activity that in many cases had 
hitherto gone unnoticed. The intervention of the visit was known to have 
precipitated reactions like the initiation of safety projects. 
Strict replication was considered too exacting to be achievable, therefore the 
triangulation of methods was an attempt to increase the reliability of the 
findings (Cox, 1993). The use of the observational methods in the main study 
was a deliberate attempt to overcome the problem with 'ecological validity', or 
relating what was said in the focus groups (and claimed in the survey), with 
what was routinely done every day within the organizations (Bracht and Glass 
1968). To overcome this problem data were not taken at face value, their 
validity was tested against other data, both by textual comparison and 
statistical testing. 
Statistical tests were to have been employed during the analysis to give an 
estimate of the probabilities of the correctness of the inference. It was 
intended the statistical tests would be used to estimate the likelihood of 
chance accounting for any of the recorded results. 
In the event the results of the statistical tests revealed no signifjcant 
disparities between the data obtained by the various methods. However, the 
statistical testing was limited, due to the evolutionary nature of the research 
design. Each phase of the research: the survey, focus groups and the case 
'studies, had different objectives. Thus the data obtained from the various 
phases was not focused on identical aspects of the inquiry. The required 
assumption in comparing data sets is that they are different but equivalent, 
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when that assurance of equality of focus is lost the test is nullified. 
5.5.2 COMPARING TEXTUAL RECORDS TO ALLOW TRIANGULATION 
The lack of scope for statistical testing of the findings does not automatically 
nUllify the notion of triangulation of the contextual information gleaned from 
the three collection methods (Becker and Geer, 1957; Zelditch ,1962). On the 
contrary, the idea of the study was to examine 'how' managers in small 
businesses effect the managerial process, in relation to safety. The rich 
information gleaned from all three methods is important to the furthering of 
understanding in this area. It was acknowledged, at the design stage, that it 
would not be possible to describe everything about each business, based on 
the observations made. It was in the nature of the research that inferences 
would be drawn. 
In comparing the findings at each phase of the study, on the basis of the 
textual notes, one is comparing the inferences drawn from the data at each 
stage as well as the data themselves. Comparing the notes reveals some 
interesting anomalies. 
The owner-manager of a carton manufacturing company [01695 - Case 
Study 141 had known when the business had been established, although she 
had bought it only recently, in 1994. Unfortunately the survey instrument had 
not allowed for this variation between establishment and ownership periods. 
So that in the survey the date of establishment had been given as 1920, this 
was borne out during the visit. However, in terms of managerial experience 
the owner-manager was very new to the organization. 
The area of safety training revealed an anomaly. In the survey the owner had 
described the safety training needs, within the business, being met by one-
day courses. During the focus group discussions this owner made no mention 
of training. While the visit to the factory revealed that not only was there no 
evidence of a systematic training programme, nor identification of training 
need, there was evidence of unsafe practices routinely performed. The 
prevalence of observable unsafe practices, during the short visit, suggests 
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that no effective training had been undertaken. Thus the owner apparently 
dismissed the concept of training, in a survey, with a 'tick in the box' for "one-
day courses" whilst in reality there was no discernible evidence of training 
having been undertaken, nor of any planned. 
The anomaly persisted when knowledge of health and safety was examined. 
In the survey the owner had claimed knowledge of the 'six-pack', again by 
ticking the boxes. During the focus groups the owner was more open about 
limitations to her knowledge, and her reliance on an insurance risk assessor 
to act as trouble-shooter in matters of health and safety. During the visit there 
was no evidence of any effort being made to ensure basic compliance with 
health and safety legislation. There was a safety policy, but it was an 
unaltered photocopy of another organization's policy. The apparent naivety 
with which the copy policy was presented for examination during the visit 
suggests that the owner's awareness of her obligations is severely limited. 
Thus the self-assessment of "awareness" during the survey seems to be an 
area of data that should be treated with caution. In the case of this manager 
the available evidence suggests they may have over-estimated their 
knowledge in this area. 
There was an area where neither the survey nor focus group discussion 
provided much data but the visit revealed information about the absence of 
this data at the earlier stages of the study. This was the area of safety 
communication. In the survey the owner-manager recorded that accidents 
were not recorded and no mention of accidents was made during the focus 
group discussions. During the visit it was discovered that accidents were 
occurring, and they were reported. However, the accidents were reported 
between the workers, not to the owner-manager. When examining data about 
safety systems this phenomenon becomes clearer. 
The owner-manager reported, in the survey, that the safety systems within the 
business were not complete. During the focus groups no mention was made 
of any systems being in place. The inspection revealed that there were 
observable systems in place, but they excluded the owner-manager from the 
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communication loop. The owner-manager was simply excluded from all 
communication pathways, unless the owner-manager specifically addressed 
one of the workers. To investigate this communication issue further the notes 
on management levels, structure, are particularly helpful. 
In the survey the owner-manger characterised the structure of her business 
as owner-manager and operatives. Thereby signifying two discreet and 
separate layers within, what is essentially, a very small organization. During 
the focus group the owner-manager was disparaging about her workforce. A 
workforce she had 'inherited' when she bought the company: She described 
them as unskilled and repeatedly implied they were uneducable. This 
perception, about the limited skills available, was not borne out entirely during 
the visit. There was an observable owner-worker divide. There was a 
demonstrable lack of communication. The workforce was stratified on the 
basis of age, experience and familial ties and acted like a patriarchy. In this 
instance the survey data simplified the structure of the business to the point 
where the useful information, about the complexities within the organization, 
was lost. However, the focus group discussions alluded to the alienation 
between the owner and her workforce. The discussions exhibited a symptom 
of the alienation, the disparaging remarks, but the cause could only be 
investigated by observation. 
The triangulation exercise, based on the research notes, demonstrates a 
general consistency in the findings for this organization (case 14). Where 
anomalies have arisen they appear to be due to the limitations inherent in 
each method of data collection, rather than any gross distortion. 
The comparison of data in another case also revealed that the three methods 
seemed to elicit broadly consistent data. There were two areas where the 
data varied, in the notes relating to the family business, a tannery (case 15). 
The knowledge of legislation, that the Factory Manager claimed in the 
questionnaire, was not consistent with the knowledge he demonstrated during 
either the focus group session or the visit. In the questionnaire there appears 
to have been an over-estimation of knowledge. 
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The same factory manager also claimed an accident and incident reporting 
system existed within his business, on the questionnaire. However, during the 
visit there was no evidence that such a system was in use; on the contrary 
two minor accidents had failed to be recorded. It is suggested therefore that 
self-assessments in the questionnaire could lead to the respondent over-
estimating their knowledge and safety activity. 
There is no evidence that the owner of the carton manufacturing company 
[01695 - Case Study 14] distorted information in her questionnaire 
responses. However, in comparing survey and group discussion data with the 
data from the visit it became clear that there were limitations to the owner's 
knowledge about the business. It was noted in the focus group that people 
were employed who were described as "antiquated in their working practices". 
However, the owner never acknowledged that the established practices were 
based on paternalistic power within the workforce; or that the staff were 
actively subverting new innovations introduced by the owner. 
This subversion and power base was evident during the visit. It was 
commented during the group discussion that" there is a lot of resistance from 
the staff point of view". It seems that the information gleaned from the 
discussions and the visits was, generally, compatible. 
5.6 THE SUCCESS IN MEETING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
As the pilots had allowed greater confidence in defining the concept of 'small' 
the concept was applied to the main study. The results from the pilots studies 
indicated that, using safety management differences as a marker, there 
seems to be natural sub divisions within the small business sector: less than 5 
employees, 5-10 employees, 11-25 employees and 26 to 50 employees. 
The sub divisions have been amended slightly, for the main study, in that the 
two smallest size-divisions have been combined. This combination was 
necessary because of the small sample size, after stratification. The 
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combined group data was based on only 16 case studies. 
The primary area of investigation is the way small businesses manage safety. 
One of the original objectives of the research was "to analyze the motivation 
for, barriers to and approaches adopted for occupational health and safety 
management within organizations, with emphasis on smaller organizations". 
From the pilot studies some motivators and barriers have been identified. 
This investigation of 'how' managers intervene to reduce risks and promote 
safe practices was a key element of this research from the o.utset. A speCific 
research objective has been set to reflect this focus. The primary objective, for 
the main study is "to examine the general management techniques and styles 
adopted in small businesses and how they affect approaches to safety and 
health management". The main thrust of the observational phase has been in 
examining whether businesses were informal or formal, whether 
communications were vertical or horizontal or how they conducted their day to 
day business. This is the primary area of investigation for the main study. 
It is during this main study phase that another research objective should be 
met: "to examine a sample of small businesses and relate the observed 
'culture' to the degree of legislative compliance, safety record and efforts to 
manage occupational health and safety within those organizations. 
This need to relate observations to performance was addressed introducing 
the notion of performance indicators. These performance indicators were 
obtained by calculation of scores applied to the relative success in attaining 
certain markers, the keeping of accident records, routine maintenance and 
testing of electrical appliances and managing a suitable targeted safety 
training regime. From this, performance was rated and businesses grouped 
according to their performance (Figure 5.1). The sorting procedure was tested 
for reliability by reassessing safety performance using five different criteria, 
and comparing the results. 
The sorting enabled a direct comparison, of observed strengths and 
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weaknesses in safety management, between those assessed as being 
successful managers of safety issues and those deemed to be under 
performing. 
Not unsurprisingly, the relevant skills that were available within a business 
were confirmed as having a direct influence on successful safety 
management. 
The business ranked lowest, based on the hazard/risk scoring, was a plastics 
reclamation firm [01196 - Case Study 4]. This organization was classified as 
having poor safety performance, based on the performance indicator scores. 
The majority of the employees in this organization were unskilled and 
employed for manual tasks, moving heavy goods and product, and as 
machine operators. The company had no declared recruitment policy but 
historically had recruited unskilled labour. Low wages were offered and staff 
without skills were attracted to local adverts. Even fork lift truck operators 
were not trained. No one in the organization was formally trained in any 
aspect of management or safety. There was evidence of a resistance to the 
concept of training, particularly from the owner-manager. The resistance to 
the training in principle was evident from the lack of training provided the fork 
lift truck drivers, despite the statutory need for training. Also during 
discussions the owner equated increased skill levels with a 'right' to demand 
higher wages; as he described his main objective as maximising profit, he 
perceived a conflict between training his staff and achieving his business 
objective. 
Even businesses that were performing poorly, although they were not ranked 
as failing in safety management to the same degree as the plastics 
reclamation business [01196 - Case Study 4], had predominance of unskilled 
employees in their workforce. The fabric finishers [L296 - Case study 6], 
although in a very different industry sector, was exhibiting similar 
characteristics. The staff were employed untrained, primarily to operate 
machines. Where training was given it was in-house and task specific. Tasks 
were kept simple and scientific management (Taylor: 1947) seemed to be the 
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prevailing ethos. There was no evidence that employees rotated between 
tasks or that any attempt was made to develop skills, broaden tasks or 
otherwise enrich the work. As with the plastics reclamation works [Case Study 
4] the M. D. of the fabric finishers [Case Study 6] repeatedly returned to the 
theme of cost minimization, during the interview. 
Higher up the hazard/risk ranking, but still exhibiting poor safety management 
performance the retail bakery [L296 - Case Study 3] had a mix of skilled and 
unskilled people among its wo rkforce. However, two-thirds of the workforce 
were unskilled. Again minimal training was encouraged or facilitated. 
Lack of skills and training opportunities was a recurring theme among 'poor 
performers'. However, if skills and training were causative factors, or 
indicative symptoms, of poor safety performance then those businesses 
performing adequately should show increased skill levels and/or promotion of 
relevant training. 
One of those businesses ranked highest (2/39), based on the risk/hazard 
scoring, and classified as exhibiting adequate safety performance was a care 
home [01496 Case Study 5]. This organization employed 
trained/professional staff. People were employed because of their existing 
skills and training was actively promoted. Most of the training was provided 
off-site and culminated in the award of certificates. There was a positive 
benefit seen to arise from relevant training, both to the organization and to the 
individual employees. Assisted training was both job-specific and 
developmental, although in each case the relevancy of the course content, to 
the organization, was actively considered, along with the cost. 
From the comparison of all cases in this study it would seem businesses 
reliant on unskilled staff were prone to failure, in attempting to manage safety. 
It has been suggested an unskilled work force may create a predisposition to 
poorer safety management. This raises the issue of who needs the safety 
skills, also in which areas the skills are required. 
288 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS 
From the data within the case studies it also seems the areas where the 
successful businesses were markedly better than the 'others' were hazard 
identification and hazard acknowledgement (see Appendix 4). One of the 
care homes [01496 - Case Study 5] was demonstrably successful in 
managing safety and was ranked second on the hazard/risk ranking. The 
identification of hazards in this organization was assessed a being good. The 
proprietor undertook regular workplace inspections and checks, to identify 
hazards. The proprietor was experienced in running similar premises in the 
care sector. The concept of hazards was understood in the context of a care 
home environment. Part of the managerial process also involyed the review of 
accident and incident reports, to identify recurring causes. In addition to 
observation and audit the proprietor also utilized "intelligence", from 
employees. Employees were encouraged to undertake relevant training and 
also encouraged to participate in briefing sessions. It was during these 
briefings that issues such as safety hazards were raised. 
In another care home [0896 - Case study 7] the, day to day, management 
was effected by an experienced manager. This too involved regular 
inspections and checks. However the acknowledgement of the risk posed by 
some hazards had been under-estimated in some instances, in the 
researcher's opinion. Chemical and electric hazards in particular posed 
heightened risks. The hazard appraisal appeared. not to include an audit of 
accident records. There had been three incidents in the preceding 6 months 
involving chemical 'fumes' but there was no evidence any action had been 
prompted by this. 
The 'briefings', that were held regularly, were more formal in this organization 
than in the other care home in the study [01496 -Case Study 5]. The briefings 
consisted of a monologue from the manager, rather than an open discussion. 
The formality appeared to inhibit the flow of information from employees and 
reduced the opportunity for the manager to receive feedback. 
A hotel is a similar environment to a care home, in some respects. The hotel 
in this study [0996 - Case Study 8] had a manager who adopted a 'hands on' 
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style and who was prepared to personally intervene to put defects right. 
However, the outputs from the hazard identification process were variable. 
The safety performance of this organization was still characterised as 
adequate (Ranking 8/39). However, it did not seem that the accident records 
were adequately reviewed to determine causality. For example there were 
repeated slips, trips and falls in the kitchen, also repeated burns, but the did 
not trigger the identification of any relevant hazards. The variation in output 
seemed to arise according to the individual undertaking the hazard 
assessment. Shift managers (supervisors) exhibited an awareness of 
potential hazards but the other staff seemed to lack that awareness. The lack 
of staff awareness seemed to affect the feedback process to the manager; 
there was no alerting procedure from staff. 
There appeared, from the comparison of all the, Case Studies, to be four key 
elements to successful hazard identification and acknowledgement: 
• Formal training, experience or awareness of industry norms to facilitate the 
identification of hazards. This foundation was also required in order for 
observations to 'register' with the assessor, so that the potential risk is 
immediately appreCiated and the hazard is considered 'worth' noting. 
• Regular, and thorough workplace inspections and checks. 
• Reviews of accident/incident reports for causality_ This information 
enriches the data from workplace checks and reduces the liklihood of 
'missinglignoring' significant hazards. 
• Regular 'intelligence' or feedback from informed staff. 
Where one, or more, of these elements was lacking the 'safety performance' 
was found to be lower than in those organizations where all elements formed 
part of regular managerial processes, 
Even among this group of businesses, where safety was being managed 
adequately, one of the group [0896 - one of the care homes, case 7) had 
difficulties in choosing suitable remedies to identified problems. 
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In the 'professionally managed' care home [0896 - Case Study 7] there was 
evidence of some inappropriate remedies being applied to reduce the risks 
posed by some hazards. One hazard was immobile patients who required 
manual handling. In the 6 months prior to the visit, five accidents (55% of the 
total recorded) had arisen from manual handling. The remedy included 
training in manual handling techniques in the induction programme for new 
care staff. The manual handling requirements for each resident were also 
included within patients' individual care plans. However, inappropriate 
handling was still condoned; when slings were unavailable or when the 
resident objected to their use. 
Among the poorer performers this difficulty in seeking suitable remedies was 
even more apparent. The management of the fruit and vegetable packers 
[0696 - Case Study 2] exhibited particularly flawed judgement when choosing 
remedies to unsafe situations. The directors of this firm described this 
enterprise as being part of the agricultural sector; rather than the wholesale 
trade. This was a family run business and the family, traditionally, were from a 
farming background. Where repairs had been effected they looked botched; 
damaged machinery was cobbled together with baling twine rather than being 
re-welded or a replacement bolt being fitted. 
The decision-making in this firm rested with the M.D., it was he who decided 
those investments that were made and which expenditure would be incurred. 
The other directors were family members and they deferred to the M.D.'s 
autocratic style. It was suggested during interviews that there were few 
dissenters in the organization, either among the packers or among the M.D.'s 
own family. The rather 'macho' approach to risk taking that he espoused went 
unchallenged, he had the power, he controlled the finances. 
A retail outlet [R398 - Case Study 13] also showed poor choices in seeking 
solutions to unsafe conditions. The manager suggested that the remedies 
were quickly chosen; they were described as an almost instantaneous 
reaction to a problem. An example of this was the supporting of a wobbly 
bookcase with a book. A permanent repair was not subsequently effected; the 
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book was left in place as a wedge, in a position where it could be 
unintentionally dislodged by a passer-by. The bookcase was also overloaded, 
at the time of the visit; were it to fall it could have caused serious crushing 
injuries. 
There were other botched repairs visible during the visit to the bookshop. 
There were some cracked switch plates held together with adhesive tape, and 
a piece of cardboard covering a broken window. In this case the owner was 
absent, but the titular manager, his wife, constantly deferred to him. He made 
all decisions; including those about expenditure. The owne~ subsidised the 
undertaking, it was not financially self-supporting. The power rested with the 
owner as he controlled the flow of funds. 
Within this group of poor performers the act of formally assessing risk also 
caused problems. In a retail wine shop [R298 - Case Study 17] there was 
very poor assessment of risks, all risks were discounted as insignificant. The 
owner undertook the assessment, although this was not systematic or 
formalized. It seemed all risks were intentionally under-estimated. During 
discussions it was acknowledged, by the owner, that he had a moral (and 
legal) duty to address any serious risks to his staff or customers. At the same 
time the owner claimed all remedies must incur expense. The owner was past 
pensionable age and he claimed the business no longer broke-even. Any 
demand for investment was described, by the owner, as the final death knell 
for the enterprise. His assessment of risk was apparently influenced by the 
anticipated costs arising, rather than the probability of a hazard causing harm. 
It was notable that the wine merchant's [R298 - Case Study 17] apparent 
tendency to under-estimate risk was echoed in the bookshop [R398 - Case 
Study 13]. In the bookshop any identification of a heightened risk, made by 
the titular manager, was seemingly belittled by her husband. DUring the 
interview she repeatedly referred to his readjustment of her assessments. It 
was her husband who had to fund any repairs or improvements if he accepted 
work was needed. It was also her husband who exercised the power. 
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After considering all the cases it seems that among some 'poor performers' 
there was clear evidence that the risk assessment process could be distorted. 
Where money/cash flow/profit was viewed as an imperative, by someone 
powerful, within the business then the assessment process could be 
perverted by giving consideration to potential expense rather that inherent 
risk. 
However, there was also evidence that where intuitive risk assessments had 
been undertaken there had been no barrier to communicating that risk to 
others within the organization. 
An example of this intuitive risk assessment not being recognized as such 
was in a joinery workshop [0596 - Case Study 16]; where the owner claimed 
not to have undertaken any risk assessment. During the visit the owner 
intervened to require a lathe operator to re-tie his long hair. When asked why 
the owner had intervened he said: "That's a dangerous bit of kit, if he gets his 
hair caught round the spindle, it [the rotating spindle] will scalp him." Thus the 
risk clearly had been assessed and acknowledged; communication was 
timely, direct and verbal. This represented an, observed, example of good 
practice. 
The communication of risk was an area at which some businesses, in the 
study, excelled; for example one of the joinery firms (0596 - case 16). The 
managerial attitudes to safety, the communication method of choice, the 
control methods adopted and the system of feeding back information to 
managers were all examined in an attempt to distil! good practice. 
The management style characterized by high visibility of the manager in the 
work place, where the manager visits the shop floor to observe rather than 
relying on reports, was common to all of those businesses which exhibited 
good risk communication practices. 
It became apparent that communication was not all. To succeed in managing 
safety there must be leadership to promote safety; an open management 
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style, that encourages rapid and direct vertical and horizontal communication; 
and timely feedback. The leadership was not always the prerogative of the 
senior manager; in some successful businesses 'safety champions' were 
discovered. 
It is risk assessment and choice of remedial action that appear to be the 
weakest elements of safety performance; across all cases studied in the main 
study phase. In the pilot studies it had been discovered that less than half of 
the 'mini' and 'micro' businesses had even made the attempt at assessing 
risks in a structured way. Comments indicated that they did nc;>t know where to 
start The problem seemed to revolve around documenting pOlicies and risk 
assessments. 
The main study has built on the data provided by the pilots and provided a 
rich picture of management systems and practices. 
On completion of the initial phases of this study there were two main areas of 
investigation that remained to be accomplished. These were: "to identify and 
describe good practice in occupational safety and health management in 
small businesses"; and "to provide a basis for the development of a model 
integrating organizational size, management style and approach to 
management of occupational safety and health". 
In the comparison of businesses on the basis of their safety performance 
good practice has been distilled. These areas of good practice have been 
examined within the context of the seven main managerial areas that have 
formed the framework for this study: structure; strategy; systems; staff; skills 
base; managerial style and shared values. 
In the next chapter the findings are examined and put into context with the 
findings of previous research. 
294 
CHAPTER SIX - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
CHAPTER SIX 
Discussion of Results of the Initial Studies and the Main Study 
This Chapter examines the findings of the two 'phase one' studies 
and the main study. The results of this research are put into 
context and compared with findings of previous researchers. The 
models and paradigms, identified whilst undertaking the literature 
search, are also used to clarify the discussion. 
6.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER 
These studies were designed to fully utilize a sound research methodology. 
The research works within the constraints of small business research 
(Chapter 2, section 2.2; Goss, 1991). These constraints arise from the 
diversity and volatility of the small business sector, and the inaccessibility of 
small businesses themselves. The studies used postal questionnaires, focus 
groups and case studies to gather data. It is suggested the results may 
provide future researchers a background of knowledge from which to more 
fully explore the whole region. 
The data gathering from the case studies followed an inspection format that 
mirrors the approach used by local authority enforcement inspectors (Chapter 
3, Section 3.4.2; Alcock, 1982). This approach was chosen because local 
authorities in England and Wales are responsible for 1.25 million premises, 
compared to the HSE responsibility for 600,000 (Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health [CIEH], June 2000), and the inspection methodology 
has been refined through repeated review over the last 25 years. 
Most small businesses are in the local authority enforced sector (HELA, 
1998). The categorization of the businesses, according to their safety 
performance, also uses an established risk stratification methodology to 
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confirm the assessment and profile the level of risk posed (HELA guidance 
note, No. 67/1 [revised]). The care taken during the design of the study was 
intended to give a fairly high degree of confidence in the results obtained. 
The theoretical contribution of this work stems from the research method, as a 
holistic study. The data gathering was phased and the results were 
triangulated (Glendon and McKenna, 1995). Some other studies have relied 
on a small sample (Kirby, 1990; Simard et ai, 2000. Much of the previous 
research has been undertaken by small business groups (Forum of Private 
Business, 1993; Association of British Chambers of Commerce, 1995) these 
are by definition interest groups so may well have a bias to their research. 
This study is independent of any special interest, and in using a range of 
methodologies the researcher would argue there is a resulting increased level 
of confidence in the findings. 
A problem arose in terms of access to small businesses. This study is likely 
only to have reached, and examined the views and behaviour of, those small 
businesses with a high degree of sophistication; it was extremely unlikely that 
the research could capture data from blatant exploiters of their workforce. 
However, the differentiation between good and poor performers has been 
possible within the sample. This research has been able to draw out, from the 
comparisons of performance, a richness of data. 
The results of the initial surveys and the main study are discussed in this 
chapter. The findings are compared and contrasted with previous findings. 
The models and paradigms that have been produced by previous research 
are also employed to test the findings and set the outcomes of the research in 
context. 
6.1. RESULTS RELATING TO MANAGERIAL COMPLEXITY AND SIZE 
The initial survey suggested that small businesses had very simple structures, 
with little managerial complexity, this was consistent with the notion of the 
simplest structure (Mintzberg, 1983; Mintzberg, 1988: p533). It also showed 
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that complexity and size of hierarchy tended to increase with the size of the 
business. This increase in the management function with size of organization 
seems logical when compared to results of past research on the optimum 
span of control for managerial staff (Urwick, 1956; Woodward, 1958). 
The lack of middle management in small firms could be expected to have 
implications for owners and managers needing to delegate health and safety 
management tasks. It was Ridley (1990) who suggested that the health and 
safety responsibilities of people at different levels in an organization are 
closely related to their daily managerial roles (Chapter 2, . Section 2.1). There 
was no further supporting evidence in the survey data to test the seriousness 
of these implications so during the consideration of the qualitative data this 
hypothesis was re-examined. 
The survey data provided some evidence that small organizations tend not to 
adopt the structure of machine bureaucracies (Mintzberg, 1979). Within the 
focus groups none of the interviewees made any comments that suggested 
that their employing organisations were machine bureaucracies. No machine 
bureaucracies were discovered during the case studies. 
The low probability of the smaller firms « 10 employees) within the sample of 
having any managerial level other than upper management could, potentially, 
impact on health and safety management. Over 45 years ago, it was 
suggested that "the main problem of small ... businesses is usually that they 
are too small to support the management they need" (Orucker, 1955). This 
phenomenon may also account for the relatively high incidence of complaints 
about bureaucracy, among this group. These complaints were reportedly 
rooted in the administration of current regulatory requirements, relating to 
safety. The real cause of the apparent irritation exhibited by some managers 
could be the lack of managerial time, due to the very low numbers of 
managers employed, in smaller businesses. 
This lack of supervisory staff may also be an important consideration if a 
behavioural approach to safety management were to be promoted for small 
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firms (Cox and Cox, 1996). A theory of planned behaviour, has been 
suggested from previous work (Ajzen, 1991). When this, planned behaviour, 
theory is interpreted using Snyder and Kendzierski's (1982) model, it is 
suggested that the organizational context and social norms should reinforce 
positive attitudes to effect positive change. If such an approach placed heavy 
reliance on supervisory checks it would seem that almost three-quarters of the 
smallest firms within the initial survey sample may be ill equipped to adopt the 
approach. During the main study phase it became clear that a number of 
organisations which were failing to adequately manage safety did not have 
necessary monitoring or control systems. Case 2, the ,fruit and vegetable 
packer; Case 3, the bakery; Case 4, the plastics reclamation site; Case 6, the 
fabric finishers and Case 10, the joiners were just some examples. Some 
businesses also lacked any outward indication of day to day supervision; 
Cases 4,10 and 14. 
Among firms within the sample with 1 0 to 50 employees the incidence of a 
supervisory layer within the structural hierarchy was found to increase. This 
was also reflected in the case studies (for example Cases 6, 7 and 8), and for 
the larger firms within the survey (with 50 to 250+ employees) this reliance on 
supervisory staff was even more marked. From this initial examination, these 
firms would certainly seem to be better equipped to cope with a behavioural 
approach to safety that hinged on supervision, than their smaller counterparts. 
6.2 CONTEXTUALlZING THE SURVEY RESULTS 
Smaller firms, within the survey, were deficient in staff trained in health and 
safety management. This finding mirrors the findings of other research into 
general training provisions in smaller businesses (Walker, 1995; Abbott, 1993; 
Blackburn and Hankinson, 1989). Using the technique of producing a 
weighted indicator for training need from the results was designed to give an 
objective comparison of that need, between different sized businesses. It 
became clear that, within the initial survey sample, training need was greatest 
within firms with less than 1 0 staff, firms with less than 25 staff showed the 
next greatest deficiency. 
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This comparison was intended to highlight what skills, in health and safety 
management and risk control, were available 'in-house' within different sized 
firms. If the skills are not available in-house they must be procured through 
training or buying in. Procurement has cost implications and this may be a 
barrier to any form of managerial intervention that requires specialist skills. 
6.2.1 THE USE OF DEDICATED SAFETY PROFESSIONALS 
From the initial survey results it seemed there was a minimum size a firm 
must reach before they were likely to employ a specialist adviser for health 
and safety issues. More than 45 years ago it was noted "Top management [in 
smaller businesses] is not, as in larger businesses, supported by a host of 
highly trained technical and functional people" (Drucker, 1955). This seems 
logical if you accept the notion that there must be a threshold, above which 
the tasks become so complex as to demand specialist input (Mintzberg, 1979 
b). This does not account for those businesses where the process itself is so 
hazardous that specialists are required independent of the size of the 
business. No small businesses were discovered within the sample that carried 
this disproportionate risk, and resorted to specialists. Within the 39 case 
studies only one business was discovered that employed someone with a 
designated health and safety role. This business (L395 - Case 1) employed 
46 people. 
There would seem also to be, within the sample, a point, in terms of size of 
business, below which the firm could not afford to employ a specialist whose 
effort does not contribute directly to cash flow, output or the core business of 
the firm. This minimum size seemed to lie at around the 40 to 50 employee 
threshold, for this sample. Within the survey, the one firm in the '25-50 
employee' category with a specialist adviser had 40+ employees; all. the rest 
had 50+ employees. 
From the initial survey results it seemed it was four times more likely that a 
business would have no internal source of advice on health and safety issues 
if it was small, [had less than 25 employees] than if it had more than 50 
employees. If this data is coupled with the lack of training among 'owners' this 
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could indicate a lack of health and safety awareness among small firms 
generally. The lack of specialist, health and safety, training experienced by 
owners, in the study, is consistent with findings from other research 
(Westhead and Storey 1997; Larson and Clute, 1979). 
A lack of safety awareness could be the characteristic that cursory 
investigations have revealed and this may account for the perception 
promulgated by the HSE and similar bodies ... "it is a priority ... to ensure that 
small firms know how to avoid workplace accidents and ill health" (Frank 
Davies, Chairman Health and Safety Commission, April 1997). This apparent 
deficiency in knowledge, within some small businesses, would be 
compounded where the business was unable, or unwilling, to draw on 
external advice and support. Private consultants may provide an important 
source of external support for health and safety management. 
The use of consultants by small firms is interesting in light of the findings in 
other research. Other research has shown that small business owner-
managers are generally unwilling to seek external guidance and advice 
(Bibbings, 1995). As long ago as 1963, when Cyert and March were looking at 
organizational decision making, they noted that in smaller businesses 
decisions followed a simple search in response to problems, these 
businesses relied heavily on traditional methods and standard operating 
procedures (Cyert and March, 1963). 
From the initial survey data it appeared, a client of a health and safety 
consultant was most likely to be a medium-sized business. However, there 
was some evidence of the use of consultants by small businesses [less than 
25 employees]. This seems to reinforce the view that there is a serious 
limitation in availability of specialist skills internally in some smaller 
businesses; and their dependence on external advice. 
6.2.2 ACTIVE SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
The basic legislative compliance indicators, within the initial survey were 
strikingly different between small and large firms within the sample. The 
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largest firms expected to achieve complete compliance with legislation. This 
level of compliance was expected for both documentation, such as the safety 
policy; and procedures, such as risk assessments. 
For firms with between 50 and 250 employees the anticipated compliance fell 
slightly. There appeared to be a variation between the expectations for 
documentation and other activities and procedures. It was those activities that 
were both labour intensive and required specialist skills, or that created a 
need for training or outsourcing, that tended to be under-achieved. The vast 
majority of larger businesses, within the sample, expected to produce the 
necessary documentation. Slightly fewer, but still the majority, were confident 
of achieving compliance with their risk assessments. 
Within the initial study, the medium sized (25-50 employee) firms appeared to 
have coped better; in that they all expected to achieve complete compliance 
in both the documentation and risk assessment processes. 
Basic legislative compliance had apparently proved more difficult for the 
smaller firms within the sample. Still, a majority of small businesses [with 
between 10 and 25 employees] were confident they had managed to comply 
with the statutory documentary requirements. However, confidence was 
markedly lower, for the same group when the need for risk assessments was 
addressed. A sizeable minority of this group had encountered barriers to 
complying with this element of their legal duties. The barriers had been 
sufficient to result in them, knowingly, contravening the legislation. Yet, they 
were prepared to own up to the deficiency during the survey. The commonly 
reported barriers were: lack of knowledge and lack of managerial time. 
For the group of smallest companies «10 employees) within the sample, the 
picture was even more pronounced. The compliance rate for basic 
documentation was just over half; while less than half were confident that they 
had adequate risk assessments to ensure compliance. 
It did seem that even those small firms who had been able to fulfil the 
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documentary requirements were less able to manage the risk assessments. 
This, difficulty in assessing risks, could present a serious barrier to safety 
management, if it is a general difficulty. It has been suggested an adequate 
health and safety management system could be based on the effective use of 
a 'safety policy' and 'risk assessments' (Tait and Walker, 1998). The process 
of carrying out risk assessments does seem to have been an insurmountable 
barrier for a significant number of small firms. When these data were 
compared to the data regarding the low level of specialist knowledge found to 
have been available within small firms and the statutory need to have a 
'competent' person undertake risk assessment (Regulation 6, M.H.S.W.R. 
1992), the picture presented was entirely logical. 
The lack of achievement of even the basic statutory minimum is likely also to 
impact on the firm's attitude to other proactive initiatives to improve the health 
and safety climate (Zohar, 1980; Cooper and Phillips, 1994). Some behaviour 
modification techniques rely on rewarding safe behaviour (Burkhardt and 
Schneider, 1987). When the perception is one of general failure the avoidance 
of applying rewards to unsafe behaviours seems to dominate management 
thinking(Burkhardt and Schneider, 1987). 
This notion of a general lack of achievement, leading to a reluctance to 
introduce proactive safety initiatives, seems to be supported by the initial 
survey. Very few of the smallest firms «10 employees) reported that they 
undertook any health and safety management initiatives, unless they were 
considered them essential to fulfil their statutory duties, This finding also held 
for the other small firms (10 - 25 employees). 
Medium sized and large firms (25-250+ employees) within the sample were 
much more likely to introduce initiatives aimed at general improvements that 
extended beyond their minimum duties. Three quarters of these larger 
businesses had current initiatives, at the time of the initial survey. 
Costs were cited as an important disincentive, in the survey. This theme was 
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repeated in the focus groups and among some of the businesses included in 
the case studies. The businesses who saw cost as a disincentive included the 
fruit and vegetable packers (Case 2), The plastics reclamation site (Case 4), 
the fabric finishers (Case 6), the book shop (Case 13) and the tannery (Case 
15). It was the smaller businesses that expressed this view most consistently. 
Costs of legislative compliance were considered prohibitive and there was 
fear expressed that the cost and effort of complying may severely damage 
trading. However, many initiatives from statutory enforcers, designed to 
promote the desirability of complying with the legislation, cite the reduction of 
costs through the avoidance of accidents as the mai.n benefit of safety 
investment. For example "Be Safe - save money: The cost of accidents - a 
guide for small firms" (HSE, 1994); and "Health and Safety in Small firms -
Discussion Document" (HSC, 1995; pS) and HS(G)96. The threat posed by 
high costs, both direct and indirect, resulting from accidents is both explicit 
and implicit in much promotional material, aimed at encouraging businesses 
to manage health and safety. This notion follows the logic of the loss-control 
method of managing safety (Bird and Loftus, 1976). 
6.2.2.1 USE OF THE LOSS CONTROL METHOD 
From the initial survey few small businesses [with less than 25 staff] collected 
accident figures. Among the case studies there were also some that 
apparently failed to maintain accident records; the fruit and vegetable packers 
(Case 2, 15 staff); the bakery (Case 3, 9 staff); the plastics reclamation site 
(Case 4, 7 staff); the carton factory (Case 14, 6 staff) and the wine merchants 
(Case 17, 2 staff). For medium sized firms and large firms (25 - 250+) the 
number that routinely captured this type of data was significantly higher. The 
findings from the initial survey would seem to indicate that the message, that: 
'the reduction of accidents can induce real cash savings' may be loston small 
firms. Some writers have suggested that, in the longer term, the costs may be 
defrayed by taking into account the cost savings resulting from reduced 
accident and incident rates (Davies and Teasdale, 1994). 
Smaller businesses, within the sample, did not tend to collect data on 
accidents. This again held for the cases visited (Cases 2, 3, 4, and 17). They 
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clearly did not apply costs to them and therefore were not aware of the 
potential for any.real savings. This finding was consistent with the Association 
of British Chambers of Commerce [BCC] (1995) survey. The BCC survey 
revealed that of those small businesses, employing less than 50 staff, who 
reported knowing the cost of accidents to the business, over three quarters 
estimated that cost to be less than 1 per cent of their annual turnover. 
Doubts about the reliability of the accident data supplied as part of the survey 
phase of the current study, caused any detailed analysis to be abandoned 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.1.4.1). However, from the free text. responses it did not 
appear that there was an unwillingness to respond to the question, merely an 
absence of information. The lack of information was supported during the 
case studies. In addition to those businesses found not to record accidents 
there were others who failed to review, or otherwise use, the records; for 
example the joiners (Case 10 and Case 15), the quarry (Case 12) and the 
tannery (Case 16). This lack of information, from managers "with an interest 
in, or involvement with, health and safety" within their organizations implied 
that loss control management (Bird and Loftus, 1976; Bird and Germain, 
1986) was not being actively practiced by small businesses, within the 
sample. 
6.2.2.2 ATTITUDES TO HEALTH AND SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
Of those who expressed a view, about legislative controls, most felt that 
current health and safety legislation had a negative impact on their business. 
This feeling was extremely prevalent among managers of small firms [with 
fewer than 25 employees] who were consulted. Nearly all of the smallest 
businesses [< 10 employees] felt the same way. However, the number of 
responses received from this group was very small and these data were 
treated with extreme caution. Nevertheless, the initial study did provide a 
possible indicator of the prevailing view; it was also consistent with the BCC 
(1995) survey findings. The case study phase also revealed some managers 
who were negative to the idea of external controls influencing their business. 
Examples were Cases 3,4,10, 15, and 17. 
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While being mindful that those holding a negative view may be more likely to 
respond, to seize the chance to air their grievances, it was considered that 
analysis of the stated causes of the negativity may be valuable to this study. 
Due to the small number of survey responses, this view was to be tested 
during focus group sessions and in interviews. The triangulation of the data 
was a deliberate technique introduced to increase the confidence in the 
inferences drawn from the data (T. Cox, 1993). 
The image of legislation, and legislative control, may have been influenced by 
the source of that image. The results of the initial survey indicated that for 
small business the most common source of information about health and 
safety was the enforcer [either the Health and Safety Executive Inspectors or 
Local Authority Environmental Health Officers (or Technical Officers)]. Heavy 
reliance was also placed on the press for information by all small businesses 
(Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3) although trade associations were also used. It was 
alarming that among the very smallest businesses a number reported having 
no source of information on which the felt they could rely. However, this 
finding was consistent with Berryman's (1993) identification, within his review 
of the literature, of a general reluctance among owner-managers to seek help. 
Some research, included in Berryman's review had identified recurring 
evidence of a resistance to advice, from qualified sources, among owner-
managers (Larson and Clute, 1979). The reliance on the press for information 
was also consistent with findings in other studies which have shown that 
media coverage and publicity surrounding breaches in safety law have a 
noticeable impact (Dawson, 1992). 
The most commonly cited problem, during the survey, was increased 
bureaucracy. The levels of perception of 'bureaucracy' as a problem were 
found to vary with company size. Kets de Vries (1977) (see also: Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.4) drew a contrast between the informal, individual managerial 
style within small businesses and the formal, bureaucratic administration of 
large enterprises. This dislike of bureaucracy, may not be surprising if it is 
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accepted that internal bureaucracy increases with a firm's size and complexity 
anyway (Merton, 1940; Selznick, 1949). From the observations within some of 
the businesses, during this research, it seemed some businesses were 
attempting to avoid formality, in their management style for example. These 
businesses included: Cases 3,4,6,8,9, 10, 13, 15 and 16. 
Some early studies may provide some clues to the apparent aversion to 
bureaucracy exhibited during this research (Merton, 1940; Selznick, 1949). If 
Selznick's model holds the concept of 'bureaucracy' engendering complaint is 
the imposition of external rules, the perceived subversion of the owner-
managers power; rather than the resulting paperwork. Later studies further 
confirmed this notion of external rules causing 'power' tensions (Gouldner, 
1954). Among the cases where there was an observed tension between the 
imposition of external rules and internal 'power' were: Case 3, the patriarch 
who ran the bakery; Cases 4 and 23 where the proprietors identified strongly 
with their 'ownership' of the business and their role as "The Boss"; Case 15 
the patriarchal firm with a strong 'family' identity; and Cases 17 the despotic 
wine merchant. 
Smaller firms were most affected by the impacts of bureaucracy and cost, in 
their own view. The elements described as essential in any management 
method included: minimum paperwork and low cost. Less than half of the 
medium sized companies in the sample reported being similarly discouraged 
by the bureaucratic aspects of complying with statutory health and safety 
duties. This negative response was surprisingly low in view of the limited 
'management' time available within these businesses, if 'bureaucracy' is taken 
to be the burden of paperwork; less surprising if the 'power' aspects of 
Gouldner's (1954) model are accepted. 
The overarching principal of the legislation is that the burden of compliance at 
this level should be in direct proportion to size of workforce and level of risk 
posed by the activity (Selwyn, 1998). However, the volume of the legislation 
that was also a commonly cited grievance within the initial survey. It was the 
small firms [with between 10 and 25 staff] that most frequently mentioned this 
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as a problem. Half of those businesses, which considered the volume of 
legislation to be a problem, were small businesses. 
The fourth barrier, inhibiting compliance was cited as the complexity of the 
regulations. Surprisingly irritation was expressed most frequently by the 
medium to large firms (50 to 250 employees). None of the smallest firms [with 
less than 10 employees] considered complexity an aspect worth noting. The 
apparent lack of concern with the complexity of the regulations among small 
firms [with less than 25 employees] seems to go against the expected trend. 
One explanation of this could be a lack of appreciation of the detail of the 
legislation by smaller companies. This explanation would be consistent with 
Larson and Clune's (1979) work in which they identified managerial 
deficiencies within small businesses. They identified evidence of some 
managers having been reluctant to undertake any reading of literature 
associated with their business activities. Superficially this explanation seems 
to be at odds with some concurrent work (Vassie, 2000). In her work she 
found that, among 225 small and medium sized enterprises (SME's) 
questioned, on average 71.5 per cent of respondents exhibited awareness of 
the legislation. However, the test of awareness was based on a presented list 
of titles of Acts and regulations; rather than knowledge of content. 
The response rate, among small firms [with less than 25 employees], to the 
question seeking views about the legislation was only 45 per cent. It is 
suggested an element of non-response could be attributed to a lack of 
understanding. In some research, into training in small businesses, it was 
concluded that owner-mangers had a pivotal role in decision-making 
processes and that the underestimate of the need for training could b~ due, to 
some extent, to their ignorance (Matlay, 1996). In some overseas studies the 
importance of the influence of the manager's preconceptions, both 
educational and experiential, was also noted (Eakin, 1992; Lamm, 1995). The 
importance of 'ignorance' may not be confined to training need. It has been 
noted "Top management [in smaller businesses] is not ... supported by ... 
highly trained technical and functional people" (Orucker, 1955). This 
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ignorance could go some way to explaining the unexpected result: that 
"complexity of the regulations" was not mentioned, because of a lack of 
awareness. 
A comment made in the free text of the questionnaire also hinted at a lack of 
appreciation of the scope of the current statutory duties: 
"it is impossible to keep up to date"... " .. sometimes the effect of the 
legislation surprises me" - [small firm, 10 to 25 employees] 
The explanation, that small firms have failed to study the new legislation in 
depth, seems logical when the data is compared to the data concerning 
sources of available advice about health and safety that is accessible by 
these small firms within the sample (Chapter 4, Section 4.1.3). Among those 
firms within the case study sample there were some that displayed an 
ignorance of their duties under the law. The managers of these firms took 
care to comply with some regulations, yet ignored others, for example Cases 
11,12and18. ,. 
Not all respondents viewed the legislative requirements negatively. However, 
the positive views were mainly expressed by larger businesses [with more 
than 50 employees] and only one small business (with less than 25 
employees) found anything positive to say. 
The larger firms (with 50 to 250+ employees) clearly stressed the importance 
of legislation in "setting the agenda". Legal duties were said to indicate the 
direction and emphasis of managers, by providing the goals or targets for the 
companies' strategic management. The "agenda setting" requirements of 
these larger businesses seemed to fit with an overall approach to business; 
that of management by objectives (Drucker, 1955; Quinn, 1980). Management 
by objectives (Drucker, 1955: p150) was apparently not uppermost in the 
minds of the respondents from small companies « 25 employees) but clearly 
was a significant aspect for managers of some of the largest firms. This 
approach was not highlighted by any of the smaller companies. It would seem 
this perspective, on the value of regulation, may differ with the size of firm and 
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management style employed. 
6.2.2.3 MOTIVATORS FOR MANAGING SAFETY 
The positive motivations expressed by small businesses, in the initial study, 
were all internal. This finding was reflected in a concurrent study conducted in 
Canada, among small businesses (Simard et ai, 2000). The Canadian study 
showed that the cultural development of safety management tended to relate 
to the internal social dynamics of a firm. The motivations cited, in this UK 
based research, for joining voluntary safety schemes included: a desire to 
support employee development; a desire to achieve recognition for the 
company and a wish to improve safety of employees. 
These internal motivations are broadly in line with other on this issue work 
(Walker et ai, 1997). They suggested that the key internal motivation for 
managing safety was an assumed moral responsibility. This 'moral code' was 
attributed to powerful members of the organization. (those with power were 
typically the owner or senior manager). It was also suggested this ethos might 
be part of the organizations own value system, gained from the powerful lead. 
The concept of a moral duty of care needs to be married with the apparently 
contrary portrayal of coerced statutory compliance among many small 
businesses. This too was reflected in the work of Walker et al (1997). They 
found that enforcement practices had an important role in motivating small 
firms to manage safely. This was consistent with the findings of the initial 
study. 
6.2.2.4 EVOLUTION OF METAPHORS FROM THE INITIAL SURVEY 
Some of the statements that were submitted, as part of the initial. survey, 
indicated some common areas where regulation was reported to have an 
impact. Some of these common areas have been grouped to produce 
. metaphors that can be applied to conceptualize types of safety management 
climates. The initial metaphor that evolved was "Big Brother". 
Some statements saw regulation and legislation as 'a driver for change' ... "an 
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incentive to give health and safety matters due attention" ... "encouraging staff 
to take safety into account" ... "induces better controls". It was the threat of 
action that was apparently the driver, from the first quote. Hence the concept 
of 'Big Brother', [after George Orwell's (1949) supreme control mechanism]. In 
the second quote 'encouraging' did not seem to be the right word choice, the 
threat of action in the event of omission is apparently the driver. In the last 
quote, the word 'induces' was used with the associated connotation of 
persuasion; regulation was clearly once again the driver. The inference from 
the quotes was that 'regulation' was a means of coercing a reluctant 
response. 
'Big Brother' was therefore used as a metaphor for those businesses where 
the prevailing safety culture was one of reluctant intervention. The main 
motivator for action was fear of legal action for breach of statutory duties. 
There was an example of the 'Big Brother' type among the case studies -
Case 12. The quarry was used to regular enforcement visits and addressed 
those issues that the inspectors routinely checked. The management failed to 
address other hazards and risks that were unlikely to attract enforcement 
action. 
6.2.3 THE USE OF STANDARDS IN SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
It has already been noted that not all respondents in the initial survey viewed 
safety management negatively, but any safety management method was 
deemed to need certain essential elements. The essential elements for small 
businesses have already been described. Mangers from the larger 
businesses reported different priorities. These managers were keen that any 
safety management method should: integrate with existing "ISO" systems; 
incur minimal increase in workload; include training for all members of the 
organization and recognize the company's achievements; integrate with other 
management systems and have a mechanism to ensure employee 
involvement throughout. 
It is striking that out of the six key elements of a safety management approach 
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in large businesses two of those elements involved integration with existing 
systems; both management systems and ISO systems. In other research it 
was found that in some cases the introduction of quality management 
systems has led to improvements in health and safety performance, thus the 
desire for integration is consistent with identified good practice (Redman, 
Snape and Wilkinson, 1995). In the case study phase the brewery, Case 25, 
showed evidence of this spin-off from quality to safety performance 
monitoring. 
From the initial survey larger businesses [with more than 50 employees] were 
more than 5.5 times more likely to have adopted a formal (hard) systems 
approach to quality management than small firms [with less than 25 
employees]. Other researchers have determined that many small businesses 
operate under simple and relatively informal management systems, and in 
most circumstances such systems appear to prove satisfactory (Storey and 
Westhead, 1994). 
To properly examine systems, and other management techniques and 
processes, in use in small businesses it was necessary to elicit responses 
face to face so that follow up questions can be used to clarify the information 
offered. The initial study was extended to include a series of focus groups to 
achieve this richer picture building. 
6.3 THE FINDINGS FROM THE GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
The internal and external motivators were still clear in the descriptions of 
health and safety management approaches within the group discussions. The 
'caring' employer was a role adopted by many within the groups and the 
consensus view was expressed that health and safety was importantbecause 
they [the participants] cared about their workforce. The concept of the value of 
the workforce however was limited in this context. The importance of the 
workforce in the discussions was relative to the success of the participants' 
businesses. This suggests the notion is less of a philanthropic motivation than 
a pragmatic one. 
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The barriers, described within the groups, to managing occupational health 
and safety are consistent with the initial survey findings (Chapter 4, Sections 
4.2.1 and 4.3.3). The participants were unclear about what they must do. 
They were also concerned about the limiting effect of both time and financial 
resources that prevented them from doing all they feared may be involved. 
The presumption about the high resource implications is at odds with the 
ignorance of what is involved. This implies that the two perceptions have been 
gained independently; one is not a consequence of thinking through the 
implications of the other. 
Ignorance of the law has already been discussed (this chapter, Section 
6.2.2.2). The suggestion of ignorance is further supported in the work carried 
out by Tait and Walker (1998). They reported there were a range of 
responses with more than 20 per cent of managers indicating that the process 
was less complicated; once it had been explained and was understood. In the 
current study participants regularly expressed a wish to be told not only what 
was required but also the optimum way to achieve it. This suggests a possible 
way forward in removing this barrier. 
The main fears articulated, in the focus groups included: the volume of 
documentation required, the cost of using consultants and finding staff time. 
However, some members of the groups had been required to submit safety 
policies when tendering for some contracts. They had not generally found this 
to be an onerous task. This creates another anomaly in the findings; the gap 
between the fear of the burdens imposed; and the experiences reported by 
those who had undertaken such tasks. The fears expressed in the groups 
accurately reflected the issues raised in the initial survey. The anomaly 
appears to be real, rather than a product of data handling, and was also 
reflected in the Safety Information Centres study (Tait and Walker, 1995). 
Fear of the perceived legal outcome for non-compliance and caring for 
employee welfare appeared to be the more significant motivators, as they 
were in the postal survey. The "Big Brother" metaphor seemed to be 
applicable but another metaphor also seemed to be emerging. The other 
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metaphor may reflect internally motivated organizations. However, it was not 
yet clear if the two types were mutually exclusive. 
6.3.1 DISCUSSION ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE REPERTORY GRID ANALYSES 
Within the more detailed analysis, facilitated by the use of repertory grids, 
Inspectors and the law were still rated as having a significant impact on the 
consideration of occupational safety issues by one manager. 
The law, cost, and investment were highlighted as having a controlling 
influence on the company's approach to safety. This is a repetition of the 
strain imposed between external motivator and the fear of resource 
implications. This fear of incurring costs is understandable when the lack of 
appreciation of potential savings is considered (Section 6.2.2.1). 
The list of the reported controlling factors included the cultural or moral 
imperative (Cox and Tait, 1997). This may mean the "Big Brother" metaphor 
and the 'caring' business were not mutually exclusive as types. It may be in 
the degree of emphasis, between the internal and external motivation, that 
there can be a distinction made between types. 
Beliefs were the only factor rated as creating safe working practices. This is 
consistent with Edgar Schein's (1985) definition of organizational culture. The 
concept of culture seems to be a relevant consideration. The measurement of 
safety culture has been the focus of a number of reviews of safety 
management (Alexander et al 1994; Cooper and Phillips, 1994). 
Part of the culture of an organization has been attributed to the vision of a 
powerful leader (Lee, 1993 and 1995). In this case the impac~ of the 
Managing Director on safety issues was seen as most closely mimicking the 
impact of line managers. It appears the interviewee rated his own influence 
and that of his line-managers as being very similar, and this suggests he may 
see his small management team as a cohesive group presenting a united 
impulsion. This impression was reinforced during the interview: " I have got 
three managers below me basically; you could say three, you could say four; 
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because my wife runs the Finance Department. ... I do all the creative and 
client contact. Basically that's the whole business". 
The lack of correlation between the influence of line managers and 
organizational beliefs was interesting because it implied that the line 
managers' beliefs were not seen by the Managing Director as reflecting the 
organizational beliefs. This implied a conflict between management desires 
and the culture of the organization. This notion of a conflict, or a sub-culture, 
has also been highlighted in other studies (Adams and Ingersoll, 1989; 
Pidgeon, 1991). Cox and Cox (1996, p117) have suggested that theoretically 
one might expect a safety culture to exist as an emergent property of a safety 
system. 
There was some evidence of formalized systems in this manager's business. 
The effect of operatives on the safety process was rated most closely with the 
effect of machinery. It may for this reason that formal documented control 
systems were described during the discussion. Formal control systems played 
an important part in the management of this business. The interviewee was 
proud of the control systems in place" We have a job procedures manual so 
we can actually include certain things in that. We have a job procedure for 
every individual department and this is part of our 'Investors in People' thing." 
"It has been said we could get BS5750 with our present management 
systems". 
The human-machine interface (Wilson and Rajan, 1998); the machine 
metaphor (Chapter 2, Section 2.3.7; Flood and Jackson, 1991) was clearly 
this manager's focus of attention. The association of operatives with 
machinery seems to be consistent with the respondent's assessment that the 
workforce was most at risk when using machinery. " ... the environments 
change so greatly. You work with machines that are spinning around at high 
speed ... and saws and routers and machinery centres and then you've got 
the other things where you've got typewriters, a computer, a switchboard, 
plotters and things like that." 
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This manager also reported limited benefit from the use of protective 
equipment. This. finding may be flawed because the constructs were imposed 
on the respondent. However, there is evidence in the transcripts that it could 
equally be a true reflection of the interviewee's thoughts: "In practice it is more 
dangerous to have the guard on." "If I was to set up [the guards] on one piece 
of equipment to pass through one sheet of material it could take an hour and 
a half to set up. With pricing and everything you just wouldn't be able to do it 
in practical terms". 
This seemed to be a manifestation of the conflict between the external 
motivator, the legal need to adequately guard dangerous machines, and the 
barrier, the costs incurred in intervening. In this instance the overriding need, 
expressed by the manager, was to minimize operating cost. This was despite 
an expressed belief that his workforce's greatest threat was from the 
machinery they operated. This manager described a business that could 
comfortably fit the "Big Brother' metaphor. 
The preferred approach to managing safety propounded by this manager was 
one of formal documented control systems. There was evidence in the text 
that this is an imported idea from his external influences. The business was in 
the upper size range of businesses for this study [30 employees] and this may 
be an important consideration when comparing these findings with the other 
results. 
The owner of a textile business, with just three employees, had reportedly 
different views. In his business there was clearly great reliance placed on the 
co-owner to spot hazards, assess risk and implement remedial action. 
However there was an anomaly in that the respondent rated his own greatest 
positive impact on health and safety management within the business as 
providing the direction for the safety management approach. 
This seemed to combine two elements of management theory. The power of 
the owner-manager (Vickery, 1991) and his unwillingness to delegate, even to 
a co-owner (Larson and Glute, 1979). This element of power was implicit in 
the respondents use of the term "my Number 2". 
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In this business,. the owner's responses suggested there was a conflict about 
how safety should be managed within the organization. The 'No. 2' apparently 
had the skills, acquired from previous experience. However, the 'No. 2' was 
relegated to responding to operational safety issues, localized problem 
solving. This finding was consistent with some previous research which 
suggested power stems either from position and status within the 
organization, or because the person wielding power has special skills which 
confer respect in certain circumstances (McClelland, 1975). 
Investment in safety was not a major consideration by the senior manager. 
Yet, the strategic direction of safety management appeared to rest with him. 
This, apparent, lack of forward planning and programmed investment in safety 
could contribute to the other emergent finding; the absence of any evidence of 
strategic direction, applied to safety management. This lack of planning was 
consistent with findings of some previous research into managerial 
deficiencies (Larson and Clute, 1979). Safety was depicted as an issue apart 
separate from the concerns with managing the business. 
The motivations for managing safety in this company were all external as far 
as the respondent was concerned. However, there is evidence that the owner 
perceives a conflict of approaches, between himself and his co-owner. The 
'No. 2' is portrayed as actively identifying hazards, assessing risks and 
instituting action. This suggests that although the strategic direction is lacking 
from the owner the advanced specialist experience of his 'No. 2' is allowing 
safety management to be pursued. This suggests a possible avenue for 
overcoming the barrier where a strong manager is negative towards safety 
management. By having someone else, sufficiently empowered to act, a 
person who is skilled in safety management; the inertia from the top could be 
overcome. 
6.3.2 FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHORS 
Initially, many of the concepts were found to overlap. The mutual exclusivity of 
metaphors were an area of concern after analysis of the initial survey data 
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and the issue still remained, even with the additional focus group results. 
The initial "Big Brother" concept seemed to recur and the ideas supporting 
this concept were found within focus group responses. It was reported that 
there was a constant fear of enforcement. The fear of enforcement action had 
never been realized, except as reported by 'others'. Within the group 
discussions several relevant comments were made :"It doesn't apply to us but 
to similar companies where some sort of official has come in and said you've 
got to try to put in the letter of the law exactly (sic)" '" "they are in a position to 
close a business down" .. [JD: 14/3/95] 
However, during discussions there was another distinct motivation that 
emerged. Some small businesses were not apparently concerned with 
preventing losses, including those due to accident, so much as ensuring that 
any losses would be covered by a third party, the insurer. This was the 
"bungee" type. There was a notion of paying regularly to take away the worry, 
rather than investing time in addressing issues. A telling comment in this 
context was "[We] shouldn't be buying health and safety, but it does cost..." 
[e: 24/5/95]. 
This "bungee" type was characterized by a reliance on the guidance provided 
during the insurance assessor's visits; with an unspoken threat of withdrawal 
of cover if the guidance was not followed. The fear of withdrawal of cover was 
paralleled to some extent by the expressed fear of enforcement action. As 
with 'enforcement', everyday business experience did not seem to have been 
the source of this concern. One participant in the groups said, when referring 
to risk controls advised by insurers: "If you spoof your car insurance they are 
not going to payout." [NE: 27/3/95]] 
This reliance on insurance against failure to prevent an accident indicated a 
very fatalistic aspect of this type of approach. One comment included an 
element of this: "Our insurance man came and just said the unions ... will fight 
this [a claim for damages incurred in an accident at work] because they [the 
union members] have free solicitors .... Your insurance company will tell you 
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without fail that unless you'd got five supervisors on duty watching this bloke 
[at the time of the accident] telling him what to do, you'd lose it [the case for 
damages]." [PJ: 27/3/95]. 
Another aspect of this insurance-based ethos was the notion that the 
responsibility is being transferred. There was a heavy reliance on third party 
intervention. One owner said "My insurance broker sends his 'Health and 
Safety' guy free of charge and I must admit, he was (sic) very helpful. But then 
I still feel I am being left to it." [AP: 27/3/95]. 
A problem may arise with this reliance on insurers. The difficulty may stem 
from the limitation of the insurance companies' risk assessments. The 
insurers focus on the most 'costly' hazards, the risk to them as insurers. 
Historically the most costly claims have arisen in the manufacturing industry 
and were associated with manual work (Sun Alliance International, 1991). 
This insurance focus was reflected by some managers in their focus on the 
human-machine interface (Section 6.3.1 - repertory grid analysis), this may 
suggest that the influence of insurance assessors is significant in some small 
businesses. Furthermore, other theorists have suggested that the focus of 
insurance inspections had traditionally been limited to the physical 
environment, rather than on organizational and management systems (Cox 
and Cox, 1996). 
Among the type of small business, that placed so much reliance on their 
insurers, there were those who described that advice, within the discussions, 
as "conflicting". They displayed no confidence in it. In previous work one of 
the personal characteristics, in some managers of small businesses, was a 
resistance to advice from qualified sources but a paradoxical acceptance of 
advice from least qualified sources (Larson and Clute, 1979). Thus this 
scepticism may be a product of the consistency of advice, or of the managers 
own wariness. The insurers' focus during an assessment may not coincide 
with the manager's own focus (or that of an enforcement officer), which may 
be most frequently occurring mishaps. The different purpose, and focus, of 
inspection may account for some variation in the advice tendered on 
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completion of the visit, and the perception of a lack of consistency. However, 
the reported effect of this lack of consistency in advice was reluctance, on the 
part of some managers, to act. 
Other barriers to activity emerged from the discussions. Some small 
businesses objectives focussed almost exclusively on profit; but not for its 
own sake. The profit margin was characterized as critical for survival of the 
business. There were many comments about this aspect" We have been 
through a recession ... you are down to the bone on the number of people 
who run that business and, therefore, you have to manage. .. .. " 'disregard' 
[the safety regulations] ... we [as a company] do our best to spend what little 
money we make to improve the situation for health and safety (sic)". [MD: 
27/3/95]. 
One participant of the group was even more graphic:" ... We are sharks, are 
on the outside trying to scrag (sic) a living. Now while we are trying to make 
this living, we are still competing against everyone else for an hourly rate and 
if your hourly rate is too high, you are out of business." [NE: 27/3/95]. These 
comments recurred across groups, they were not confined to one discussion: 
"If my business wasn't the cheapest I'm afraid I wouldn't get the business". [B: 
24/5/95]. 
Some small businesses saw their future resting on their image as a 'Cheap 
Option'. These businesses had a specific niche in the market. Their niche 
was in supplying larger businesses, acting as sub contractors. Sue Birley 
(1991) highlighted this potential, for larger businesses to sub-contract, as one 
means by which business start-up opportunities were created. Managers in 
this type of small business described safety management as a waste of 
resources, particularly managers' time. It has already been described how 
proactive health and safety was presented in these discussions as just a cost. 
A large proportion of these businesses had been created within the last five 
years. This may have placed them in Phase 1 of their lifecycle, at the time the 
focus groups were held. Phase 1 in one model is termed the existence and 
survival phase (Burns, 1991). Burns identified that in this phase cash flow was 
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often the major control imperative. 
Some of the small businesses, within the groups, were openly reluctant to 
invest in health and safety initiatives. Those in this group did not tend to have 
staff skilled in health and safety. Skilled staff were described as costing too 
much to employ; or to train. This view was consistent with other findings 
(Westhead and Storey, 1997). They concluded that there are a number of 
reasons why smaller businesses were markedly less likely to provide any form 
of training for their employees. They noted owner-managers were 
overwhelmingly concerned with short-term survival. 
There was another barrier to active management of health and safety issues 
that was identified from the discussions. Some small businesses, in the 
groups had managers who showed a tendency to repeatedly stress "It'll never 
happen to us". The metaphor adopted was the "ostriches". These small 
businesses did not perceive risk of serious accident as real; certainly did not 
accept any real danger of business closure as the outcome of an accident. 
The notion of 'acceptable risk' and the linkage between concepts of risk and 
harm could be said to be fundamental to safety management (Fido and WOOd, 
1989). Cox and Cox (1996) noted that evaluation of risk is dependent on the 
person's perception and knowledge of the hazard and the associated 
consequence, and in turn their experience of that, or similar hazards. The 
evaluation of any risk is firstly dependent on who is the 'assessor' (Hale, 
1996). Where the assessor is an unskilled owner-manager, their lack of 
experience and training (Section 6.2.2; Matalay, 1996) may reasonably be 
expected to influence their judgement. 
There were also "passive" types of businesses characterized within the 
discussions. The reports from managers of some small businesses lacked 
any evidence of managerial intervention for health and safety. These "passive 
types" were also found during the case study phase, for example the 
management in Cases 4, 10 and 14 were essentially passive. Senior 
managers portrayed themselves, often unconsciously, as reactive rather than 
proactive. A common theme among these types of businesses was "Where 
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do we start?" The issues were portrayed as overwhelming, with no element of 
prioritization or focus having been applied. One participant summed up the 
enormity of their task as he saw it: " It's the 50 pages that you have to read [in 
the legislation] to get to that one line that tells you what you should do." [NE: 
27/3/95]. Another member of the same group showed that she was overawed 
by the problem "I am in the situation where, within limited knowledge, looking 
around the place, you say 'where do we start?' and 'what are the relevant 
things to start with?'" [AP: 27/3/95]. 
These types of businesses had managers who portrayed only a vague notion 
of what health and safety management could entail. They were interested in 
"keeping in touch" with health and safety issues. Their approach was 
aspirational. This aspirational trait was noted in the carton manufacturers 
(Case 14) during the case study phase of the research. Some representatives 
of this 'passive type', cited, during discussions, a general wish for a 'better 
working climate'. There was evidence of passive reliance on suppliers to notify 
changes to the law, and to take some responsibilities from the small business 
customer. There was again some evidence of the reliance placed on third 
parties; the dependence on insurers was similarly exhibited by some small 
businesses as having been placed on suppliers; especially equipment and 
chemicals suppliers. Previous research had noted that there were traditional 
sources of advice and assistance for small businesses that included suppliers 
(Birley, 1991: p21). One manager summed up his risk control approach: 'We 
hire plant from 'reputable' firms" [JD: 21/2195]. It is implicit in this statement 
that the speaker trusts that the supplier will make the effort to ensure 
compliance, no effort is required from the hirer. 
This type of passive management also seemed to include a passive approach 
to gathering information. This tendency had already been uncovered (Larson 
and Clute, 1979). Within the groups some respondents expressed difficulty in 
getting hold of information on regulations. Information gathering was the 
reason given by one manager for his participation in the group. "This [focus 
group] will be just bringing us [his business] up to date, finding out, from my 
point of view, what is going on and what should be done as an organization of 
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this size [30 employees including part-timers]". [JR: 27/3/95]. 
Others seemed to rely on unsolicited information that crossed their desk. 
There was no suggestion of active searching. 'We get various publications 
come through ... Croner [a health and safety briefing sheet in A4 leaflet form, 
with condensed summaries and a journalistic style] once a month ... I think we 
pay for it." [C: 24/5/95]. 
The passive gleaning of information was a problem for some small 
businesses within the groups. However obtaining information seemed to be a 
wider problem among participants. The barrier is the limited number of 
sources of information available to small businesses. 
Some of those in the groups were suspicious of people "trying to sell us 
consultancy". One owner said "We are inundated with people trying to sell us 
consultancy, which can become very threatening." [AP: 27/3/95]. There was 
also a lack of confidence in the quality of advice obtainable. 
In the face of the difficulty in obtaining reliable advice from a competent 
source there was still resistance to employing a specialist. In his review of 
literature Berryman (1983) had identified the recurrent reporting of a 
reluctance, among owner-mangers, to seek help. This resistance was 
apparent among participants across all groups. In most cases the resistance 
seemed to be allied to the perceived cost and the reluctance to invest that has 
already been discussed. However, one manager stated "I don't want to have 
to put someone in as a specialist. I've already got a debt collector and people 
like that which is (sic) against the grain to me to have to run a small business 
and take people on that sort of nature (sic)" [MD: 27/3/95]. This manager 
viewed specialists as unproductive the notion of a multi-skilled workforce was 
central to his perception of how a small business should be run. Within that 
group no dissent was expressed to that notion. 
There was some evidence that a number of those who participated in the 
initial survey adopted a very passive approach to safety management or 
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attempted to intentionally transfer their duty of care to a third party. There 
were also those.who reported the risk of an untoward event as being unreal, 
or negligible. This discounting, or belittling, of risk was observed during the 
case studies, in the bookshop (Case 13) and the bus depot (Case 23). 
The initial studies allowed greater confidence in defining the concept of 
'small'. The results from the initial research also gave direction to the next 
stage of the research by suggesting avenues of investigation: testing the 
metaphors derived and investigating how safety is managed particularly in 
those small businesses where the approach appears passive. 
6.4 . THE SECOND STAGE - THE MAIN STUDY 
The sample for the case studies was tightly focused on small businesses and 
industry sectors were well represented across the sample. The sector was 
subdivided by size of business, based on data elicited from the initial surveys, 
prior to the selection of the sample. 
The basis of the main study was an investigation of 'how' safety is managed in 
small businesses. The use of performance indicators was a tool that has been 
used to objectively judge the success of safety management, in the selected 
areas. The scores were being used to indicate safety performance so that the 
businesses could be grouped according to perceived performance and 
commonalties and differences between groups and between members in the 
same group could be assessed. 
6.4.1 COMPARISON OF ATTRIBUTES OF THOSE WITH ADEQUATE SAFETY 
PERFORMANCE AND POOR PERFORMERS 
Using the performance indicator scoring to assess structural differences 
showed a skewing of the results. The adequate performers tended to have 
professional managers or a board of managers determining the strategic 
direction of the business. 
323 
CHAPTER SIX - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Any anomalies identified during the comparison process were traced back 
through the raw data, in the field notes and matrices. The notion of experience 
and knowledge affecting performance seemed to be confirmed in this study. 
Those with previous industry experience appeared to enjoy greater success 
in managing safety, for example in the care homes (Cases 5 and 7) the hotel 
(Case 9), and the brewery (Case 25). The under-performers were 
concentrated among the family businesses and the single owner-manager 
start up companies, for example the bakery and grocers (Cases 3 and 20) or 
the plastics reclamation site (Case 4). Among these owner-managers most 
had no previous experience of large organizations in their chosen industry 
sector. 
Using the performance indicator scoring to assess the effect of differences in 
managerial style showed a marked skewing of the results. These results 
suggested that managerial styles were related to safety performance. This 
reflects the work Lee (1993 and 1995) has done in summarizing the key 
characteristics of low accident organizations. One of Lee's 'key 
characteristics' relates to management style. He suggests that less formal 
styles with partiCipatory leadership are common to some low accident 
organizations. 
It is not suggested that by looking at 'style' as a factor that it is independent of 
other variables. The choice of style originates from the framework adopted for 
the study (the McKinsey 7-s framework; Chapter1, Section 1.6.3; Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4; Peters and Waterman, 1982) this framework highlights the 
interconnectedness of the factors. 
The style adopted by those successful businesses was a traditional 
hierarchical system with established delegation channels (Mitzberg, 1979, b.). 
This was apparent in the case studies in the care homes (Cases 5 and 7) and 
the brewery (Case 25) particularly but all eight businesses in this group had 
managers with a traditional business background, by experience or training. 
The examination of the under-performers proved far more interesting in this 
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instance. From this study the least successful management style seems to be 
the autocratic leader: one who centralizes all decision-making, and is reluctant 
to delegate (Cases 3, 20, and 2). These characteristics again echo some 
previous findings (Argenti, 1976; Larson and Clute, 1979; Helier et ai, 1988). 
Conversely, the HSE (1981) has in the past criticized managers for delegating 
decision-making on safety to individuals with a low powerbase. 
From the case studies it would appear that in each case the leader did not 
have sufficient personal knowledge, or experience to facilitate the self 
imposed role. In at least two cases sufficient expertise did exist elsewhere in 
the organization but the autocracy was a barrier to upward communication 
and the resource was wasted. 
The variation between the autocratic and laissez faire styles seemed, from the 
cases, to focus on knowledge available within the organization. In the 
autocratic businesses centralized control was a deliberate method. Within the 
passive style the laissez faire approach caused no observed barrier to upward 
communication. There was a recurring theme in these cases: the manager did 
not act because the issue was not a concern of the workforce. While, some of 
those workers, who had previous experience of other organizations: saw 
safety as 'a management' issue, and not for them to lead on. This 
unwillingness to take responsibility for safety issues seemed to cause the 
passivity. 
The tension between the manager's need to have issues brought to him and 
the employee's reticence seemed consistent with Leavitt's (1951) theories on 
peripherality and centrality within communication systems in organizations. He 
postulated that those positions most limited in independence may begin to 
perceive themselves as subordinates. 
Those workers without previous work experience, or training, appeared 
ignorant of the concept of risk management or safety management. Some 
problems were, apparently, solved intuitively on an ad hoc basis; or reportedly 
remained unresolved. There were some "Heath Robinson" repairs and 
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modifications seen: for example, the missing wing nut on the guard to a press 
replaced by a binding of garden twine; and the rickety book case wedged 
under one leg with a book of suitable thickness, 'borrowed' from the case. 
This type of flawed remedy decision shows similarities with the 'cycle of . 
decision failure' described by Glendon and McKenna (1995). 
From previous work it was expected that management characteristics may 
vary from industry to industry (Sandler and Barry, 1970). However, analysis 
by Industry sector was limited, by the size of the sample. From the limited 
analysis there was no observable pattern, it was an apparently random 
distribution. The major influence on performance still seemed to relate to the 
size of the business. 
Comparison of differences in size [expressed as number of employees] 
between poor safety performers and those who performed adequately 
appeared to confirm the notion that the small businesses were less 
successful. Only one of the smaller companies (with less than 10 employees) 
achieved adequate safety. This business was a medical based business with 
strict formalized control procedures for some tasks, for example drug 
dispensing. The organization was a formal hierarchy with a trained and 
experienced professional manager. 
When looking at attitudes of senior managers, it is not surprising to find that 
those positively disposed towards safety management are most likely to attain 
the desired results. Those with a negative view could be expected to fail. 
What is more interesting is that in 36 per cent (9/25) of cases the business 
found to be under-performing had a manager who was positive, or very 
positive to the idea of managing safety issues. However, where there is a 
desire to succeed some barrier must exist that is frustrating that desire. A 
number of these businesses, although positively disposed to the notion of 
safety management, exhibited a passive management style. The barrier was 
apparently a lack of drive to succeed. The safety problem had not been 
investigated, no issues had been distilled, no targets set and no plans made 
to resolve or change anything. Thus while the aspiration was vocalized it was 
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never translated into action; the ideal remained an abstract concept. 
There was an impression given in some of these businesses that the positive 
aspirations were parroted rather than 'lived'. During some inspections, while 
the aspiration had been specifically outlined during the interview, some 
obviously dangerous practices were apparently being ignored. Some of these 
dangerous practices were seen during the visits, but were not acknowledged 
by managers. These practices included: paring a strip of wood with a blade 
while bracing the piece between the thighs - cutting towards the groin; leaving 
a knife protruding from a bench so that the manager knocked it to the floor 
while passing; charging a battery whilst smoking a cigarette, etc. 
The managers' apparent oversights in relation to unsafe acts could have been 
the result of the researcher's presence, in each case. The manager may have 
been unwilling to draw attention to mistakes in front of an outsider. This 
potential for modified behaviour as a response to the act of obtaining the data 
(Chapter 3, Section 3.4) casts some doubt on the validity of these 
observations. However, there is supporting evidence of long term behaviours: 
in the work area there was piled refuse that had not been cleared; and some 
staff had heavy soiling to their hands and work-wear, although they were not 
engaged in any dirty activity at the time of the visit. The long-term indicators 
were often taken as supportive evidence, in preference to actions witnessed 
at the time, because of fear of contaminating evidence through the act of 
collection. 
It appeared skills were important in relation to safety management. The skilled 
and professionally based businesses exhibited a higher rate of success in 
achieving the safety indicators than other businesses; whilst small business 
reliant on unskilled staff had a high probability of under-performing. This idea 
of a minimum skill level has interesting links with training in small businesses. 
This in turn links to some research into the factors that inhibit small firms from 
using available health and safety training opportunities (Walker, 1995). 
It seems to be the systems employed that go to the core of 'how' the 
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managerial process is effected (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.7). There were clear 
differences between poor performers and those achieving their aims. Three-
quarters of the small businesses achieving adequate management of safety 
had discernible formalized systems. The types of systems included: quality 
control systems; documented monitoring and control procedures; permit to 
work systems; formal recording methods in some areas; and evidence of 
training record and skill review systems. 
The remainder of those performing adequately had: a safety system, supplied 
by a third party; a documented safe system of work for blasting; a double 
entry book keeping system with Worksheet -docket -account reconciliation; 
and written procedures for security tasks e.g. cashing up and locking up. 
Some of these systems were unsophisticated, like the worksheet - docket 
reconciliation. Most of the systems had evolved internally to address a 
perceived need. In each case the systems used were practically based and 
showed evidence of having evolved. Very few were computer-based. 
The exception to the evolved system was the safety system that was a 
"tailored" off the shelf procedure manual purchased by one business to fulfil 
their legal duty to document aspects of their safety management approach. 
This folder was pristine inside and dust covered on the top, the spine was stiff 
and gave every appearance of never having been opened. This was the one 
system that was not in regular use within the business. It was also the only 
system that had been imposed. The adequate safety performance in this case 
arose because parallel systems had arisen. These systems evolved to meet a 
need and nobody within the organization seemed to be aware that similar 
control procedures were documented in their "Safety System's Manual". 
Among those small businesses that were under-performing, there was a 
distinct difference in their use of systems. Within the majority of these 
businesses there was no evidence of formalized or documented systems. 
During the visits it was observed that operations were pursued and controlled 
by custom and practice of the individuals rather than an overtly systematic 
approach imposed, sanctioned or even recognized by the manager. 
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Among the rest of the under-performers there was some evidence that they 
had documented systems in some cases, but a substantial proportion of these 
were unused. This was often characterized by a system that had been 
developed elsewhere and brought in. 
6.4.2 ANALYSIS OF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
Hazard identification was seen as an important part of a risk assessment 
process. Prompted hazard identification, for the purposes of this research 
was: acknowledgement of a hazard following an accident or near-miss. 
The method of risk assessment and use of the assessment as an action 
trigger was also used as an indicator of safety performance. The choice 
remedy was another indicator. The adequate performers appeared to have 
performed well across the range of indicators. This goes some way towards 
justifying the original choice of indicators to sort the businesses according to 
their performance. 
The areas where the poor performers had most difficulty seemed to be 
primarily in seeking remedies to problems. Risk assessments also seemed to 
cause difficulty; the lower incidence of small businesses carrying out risk 
assessments has been documented previously (BCC, 1995; Walker and Cox, 
1995). It has been suggested that the difficulties for small businesses, in 
undertaking risk assessments, may arise partly from difficulty in 
comprehending both terminology and concepts (Tait and Walker, 1998). 
The task that was most consistently achieved was hazard identification. This 
may suggest that to improve performance among the lowest achievers the 
areas to target should include risk assessment, communication of -risk and 
choice of remedy. 
The comparison between the two groups has revealed that on average 
communication of risk was less successfully achieved by 'poor performers', 
than within the adequate performance group. The communication techniques 
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of these businesses were examined further as possible examples of good 
practice. 
The primary method of communication in all cases, for health and safety risk 
matters, was the spoken word. It also seems important that verbal 
communication should be timely, open and direct. Communication has been 
as a key organizational process, in effecting attitude change (Lee, 1995). He 
also highlighted the superior method of communication as face to face 
contact. Peters and Waterman (1982) had already noted that "the nature and 
uses of communication in the excellent companies are remarkably different 
from those of their non-excellent peers". They coined the term 'organizational 
fluidity: M BWA' to convey the notion of the rich ways of communicating 
informally to engender a rapid response. 
In the current study, the preferred management style in all cases, showing 
some evidence of success, was "Management by Walking About" [M BWA]. 
This allowed the manager to observe, intervene and correct rapidly and 
precisely. It also made the manager accessible for the workforce to initiate 
communication. In every case the manager was out mixing with the staff 
regularly, several times an hour. 
In all three 'successful' cases, staff provided the feedback to the manager, 
directly. Feedback was informal and verbal and took place during normal 
interactive conversations during the work period. In all cases the 
organizations were hierarchical but informal, the managers were 
approachable because of the management style as well as the physical 
proximity of manager and staff. 
Those small businesses with borderline safety performance were examined 
next; to discover, in particular, in which areas they were under performing. 
The most troublesome area for these mediocre performers was hazard 
acknowledgement, assessment of risk also showed as a weak area. Choice of 
remedy was also poor. 
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The results confirmed that the scoring for the performance of the intermediate 
group lay between that for the better and worse performing groups; increasing 
confidence in the suitability of the initial rating methodology. 
6.4.2.1 CATEGORIZING BUSINESSES ACCORDING TO MUMFORD'S 'CONTRACTS'. 
- ... _-
The organization 
: The knowledge contract Needs a certain level of skills and 
• knowledge in employees to 
• function efficiently 
...... --'.-.--~. - -.-,.----. -" -_ ... _- .. ---_._- . 
The psychological contract . Needs motivated employees 
Adequate 
Performers 
s 
o. 
...... - .. _._-_., ... _-_.... .---.-... ---~.--.----.. ..- -- _.... . ... -.......... _-- ",----" -_ ... -_ ....... -.-•.. _-_ .. -. 
: The efficiency contract . Needs to maintain quality and 1 
._ ........... __ , ..... __ ........ , ...... "."._ ... , .. e>utput .... ........ ... .... . ..... ,_ .... _., ... . 
. The ethical contract Needs employees who will accept 
, the organization's ethics and . 
. values o 
~ .. -.. -----------.----------.--.~----.-------. .--.. , ... __ .--." .... --. -- " .----_._- .•. _.- .--,-.. -.-.. --------.- .. 
Poor 
Performers 
2 
3 
3 
6 
: The task structure contract . Needs employees who will accept ,2 11 
. : any technical constraints 
: ....., .... __ .. ,. _ ... _ " ... __ .".·associates with, their jobs ............. _ ....... , .......... _ ,_. 
Use of Mumford's (1972) 'contracts', to compare those businesses with 
differing success rates, showed that those small businesses with adequate 
safety performance seemed most likely to value knowledge and skills in their 
employees [S/8] (62.S%). Whilst those who failed to achieve a high degree of 
safety management were most likely to be task orientated [11/2S] (44%). The 
other type of contract typified by those poor performers was the ethical 
contract [6/2S] (24%). The ethical contract has been identified in those small 
businesses with a passive, laissez faire, management style. 
6.4.2.2 USING RAINNIE'S TYPOLOGIES: 
Dependent - Small businesses exist to serve larger firms 
Dominated - Small businesses compete with large firms by" intense 
exploitation of their machinery and workforce 
Staid - Small businesses operate in a safe market niche 
Innovative - Small businesses pioneer new products and new markets 
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Rainnie's typologies Adequate Performers Poor-Performers 
.. 
o 5 
Dominated o 10 
Staid 4 7 
I Innovative 4 3 
Rainnie's (1991) work allowed a different categorization of small businesses. 
After sorting, the adequate performers were evenly split between innovative 
businesses and those operating in niche markets. However, innovative 
practices seem not to provide any guarantee of, successful safety 
management as three of those under performing could also be described as 
innovative. 
The largest single group [10/25] (40%) of those small businesses that were 
not adequately managing safety were trying to compete with large market 
players. This possibly accounts for the emphasis on cost minimization as 
being key to survival, being the cheap option. In all 60% [15/25] of under 
performers were either competing with large businesses or supporting large 
businesses as sub-contractors. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This section summarizes examples of good practice and barriers 
6.5.1 THE MOTIVATIONS FOR SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
One clear motivation to manage safety was fear of enforcement, and fear of 
increasing insurance premiums. The altruistic employer was commonly self 
described, albeit obliquely, during group discussions but this altruism was 
rarely found to stand alone it was often coupled with a pragmatic motivation. 
The importance of the workforce was relative to their role in the continuing 
success of the business. 
6.5.2 BARRIERS TO SUCCESSFUL SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN SMALL BUSINESSES 
One barrier, to managing safety, emerged among those businesses that saw 
themselves as the 'Cheap option'. Those businesses focused almost 
332 
CHAPTER SIX - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
exclusively on profit. Profit in these cases was seen as critical to survival. 
These businesses were reluctant to invest in health and safety initiatives and 
did not tend to have skilled staff to champion health and safety issues. It 
seemed that in some cases the presumption of high resource implications 
was voiced while there was a simultaneous display of ignorance of detail 
regarding the action required. 
Another barrier was the lack of a realistic appreciation of risk, this was 
displayed in the plastics reclamation process (Case 4), the bookshop (Case 
13) and the bus company (Case 23). It has been suggested that a hazard-
harm-risk process may underpin the safety management process (Cox and 
Cox, 1996). The 'ostriches' reported the risk of serious accident as being 
unreal and indicated they believed enforcement action, against them, to be 
unlikely. This was reported not only in the focus groups but also during the 
visits, Cases 4 and 6. 
There were passive managers who also adopted a passive approach to 
information gathering. They portrayed only a vague notion of what health and 
safety management can entail. There was a dependency on suppliers to notify 
changes in the law. These managers acknowledged the difficulty in obtaining 
reliable information. The sourcing of information seemed to be a wider 
problem among small businesses. The barrier in this instance was the limited ' 
number of reliable sources accessible to small businesses. 
There were also some major problems encountered by managers of smaller 
businesses in setting safety objectives. In many cases the data requirements 
outstripped the capacity of the management information system to meet the 
need. The management information available in many of the_smaller 
businesses was found to be severely restricted, bureaucracy was actively 
avoided in many small firms. The operating environment of many small firms 
was one of limited experience of data collection and analysis. 
The goals that had been set (even intuitively, and not necessarily articulated 
as goals) may not have been achievable in the time, or with the resources, 
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available. Many objectives were not explicitly articulated, they were expressed 
in conversation as aspirations. 
6.5.3 APPROACHES ADOPTED FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY 
MANAGEMENT WITHIN SMALL BUSINESSES. 
Those most successful in managing safety had a hierarchical structure with 
established lines of delegation and communication. However, those with 
autocratic leaders without delegation practices were demonstrably less 
successful, for example the bakery (Case 3) and the grocers (Case 20). 
Autocracy seemed to cause significant barriers to upward communication 
and, in some cases, stifled problem solving. 
Neither the autocratic or laissez fa ire styles were evident in successful 
businesses. Those employees without training, or previous experience, solved 
safety problems intuitively on an ad hoc basis, or they remained unresolved. 
The attitude of those with power was shown to impact on success. Those 
managers positively disposed to the notion of safety management were most 
likely to attain desired results. However, the desire to succeed did not 
overcome some barriers. Passive management styles lacked the drive to 
succeed, intentions were seldom translated to actions, for example the joiners 
(Case 16). 
The skilled and professionally based businesses exhibited a higher rate of 
success than those businesses with unskilled staff. This notion of minimum 
skill level has links to training within small businesses (Fuller et ai, 1991; 
Birley and Westhead, 1992; Walker, 1995; Matalay, 1996; Curran et ai, 1996). 
However, the systems involved in running the business seem to affect 
success directly. The majority of small businesses achieving adequate safety 
management standards had discernable formalized systems. In each case 
systems were practically based and showed evidence of having evolved to 
meet an identified need. 
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It was noticeable that systems per se did not guarantee success. The most 
notable examples were the off-the-shelf generic safety systems that are 
brought in to the organization from an external source. These systems were 
found to exist as documents but where they were not adopted into the 
management process, they had no visible effect. 
In many poorly performing small businesses there was a demonstrable lack of 
knowledge of the basic principles and concepts relating to safety, for example 
in the bakery (Case 3). This reflected the inherent introversion exhibited by 
many small businesses, and was apparent in most of those questioned during 
this study. There was a demonstrable lack of knowledge of established 
approaches to many problems relating to safety and many participants in the 
focus groups reported that their motivation in attending was to gain answers 
to some of their concerns relating specifically to risk assessment. 
There were cases where managers were repeating an approach and finding it 
failed on the second application. It became clear there was a failure to 
appreciate why success was achieved the first time. There was a general lack 
of knowledge of how other management functions and business strategies 
could dovetail with safety strategies. 
Managers were repeatedly choosing an approach that did not leave sufficient 
time for evaluation of the choice and the development of alternatives. This is 
believed to be because many managers of small businesses did not have 
formal management qualifications and the associated specialist training, this 
was certainly true of the majority of those questioned during the study. 
It was found some managers had been choosing an approach that avoided 
highlighting human problems. This was thought be a result of unconsciously 
holding a concept of the organization that reflects the machine metaphor. This 
conceptual framework may itself be a product of the traditional hard systems 
approach, the operational safety management approach simplistically 
conveyed in many of the more accessible texts available to the small 
businessman. 
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Frequently in the study managers were failing to assess the readiness for 
change and the human environment prevailing, before making a choice. 
Choices were made using a non-participative approach. The most striking 
example of this was a small business where the owner-manager was 
autonomous and delegation was resisted. 
There were occasions when managers were letting the need for acceptability 
become the overriding influence for the determination of the strategy, and 
approaching the problem bottom up rather than top down. Not all businesses 
within the sample were failing to manage safety successfully. 
Good communication was observed within successful businesses. In each 
case someone with power with an interest in safety acted as issue champion. 
The primary method of communication was direct and verbal. It seems 
important that communication is open and timely. 
Feedback was provided in an informal way, and was again verbal. Feedback 
took place on a ad hoc basis during normal conversations. These interactions 
were themselves facilitated by the accessibility of managers, management by 
walking about was actively practiced. Good safety management was found 
not to be divorced from the principles of good management practice generally. 
To achieve the desired improvement firstly in accident statistics, and then in 
general well being, in small firms it would seem that the hard systems method 
is not the way forward. The future would seem to lie with creating an 
environment where good safety and welfare practices are the norm. It is the 
evolution of safety cultures that need to be assisted. 
6.6 CRITIQUE OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The research question was deemed to require a muli-method data collection, 
to give the desired depth of information. However, the initial postal surveys 
were hampered by a poor rate of response. The decision to include qualitative 
questions in the survey instrument reflected the investigative nature of the 
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initial, exploratory phase of the research. The omission of quantitative 
questions denied the researcher an opportunity for greater statistical testing of 
the results. A relevant criticism that has been leveled at the survey method is 
that it rules out the possibility of understanding the process by which people 
come to adopt particular behaviours. As a method it does not address the 
question of 'how; safety is managed. By using the survey as part of the multi-
method approach with qualitative methods following was designed to allow 
the development of an understanding of the processes involved in safety 
management. 
With hindsight opportunities were lost in using a postal survey at the outset. 
The return rate was poor because in sufficient information was available to 
target the instrument properly. Also the survey instrument was bland because 
there was limited knowledge of the subject at the design stage. If the survey 
instrument had been used after case studies and focus group data was 
available it could have been more tightly focused on demonstrating the 
reliability of the data from the qualitative methods. 
If the survey instrument had been designed towards the end of the study it 
could have posed deeper questions, based on the information already 
gathered, for example the procedure for identifying hazards or estimating risk. 
It should also probably be administered by telephone interview, rather than as 
a postal survey. A telephone interview allows a more investigative approach 
with the open questions, it would also enable information to be collected from 
those who declined to participate, about why they declined. The response rate 
should also be higher from a telephone survey. 
The focus groups yielded a wealth of information and enabled much of the 
research to be set in context. However, the groups were labour intensive, time 
consuming and poorly attended. The shortage of participants caused the 
programme of scheduled groups to be curtailed. The restrictions in both the 
number of groups and the number of participants in each limited the 
confidence in the data elicited. 
337 
CHAPTER SIX - DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
If the study were being designed now it may be preferable to have focus 
groups between. the case studies and the survey phase. This would give the 
opportunity to test the initial findings from the case studies with an informed, 
and interested audience. This might have stimulated discussions and refined 
the question of 'how' safety management is effected. It would also afford the 
opportunity to test the language and concepts in the survey instrument before 
the formal pilot. 
It might also have been worthwhile, had time permitted, to have the same 
groups meet more than once. To develop a relationship with, and between, 
the group and observe any change in attitudes or knowledge. This might have 
indicated whether or not the management approaches could be influenced by 
networking. 
The case studies provided a wealth of data. The observations and interviews 
were reliant on the researchers prior knowledge and experience, not only 
during the process of collection but also during the data sorting, 'ditching'. And 
analysis. It was not possible to achieve complete objectivity during the 
observation phase some impressions were subjective by their very nature. 
The ranking of the businesses by hazard and risk was quasi-scientific, in that 
it used a tried and tested methodology, and the consistent use of the method 
by the researcher had been moderated by peer review. However, the ranking 
was still reliant on subjective assessment and evaluation of residual risk. The 
performance indicator scoring used different scales but the individual scores, 
although systematically applied, were no less subjective. 
The central question in considering the validity of the data, bearing in mind the 
relatively small sample of 125 small businesses across all data collection 
methods, is 'are the findings true for small businesses?' The findings were 
valid for those businesses that were subject to inspection, at the time of the 
visit. There were also common findings across all three methods which 
increases confidence in the validity. However, it was clear at the outset that 
the small business sector is essentially a heterogeneous group and as such 
generalizations should always be guarded. 
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6.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FURTURE 
The main outputs from this research have been the determination of some 
aspects of management that were common to those smaller business that 
were achieving success, from their managerial intervention in safety issues. 
Also the identification of some areas of organizational behaviour that 
differentiated good performers from those that were achieving less. These 
issues have been discussed in line with theoretical frameworks and this 
combination of observation and the underpinning theory has allowed the 
determination of some of the practical implications for the ~ndings. 
These practical implications may be of use to health and safety trainers, 
enforcement officers, consultants, other intermediaries and small business 
managers themselves. By distilling good practice it may be possible to 
overcome some of the identified barriers. Also by tailoring advice or guidance 
in a manner that is designed to reflect the normal operating environment of 
some small businesses one may make small business managers more 
receptive. The focus on good practice and the identification of potential 
barriers to success was specifically aimed at facilitating the practical 
application of the study findings. This study has only just begun to answer the 
question of 'how' small businesses manage safety. Further work is needed to 
develop and test the findings. 
The methodology used to categorize businesses on the basis of their safety 
performance may be of use to others undertaking bench marking. Although 
essentially subjective through repeated use it may be standardized. The 
HELA system was used as one ranking method, it is not widely used outside 
the enforcement sector. Small businesses may be able to help themselves if 
they can identify their own progress in relation to others. The system could 
help in identifying successful practitioners of safety management so that good 
practice can be more readily located and disseminated. 
6.7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The HSC (1992) stated "Assessment of the quality of health and safety 
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management is a very important element in HSE's approach to inspection .... 
work is directed. at large companies and centralized systems, but there are 
important spin-offs for smaller firms .. ". An understanding of the status and 
success of such systems within organizations can be explored through 
bench marking exercises (Cox and Fuller, 1995). 
One area that would benefit from further refinement is the performance rating 
system. The testing built into this study has lent some confidence to the 
robustness of the methodology. However, the number of rating factors was 
necessarily limited, as was the sample size. Further expansion of this aspect 
of categorizing businesses according to their safety performance would lend 
greater credibility to the technique. The HELA system is based on factors 
such as 'confidence in management' which is hardly appropriate for a self-
assessment methodology. 
Once tested over a larger sample and a prolonged period the methodology 
may provide a means of distilling good and bad practices more easily by 
facilitating comparisons. Alternatively if the rating could be reapplied to the 
same businesses over an extended period it may prove a robust measure of 
progression (or lack of it) over time. 
To develop appropriate policies for addressing safety management, policy-
makers and legislators may need to be aware of the motivations, and barriers, 
to effecting change in safety management practices. The nature and form of 
the barriers should be conSistently measured and researched over time. 
The 'Big Brother' metaphor underlines the importance of regulation to safety 
management. Further research into the incidence of the 'Big BrotRer' type 
could reveal the frequency of occurrence of this type of undertaking. If 'Big 
Brother' types, who are motivated to act by threat of prosecution, are 
prevalent then legislators may need that information, for instance if 
consideration were being given to self-regulation or de-regulation of aspects 
of safety management. 
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One barrier identified in this study was the perceived cost of implementing 
some safety practices into smaller businesses. However, this study was 
conducted over a comparatively short period. The data gathering extended 
over just three years. During the data collection phase many businesses were 
only contacted once. Three years is a short time in economic terms. It may be 
that the barrier of cost was due to the general economic position of those 
businesses at the time, rather than the developmental phase effect 
postulated. Should the notion of the cost barrier be re-tested the economic 
effect could be refined, or discounted. 
Aggregate research is required to explicitly test the ignorance of basic (safety) 
management theory and good practice exhibited by managers in smaller 
businesses. 
Researchers should, in addition, explore factors associated with the provision 
of safety training within smaller businesses, and more specifically for small 
business managers. A specific area of this could be to trial an informal briefing 
regime for small business managers. Such briefings could be cascaded 
through intermediaries. Short lunch-time seminars might attract attendance 
from those who spend little time on their own research of available literature, 
as evidenced by those who attended the focus groups and the evaluation 
feedback they provided at the time. An evaluated trial would reveal the cost v. 
benefit of reaching small businesses directly in such a personalized way. This 
notion also follows the findings of other research (Milne and Thompson, 
1986). 
The links between level and types of safety training and safety management 
performance may also need to be explored within a qualitative as well as a 
quantitative multivariate statistical framework. There are many avenues yet to 
be explored. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
Questionnaires Used in Pilot Survey 
Postal Questionnaire 
SECTION 1 About the business ... 
NAME:~ __________________________________________ _ 
JOB TITLE: 
----------------------------------------------
1.1 How long have you held this position? 
------------------------
1.2 Please give brief information about your previous work experience of 
relevance to health and safety e.g. specific training 
1.3 What is the nature of the business? (Please tick appropriate box) 
D Agriculture or Horticulture D Chemicals or Chemical 
Products 
D Engineering D Food, Drink or Tobacco 
D Timber, Joinery, Furniture and D Printing & Publishing, Paper & Shop and Office Fittings Packaging materials 
D Rubber and Plastics D Construction 
D Wholesale Distribution D Hotels & Catering, Shops & 
D Business Services D 
Garages 
Transport & Communications 
D Miscellaneous manufacturing D Apparel Oewelry, toys, sports goods, 
photographic laboratories) 
D Miscellaneous services 
1.4 When was the organization established ? 
1.5 How many employees does the company have? 
I 
APPENDICES 
1.6 Which of the following levels of management does your company 
have? 
{Please tick appropriate box(es)} 
Cl Director Cl . Factory Manager 
Cl Process manager / team Cl leader Supervisors 
Cl Foreman Cl Operatives 
Other (Please specify) 
SECTION 2 Awareness of Health and Safety 
2.1 Who is responsible for giving advice on H&S matters in your company? 
(name & job title) 
---------------------------------------
2.2 How many hours a week are spent on this activity?:......-____________ __ 
2.3 Who else is involved? {Please tick appropriate box(es)} 
Cl Senior management 
Cl Safety Committee 
Cl External consultants 
2.4 What are the main hazards in your workplace? {Please tick appropriate 
box(es)} 
Chemical 
Mechanical 
Optical 
Sources of stress 
Vibration 
Dust 
Electrical 
I-----i Fire 
I-----i Noise 
Vehicles 
slips/trips/falls 
1----1 Other (specify) 
Manual Handling 
VDU (DSE) 
Falls from height 
Excessive hours 
Extreme temperature 
2.5 Please list a few of the hazards you have identified and briefly describe 
the controls you use 
II 
APPENDICES 
2.6 What Health and Safety legislation are you aware of that affects your 
business? 
(Please tick appropriate boxes) 
D Health & Safety at Work etc. D Factories Act Act 
D Offices, Shops and Railway D COSHH Premises Act* 
D Electricity at Work Regulations D Manual Handling Regulations 
D Management of Health & D Personal Protective Safety at Work Regulations Equipment Regulations 
D Display Screen Equipment D First Aid Regulations 
Regulations 
D Workplace (Health, Safety & D Provision & Use of Work Welfare) Regulations Equipment Regulations 
D Other (specify) 
* The questionnaire distribution preceded the final repeal of this Statute 
2.7 How many lost time accidents have you had in the past 5 years? D 
2.8 Who enforces Health & Safety at your premises? (Please tick 
appropriate box) 
D Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
D Local Authority 
D Don't know 
2.9 If you have ever been visited by your enforcement agency, what was 
the outcome? 
D friendly chat 
D advice 
D improvement notice 
D prohibition notice 
III 
APPENDICES 
2.10 What arrangements do you have in place for managing health and 
safety? 
{Please tick appropriate box(es)} 
D Written policy D Safety Audit system 
statement 
D Risk assessment: ~ in-house consultant 
package 
D 
proprietary 
D Training Health surveillance 
programmes 
D Accident! incident D Written safe working 
reporting procedures 
procedures 
D Permit to work D incentive schemes 
D Other (Please specify 
2.11 How do you update yourself on H&S issues? (Please tick appropriate 
box) 
D 
B 
Trade Associations 
Health and Safety Press 
HSE 
D Local Authority 
D Head Office 
D Other (Please specify _______________ _ 
2.12 How do you consider the H&S legislation impacts on your company? 
NB. This questionaire was compiled by , CHaRM; 
questions were included by Luise Vassie, Susan Lammin and Deborah Walker. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
Repertory Grid Analysis - Grids Produced 
Example of a grid, Grid 'JK', 
1 ; 5~ 
1 :---1-,------2:-----5: 
, : ' , , ; , I : 
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APPENDIX THREE 
Results of the first performance analysis 
Table showing scored performance indicators. Each indicator is scored from 0 
to 2 with 0 being worst performance and 2 best. 
Unique Accident Electrical Safety Safety Training Total performance 
reference recording rating (max. 6) 
0196 1 1 1 3 
0296 1 1 2 4 
0396 1 0 0 1 
0496 0 0 1 1 
0596 1 0 0 1 
0696 0 0 0 0 
1196 0 0 0 0 
1296 0 0 0 0 
0796 1 0 2 3 
0896 2 1 2 5 
0996 1 1 2 4 
01096 0 0 1 1 
01196 1 0 0 1 
01296 2 0 2 4 
01396 0 0 1 1 
01496 2 0 2 4 
01596 1 0 2 3 
r198 0 0 1 1 
1395 2 0 1 3 
1495 0 0 2 2 
1595 0 0 1 1 
01696 0 0 0 0 
1695 2 0 1 3 
r298 0 0 0 0 
r398 0 0 0 0 
r498 2 2 2 6 
1193 0 0 2 2 
1293 0 0 1 1 
1393 0 1 2 3 
1493 1 0 0 1 
1593 0 0 0 0 
1693 0 1 0 1 
1793 0 1 0 1 
1893 1 0 0 1 
- r199 0 0 0 0 
r299 1 1 0 2 
r399 0 0 1 1 
r499 2 2 2 6 
r599 2 1 1 4 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
Results of the hazard identification and acknowledgement analysis 
Unique 
reference 
0196 
Questionable 
I 
Borderline 
Safety 
Performance 
0296 
Poor 
Safety 
Performance 
0396 
Poor Safety 
Performance 
Hazard Hazard Risk 
Identification Acknowledgement assessment 
Overall 
Satisfactory. 
Reason: Good in 
areas of 
specialism i.e. 
industry specific 
where it is 
prompted 
identification. 
Poor in-house in 
unprompted 
identification or in 
areas where 
specialist 
knowledge 
lacking.; this lack 
recognized and 
consultant 
employed for 
hazard 
recognition. 
Overall: Good 
Reason: Staff 
with relevant 
qualifications and 
experience 
Overall Poor: 
Reason: Pre-trained staff 
employed for those tasks 
perceived as inherently 
hazardous i.e. hot bitumen 
processes. No ongoing 
monitoring by 
management, no refresher 
training, heavy reliance on 
individual responsibility. 
Unskilled work perceived 
as non- hazardous i.e. 
untrained abrasive wheel 
operators and mounters. 
No monitoring of air 
receivers inspections. No 
manual handling training. 
Overall: Variable 
Reason: aualified and 
experienced staff; 
emphasis on individual 
responsibility but 
Overall: Good for 
skilled specialist 
tasks; Poor for 
manuaVunskilled 
work. 
Reason: No 
monitoring of 
PPE. Hazard 
Identification and 
risk assessment 
delegated to 
consultant in toto. 
No training in 
response to 
assessment. 
Over all: Variable 
Reason: No 
regular inspection 
system and nor 
ongoing training. 
Remedy 
Choice 
Communication 
of risk 
Overall: Poor Overall: Poor 
Reason: choice Reason: Complete 
delegated to delegation leaves 
perceived expert assessment of risk 
either process and choice of remedy 
specialist in- to specialists. Lack of 
house or formal feedback, 
consultant. training and 
monitoring inhibits 
dissemination of 
information 
Overall: variable Overall: good 
Reason No Reason: some written 
regular training procedures account 
and inspection for risk assessment. 
systems in Also detailed briefings 
employed. All supported by some written Annual auditing by place. at change over of 
staff procedures. Health and retained Monitoring each shift. 
qualifications safety training consultant and frequency drops 
subject to implemented as part of enforcement when work 
independent induction. agency staff. pressures or 
examination and staff shortage 
testing. increase-
Prompted particularly on 
identification nightshift when 
particularly slick. staff less 
Consultant qualified. 
contracted to 
audit. 
Overall: poor Overall: under Overall: Overall: Poor 
Reason: Some areas of achieved due to inadequate due Reason: Realistic risk 
work inherently hazardous: lack of risk to lack of perception retained 
fire and explosion risk, risk perception. perceived risk solely by outside 
of contamination, risk to Delegated risk and infrequency expert. Conveyed to 
breathing etc. No control, assessment to of intervention owner annually by 
or monitoring systems in third party ie by consultant. written re port., not 
place, inadequate annual visit by No active in- shared with staff. No 
management inspections. H&S consultant. house training or briefing of 
No pro active testing or management staff implemented. 
maintenance procedures. evidenced. Few Risk based approach 
recommend- not compatible with 
actions ethos i.e. Do it quick 
implemented and do it cheap. 
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Unique Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Comm unication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
0496 Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: Overall: None Overall: Poor 
Reason: Passive Reasons: Owner/manager Completely Reason: Very Reason: Staff 
management. exhibited complete lack of absent. Reason: negative view of appreciate some of 
Lack of awareness and artisan Delegated to third H&S no training the risks in theory 
Poor Safety awareness of staff lack necessary party to produce beyond although do not 
Performance hazards, even experience to have document to induction not acknowledge them in 
well publicized independent awareness of demonstrate legal even for specific their actions or 
disasters that specifics. Although staff compliance but skills for specific behavior. No 
made national acknowledge [out of document never staff eg FL Ts. communication with 
media and were owners hearing] that if opened. Risk owner who is very 
sector specific there was a fire they work assessment is dictatorial in manner 
problems. Head "in a death trap". Some merely an annual and very anti-
in sand mentality. Fork Lift Truck (FL T) paper exercise. regulation. Personality 
Extent of drivers are aware from Image in case of problem at the top. 
expressed contact with peers that enforcement visit. 
ignorance not they should be trained. 
credible. 
0596 Overall: variable Overall: Good where Overall: good Overall: good Overall: good 
Reason: Much identified Reason: Once Reason: Reason: Very flat 
emphasis on Reason: Identified hazards hazards identified appropriate management structure 
individual acknowledged at all levels. risks realistically remedies and verbal systems all 
Poor Safety responsibility. Management by walking assessed. No applied. FLT communications direct 
Performance Staff adopt duties about: minor infringements evidence of inspection and and verbal and 
appropriate to or risky behaviour have "intentional records reinforced several 
the perceived immediate interventions; ignorance" nor of delegated to times a day. MBWA. 
skills. e.g. long haired operatives over reaction. third party Tight personal control 
Experienced staff using lathes required to However, real because lack of by manager. Informal 
only on stop work and tie hair ignorance found to skills internally style with emphasis on 
woodworking back. exist in some risk was an personal 
machinery Some hazards not areas. identified responsibilities. No 
because hazard identified or acknowledged problem. written policies or 
identified but no ego electrical safety and strategies. 
such restriction fire. Knowledge/experience 
on abrasive limitations. 
wheel. 
0696 Overall: Poor Overall: poor Overall: appalling Overall: Overall: poor 
(although good in Reason: Very limited. Reason: Not done appalling Reason: very 
theory) Consultanfs risk , willful ignorance. Reason: hierarchical family firm 
Reason: Hazard assessment not actioned. Both risk hazards and - patriarchal verging 
Poor Safety identification Visibly dangerous assessment and risks not on despotic. No 
Performance contained in practices observed. monitoring system acknowledged. upward 
consultanfs risk recommendations No remedies in communication due to 
assessment by consultant place. Very fear of reprisal: job 
document. Risk ignored. Visibly blinkered loss; shooting the 
assessment dangerous approach to messenger. 
reviewed practices seen daily tasks. 
annually by already identified Damaged 
external by consultant as a machinery 
consultant. problem. patched/cobbled 
Document not with twine rather 
studied by than a proper 
management. repair. 
Document seen 
as end in it self. 
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Unique Hazard. Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
1196 Overall: variable Overall: variable Overall: variable Overall: variable Overall: poor 
Reason: Strong Reason: Management do Reason: No Reason: Reason: Very 
Poor Safety 
reliance on not participate. Hazards systematic depends entirely hierarchical father/son 
personal acknowledged by trained approach. Risk on an individual firm. Very dictatorial 
Performance responsibility. staff and under their assessment not assessment. father figure, not true 
Fully trained staff influence by unskilled staff formalized. Remedies partnership between 
employed for they supervise. No hazard Personal risks applied where owners. VerylHtie 
skilled tasks. acknowledgement by assessed based they are within upward flow of 
Untrained staff management, so no overall on experience and the sphere of information; coupled 
for general co-ordination, uniformity or previous control of staff with complete 
labour. Hazard control. employment perceiving risk. ignorance of owner 
identification training. No input Remedies about "working end". 
rests with trained by senior requiring Total reliance on 
staff and management! investment or skilled staff but this 
restricted to their owners. management reliance not 
task areas. No control or co- acknowledged. 
overall hazard ordination not Virtually no 
identification e.g. implemented. meaningful 
fire or electrical communications 
safety. except on cost limits. 
Communications all 
downwards. Very real 
sense of a danger of 
sacking for seeming to 
"challenge" the 
"boss's' assumptions. 
296 Overall: poor Overall: appalling Overall: lacking Overall: Overall: poor 
Reason: Reason: No Reason: Not appalling Reason: Very 
Unskilled staff acknowledgement of done, no hazards Reason: None despotic senior owner 
Poor Safety only employed - hazards. Steps and floor acknowledged, implemented. who ostensibly 
Performance premises shared covering poorly maintained very dingy dirty Large structural delegates all 
with another even in face of large and crumbling defects responsibility to son, 
business blurred number slips, trips and place of work. observed e.g. son completely 
responsibilities falls among staff. Manager Manager supporting powerless. No direct 
for control, of completely lacks training or completely out of beam crumbling intervention in 
premise. No experience to manage his depth no with no business by father but 
active hazard business or staff. Very attempt to supporting lintel. on personal level 
identification young in years and lacks manage business undermines son. Son 
maturity. resists ineffectual. Staff 
intervention. unskilled and have no 
employment contracts. 
Very oppressive place 
of work. 
0796 Overall :good Overall: good Overall: good Overall: variable Overall: good 
Reason: Reason: Hazard Reason: risk Reason: some Reason: Verbal 
Accident book acknowledgement good. assessment is an remedies not briefings three times a 
Questionable kept and studied Evidence of active active process implemented. day on shift change. 
IBorderline and some control identification of hazards with active data Business failing Briefing format 
Safety systems in place and intelligent assessment gathering and so cost of includes exchange of 
Performance to feed into during briefings assimilation remedy is a information on recent 
hazard significant changes in hazard or 
identification. consideration, risk perception. 
Skilled staff investment very 
employed and on limited. 
the job training in 
hazard 
awareness 
provide. 
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Unique 
reference 
0896 
Adequate 
Safety 
Performance 
0996 
Adequate 
Safety 
Performance 
Hazard Hazard 
Identification Acknowledgement 
Overall: good I Overall: good generally, 
variable blinkered when 
Reason: considering behaviour and 
Structural risk 
hazards were Reason: no 
being acknowledgement of 
successfully hazard posed by people's 
identified as were behaviour e.g. threat of 
other physical violence although business 
hazards. is people orientated and 
Hazards due to some residents have 
unsafe acts violent history. Staff at 
omitted so that sharp end perceive risk but 
there is no no acknowledgement by 
acknowledgemen management 
t of the need for 
safe working 
practices. 
Overall: variable Overall Variable 
Reason: Reason: shift managers 
Repeated slips have sound awareness but 
trips and falls staff show little, no 
and kitchen management response to 
burns not pool dangers but fire 
actioned .. No evacuation system is 
safe system for tested and works. 
swim pool - users 
often alone 
isolated by sight 
and sound. 
Employ 
consultants for 
food safety not 
H&S. 
01096 Overall: Overall: variable/poor 
Reason: Staff employed 
deliberately with 
appropriate skills. No 
training for some tasks e.g. 
abrasive wheels. 
Management team think 
they are aware, open to 
prompted action. but 
awareness limited to very 
narrow experience. 
variable/poor 
Reason lacking 
Poor Safety in some areas 
Performance focus on fire risk 
and dust control. 
No noise 
assessments no 
electrical testing 
etc. No accident 
recording or 
appraisal. No 
systematic 
means of hazard 
identification. 
x 
Risk 
assessment 
Overall: good 
Reason: safety 
training needs 
regularly 
assessed and 
consultant does 
risk assessment 
on ad hoc basis. 
Task based risk 
assessment on 
going 
Remedy 
Choice 
Overall: Variable 
Reason: 
Behaviour 
based approach 
to staff, most 
risks addressed 
through training. 
Some structural 
remedial work 
remains undone 
due to lack 
investment.. 
Staff and 
structure seen 
as main risks 
NOT clients. 
Overall: satis Overall: satis. 
Reason: accident Reason: Slips 
statistics kept and trips and falls 
analyzed and and kitchen 
interpreted. burns required 
Regular slips trips structural 
and falls and alterations of 
kitchen burns internal layout. 
forwarded for Remedy 
remedy. identified, not 
implemented 
- delayed 
funding 
Overall: poor 
Reason: Abrasive 
wheels not 
deemed 
hazardous, no 
safety strategy 
Many real hazards 
not addressed in 
anyway. 
Overall: good 
Reason: once 
identified 
remedies 
sought. LEV 
used to control 
dust, qualified 
FLT drivers 
employed. 
Communication 
of risk 
Overall: good but with 
problems 
Reason: Most risk 
communicated via 
formal training 
courses. Very active 
training needs 
assessment and 
review system in 
place Hierarchical 
management system 
with very limited flow 
of upward information. 
Evidence of varying 
perception of hazard 
and risk between 
management and 
staff. 
Management perceive 
most risks due to staff 
behaviour staff 
perceive client 
behaviour and poorly 
adapted work areas 
as potential hazards. 
Overall: poor 
Reason: Shift 
managers have sound 
awareness but not 
staff. 45% of staff part 
time casuals, unskilled 
and untrained. 
Training records for all 
staff poor. Information 
flow down not 
effective beyond 
immediate tasking. 
Overall: good 
Reason: what 
managers know the 
workforce know. 
Management by 
walking about, very 
tight team with regular 
verbal exchanges. 
APPENDICES 
Unique Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
01196 Overall: abysmal Overall: No hazards Overall: non Overall: lacking Overall: poor 
Reason: No acknowledged existent Reason: no Reason: unskilled staff 
interest, No Reason: Dangerous Reason: remedial work only employed, owner 
Poor Safety records of any machinery used with completely undertaken. very dictatorial. 
Performance sort, except inadequate guarding and lacking. Very Machinery not Working environment 
consultant's interlocks. No fire hierarchical maintained work dirty and unpleasant. 
report that is precautions or procedures environment close area filthy and Workforce do not offer 
under mound of despite serious fire history immediate control noisy. Even advice to "boss". 
grime .. No in industry. No noise by owner. Only toilets dirty. Owner practices seat 
considered precautions although work unskilled staff of the pants 
management as feels deafening even employed management, lacks 
a separate without formal ConSUltants formal education and 
process, assessment. Consultants employed but resists written word in 
owner/manager recommendations report shelved and either reading or 
hands on and discounted as not being ignored. writing. Owner very 
immersed in day relevant to particular defensive with strong 
to day industry. sense of inferiOrity 
operations. resists advice or 
guidance in any form. 
01296 Overall: variable Overall: good Overall: good Overall: good Overall :good 
Evidence some Seriousness reflected in piecemeal, noise Successful in Written traceable 
hazards not permit to work systems monitoring/control many areas. systems, permits to 
Adequate identified e.g. and controls absent but regular Good control work, written operating 
Safety electrical fire liaison. systems and procedures. Thorough 
Performance installation, training training + records kept 
machinery poorly and reviewed. 
guarded. 
Consultant relied 
on. 
01396 Overall: 
Overall poor Overall: variable Overall: Poor Machines Overall: variable inadequately 
Poor Safety Noise and Chemical hazards Noise not guarded, some Gap between strategic 
Performance electrical system accepted and addressed assessed at all, things not and operational levels. 
omitted conversations addressed e.g. Close supervision of impossible in work falls from height. operatives. 
areas 
01496 Overall: good Overall: overall: good Overall: variable Overall: overall: good 
Adequate Regular hazards understood; delegated to adequate Management by 
Safety workplace accidents reviewed and consultant and Training good, walking around 
Performance inspections & training tailored enforcement main risks (MBWA;) safety 
checks officers. No reviewed notices conspicuous, 
COSHH shift briefings 
01596 Overall: good Overall: Variable Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: good 
Questionable Regular Chemical and electrical Delegated to Inappropriate MBWA; briefings for 
Safety workplace hazards underestimated consultant no manual handling supervisors on each 
Performance checks COSHH or condoned shift, review of electrical systems incidents 
test 
r198 Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: variable Overall: poor 
Explosives risk Explosion risk No systematic Strict blasting No H&S policy, 
identified but no acknowledged other assessment, no controls but message conveyed 
Poor Safety accident book or hazards discounted in accident! near- otherwise site that the priority is to 
Performance traffic controls comparison, very blinkered miss monitoring very lax keep costs down, no 
approach traffic flow systems, 
owner-drivers 
employed allowed on 
site first time without 
briefing 
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Unique Hazard. Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
1395 Overall: varies Overall: variable 
Overall: poor Overall: variable Overall variable hazards not most procedures 
Questionable Lack of general little management Majority staff 
identified, informal, unwritten; 
Safety awareness, intervention, staff work in women task 
acknowledged control systems 
management teams old hands convey warehousing and or actively flawed as reporting Performance 
naivete apparent their wisdom at operational packing but no assessed so few mechanism in place 
level manual handling remedies but no action triggered 
assessments, lots initiated; 2 in response. Operative 
of personal reportable - management 
assessments on accidents communications very 
task by task basis (RIDDOR) not formal but verbal, very 
reported by hierarchical. 
management; Demarcation and 
operative initiate status actively 
own remedies preserved, Effective 
on ad hoc basis communication barrier 
- most areas low throughout 
risk organization. 
1495 Overall: good Overall: variable Overall: good Overall: poor OVerall: poor 
Poor Safety Emphasis on machines guarded but Emphasis on No enough No control systems, 
Performance environmental under pressure of work operator error. guarding. PPE informal hierarchy 
factors and guards removed- Assessment shifts provided but allows information flow 
operator error guillotines with pressure of use not but no active 
work! compulsory. managerial 
intervention e.g. spray 
booth staff don't use 
PPE management 
turn a blind eye 
1595 OVerall: poor Overall: poor OVerall: poor 
Poor Safety Overall good hazards theoretically Assessments No fork lift truck Overall: poor 
Performance relies on owners acknowledged but when absent (FL T) training, No formalized control 
lengthy pressure on ignored in adaptability antiquated systems very much 
experience in favour of 'getting the job considered so working owner controlled, done' important risk methods trade deemed to capricious priority 
fluctuate setting 
proportional with 
pressure of work. 
01695 Overall: poor OVerall: poor 
Overall: good No active remedies Overall: poor Overall: poor . absent, 
Poor Safety Owner-manager Hazards not acknowledged a~sesslme~t of nsk unguarded No management 
Performance clearly aware of workers carry on ~ any eve ~ presses with no intervention, very hazards regardless in:~~~::ers low master shut passive laissez-faire 
educational level down/panic management style .. Unskilled uninterested 
and absence of button etc. 
staff doing routine 
skills preclude Working 
independent practices by tasks by rote. 
assessments habit and 
custom 
1695 
OVerall: Variable Overall: good Overall: variable 
Questionable Overall: variable Overall: good COSHH remedies house H&S leaflet for 
Safety DSE eye tests Once identified assessments appropriate and all staff, but induction 
Performance arranged on management keen to take active and implementation by leaflet; COSHH ongoing, DSE & rapid on advice by leaflet; 
request no action to assess risk electrical demand communications 
systematic assessments distanced and in 
assessment of 
absent writing opportunity for 
need feedback limited. 
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Unique Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
r298 Overall: poor 
Overall: poor Overall: very poor Overall: poor Any remedy Overall: poor 
Poor Safety Active Hazards not acknowledged False assessment 
seen as cost, Owner dictatorial and 
Performance identification owner despotic, anti- H&S, all hazards 
any expense 
scary. Workers 
could threaten 
absent, very business making a loss discounted 
viability of unskilled, feedback blinkered H&S seen as expense. business at time from employees 
approach. 
of inspection unlikely. 
and interview. 
r398 Overall: varies 
Remedies often 
Poor Safety 
speedy 
Overall: good Overall: non-existent Overall: poor generally Overall: good 
Performance Hazards fully Hazards identified No assessments instinctive not husband and wife 
described by theoretically but no done always team plus two friends, 
owner- high perceived threat from any systematically; all appropriate e.g. communications 
level of area identified risks automatically load bearing informal and open but 
awareness discounted or bookcase in not comprehensive. 
"minimized" danger of H&S as topic never 
toppling discussed. 
permanently 
propped by 
book from stock 
(of suitable 
thickness). 
r498 Overall: good 
Overall Very Overall: good Overall: good remedies Overall: good 
suitable and 
Adequate good Quality systems and fumes, manual timely formal hierarchy; 
Safety Formalized control systems contain handling and implementation induction training + 
Performance control systems detail documented COSHHall on-going H&S training. involve visual procedures and permit to realistically success Direct supervision with 
checked by 
checks work systems common addressed 
systematic documented checks. 
review. 
1193 Overall: poor 
Overall: very Overall: Very poor Overall: Very poor Often Overall: variable inappropriate, 
Poor Safety poor family clique, emphasis on No pro-active broken among management 
Performance No effort in cost minimization, regular assessments, equipment & good among identification equipment failures. repairs or operatives, poor links 
already maintenance; taped or tied not between. Formal fixed, prosecuted, H&S regular 
overheating hierarchy no 
notices served breakdowns triggers by pass delegation of authority 
regularly 
of fuse to all instructions verbal 
prevent tripping non-English, some internal translation NOT thermostat 
required between 
repair. Urdu and Gujerati as 
maintenance man 
non-Urdu speaker. 
L293 Overall: good Overall: poor Overall: variable 
Overall: variable Good level of awareness No active Overall: poor supervision and visual 
among manager and staff. assessments sat inspection of work in 
Poor Safety Generic One outsider in team has any level operator Not always progress. English not 
Performance identification long industry experience training minimum appropriate spoken. No training from plagiarized to operate botched repairs after initial basic H&S doc 
machine evident instruction. 
L393 Overall: good Overall: poor Overall: good Overall: good 
Questionable safety officer Overall: poor risk assessments Written formal Written procedures, 
Safety employed but no hazards discounted at too unrealistic or work training programme, 
Performance safety policy and early a stage omitted ego no procedures, FL T info. posters, written 
no accident book COSHH driver training messages between 
review assessment etc. day and night shift. 
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Unique Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy Communication 
reference Identification Acknowledgement assessment Choice of risk 
1493 Overall: poor Overall: Variable Overall: Lacking Overall: poor Overall: variable 
Lifting table faults Acknowledged by Accident book plant not employees semi-
Poor Safety 
ignored. No workforce not conveyed to kept but not checked, faults skilled, same jargon, 
routine manager; hazards reviewed. No from insurance no records kept, 
Performance maintenance discounted realistic inspections not lad dish culture, risk 
checks for air assessments remedied "part of the job" 
receivers or 
power tools. 
1593 Overall: poor Overall: variable Overall: variable Overall: good Overall: poor 
Poor safety No awareness of Water and electrical Plugs and water Reflexive New business, 
Performance H&S in general equipment distanced but kep apart but no responses to squatting in vacant 
or detergent no other evidence. No PPE ideas why, so problems OK so unit working in same 
effects on skin intuitive it didn't far space but no group 
etc. seem to register co-hesion or 
communication. 
1693 Overall: good Overall: variable Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor 
Poor Safety FLThazards FLT driver training but No accident book, No remedy to Max use sub-
Performance discussed, danger of toppling carpets no policy or shaky racking + contractors but 
electricity discounted assessments storage on communication solely 
awareness good fragile by work sheet for each 
mezzanine floor; job - quantities and 
imminent risk time-reconciliation 
collapse with sales docket no 
other feedback. 
1793 Overall: poor overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: good Overall: good 
Poor Safety regular hazards not acknowledged none done delegated to M8WA but any 
Performance enforcement undertaking seen as staff entirely, member of staff 
visits who identify inherently safe only empowered to take 
hazards, experienced urgent decisions. 
judgements not staff employed 
accepted 
1893 Overall: poor Overall: variable once Overall; poor Overall: poor Overall: variable 
Poor Safety general hazards brought to owners No safe systems delegated to No delegation of 
Performance ignorance; attention he needs of work for staff entirely. power but total 
batteries persuading or convincing dangerous tasks Staff skilled but delegation of 
exploded during that hazard is real e.g. battery cut corners, responsibility. No 
charge more handling and emphasis on training, only time 
than once charging, tyre doing it cheap served staff employed 
inflation etc. e.g. 2nd hand 
coaches bought 
almost scrap: 
r199 Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: variable 
Poor Safety Electrical system Anything with cost ignored. None done; frayed electric Poor landlord to 
Performance visibly Confusion over brewery v. obvious serious cables taped tenant communication. 
dangerous: taped tenant responsibilities faults and hazards dangerously Staff tasked directly by 
jOints, compounds blinkering ignored botched repairs pre-shift briefing. 
overloading, effect common 
spaghetti wiring 
etc 
r299 overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor Overall: poor 
Poor Safety no identification No interest in H&S, cost None done by Dangerous Hierarchical no 
Performance effort. Photocopy cutting paramount e.g. management, staff practices delegation owner very 
of another burning plastic illegally and very insecure common anti-authority. 
company's policy risking fine rather than prepared to play throughout the 
core details not paying for disposal down risks day 
tailored 
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Unique 
reference 
r399 
Poor Safety 
Performance 
r499 
Adequate 
Safety 
Performance 
APPENDICES 
Hazard Hazard Risk Remedy 
Choice Identification Acknowledgement assessment 
Overall: poor 
Cavalier 
approach 
underage staff, 
loose asbestos in 
storeroom, 
working hours 
excessive etc. 
Overall: very 
good 
Fully 
documented lab. 
safety systems. 
owner long 
industry 
experience in 
large companies 
Overall: variable 
Generally reluctant to 
acknowledge if forced is 
prepared to take 
necessary action e.g. 
asbestos stripping. 
Overall: good 
Hazards acknowledged 
and reinforced through 
regular training and written 
procedure notes 
xv 
Overall: absent Overall: poor 
No realistic Remedies rarely 
assessments, very undertaken 
exploitative ethos unless forced by 
Overall: variable 
Assessments 
done control by 
documented 
procedures in lab 
but stock areas 
more relaxed. 
enforcement or 
civil litigation 
Ove~all: good 
remote handling 
of most 
hazardous 
substances. All 
centre on 
owners control 
Communication 
of risk 
Overall: poor 
Deliberately difficult 
;owners are directors 
but ownership covered 
in layers of other 
companies, staff have 
no contracts, staff 
regularly complain to 
enforcement agencies 
because of lack 
management 
response. Very 
oppressive and 
exploitative 
Overall: good 
Most instructions 
written to ensure 
consistency and strict 
quality controls. Power 
. centre on owner but 
evidence of effective 
delegation. 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX FIVE 
Coding for Analysis of Questionnaires Used in Pilot Survey 
A Identifier code 001, 002, etc. 
B.1 How long have you held this position? 
1.1 [0 - 5] years 
1.2 [6 - 10] years 
1.3 [11 - 15] years 
1.4 [16 and above] years 
C.2 Previous work experience of relevance to health and safety e.g. 
specific training 
2.1 No training 
2.2 Some training 
2.3 Lots of training 
D.3 The nature of the business 
1 Agriculture or Horticulture 9 Chemicals or Chemical 
Products 
2 Engineering 10 Food, Drink or Tobacco 
3 Timber, Joinery, Furniture and 11 Printing & Publishing, Paper & 
Shop and Office Fittings Packaging materials 
4 Rubber and Plastics 12 Construction 
5 Wholesale Distribution 13 Hotels & Catering, Shops & 
Garages 
6 Business Services 14 Transport & Communications 
7 Miscellaneous manufacturing 15 Apparel + textile manufacture 
uewelry, toys, sports goods, 
photographic laboratories) 
8 Miscellaneous services 16 Other 
E.4 Date the organization was established 
4.1 before 1945 
4.2 1946 - 1970 
4.3 1971 - 1985 
4.4 1986 - 1990 
4.5 1991 onwards 
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F.5 Number of employees 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
[0 - 25] full time equivalents (FTE) 
[26 - 50] FTE 
[51 - 100] FTE 
[101 - 250] FTE 
[251 and over] FTE 
1.6 levels of management - multiple answer 
G1 Director J4 Factory Manager 
H2 Process manager I team 
leader K5 Supervisors 
13 Foreman L6 Operatives 
M7 Other 
SECTION 2 Awareness of Health and Safety 
N.7 Person responsible for giving advice on H&S 
7.1 A manager 
7.2 No-one in particular [or all managers] 
7.3 H&S Specialist 
7.4 No-one 
0.8 Number of hours a week spent on H&S 
8.1 [1 - 2] hours 
8.2 [3 - 5] hours 
8.3 [6 - 10] hours 
8.4 [11 and over] 
8.5 unsure 
8.6 nil 
9 Others involved - multiple answer 
P 9.1 Senior management 
Q 9.2 Safety Committee 
R 9.3 External consultants 
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10 Main hazards - multiple answer frequency count 
S 10.1 Chemical Y 10.7 Electrical AD10.12 Manual Handling 
T 10.2 Mechanical Z 10.8 Fire AE10.13 VDU (DSE) 
U 10.3 Optical AA10.9 Noise AF10.14 Falls from height 
V 10.4 Sources of stress AB10.10 Vehicles AG10.15 Excessive hours 
W 10.5 Vibration AC10.11 slips/trips/falls AH10.16 Extreme 
temperature 
X 10.6 Dust A110.17 Other (specify) 
9 = No response to question 
11 Identified hazards and the controls - multiple answer 
AJ 11.1 
AK11.2 
AL 11.3 
Hardware controls 
Systems of work 
Training / Behaviour / Attitude 
12. Health and Safety legislation awareness - multiple answer 
AM 12.1 Health & Safety at Work etc. AT 12.8 Factories Act 
Act 
AN 12.2 Offices, Shops and Railway AU 12.9 COSHH 
Premises Act* 
AO 12.3 Electricity at Work Regulations AV 12.10 Manual Handling Regulations 
AP12.4 Management of Health & AW12.11 Personal Protective 
Safety at Work Regulations Equipment Regulations 
AQ 12.5 Display Screen Equipment AX12.12 First Aid Regulations 
Regulations 
AR 12.6 Workplace (Health, Safety & AS 12.7 Provision & Use of Work 
Welfare) Regulations Equipment Regulations 
AY12.13 Other 
* The questionnaire distribution preceded the final repeal of this Statute 
2.7 How many loss time accidents have you had in the past 5 years? D 
Not coded 
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2.8 Who enforces Health & Safety at your premises? 
Not coded 
2.9 . If you have ever been visited by your enforcement agency, what was 
the outcome? 
Not coded 
13 Arrangements for managing health and safety - multiple answer 
frequency count 
AZ13.1 Written policy 
statement 
13.2 Risk assessment: 
BH 13.7 Training 
programmes 
BD 13.3 Accident! incident 
reporting 
procedures 
BJ 13.9 Permit to work 
BK 13.10 Other 
BA13.2.1 in-house 
BB13.2.2 consultant 
BC13.2.3 package 
proprietary 
14 Update sources for H&S issues 
BL 14.1 Trade Associations BO 14.4 
BM 14.2 Health and Safety Press BP 14.5 
BN1~3 HSE BQ1~6 
BG 13.6 Safety Audit system 
B113.8 Health surveillance 
BE 13.4 Written safe working 
procedures 
BF 13.5 incentive schemes 
Local Authority 
Head Office 
Other 
15 How do you consider the H&S legislation impacts on your company? 
Multiple answer free text 
Not coded 
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APPENDIX SIX 
Testing the incidence of adequate safety documentation within 
survey responses. A comparison between small businesses (10 to 
25 employees) and very small businesses «10 employees) 
Testing the null hypothesis that the probabilities of a business (10 -25 
employees) having adequate, statutory, health and safety documentation 
is the same as for small businesses «10 employees) 
TableA6.1 Businesses with Small businesses Total 
between 10 to 25 < 10 employees 
employees 
Adequate 
documentation 25 16 41 
reported 
Inadequate 
documentation 6 11 17 
reported 
n 31 27 58 
Table A6.1 shows the frequency of responses indicating adequate or 
inadequate safety documentation within two groups of businesses sorted 
by size. 
TableA6.2 Businesses with Small businesses Total 
between 10 to 25 < 10 employees 
employees 
Adequate 
documentation 22 
reported 
19 41 
Inadequate 
documentation 9 8 17 
reported 
n 31 27 58 
Table A6.2 shows the expected frequency of the incidence of adequate 
and inadequate documentation based on the null hypothesis that both 
groups have the same probabilities of having the documentation. 
The calculation: 
Where 0 = the original frequency 
And ~ = the estimated frequency 
x?- = L ([O-E] - 0.5)2/E = 3.07 
x?- must be >6.63 to be significant at the 0.01 level, or> 3.84 at 0.05 level 
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The test shows '2 is not significant in this data comparison. The null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no empirical evidence to suggest that 
these two sub-groups vary by one group experiencing any greater difficulty in 
meeting the demands of producing safety documentation. These findings are 
reported in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.4. 
Given the aversion to bureaucracy that has emerged in other studies of small 
business it may be the production of documentation that is the barrier. It was 
therefore decided to analyze reported data for the incidence of carrying out 
risk assessments, to compare the same two sub-groups. 
Testing the null hypothesis that the probabilities of a business (10 - 25 
employees) having undertaken risk assessments is the same as for small 
businesses «10 employees) 
TableA6.3 Businesses with Small businesses < Total 
between 25 to 250 25 employees 
employees 
Adequate risk 
assessments 16 13 29 
reported ". 
Inadequate, or no, 
Risk assessments 15 14 29 
reported 
n 31 27 58 
Table A6.3 shows the frequency of responses indicating the incidence of risk 
assessments within two groups of businesses sorted by size. 
By comparing the results within the table it is evident it is not necessary to 
complete the analysis. Both groups clearly exhibit a similar propensity towards 
undertaking risk assessments. 
These two data comparisons were between the sub-group of very small 
businesses «10 employees) within the sample and the small businesses (10 
- 25 employees). From this data comparison these groups are not exhibiting 
discernable differences in safety management outcomes. It was therefore 
decided to test if the 25-employee threshold was a realistic descriptor. 
The 25-employee threshold for 'small' was tested by analyzing the survey 
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data and testing whether a business with between 25 and 50 employees is 
just as likely to have adequate safety documentation as a small business with 
between 10 and 25 employees. 
Testing the null hypothesis that the probabilities of a business (10-25 
employees) having adequate, statutory, health and safety documentation 
is the same as for small businesses «10 employees) 
TableA6.4 Businesses with Small businesses Total 
between 25 - 50 10 - 25 employees 
employees 
Adequate 
documentation 17 25 42 
reported 
Inadequate 
documentation 0 6 6 
reported 
n 17 31 48 
Table A6.4 shows the frequency of responses indicating adequate or 
inadequate safety documentation within two groups of businesses sorted 
by size. 
TableA6.5 Businesses with Small businesses Total 
between 25 -50 10 - 25 employees 
eml'loyees 
Adequate 
documentation 14.875 27.125 42 
reported 
Inadequate 
documentation 2.125 3.875 6 
reported 
n 17 31 48 
Table A6.5 shows the expected frequency of the incidence of adequate 
and inadequate documentation based on the null hypothesis that both 
groups have the same probabilities of having the documentation. 
The calculation: 
Where 
And 
o = the original frequency 
E = the estimated frequency 
x?- = L ([O-E] - 0.5)2/E = 4.36 
x?- must be >6.63 to be significant at the 0.01 level, or> 3.84 at 0.05 level 
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The test indicates XL is not significant at the 0.01 level. However, it is 
significant at the 0.05 level. Thus businesses within the survey sample with 
more than 25 employees appear more likely to have adequate safety 
documentation than the smaller businesses. This result does seem to lend 
some weight to the notion that SME's cannot necessarily be grouped together 
and treated as similar entities. The empirical results suggest difference in 
safety management performance within the sample. The differences seem to 
remain when groups of businesses are considered, according to their size. 
The thresholds for these groups are smaller than the traditional SME 
classification threshold of 50 employees. Realistic groupings, from the 
preliminary stages of analysis of the pilot survey, seem to be 25 - 50 
employees; 10 - 25 employees. 
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